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Air Power and Armies

Online Description

An account of Sir John Cotesworth Slessor (1897–1979), one of Great Britain’s most influential airmen Sir John Slessor played a significant role in building the World War II Anglo-American air power partnership as an air planner on the Royal Air Force Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He coordinated allied strategy in 1940–41, helped create an Anglo-American bomber alliance in 1942, and drafted the compromise at the Casablanca Conference that broke a deadlock in Anglo-American strategic debate. Slessor was instrumental in defeating the U-boat menace as RAF Coastal Commander, and later shared responsibility for directing Allied air operations in the Mediterranean. Few aspects of the allied air effort escaped his influence: pilot training, aircraft procurement, and dissemination of operational intelligence and information all depended to a degree on Slessor. His influence on Anglo-American operational planning paved the way for a level of cooperation and combined action never before undertaken by the military forces of two great nations.

🔫 Author Background

Wing Commander J. C. Slessor, the author of “Air Power and Armies,” based his book on a series of lectures delivered at the Staff College at Camberley between 1931 and 1934. His primary motivation was to draw useful lessons for the future by analyzing the recorded experience of the last war, specifically the Royal Air Force’s actions in overseas campaigns. Slessor aimed to help future commanders and staff officers understand how the “new power of the air is likely to affect the problems of land warfare” and to be “wise before the event”. He wrote the book “in no spirit of destructive criticism,” instead seeking to identify what “might have been done better” given that early air forces were “amateurs at a new art”. His goal was to provide a reasoned examination of potential air action in cooperation with an army, using past examples as models for the future and suggesting improvements based on contemporary knowledge. The book also serves as a poignant dedication to Lieutenant Anthony Bristow Slessor of the 52nd Light Infantry.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

• Concentration as Fundamental Principle: The author posits that the fundamental principle of air strategy is concentration, requiring the deployment of the maximum force, moral, physical, and material, at the decisive time and place. This is enabled by air power’s inherent mobility and tactical flexibility, allowing forces to switch objectives rapidly and apply strength where it is most needed.

• Primary Task of Air Striking Force: The primary task of the air striking force in a land battle is to isolate the battlefield from enemy reinforcement and supply, disrupting their communications and logistical systems, such as railways and roads, far behind the front lines. This goes beyond mere reconnaissance or direct battlefield support.

• Air Superiority as Means, Not End: Air superiority is not the ultimate objective but a crucial means to an end. It is best achieved through a resolute offensive bombing campaign against the enemy’s vital centers, which compels them to divert their air forces to a defensive, often ineffectual, role, reducing interference with friendly operations.

• Obsolescence of Traditional Armies: The book argues that traditional national armies, reliant on “man-power and shell-power,” are becoming obsolete due to the immense vulnerability of their extended lines of communication and supply to modern air action. A single line of supply within hostile bombing range, for instance, would be a fatal disability.

• Complementary Land and Air Operations: The author stresses that land and air operations must be complementary and mutually interdependent, requiring deliberate and coordinated planning to maximize each service’s potential. Air action should be designed to create opportunities for ground forces, for example, by hindering enemy reserves, thus helping to convert an initial “break-in” into a decisive “break-through.”

• Learning from Past Experience: Slessor emphasizes that the recorded experience of past air operations, particularly from the last war, provides invaluable lessons for future commanders and staff officers. He seeks to draw useful conclusions on how “the new power of the air is likely to affect the problems of land warfare” to ensure commanders can “be wise before the event.”

• Constructive Analysis: The book is not intended as destructive criticism but as a “reasoned attempt to examine some possibilities of air action in co-operation with an army in the field.” It aims to suggest how things “might have been bettered” given the early air forces were “amateurs at a new art,” applying contemporary knowledge to historical examples.

📒 Sections

Introduction

• The first and most important commitment of the Royal Air Force (RAF) is the defence of Great Britain against air attack [p. 3]. Connected to this is providing an air expeditionary force to cooperate with the army overseas [p. 4].

• It’s crucial for officers of the army and air force to understand how air power affects land warfare, especially given the continued existence of large national forces with traditional arms [p. 4].

• The author acknowledges drawing heavily on experience from the last war (1914-1918), admitting that some comments are “wisdom after the event” [p. 5]. The sole object is to “draw conclusions on which to base useful lessons for the future” [p. 6].

• The important function of military history is to enable future commanders and staff officers “to be wise before the event, and to learn not only from the successes but from the failures of their predecessors” [p. 6].

• Since 1918, great progress has been made in air warfare [p. 8]. Technical efficiency is “extremely high,” training (especially weapon-training) is “of a very high order,” and service manuals and training establishments contain “the fruits of years of study and discussion on the strategy and tactics of air warfare” [p. 8]. In the last war, commanders lacked these advantages, and the rapid growth of air forces, coupled with technical inadequacy and novelty of air warfare, meant they were not always used to “the best advantage” [p. 8].

• A common criticism to anticipate is that modern developments have rendered lessons from 1914-1918 obsolete, arguing that trench warfare will “never Be seen again” [p. 9]. While this is true for specific trench warfare characteristics, the author cautions against assuming that “military operations of any nature on the ground are, as yet, only a matter for the reminiscences of a modern generation of Old Kaspars” [p. 10].

• British defensive policy highlights the primary importance of the Low Countries [p. 11]. Their freedom, historically vital for maritime security, is now also crucial for air security [p. 11]. In air defence, “a first essential is depth, because depth means time and space” [p. 11], allowing fighters to reach height and bombers to establish forward aerodromes [p. 12]. Although increasing bomber ranges will diminish this, intensive attacks on Britain could still be sustained from Channel coast bases [p. 12].

• Therefore, military operations on the ground—though different from 1914-1918—may again be necessary to “ensure the integrity of the Low Countries, to prevent the establishment of hostile air bases within fatally close range of these coasts” [p. 13].

• It is “obviously worth while trying to learn something from a study of the only first-class war in which aircraft have played an important part” [p. 13]. The author warns against two dangerous attitudes: assuming a future war will be exactly like the last, or so utterly different as to ignore all past lessons [p. 14].

• The interval between the South African War and the Great War showed failures (e.g., ammunition supply system based on South Africa) and achievements [p. 14, 15]. The 1914 campaign was “nothing like as different as the next land operations are likely to be from those of 1918” [p. 15].

The author stresses that the basic principles of war—“merely the basic principles of common sense applied to war—do not change” (Slessor, 16). Knowledge of past actions and results provides “the best basis for sound judgement” (Slessor, 17). The air force, with only one major war to draw upon, must study its operations to understand “broad principles such as concentration, security, and offensive action” (Slessor, 17).

The book is written “as a reasoned attempt to examine some possibilities of air action in co-operation with an army in the field, in the light of experience of the last Great War” (Slessor, 18). It aims to suggest how operations might have been bettered with today’s knowledge (Slessor, 18).

Conditions envisaged: a land campaign where the primary problem is “the defeat of an enemy army in the field” (Slessor, 19). The application of great principles varies with war conditions (Slessor, 19). In wars against a naval power or when the main threat is hostile air forces, the air force’s objectives would differ (Slessor, 20).

• Historical research is severely handicapped by a lack of comprehensive documentary records for air force operations in WWI [p. 20]. Liaison was primarily “personal discussion and verbal instructions, usually unconfirmed in writing” [p. 21]. This makes it difficult for historians to grasp the atmosphere in which decisions were made [p. 21].

• Immense advances in aircraft performance and offensive power since WWI are noted, with “still greater improvement both in speed and carrying capacity” expected [p. 23]. Developments like heavy oil engines will “mean a very great increase in bomber ranges in the near future, possibly by 100 per cent, or more” [p. 24]. Overlooking increases in “bombing accuracy and the efficiency of air armaments, of organization, and of training” would give a “very false picture of the potentialities of air warfare in modern conditions” [p. 25].

