During the early and mid 1950s, the
U.S. grew increasingly apprehensive concerning the Soviet Union's
development of advanced weapons including aircraft, air defense radar
& missile systems, and atomic bombs. The Berlin Airlift and Korean
War increased the level of mistrust on both sides; however, the closed
Soviet society made gathering intelligence about the development of
new weapons very difficult and greatly concerned the US and its
allies.
In an effort to obtain information about weapons development and
deployment, the USAF conducted regular routine reconnaissance missions
near the Soviet land borders or just outside the 12-mile limit
defining international waters. In most cases, the planes were
forbidden to fly into Soviet airspace, but in a few cases the need for
information outweighed the risk of overflight and a plane was sent
into the Soviet Union.
One such flight occurred on 8 May 1954. The US Air Force had strong
suspicions that the Soviets were getting ready to deploy a follow-on
to the MiG-15 and needed to find out for sure. Additionally, the
USAF's Strategic Air Command needed to know how many Soviet long-range
bombers were stationed at the northern bases on and near the Kola
Peninsula. As a result, a flight of three RB-47E reconnaissance planes
took off from RAF Fairford in England. Two of the Stratojets flew as
airborne spares and turned back before the overflight began; however,
one plane penetrated Soviet airspace near Murmansk. The plane flew
over numerous Soviet airfields and naval facilities conducting
photographic reconnaissance and making radarscope images of the
various facilities. The RB-47E continued to Arkhangelsk before turning
west and heading back to England.
The USAF plane was intercepted by MiG fighters after being over Soviet
territory for about 50 miles. Initially, MiG-15s were spotted, but a
short time later a flight of MiG-17s appeared. The operational
deployment of the MiG-17 was a significant surprise to the three men
in the RB-47 and they knew they were in trouble since the new fighter
was capable of reaching the RB-47 and attacking.
When the MiG-17s climbed to approximately the same altitude as the
reconnaissance plane (38,000 feet) they opened fire. The Soviet
fighters each made single shooting passes at the USAF plane. The RB-47
was equipped with a tail gun controlled by the copilot and returned
fire but did not hit any Soviet plane. One MiG was able to hit the
Stratojet with several rounds and caused moderate damage to the wing
and fuselage.
Before the MiGs were able to shoot down the USAF plane, it crossed the
border into Finland and the MiGs broke off the attack. However, during
the attack the RB-47's fuel tanks were hit and the plane nearly ran
out of fuel before it was met by a 91st Air Refueling Squadron Boeing
KC-97 tanker for in-flight refueling. The RB-47E landed safely in
England a short time later.
When the reconnaissance data from the RB-47 was analyzed, it was
determined that the Soviets did not have any long-range bombers
stationed at its northern bases. The confirmation of the operational
deployment of the MiG-17 was another significant outcome of the
flight. The great need for reliable information on Soviet weapons
development and deployment combined with the great risk of overflights
of Soviet territory prompted President Eisenhower to propose the "Open
Skies" treaty in mid-1955. President Eisenhower was concerned the
overflights by military aircraft would be considered an act of war by
the USSR and only approved a few flights. In 1956, after the Soviets
rejected the "Open Skies" treaty proposal, the US Central Intelligence
Agency created a secret reconnaissance program using the Lockheed U-2.
The CIA conducted overflights of the Soviet Union into the early
1960's when the U-2 flown by Francis Gary Powers was shot down in May
1960.
Because the RB-47E was over Soviet territory, it was a spy flight and
a legitimate military target. If the Soviets had shot the plane down,
it would have created an international incident to the detriment of
the United States. This was the situation when the CIA U-2 was shot
down over Sverdlovsk on 1 May 1960.
Photo/Information
courtesy of the US Air Force Museum