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Part I: Air Superiority

I. The Object

“The National object in war is to overcome the opponent’s will” by overcoming “the armed forces or such of them as are capable of influencing the decision” (Slessor, 52). • The object of an army in a land campaign is to defeat the enemy’s army [p. 53]. The object of the air force contingent in the field is to “assist and co-operate with the army in the defeat of the enemy’s army, and of such air forces as may be co-operating with it” (Slessor, 53). • WWI air operations were largely “Army co-operation” focused on reconnaissance [p. 54]. Up to the end of the war, the “primary object of all air operations, with one exception, was to secure air superiority over the battle line, to enable our reconnaissance and artillery aircraft to carry on their work of close co-operation” [p. 55]. The exception was the Independent Force, RAF [p. 55]. • While close cooperation (Army Co-operation Squadrons) is important, the book emphasizes the positive influence of an air striking force in direct attack upon objectives on the ground [p. 56]. This aspect is “still seriously underrated in the British Service to-day” but “may have an influence on the course of a campaign out of all proportion to that which can be exerted by the purely ancillary service of reconnaissance and observation” [p. 57]. In a land campaign, primary objectives are “the enemy land forces, their communications and system of supply” (Slessor, 57). • A land campaign is defined as a campaign or stage where the “primary object for the time being is the defeat of an enemy army in the field” [p. 58]. This includes initial struggles for bases (e.g., in the Low Countries) to achieve air defence depth for Britain [p. 58, 59]. • Once the army’s objective is achieved, the ultimate reduction of the enemy nation “may (and very likely will) be undertaken, not by the traditional methods of land invasion… but by air measures” [p. 60]. At this point, it becomes an “air campaign,” and the army’s task is “simply to protect the air bases” [p. 60]. Even then, direct action against “hostile vital centres” is more likely to be decisive than action against air forces alone [p. 61]. • Therefore, in a land campaign, “all action other than against military objectives (as opposed to objectives connected with the enemy air force) is merely secondary” [p. 61]. • However, action against enemy air forces and their supply system is essential for two main reasons: 1. To enable “our own air offensive to be directed with the minimum of interference against the objectives best calculated to contribute to the primary aim” [p. 62]. 2. To “protect our own army and its reconnaissance aircraft from hostile air interference” [p. 62]. • This makes action against enemy air forces “a means to an end, an essential measure of security upon which all offensive action must be based” [p. 62]. However, “air fighting in itself, the destruction of enemy air forces, will not give us a decision in a land campaign” [p. 63]. The term “air superiority” is often a “catchword” leading to “confusion of thought” (Slessor, 64). The official definition is “a state of moral, physical, and material superiority which enables its possessor to conduct operations against an enemy and at the same time deprive the enemy of the ability to interfere effectively by the use of his own air forces” (Slessor, 65). > This means “the capacity to achieve our own object in the air and to stop the enemy achieving his” (Slessor, 65). > Analogous to sea supremacy, the object of air superiority is control of air communications: “firstly for our own use and secondly to deny their use to the enemy” (Slessor, 66). • Due to the “cubic area of the battle-fields,” absolute air command is “hardly ever practicable” [p. 67]. • The surest method of securing freedom of action in the air is the destruction of the enemy’s air forces [p. 67]. Even then, it only limits interference, achieved through “hard and continuous fighting” [p. 68]. In both sea and air warfare, battle with enemy forces is only the means, not the end (“the Method, not the Intention”) (Slessor, 68). Confusing this can lead to strategic errors, as seen in Mr. Winston Churchill’s 1917 memorandum which stated the “primary objective” of air forces was “the air bases of the enemy and the consequent destruction of his air fighting forces” (Slessor, 69). The author points out the confusion between “objective” and “purpose” (Slessor, 70). For fighter aircraft alone, destruction of enemy aircraft “may be said to be the primary objective” (Slessor, 70). However, fighters are “only one arm of the air forces” (Slessor, 71). Their influence is “entirely indirect and auxiliary” (Slessor, 74), but “No mistake could be more destructive in its consequences than to underrate the value of pursuit aviation to air operations as a whole” (Slessor, 74). Marshal Foch correctly understood the relation between air fighting and the true object in 1918 (Slessor, 75). His plans for the Inter-Allied Bombing Force aimed at “dislocation of German war industry and munition supply” (Slessor, 75). Sir Hugh Trenchard, commanding the force, was given freedom to neutralize enemy air forces to enable his squadrons to carry out this primary mission (Slessor, 76, 77). This reinforces: “Method, not Intention” (Slessor, 77). The apparent divergence between army and air force objectives is “more apparent than real” and “mainly a matter of degree” (Slessor, 78). The airman “strikes direct at those objectives” (enemy country/LoC) because, within tactical range, the air force is “independent of lines of communication and has no flanks” (Slessor, 79). An army cannot ignore hostile forces and forge straight ahead; an air force can reach objectives, “do its job, and get back again without the preliminary total defeat of the corresponding hostile armed forces” (Slessor, 81). Another important strategic difference is that an air force “is not committed to any one course of action” (Slessor, 82). Unlike land forces, which incur “great dislocation and delay” with fundamental plan alterations due to their slow movement and “elaborate and cumbrous administrative machinery” (Slessor, 82, 83), an air force “can switch, literally almost at a moment’s notice, from one objective to another several hundred miles away, from the same base” (Slessor, 84). Sound organization and inexpensive aerodromes also allow base changes with minimum dislocation (Slessor, 85). Air superiority is not a definite condition achieved once and for all (Slessor, 86). It is “not a phase to be gone through, a necessary preliminary… before the real business can begin” (Slessor, 86). It must be “constantly maintained by striking direct at those objectives which are of first importance to the enemy at the time” (Slessor, 87). “The struggle for air superiority is part and parcel of all air operations against a first-class enemy” (Slessor, 87). Its moral factor is secured by “an instant and unremitting offensive directed against the primary objective” (Slessor, 88).

II. The Main Offensive

The goal is to obtain and maintain “control of air communications for our own use and deny them to that of the enemy” (Slessor, 89). • Influence of air superiority in WWI examples: ◦ Palestine campaign (1917-1918): British air force wrested command of the air from the enemy in autumn 1917, enabling concealment of troop concentrations and achieving “strategical surprise” for General Allenby’s break-through (Slessor, 90, 91, 94). Fighters patrolled over enemy aerodromes, “effectively prevented any hostile aeroplane from leaving the ground” (Slessor, 93).

Allenby stated, “The superiority established by the Air Force over the enemy was one of the great factors in the success of my troops” (Slessor, 95). This was against a numerically inferior enemy (Slessor, 95). ◦ Somme battle (1916): British achieved “local superiority approximating more closely to absolute command” [p. 96]. General von Below (German First Army) reported “a complete inferiority of our own air forces,” with enemy aeroplanes enjoying “complete freedom in carrying out distant reconnaissances” and artillery observation, while German planes “only succeeded in quite exceptional cases in breaking through the hostile patrol barrage” [p. 97]. This control was achieved “by seeking out and fighting the enemy’s aeroplanes far over his own lines, and by creating such a threat to the vitals of his communications, by incessant bombing” [p. 101]. • From these methods, two main principles emerge for air superiority, based on “actual practical experience” [p. 103, 104]: ◦ A. The Main Offensive (Resolute bombing offensive against enemy vital centers): ▪ Forces enemy on the defensive: compels them to use strength in defence, diverting aircraft from decisive tasks [p. 104, 105]. ▪ Forces diversion from decisive area: by judicious selection of objectives, enemy may be forced to protect vital centres not in the immediate battle area, but which they “cannot for military or political reasons afford to leave unguarded” [p. 105, 106]. ▪ Attacker always on interior lines: this offensive approach retains the initiative and forces enemy aircraft to fight under chosen conditions [p. 106]. ◦ B. The Supplementary Offensive (Direct action against enemy air forces): Supplements the main offensive “in varying degree” [p. 106]. ▪ By fighters: “seeking out and destroying the enemy air forces in the air” over enemy points of departure (aerodromes) or destination (bomber objectives, close co-operation areas) [p. 107]. ▪ By bombers (sometimes with low-flying fighters): “attacking the enemy air forces upon the ground, their aerodromes, bases, aircraft depots, and technical establishments” [p. 108]. Definition of “vital centre”: “Any point in the enemy’s system of supply or communication of which the destruction or interruption for a sufficient length of time will, either immediately or in due course, be fatal to his continuance of effective operations” (Slessor, 110). ◦ This definition must extend beyond literal military destruction to include centres that are humanly important enough that “no government can afford to leave it unprotected” (e.g., London in WWI, due to population, commerce, and finance, despite being militarily secondary objectives) [p. 112, 114, 115]. • Moral advantages of an offensive policy are clear, and modern air developments “are tending more and more to weigh the scales in favour of the attack” [p. 116, 117]. • A “stage of deadlock” may occur, but “a variety of factors, physical, psychological, and material, will come into play,” eventually tipping the scales [p. 118]. A “very serious handicap will be imposed upon that side whose essential communications and machinery of administration and supply are most concentrated” [p. 119]. • Past experience shows that a “persistently offensive policy… if persisted in and directed upon sound lines it will in the end compel the enemy to resort to ineffectual and uneconomic methods of protection” [p. 121, 126]. The German High Command, despite believing in methodical bombing, were compelled at Verdun and the Somme to use their bombing and reconnaissance squadrons defensively on “Sperrefliegen, or barrage patrols” [p. 123]. These aircraft were “thrown back upon an inevitably ineffective defensive” [p. 123]. • Modern high-performance day-bombers or reconnaissance aeroplanes make “very fine fighter[s]” [p. 128]. Commanders compelled to yield to pressure for close fighter protection can use bomber and reconnaissance squadrons [p. 129]. • A long-term result of offensive policy is diverting enemy aircraft to “indirect role[s]” (protection of direct action aircraft), equivalent to a “shrinkage of effective strength” [p. 130, 131]. For example, German policy in 1917 requiring three fighting machines to escort one reconnaissance machine resulted in a high “proportion of three indirect to one direct action aeroplane” [p. 131]. The British policy of “consistently offensive policy” (though often with lower numbers) indexed the value of this approach [p. 134]. • Exploiting air power’s capacity for effective diversion: An attacker is “always on interior lines” [p. 139]. A bomber force can cover a vast area, enabling simultaneous attacks on distant objectives [p. 140]. This means defenders need “far more than double the numbers of potential attackers” [p. 141]. ◦ Classic instance: German bombing force from Belgium contained about “600 British aircraft” in England for home defence, “a successful detachment if ever there was one” [p. 142, 143]. Political demand for home protection was so urgent that two of Sir Douglas Haig’s best fighter squadrons were sent home from France in summer 1917 [p. 143]. ◦ Home defence will always take precedence in a war on the Continent [p. 146, 147]. • An air force commander must “deliberately make use of this extraordinary capacity for effective diversion to attain air superiority at the really decisive point” [p. 147]. This requires “the highest qualities of command and the exercise of the nicest judgement” and “the most exhaustive resources in information and the most meticulous system of day-to-day intelligence” [p. 149]. This also calls for “real and intelligent co-operation” with other Services and Government Departments (Foreign Office, Board of Trade, Propaganda) [p. 151]. • The author argues for combining the three Service Intelligence branches with those of the Foreign Office and Board of Trade [p. 151, 152]. • Action against hostile air forces, though “vitally important,” is from a broad strategical viewpoint a diversion [p. 152]. It may “at times absorb the greater part, if not the whole, of our own air effort,” but it remains a diversion [p. 153]. • The air situation is subject to variations (e.g., introduction of new aircraft types) [p. 154]. • In exceptional cases, strategic defensive in the air may be necessary when “our own army is temporarily so vulnerable to air action relatively to that of the enemy” (e.g., passing through a defile, operating on a single line of communication, opposed landing) [p. 155, 157]. Security assumes “first importance” [p. 157]. • In a land campaign, “one can ultimately only attain the object by hitting the enemy on the ground” [p. 159]. Air forces must achieve mastery to “direct their attention to hitting the enemy on the ground” [p. 159]. • The “method of approach to the problem” is crucial [p. 160]. A hypothetical air plan for the Battle of Amiens (1918) is used as an illustration: ◦ Object: “to isolate the area Bapaume—Le Catelet—Guise-La Fére—Noyon from enemy reinforcement and supply, in order to enable the attack of the Fourth Army to be carried to a complete decision” [p. 161]. ◦ This requires parallel examinations by Air and General Staffs, selecting detailed objectives and estimating required force [p. 162, 163]. ◦ The Air Force commander must ask: “How can I create the necessary air situation to enable me (a) to make certain of cutting and keeping cut the railways at those points… and (b) to ensure the security of the Fourth Army and its close co-operation aeroplanes against serious interference by the enemy air forces?” [p. 163, 164]. ◦ This breaks into subsidiary questions: ▪ (a) What distant objectives (diversions) will compel enemy air defence disproportionate to our effort? [p. 164, 165] ▪ (b) To what extent will striking force operations against enemy communications “impose a defensive attitude upon the enemy air forces,” thus securing the Fourth Army? [p. 165, 166] ▪ (c) What proportion of force must be diverted to direct action against enemy air forces to free our striking force and provide army security? [p. 166] ◦ The “extreme tactical flexibility of air power” allows switching strength between objectives [p. 167].

III. The Supplementary Offensive—The Destruction or Neutralization of Enemy Air Forces

• Strategy of offensive against enemy air forces: difficult to dogmatize due to limited experience in open warfare [p. 169, 170]. Need for “imagination” and “capacity to adapt our methods quickly” based on “sound grasp of principles” [p. 171, 172]. • The problem is to “deprive the enemy of the ability to interfere effectively by the use of his own air forces” [p. 172]. Ideally, destroy hostile aircraft in air or on ground [p. 172]. Supplement by disrupting aerodromes, workshops, depots [p. 173]. • Action against enemy air forces is a joint responsibility of both fighters and bombers [p. 173]. Fighters primarily destroy aircraft; bombers primarily attack ground organization [p. 174]. • The claim that air forces “can only be brought to battle by consent” and operate like a “Fleet-in-being” is “only partly true” and “largely obsolete” [p. 175, 180]. Naval “fleet in being” relied on finding “complete security in fortified harbours” [p. 180], but the aeroplane cancelled this condition [p. 180]. • Simple principles of air warfare (confirmed by WWI experience): 1. Air forces can only be destroyed or neutralized effectively by “an active and persistent offensive in the air” [p. 183]. This is due to the “immense importance of the moral factor in air fighting” and aircraft having “no definite physical stopping-power” like land fortifications, making barrage patrols “uneconomical and usually ineffective” [p. 183, 184]. 2. This offensive “must obviously be intelligently controlled” and attacks directed to areas where enemy aircraft are “most likely to be encountered” [p. 184]. 3. Aerodrome patrols may be supplemented by patrols “over the enemy’s most probable area of destination” [p. 185]. 4. If the main bombing offensive hits enemy vitals, a “certain area of destination at least for the enemy fighters will be that area where our bombing force is operating” [p. 186]. Therefore, sending fighters to rendezvous with bombers over their objectives is a way to force action [p. 186]. 5. “Close O.P.s over battle area” should be reserved for special occasions and combined with aerodrome patrols [p. 187]. 6. Low-flying attack on enemy bomber aerodromes (with machine-guns and small bombs) can achieve “important results” through moral effect, even if material damage is minimized by dispersal [p. 190]. It may also force enemy bombers to shift bases, reducing their effective range [p. 191]. 7. Bombing of aerodromes (especially with bombers and fighters together) is “well worth while” when conditions are favorable (e.g., few, congested aerodromes; enemy air forces not rapidly reinforced; time-critical situations) [p. 191, 192]. Reserve depots and parks are also good objectives due to difficulty of dispersal [p. 192]. 8. While an active offensive is normally best, tactical defensive may sometimes be necessary “for reasons of security” (e.g., defending a point “so exceptionally vital to us that… we cannot possibly accept the risk of failure to afford an adequate degree of protection by the maintenance of our air offensive alone”) [p. 193, 195]. Examples: port of disembarkation, transports/landing craft during an opposed landing [p. 196]. This should be an exception, temporary, and cannot guarantee complete success [p. 194]. 9. Exploiting the need for enemy defence during an opposed landing: A belligerent typically avoids declining combat or keeping bombers grounded in normal situations [p. 198]. However, in an opposed landing, the invader forces the defender to “come up and fight” by threatening their vitals (landing troops, ships), or accepting “fatally results of unrestricted, unopposed air action” [p. 199]. • Detailed Examination of Principles: ◦ Active Offensive Policy: In WWI, criticism arose from those in back areas being bombed without reciprocal air presence [p. 199, 200]. However, “its soundness was incontestable” [p. 201]. German bombing was a “serious nuisance,” but British lines of communication were not subjected to “constant strain” like the enemy’s [p. 201, 202]. Interruption of close co-operation was temporary, and results justified the policy [p. 202]. French airmen regained superiority by returning to the offensive after losing it [p. 203]. ◦ Intelligent Direction: In WWI, offensive patrols were “often sent off without sufficiently careful planning and co-ordination” [p. 204]. The idea grew that battle areas were never the best place for fighters, leading to bomber commanders asking for support being told “there will be an offensive patrol operating in the area at the time” with little apparent effect [p. 205]. ◦ Offensive Patrols over Enemy Aerodromes: Usually “the best and surest way of bringing an enemy to action” [p. 210], but must be “intelligently planned and co-ordinated” [p. 211]. ◦ Barrage Patrols: “Usually ineffective” [p. 208] unless the “important area was small and when there were a very large number of fighters available,” like at Messines (1917) where complete superiority was gained over the battle-front for artillery-observation aircraft [p. 208, 209]. • Co-operation of Fighter Squadrons in Bomber Offensive: ◦ British Service favors bombers looking after themselves by “close and steady formation flying” [p. 211], generally not close escort for bomber formations [p. 211]. ◦ However, bomber pilots need “freedom of action and protection from enemy fighter interference” primarily “while he is actually over his objective” [p. 212]. This is precisely where enemy fighters are “most likely to be encountered” if the bombing is effective [p. 213]. ◦ Difficulties with single-seater fighters for escort: no rear gun, forcing bombers to turn to fight [p. 213], and “relatively short endurance” limiting range [p. 214]. ◦ With increased bomber ranges, “any of the enemy’s vital centres… can be out of fighter range” [p. 214]. ◦ Fighters have the “best chance of getting their fight in the immediate vicinity of the bomber’s objectives” [p. 219], so patrols should arrive “a few minutes before the arrival of the bombers” [p. 219]. ◦ “Scooping out”: Fighters meeting returning bombers “fifty miles from home” was valuable for Independent Force bombers returning from long-range targets [p. 221, 223]. ◦ Case for the two-seater fighter: Address issues of no rear gun and limited range [p. 223]. Two-seaters are superior fighting machines for “almost any other purpose” than high climb for home defence [p. 226]. The Bristol two-seater was the “most formidable fighter” in 1918, with lower casualties due to its rear gun allowing self-defence while retreating [p. 227]. Introduction of “Demon” (basic type for day-bombers) as two-seater fighter is significant [p. 228]. ◦ Single-seater fighters remain necessary where “interception requires a big margin of speed and a high rate of climb” (e.g., tactical defensive duties) [p. 230, 231]. ◦ “Local superiority can never be absolute” [p. 231]. No defensive system can guarantee “no determined enemy will get through” [p. 231]. Air force commanders should not guarantee immunity [p. 232]. ◦ Defensive system for expeditionary force disembarkation: Requires warning system and searchlights at night [p. 232]. Field air defence intelligence is difficult to improvise [p. 233]. Enemy bombers might detour seaward, where warning/lighting is impracticable [p. 233]. “Interception of enemy bombers before they reach their objectives will be largely a matter of luck” [p. 233]. Suggests incorporating an “air-defence-intelligence warning unit” (like Observer Corps) into the field force [p. 234]. ◦ Bombing of aerodromes is a diversion “only worth while when adequate results may be expected, and when there are no more vital objectives” [p. 235]. It must “increase the efficacy of our main air offensive, or afford to our own army a security which cannot otherwise be attained” [p. 236]. ▪ In 1918, Independent Force dropped one-third of its bombs (220 tons) on German aerodromes [p. 236]. ▪ “Adequate results” can be expected. There’s a tendency in the British Service to underrate effects of modern aerodrome bombardment [p. 239]. ▪ While proper dispersal and metal construction reduce casualties and reliance on hangars, “bomb-holes in the aerodrome itself can be rapidly filled in” [p. 239, 240]. But the ease of reconditioning is “exaggerated” [p. 240]. ▪ “It is very dangerous to underestimate the damage and dislocation which might be caused even to-day by skilfully executed bombardment of aerodromes, especially if it is combined with fighter attack” [p. 241]. ▪ British experience (German attacks on British aerodromes 1917-18): Total 40 tons of bombs caused 29 aircraft destroyed, 48 damaged, 19 hangars destroyed/damaged, much MT destroyed, 26 killed, 82 wounded [p. 242]. This rate of loss, sustained over weeks, “would become very serious indeed” [p. 243]. ▪ Key conditions to reduce losses: Aircraft widely dispersed (not in neat lines), away from hangars [p. 244]. This is inconvenient but “absolute essential” [p. 244]. ▪ Overcrowding of aerodromes leads to increased vulnerability [p. 245]. Need for dispersal of aerodromes with fewer aircraft on each [p. 246]. This raises control problems (meteorological service, comprehensive communications system) [p. 246, 247]. ▪ Aircraft parks and depots are harder to disperse, and damage here would be “more widely felt” [p. 248]. Need to “organize our maintenance and supply system in smaller units, and put fewer eggs into each basket” [p. 250]. Reserve aircraft in forward areas must also be picketed out and dispersed [p. 251]. ▪ Replacement of casualties: If enemy’s industry struggles, aerodrome bombardment can reduce air activity [p. 252]. ▪ Fortified bases on Empire air routes: Need “absolute security for the refuelling-grounds” and rapid development of “longer cruising range for all classes of Service aircraft” [p. 253, 254]. ▪ Time factor: Heavy bombardment “immediately before some important operation” can cause temporary disorganization and morale damage, restricting enemy air activity at a critical time [p. 254, 255].

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Part II: The Selection of Objectives

V. Strategic Concentration

• “All bombing… must be co-ordinated with the efforts that are being made by the land or sea forces” [p. 256]. • The object of the air force in a major campaign with armies is “the defeat of the enemy’s forces in the field, and primarily of his army” [p. 258].

The three real principles of war are: concentration, offensive action, and security (Slessor, 260). Other factors like mobility and economy of force are elements of these (Slessor, 260, 261). Concentration is “the foundation and corner-stone of sound strategy” in air warfare (Slessor, 262). It consists of “the concentration and employment of the maximum force, moral, physical, and material, at the decisive time and place” (Slessor, 262). • Difficulty lies in clearly understanding “what is the decisive place at the time” [p. 265]. • Objectives fall into two main classes: fighting troops and supply [p. 266]. ◦ Fighting troops includes soldiers, rail/road communications for mobility, and headquarters [p. 267]. ◦ Supply covers food, munitions, raw material, production, depots, and lines of communication [p. 268]. ◦ Attack on Production (war industries, strategic bombing) will usually be “conducted by the Air Ministry” and connected to home defence, not the direct responsibility of field air forces [p. 270, 271]. It can “vitally affect the operations of the field army” [p. 271]. ◦ The author stresses understanding the moral effect of air bombardment on the “non-combatant” civilian population [p. 274, 277]. Initial attacks on German industrial areas (Oct 1917) were often “a measure of reprisal, an attempt to exercise moral pressure, rather than as an attempt to reduce the German output of munitions” [p. 276]. ◦ Object of attack on production: “dislocation and restriction of output from war industry, not primarily the material destruction of plant and stocks” [p. 278]. Material damage may be less than land bombardment but its cost “relatively almost negligible” [p. 279, 280]. ◦ War industries include arsenals, oil-wells, rail communications [p. 280, 281]. Most European war industries are “concentrated in relatively small areas on or near the frontiers” [p. 281]. ◦ German air operations against England (1916-1918) showed “very serious and alarming proportions” of reduction in output and disorganization of traffic [p. 282, 283]. Less than 300 tons of bombs dropped in 4.5 years, a quantity “could be dropped in two or three days by any one of several first-class European air forces to-day” [p. 283, 284]. ◦ Air bombardment on an intensive scale “can to-day restrict the output from war industry to a degree which would make it quite impossible to meet the immense requirements of an army on the 1918 model” [p. 285, 286]. ◦ Method of attack requires “detailed and expert knowledge of the enemy’s industrial system” and “careful selection of objectives” [p. 286, 287]. It involves “deliberate exploitation of the effects of air-raid precautions and warnings in reducing output” [p. 287]. • Two opposing schools of thought on air attack on production: ◦ One: aircraft only for “intimate and direct ‘short-range’ co-operation with the Army” [p. 290]. (e.g., Sir Henry Wilson) [p. 290]. ◦ Other: any “available margin of air power should be employed on an independent basis for definite, strategic purposes” against towns/industrial areas [p. 291]. (e.g., Sir Frederick Sykes, Brig.-Gen. Groves) [p. 291]. ◦ The author argues both are “fundamentally unsound” [p. 294], failing to appreciate the “most fundamental and valuable quality of air power—mobility” [p. 294]. > The answer: “make full use of the mobility and tactical flexibility of air power; and concentrate the maximum force on whatever task is likely to be decisive, or to contribute most usefully to an ultimate decision, at the time” (Slessor, 295). This is “the key to the whole strategy of air power” (Slessor, 295). • Formation of the Independent Force (1918): ◦ Early bombing attempts on Germany were often reprisals [p. 297]. The formation of the RAF (April 1918) created an opportunity to implement “long-term” strategic bombing ideas [p. 297, 298]. ◦ Sir Frederick Sykes formed the Independent Air Force in June 1918 by “secur[ing] a margin” [p. 299]. This was during Ludendorff’s desperate offensives on the Western Front [p. 300, 301]. ◦ The Air Council proposed the Independent Force, directly responsible to the Air Ministry, not under the British C-in-C in France or Marshal Foch [p. 305, 306]. ◦ Sir H. Trenchard, commanding the Independent Force from June 6th, believed the time was ripe to attack German industrial centres [p. 309]. ◦ The Inter-Allied Bombing Force was decided upon in early August, to be under Foch’s command [p. 310]. ◦ Crucial question: Who decides when aircraft can be “spared”? The Air Council decided for the British, sometimes “in direct opposition to those of the General Staff at the War Office” [p. 311, 312]. ◦ Trenchard believed aircraft could be spared when British and French air forces were “each strong enough to defeat the German air force on the Western Front” [p. 313]. The author questions if this condition existed or if it was the right criterion, arguing the goal was to defeat “all the German forces in the field” [p. 314]. ◦ Trenchard “does not appear to have held a very high opinion of the influence which air action might exert on a land battle” [p. 315]. ◦ At this critical period (German offensives 1918), British HQ in France saw bombing aircraft as vital for interfering with enemy communications [p. 317, 318]. Transportation expert Major-General Sir Philip Nash made “valuable suggestions on the way in which the bombing of railways might contribute to the defeat of the German attacks” [p. 319]. The Air Staff objected Nash’s proposals, claiming insufficient aircraft were available [p. 321, 323]. ◦ The author concludes that in 1918, “there was no such margin” and employment of the Independent Force against objectives in Germany at this time was an “entirely unjustified diversion of effort” [p. 324, 325]. No industrial reduction was valuable if German armies won in France [p. 326]. The “fundamental characteristic of air-power—mobility” was “apparently complete failure” [p. 326]. ◦ The author suggests appointing Sir H. Trenchard as a Supreme Air Commander under Marshal Foch to coordinate Allied air policy and control an Inter-Allied Air Reserve, used where “influence was most likely to be decisive” [p. 330, 331]. • Three main classes of objective in a land campaign, appropriate to different conditions [p. 332]: 1. Fighting troops: primary objective during actual battle periods [p. 333]. 2. Attack on Production: first importance during “periods of comparative inactivity” [p. 333]. 3. Supply in the field: most suitable during “periods of preparation for battle” [p. 333, 334]. • Air action against production “cannot yet altogether replace active operations on the ground” [p. 340], but “should limit and reduce them” and “endow the offensive on the ground with much greater chances of success” [p. 340]. • Correlation of ground and air plans: They must be “complementary” [p. 341]. Ground operations may be “profoundly influenced by the air factor” [p. 342]. • Air strategy: “the whole art of air warfare is first the capacity to select the correct objective at the time… and then to concentrate against it the maximum possible force” [p. 343, 344]. • Other decisive tasks can arise even with an army in the field. For example, the submarine campaign of 1917 against British shipping was nearly decisive, suggesting the correct strategic objective for Allied air forces should have been “the enemy submarine fleet and its bases” [p. 345, 346]. A similar situation might arise with hostile aircraft [p. 348, 349]. • Strategic mobility: The aeroplane is “a superlatively mobile instrument of war,” but current strategic mobility is not as great as it should be [p. 350]. Dependence on “tarmac aprons, fitted workshops, huge lighted hangars, and bulk petrol installations” is “the antithesis of true mobility” [p. 352]. An air force must be “basically mobile” to operate “at full capacity and at short notice from open fields, with the aircraft picketed out, and the personnel living and working in bivouacs and lorries” [p. 353, 355].

VI. Fighting Troops and Supply

• This chapter focuses on the air expeditionary force in close and direct cooperation with an army in a land campaign [p. 356]. • The two main classes of objectives are fighting troops and supply in the field [p. 359]. • Process of selecting targets: ◦ Future possibility of one Commander-in-Chief (soldier or airman) with a combined staff overseeing coequal air and land forces [p. 360, 361]. ◦ The Air Officer Commanding (A.O.C.) the expeditionary force has a dual capacity: executive commander and adviser to the Commander-in-Chief at GHQ [p. 362]. ◦ The air plan is initially the result of discussion between military and air force commanders [p. 363, 364]. ◦ Three essentials for making the plan: 1. Information: Intelligent use of all available intelligence about the enemy (forces, communications, HQ, depots, organization) [p. 365, 366]. The “zone of which a detailed knowledge is essential has increased in depth” [p. 368]. 2. Expert technical advice: From own supply and transport services (e.g., railway experts for vulnerable points) [p. 369, 370]. “It is difficult to overstate the importance of this step in the selection of objectives” [p. 371]. 3. Reconnaissance: Essential for initial plan and post-zero confirmation/modification. “Good reconnaissance is no less essential after zero” [p. 372]. Results must be rapidly disseminated through “adequate signal-organization” [p. 374]. • Fighting Troops as Objectives (Bombers and Low-flying Action): 1. The aeroplane is generally “not a battle-field weapon” [p. 375]. Air striking force is “not as a rule best employed in the actual zone in which the armies are in contact” [p. 375]. ▪ Exceptions: initial break-in to highly organized defences, breaking up counter-attacks (e.g., French bombers vs. German division at Villers Cotterets; Australian squadron vs. Turkish cavalry at Gaza) [p. 375, 376]. ▪ More profitable and important objectives are “farther back—beyond the range of artillery and machine-guns” [p. 378]. ▪ Examples: At Amiens (Aug 8th, 1918), bombers attacked Somme bridges, assault aircraft supported infantry, but German reserve divisions moved “relatively unhindered on the battle-field” via roads and railways [p. 378, 379]. Similar issue at Cambrai (Nov 1917) where assault aircraft attacked forward troops while German reserves poured in unhindered from Douai [p. 379, 380, 381]. 2. Large movements of troops by road are “very vulnerable” to air action, especially from assault aircraft [p. 382]. Mechanized forces are “entirely dependent for their fighting efficiency upon uninterrupted communication to the rear” [p. 383]. Petrol is a “terribly vulnerable form of supply” [p. 385]. 3. Troop movement by rail: Different technique, focuses on “dislocation and disorganization of the railway system than on material damage or casualties” [p. 386]. Entraining stations are generally better objectives than detraining stations [p. 388]. 4. Mounted troops and animal transport are “especially vulnerable to air action” [p. 388, 389]. Horse/camel lines are “almost impossible to conceal from the air” [p. 389]. Small bombs are more effective than machine-guns, as their noise can “stampede the animals” [p. 390]. 5. Troops in rest or reserve: Air attack creates “permanent insecurity” which “cannot fail to have a terribly wearing effect on morale” [p. 394]. Constant alarms and interruptions to rest, even without lethal results, are irritating [p. 394]. Example: German raid on Etaples (May 1918) caused 840 casualties in crowded rest camps/hospitals [p. 395]. 6. Head-quarters and cable communications: Bombing HQ can lead to “complete paralysis of that army as a fighting body” [p. 396]. Cable communications are the “nerves” of an army [p. 397]. Example: At Megiddo (Sept 1918), British air action “made the enemy’s command deaf and dumb” by bombing the main telephone exchange at El Afule and army HQ, resulting in the enemy C-in-C not knowing his front collapsed for 24 hours [p. 397, 398]. Modern HQ are “almost ideal target[s]” due to their size and concentration [p. 399, 400]. • Low-flying Action: ◦ Definition: “attack at point-blank range by light aircraft using small bombs and machine-guns, and taking advantage of high speed, manoeuvrability, and natural cover” [p. 401]. ◦ British Service does not favour specialized “Assault” or “Battle” aircraft, seeing it as “a special tactical use in an emergency of aircraft which can be, and normally are, otherwise employed” [p. 402]. ◦ Armour ineffective; reliance on surprise, speed, manoeuvrability [p. 403]. Single-seater fighter is best type, though two-seaters have advantage of rear gun [p. 404]. ◦ Not to be confused with Dive Bombing, which is a high-speed attack from considerable height [p. 405]. ◦ Requires “a very high degree of air superiority” and “very large numbers” of aircraft [p. 407]. Examples: Megiddo (absolute command of air), Cambrai (10:1 numerical superiority), Amiens (3:1 numerical superiority) [p. 407]. ◦ In WWI, high casualty rates (e.g., 9th Brigade RAF averaged 75% officer casualties per month, nearly half killed) required “ample reserve of personnel and aircraft” [p. 408, 409]. Modern fighters’ increased performance may reduce this, but “assault action must be used very sparingly, and retained for conditions of real emergency” in early campaign stages [p. 410]. ◦ Three sets of circumstances for justified low-flying action: 1. In Attack: “to assist the army to break the crust of very highly organized defences” (e.g., against artillery, anti-tank weapons, immediate reserves) [p. 411, 413]. This should be temporary, and aircraft lifted against rear communications to convert “break-in into a real break-through” [p. 414]. 2. In Pursuit: “to turn an enemy’s retreat into a rout” [p. 411, 414]. This is the “supreme opportunity” for decisive success [p. 414, 415]. • Examples: Annihilation of Turkish Seventh and Eighth Armies after Megiddo (Lawrence’s account describes 9 tons of bombs, 50,000 rounds of S.A.A. causing enemy organization to “melted away”) [p. 415, 417]. Rout of Bulgarians on Macedonian front (aviators flew at 20 feet, machine-gunning, demoralizing columns) [p. 418]. Rout of Austrians at Vittorio Veneto (3.5 tons of bombs, 30,000 rounds S.A.A. at low altitudes; “observer to the conclusion that this form of warfare should be forbidden”) [p. 419]. • Air arm has “restored the pursuit to its former dignity as a principle of war” [p. 420]. 3. In Defence: “to hold up the advance of a victorious enemy, and enable our own rearguards to get clear and reorganize the defence” [p. 411]. • Examples: German counter-attack at Cambrai (Dec 1917), covering British withdrawal [p. 424, 425]. Retreat of Gough’s Fifth Army (March 1918), where low-flying action “froze up” German advance and averted break-through [p. 425, 426]. Marshal Foch’s directive (April 1st, 1918) stated: “the first duty of fighting aeroplanes is to assist the troops on the ground, by incessant attacks with bombs and machine-guns” [p. 427]. • Future value may be reduced if infantry role becomes holding/consolidating and break-in is by armoured units [p. 429, 430]. ◦ Control of Assault Squadrons: ▪ Pilots must be given “clear and definite orders before going into action,” defining objectives, priority, and areas [p. 431, 432]. Initial orders alone are not enough; fresh aircraft need “equally definite orders” as situation develops [p. 438]. ▪ Problem of quick and accurate information: Reconnaissance aircraft are key for back areas [p. 440]. For close support on the battlefield, placing squadrons temporarily under subordinate army formations (e.g., Corps) may be advisable for rapid information [p. 441]. Wireless communication improvements are hoped to solve this [p. 441]. ▪ Flesquiéres incident (Cambrai, Nov 1917): Assault pilots attacked “targets of minor importance” while a vital artillery area, where tanks were being destroyed, remained untouched due to lack of information [p. 443, 444]. Artillery in exposed positions is “particularly vulnerable to assault action” [p. 445]. ▪ Importance of pilots knowing the ground: “an absolute essential” for operations on the battle-field in close support [p. 449, 450]. • Supply as an Objective: ◦ Mainly amounts to “action against communications—rail, road, and water” [p. 452]. During battle, air action against hostile reserves will simultaneously affect maintenance [p. 452]. ◦ “More interesting range of possibilities” opens “during periods of preparation for active operations on the ground, or of temporary deadlock” [p. 453]. ◦ Modern armies have “vast supply requirements” in “thousands of tons and dozens of train-loads” [p. 454, 456]. ◦ Colonel Wingfield’s article (1926) on Second Army maintenance (1918) found the “danger-spot in an army’s administrative system lies in front of its base depots,” where only small emergency reserves are held [p. 456, 459]. ▪ Second Army’s LoC (Calais, Boulogne bases, Bourbourg, St. Omer, Blendecques lines) had a total capacity of 98 trains/day, with active operations requiring 68 trains/day [p. 460, 461]. Five days’ stocks were held in forward depots [p. 462]. ▪ Blocking behind base depots leaves large reserves; blocking in front (e.g., Bourbourg, St. Omer, Arques) could cut off divisions entirely [p. 462, 463, 464]. Maintaining blocks for “less than half that period could have been more than critical” [p. 464]. ▪ Blocks must be sufficiently far back to “impose an intolerable strain upon the road transport echelons” [p. 467, 468]. ▪ General Plumer “had great confidence” in air action’s capacity for dislocation, emphasizing concentration on “minimum number of points where the greatest dislocation could be produced” [p. 469, 470]. ◦ Need for new technique of supply [p. 473]. Cannot adhere to old methods [p. 474]. ◦ Bulk delivery and base ports are “especially vulnerable” [p. 474, 476]. ◦ Measures to minimize risks of bulk delivery/storage in base depots: 1. Base depots must be much farther from the front [p. 477]. This means more time, rolling stock, guards, and intermediate depots, but “will have to be accepted” [p. 477, 478]. 2. Hold larger reserves in the theatre of war [p. 479]. 3. Decrease size of depots and increase their number (more smaller baskets instead of one large one) [p. 481]. ▪ Ammunition is “most vulnerable form of supply, with the possible exception of petrol” [p. 485]. Dispersing ammunition depots is crucial [p. 485]. ▪ Petrol supply: increasingly in bulk wagons from port installations, difficult to disperse [p. 486]. Urgent need for “light engines burning heavy oil fuel” [p. 488]. ▪ Frozen meat, other commodities also need dispersal [p. 488, 489]. ▪ Interference can be by “dislocation, by disorganization of issue and distribution, by constant dowsing of lights at night and moral effect” [p. 489]. ◦ New layout for lines of communication: instead of few large forward depots, “a number of smaller depots suitably spaced along the longer line of communication of the future” [p. 490]. This is uneconomical but safer [p. 492]. ◦ Possible solutions: wider use of motor transport (though limited), light railways, inland water transport [p. 493, 494]. Experts must realize the “extent and scope of the air threat to supply” [p. 494].

VII. Air Attack on Communications

• The main method of striking fighting troops or depriving them of supplies is “interference with movement, by striking at the communications, rail or road” [p. 495]. • Two key factors: 1. Importance of intelligence and “expert technical advice”: Necessary for accurate and detailed knowledge of the enemy’s transportation system and its “vulnerable points and weak links” [p. 496, 497]. 2. Air action relies “far more upon dislocation and disorganization than upon actual material damage” [p. 497]. Wholesale demolition is not necessary [p. 497]. A “serious stoppage at any one point in the system has a cumulative ‘piling-up’ effect” throughout, creating “conspicuous and vulnerable targets” [p. 498, 499]. • Railways: ◦ History in WWI: Early railway bombing was often sporadic and inadequate (e.g., Neuve Chapelle, Loos) [p. 500]. Policy (Feb 1916) dictated attacking railways only “at the right moment, i.e. at a time when even a temporary interruption… would interfere with important operations” [p. 501]. ◦ Reasons for meagre direct results: The “primary object of the railway bombing was to draw off enemy fighters from the battle zone” to establish “local air superiority over the zone in which the battle was in progress” [p. 504]. This focus on air superiority “always militated against the concentration of bombers on railway objectives to a degree that could really effectively dislocate a railway system” [p. 505]. ◦ Foch’s directive (April 1918) allotted 8 important railway junctions to Allied air forces for bombing [p. 510]. ◦ Nash’s suggestions (April 1918) for railway bombing were valuable but met with Air HQ objections about insufficient aircraft [p. 512, 515]. ◦ Staff vs. technical advisers: Staff decides objectives after weighing factors, but should not contradict technical experts’ advice on vulnerability [p. 517, 518]. Technical advisers should not encroach on Staff’s domain (e.g., on target size/prospects of success) [p. 519]. ◦ “Concentrated bombing schemes” were drawn up for British front sectors, but only one partially implemented due to shifting war situation [p. 520, 521]. ◦ Overall, WWI railway bombing results were “disappointingly meagre” due to primitive material/technique and dispersion of effort for air superiority [p. 522, 523]. Concentration of “every available aeroplane at the decisive point, against the smallest possible number of targets, and for really adequate periods” is key for decisive results [p. 523, 524]. ◦ Objectives in a railway system: 1. Junctions and main-line stations: Transportation experts in 1918 often didn’t consider them best targets due to many alternative lines, on-site repairs, and quick clearance [p. 526, 527]. However, they can be “most suitable points for attack” depending on railway system density and traffic intensity [p. 527, 529, 530]. • Examples: Amiens (300 trains/day), Deutsche Eylau, Bromberg (strategic moves in East Prussia), Thionville (station blown up for 48 hrs), Metz Sablon (24 hr stoppage) [p. 530, 533, 534]. 2. Trains on the move between stations: “Difficult target” but “very conspicuous” by steam/firebox glow [p. 534, 535]. Anti-aircraft defence of trains is difficult [p. 535]. Night offers best opportunities for bombers [p. 536]. 3. Electrification: Power-houses and transformer stations are “most vulnerable and vital objectives,” whose destruction “would paralyse all movement over very large areas” [p. 537]. 4. Sections where traffic is heaviest: Cuttings, viaducts, gradients, and where “strategic lines converged for a number of miles” [p. 537, 538, 540]. Examples: Liége bypass (1914), Thorn-Schönsee, Dirschau-Marienburg (East Prussia), Koblenz-Trier [p. 538, 540]. 5. Keeping a block closed: After making a block (wrecking station, cutting, derailing train), “constant harassing, bombing by day and night” is needed to prevent rapid repair [p. 541, 542]. Direct hit on repair trains is valuable [p. 543]. Author suggests considering use of “persistent chemical such as mustard gas” to impede breakdown gangs [p. 543]. 6. Control offices: Bombing these at important centres can disorganize railway administration by forcing less efficient decentralized control [p. 546]. Example: German Eastern Army control under “D.R. Ost” in WWI [p. 548]. 7. Intercommunication (telephone, telegraph) and signalling apparatus: Essential for centralized control; successful attack leads to “widespread dislocation” [p. 549, 550]. “Absolute block” system means a stoppage at one point holds up the entire line [p. 550]. Examples: Lagny collision, French concentration (1914), Turkish telephone exchanges at Megiddo [p. 551, 552]. 8. Marshalling yards: “Almost the most vulnerable points on the railway,” a stoppage in which would have “rapid and widespread repercussions” [p. 553, 554]. Work often done at night, so threat of bombers causes delays by plunging yards into darkness [p. 554, 555]. 9. Engine sheds and workshops: WWI experts deemed bombing these unprofitable due to vast resources and slight damage [p. 555]. But author argues this view may need revision for modern scale attacks as “constant feature in a co-ordinated programme of attrition” [p. 556, 557]. Moral effect (“disorganization of labour and restriction of output”) is important [p. 557]. Affects maintenance, repair, and manufacture [p. 558]. 10. Locomotives: WWI efforts had “insignificant percentage” effect on enemy’s total [p. 559]. But other theatres (Russia, Austria) had shortages [p. 560, 561]. “Round-house” engine sheds are vulnerable; single bomb on turntable can lock up many engines (e.g., Metz Sablon, Ruhr) [p. 562, 563, 564]. 11. Fuel reserves (coal dumps, watering arrangements): Can be important targets, especially in dry countries or when enemy relies on distant supply [p. 565, 566]. 12. Large stations with roofs: Heavy bombs can blow out walls, dropping roof and blocking lines for days [p. 566, 567]. ◦ Remember to “concentrate upon it the highest possible proportion of our available strength, and continue to do so for sufficient length of time to give a reasonable chance of decisive effect” [p. 569]. • Roads: ◦ Road transport offers “increased flexibility” but the railway is still best for bulk transport over long distances [p. 569, 570]. ◦ Importance of roads as objectives is “inverse ratio to density of railway system” [p. 570]. Crucial in undeveloped countries (e.g., Khyber road) [p. 570]. ◦ Roads are “difficult to break” by bombing [p. 571]. Blocking in towns (e.g., gas mains) is more feasible [p. 571]. ◦ Air action against roads primarily aims at “stopping or dislocating the traffic” [p. 571]. Bottle-necks and defiles (towns, bridges) are suitable [p. 572]. ◦ Attacking supply on roads forward of railheads is “not normally be worth while” as supplies become too scattered [p. 572]. Exception: sustained attack on a “single line of road communication” (e.g., Bar-le-Duc road into Verdun) [p. 572, 573]. • Bridges: ◦ Superficially attractive, but “not nearly such suitable objectives as they appear at first sight” [p. 573]. ◦ Important bridges are “almost bound to be defended” [p. 574]. Heavy bridges are “almost impossible to destroy from the air” (except by direct hit from super-heavy bomb) [p. 574]. Ordinary bridges can be “temporarily fit for use” quickly [p. 575]. ◦ Exceptions: A strategically vital bridge “not of very solid construction” (e.g., Kuleli Burgas railway bridge on Berlin-Constantinople line, whose destruction meant a “serious breach”) [p. 576]. ◦ As a rule, “it is better not to attempt to demolish bridges, but to regard them as defiles and attack the traffic crossing them” [p. 577]. Bridges are “the best example of that well-worn military expression the bottle-neck” [p. 577]. ▪ Examples: Köln bridges (German concentration 1914), Marne bridges (July 1918) where air action and artillery “dried up supply to the Divisions” [p. 578]. • New standards of judgment are needed for air war, recognizing the proven effects of air attack on communications [p. 579, 580]. This requires attention from airmen, administrators, and General Staff [p. 581].

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Part III: The Battle of Amiens, August 8th-11th, 1918

VII. The Story of the Battle

• Situation (July 1918): Sir Henry Rawlinson (Fourth British Army) drafted a plan to attack astride the Somme to disengage Amiens [p. 582]. German attack south of Rheims was ongoing, and another Lys offensive imminent [p. 582, 583]. German air attacks on London had ceased [p. 583], and British counter-measures (Independent Force) were bombing German war industry [p. 584]. Submarine menace was checked [p. 585]. • The Plan: ◦ Rawlinson’s original plan (July 17th) was of “limited scope,” aiming to secure Amiens, improve British/French junction, shorten the line, and strike at enemy morale [p. 586]. Key elements: surprise and secrecy, tank attack without artillery preparation (like Cambrai) [p. 587]. ◦ Plan was enlarged by Sir Douglas Haig to include the French First Army (General Débeney) [p. 588]. ◦ Further extended by Foch (Aug 5th) to “exploit by pushing on towards Ham” [p. 589]. ◦ The plan grew from limited to “far more ambitious” with “most far-reaching results, and aiming at a penetration little inferior in depth and importance to the great German break-through” [p. 590, 591]. ◦ Actual results: After a “most completely successful and apparently overwhelming initial break-in,” the attack “was brought to a standstill on the fourth day on a line little in advance of that originally intended as the final objective in Rawlinson’s original plan” [p. 591]. • Preliminary Arrangements and Orders: ◦ Conferences held with minimum senior officers to maintain secrecy [p. 593]. Brigadier-General L. E. O. Charlton (5th Brigade RAF) was present from July 30th [p. 594]. Air Force commanders need to be in the General’s confidence [p. 595]. ◦ Battle orders (Aug 1st, 6th) set objectives, allocated 10 heavy tank battalions (360 tanks) and 2 whippet tank battalions (96 tanks) [p. 597, 598, 599]. No artillery preparation, guns to cover assault and counter-battery fire [p. 598]. Cavalry Corps to assist infantry and explore towards Roye/Chaulnes [p. 599]. French First Army attacked 40 minutes after British zero [p. 599]. ◦ RAF instructions: ▪ Six Army Co-operation Squadrons (15th Wing, 5th Brigade) for contact patrol, artillery co-operation, and specific tasks like supplying machine-gun ammunition [p. 600, 601, 610]. Canadian and Australian Corps squadrons laid smoke screens [p. 609]. ▪ Eight single-seater fighter squadrons (22nd Wing) for “low-flying attack against objectives on the ground,” allotted by Corps front [p. 601, 602]. ▪ High flying patrols (9th Brigade, GHQ Reserve) to hold the ring [p. 603]. ▪ Two bomber squadrons (22nd Wing) and 7 other bomber squadrons to co-operate [p. 603, 604]. Bomber objectives were “railway centres at Chaulnes, Roye, Nesle, and Péronne, the crossings of the Somme, roads and billeting areas” [p. 605]. These details were arranged verbally [p. 605]. • The Battle: ◦ August 8th: RAF played a role in concealing the preliminary concentration (5 divisions, 2 cavalry divisions, 9 tank battalions, 1,000 guns moved into area) [p. 607]. Low-flying aircraft noise covered tank movements [p. 607]. Initial attack was “successful almost beyond the most sanguine expectations” [p. 608]. ▪ Low-flying fighters (22nd Wing) operated “Flying very low… completed the demoralization of the enemy by attacking his retiring troops and transport with bombs and machine-gun fire, and by shooting gun teams” [p. 612]. ▪ Bombers attacked enemy aerodromes and “by far the greatest proportion… was directed against the crossings of the Somme” [p. 613]. ▪ Reconnaissance was “disappointingly meagre” [p. 614]. ◦ August 9th: Enemy reinforced, resistance stiffened [p. 615]. Low-flying fighters continued; some shifted to offensive patrols [p. 616]. Bombers continued railway attacks [p. 617]. ◦ August 10th and 11th: Enemy stabilized defence; little progress despite desperate fighting [p. 617]. Attack called off on 11th by Canadian Corps due to difficult ground, lack of tank/artillery support [p. 618]. Fourth Army’s impetus was “finally spent” [p. 619]. ▪ RAF efforts slacked off; fighters returned to offensive patrol [p. 620]. Bombing of Somme bridges, billets, roads, railways continued [p. 621]. ◦ German Air Forces: Total 134 aircraft (64 single-seater fighter/battle, 12 bombers) in Second Army area on Aug 8th [p. 621]. Numerically inferior to British (British alone outnumbered Germans ~4:1, 1,390 to 340) [p. 622]. German tactics inclined to defensive [p. 623]. Most British casualties were from low-flying fighters due to small-arm fire [p. 624]. Enemy air activity increased on Aug 9th-10th, particularly night bombing [p. 624]. • Disappointing results after break-in: Despite initial overwhelming success, the attack’s strategic objective (pushing towards Ham) was not achieved [p. 626]. This was due to “the enemy had been able to bring up fresh troops and to reinforce his shattered artillery” [p. 627]. Sixteen German divisions arrived between Aug 8th-11th [p. 627]. • RAF contributions: “the remarkable concealment of the preliminary concentration” and “the very effective low-flying action by the fighter squadrons on the first day” [p. 628]. However, the strategic influence “was surprisingly limited” [p. 629].

IX. The R.A.F. in the Battle—The Air Plan

• A fundamental principle is to “clearly to define the object which the use of force is intended to attain” [p. 630]. • The system of verbal instructions for air cooperation in WWI made it difficult to assess [p. 630]. At Amiens, the object of air operations “was not clearly defined on paper” [p. 631]. The 5th Brigade commander evidently “did not understand it—or understood only part of it” [p. 632]. • His instructions to pilots defined the army’s task as capturing the “blue line” (old Amiens outer defences) and the air force’s task as direct support of infantry and helping other arms help infantry to the blue line [p. 632, 633]. This was “not a very wide scope for an arm of which the rate of tactical movement was even then at least twenty times that of the other arms on the ground” [p. 634]. • Mistake: “the selection of too limited an object, and in a failure to look sufficiently far ahead” [p. 635]. The blue line was only the first stage of the Supreme Command’s “far deeper penetration” plan [p. 636]. The Air Officer Commanding believed it was a “one-day battle,” showing he was not fully aware of the wider plan [p. 637]. • The object of the air force should have been to “isolate the battle-field from enemy reinforcement and supply” [p. 640]. This should have been clearly stated in orders, including the proportion of effort against specific objective classes [p. 640]. • Had this wider object been pursued (e.g., blocking main approaches to Bapaume-Noyon area), the “impetus of our initial advance might have been maintained unchecked across the old Somme battle-fields and on to St. Quentin” [p. 642]. • Temporary diversion of assault aircraft to support attacking troops (“break the crust”) was sound, and they might have been placed under Corps command [p. 643, 644]. • The Plan as it was (actual execution): ◦ Low-flying fighters (22nd Wing, 176 aircraft) performed “low-flying attacks on hostile troops, transport, gun-teams… and last but not least anti-tank guns” [p. 647]. Their action was “a factor of immense importance in the overwhelming success of the initial attack” [p. 648]. ◦ Bombers’ employment was based on reasoning that railway stations would have “little activity for the first ten hours” and distant ones shouldn’t be bombed till after 24 hours [p. 649, 650]. ◦ The air plan suffered from a “singular neglect… of the three essentials…—Information, Expert advice, and Reconnaissance” [p. 652]. 1. Information: Vast, detailed information on enemy divisions, positions, etc., was available from Intelligence Staff, but it’s unclear “To what extent all this mass of information was used in framing the air plan” [p. 653, 654]. Enemy reinforcements were underestimated [p. 655]. 2. Expert advice: Little serious attempt to cut railways on a thought-out plan, so “use of Technical advice… can hardly have arisen” [p. 655]. The policy of confining attacks on railways to active operations was perhaps “carried too far” [p. 656]. 3. Reconnaissance: “notably honoured in the breach” [p. 663]. Of three fighter-reconnaissance squadrons, two were used as fighters, and only “one flight of seven aircraft” from No. 48 squadron was left for vital reconnaissance [p. 664, 665]. These reconnaissances were often wasted, producing “little information which could not perfectly safely be taken for granted” and leaving “questions… unanswered—because they were never asked” (e.g., origin of trains, main road/rail movements deep in enemy territory) [p. 668, 669]. No reconnaissance for bridge usage was dispatched [p. 670]. ◦ The Plan as it might have been (suggested alternative): ▪ Object: “To prevent enemy reinforcements and supply traffic from entering the area Bapaume—Le Catelet-Guise-La Fére-Noyon, and to break up the movement towards the battle front of enemy reserves already within that area” [p. 687]. This would allow the attack to “maintain its initial impetus unchecked across the Somme to the great road and rail centre of St. Quentin” [p. 681]. ▪ Road movement: Difficult to block all roads, but “defiles, where roads converge in villages and towns” are suitable for bombing [p. 681, 682]. ▪ Railways: Breaches at “only five points, at Cambrai, Le Cateau, Le Nouvion, Vervins, and Laon, would virtually put a stop to all rail movement towards the front attacked” [p. 683, 684]. This would be fatal to the enemy [p. 684]. ▪ Suggested Method: • (a) Reconnaissance: Continuous patrols over a wide deep area (Douai-Soissons) for road/rail movement, continued at night by light night-bombers [p. 687, 688, 689]. • (b) Bombing: Primary task: “cut and keep cut the railways at Cambrai, Le Cateau, Le Nouvion, Vervins, and Laon” from the evening of the 8th, supplemented by derailing trains [p. 689]. • (c) Day-bomber attacks (first 10 hours): Low-altitude attacks on German Second Army HQ and Corps HQ, billeting areas of fit reserve divisions (54th, 243rd), and specific road communications [p. 690, 691]. • (d) Low-flying attack: Maximum squadrons against formed enemy troops/transport in back areas, focusing on bottle-necks and Somme bridges [p. 691]. Subsidiary role: 22nd Wing under Corps for temporary close support to infantry/tanks on blue line [p. 692]. • (e) Unfit/reserve divisions: Reconnaissance first, then attack by assault aircraft/bombers when movement is confirmed [p. 692, 693]. • (f) Air superiority: Vigorous execution of offensive and strong offensive patrols to ensure secure base against enemy air action [p. 694, 695].

X. The R.A.F. in the Battle (contd.) Tactical Concentration

• The allocation of resources is crucial: “The Selection of a correct object demands knowledge and judgement to ensure that the resources which can be made available are sufficient for its attainment” [p. 695, 696]. • Principle of Concentration: “the concentration and employment of the maximum force, moral, physical, and material, at the decisive time and place” [p. 697]. • Principle of Economy of Force: “To economize strength, while compelling dissipation of that of the enemy” by using “the smallest forces for purposes of security, of diverting the enemy’s attention or of containing superior enemy strength” [p. 698]. This is a “necessary complement to the principle of concentration” [p. 698]. • Amiens front (August 8th) was the “decisive place in the west” [p. 699]. • Concentration considered under four headings: ◦ (a) Concentration of maximum possible number of aircraft on the decisive task: ▪ Only 47% of British striking-force squadrons in France were concentrated on the decisive task on Aug 8th [p. 702]. ▪ In contrast, Germans concentrated 57% of their aircraft on the attacking armies’ front for their March offensive, despite holding twice the line length [p. 703]. ▪ British numerical superiority (4:1 British vs. German total on Aug 8th) was not fully leveraged [p. 704]. ▪ Reasons for low British concentration: decentralized command, Army commanders reluctant to release reserves [p. 705, 706]. ▪ Contrast with Royal Tank Corps: “every up-to-date tank in the B.E.F. was concentrated” (456 vehicles) under Fourth Army [p. 706]. ▪ Squadrons not taking part in Amiens battle: • Squadrons on other Army fronts (7 squadrons) [p. 707]. • 5th Group on Belgian coast (8 squadrons) engaged in “private war against German air bases in Belgium” despite submarine menace being “virtually a thing of the past” [p. 708]. • Independent Force (6 squadrons) bombing German war industry; its activities were “difficult to justify under the circumstances at the time” and had “little or no effect on the situation at the decisive point” [p. 707, 709]. These were “unjustified diversion[s]” [p. 709]. • Home Defence force (400 aircraft) was a “very strong potential reserve” but not practically available due to fixed garrisons and political demands [p. 710, 712]. ▪ Lessons: Air forces should not be permanent fixed garrisons; full use of mobility is needed [p. 712]. ▪ Suggested concentration for Amiens: 61% of British air forces on the Amiens battle (1,249 aircraft total) [p. 713, 714]. This concentration was administratively “perfectly practicable” [p. 716]. It does not mean massing aircraft in one small area, but unified control on a single plan [p. 718]. It can also deceive the enemy [p. 718]. ▪ Some preparatory moves of squadrons would be necessary [p. 720]. It requires being less dependent on hangars and having mobile ground organization [p. 721]. ▪ Concealing concentration: the British army doubled its strength without betraying the secret [p. 723]. Dummy aerodromes and concentration of obsolete aircraft could be used for deception [p. 724]. ▪ Pilots knowing the ground is essential, especially for assault aircraft [p. 725]. This could be managed by attaching reinforcing unit commanders/leaders to existing units [p. 727]. ▪ Security for other sectors: Critics might argue weakening other sectors, but air forces can be “switched back at a moment’s notice” [p. 728]. The immense Allied numerical superiority at the decisive point would force the enemy onto the defensive elsewhere [p. 729, 730]. “The power to achieve great results in war entails the reasoned acceptance of calculated risks” [p. 731]. ◦ (b) Development of the maximum effort by squadrons concentrated: ▪ British policy was “constant pressure” [p. 732]. ▪ Analysis showed actual effort often fell below maximum (e.g., No. 205 Squadron’s performance as 100% standard, others averaging under 50%) [p. 733, 734]. ▪ “The effort that we put forth to avert disaster to our own arms should at least be equalled by that exerted to inflict disaster upon the enemy” [p. 734]. Resources should be husbanded in less critical periods and strained to the utmost in battle [p. 734, 736]. ◦ (c) Concentration of effort upon the minimum number of objectives: ▪ Foch emphasized “concentration of every resource… on such few of the most important of the enemy’s railway junctions as it may be possible to put out of action with certainty, and keep out of action” [p. 736]. ▪ At Amiens, 11 squadrons attacked 22 objectives in 24 hours [p. 737]. The suggested plan would have had 28 British bomber squadrons (and French allies) directing bulk effort at only 5 railway points [p. 737, 738]. This intensity could “completely stopped rail traffic through those five points” [p. 739]. ◦ (d) Centralization of control: ▪ Difficulty with inter-Allied forces (“Marshal Foch has described himself as ‘the conductor of an orchestra’”) [p. 740]. ▪ A Supreme Air Commander under the Generalissimo would have been beneficial [p. 740]. ▪ British air striking force in France was decentralized among “eight different commanders” (Vice-Admiral Dover Patrol, five Army Commanders, A.O.C. Independent Force) [p. 742]. ▪ Argument for a single British air commander under General Rawlinson at Amiens [p. 743, 744]. This would allow survey of the “air situation on the entire front… and the combined efforts… properly co-ordinated and directed to the attainment of the one common object” [p. 745]. • Warning on low-flying attack: The large-scale use of low-flying fighters in Aug 1918 was justified by “desperate nature of the situation” and huge numerical superiority (3x RAF 1935 strength) [p. 747, 748]. In future, with fewer fighter squadrons, it will be difficult to divert them from their normal task of destroying enemy aircraft and clearing the ring for bombers [p. 748, 749]. • German reinforcement of Second Army (Aug 8th-11th): 16 German divisions arrived, 12 from other army fronts [p. 627]. Routes for identified divisions are deduced, showing significant rail movement (e.g., ~200-300 trains through Cambrai within 48 hours) [p. 749, 750, 753].

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Part IV: Conclusions

XI. The Third Revolution

• History sees military revolutions from new inventions: gunpowder, the machine-gun [p. 753, 754]. The third revolution is “the conquest of the air,” and it is “the most revolutionary of all” [p. 755].

“Where other weapons have enhanced the capacity of men to kill each other in battle, and increased the depth of the battle-field, the Air may stop men or their supplies arriving at the battle-field at all” (Slessor, 755). • Conclusions (Deductions): 1. Influence on the maintenance of modern armies: History shows defeats due to defective transportation and supply (Masséna, Russia/Japan, Mesopotamia, Tannenberg, German 1914 invasion) [p. 758, 759]. Colonel Wingfield concluded that air action “could definitely prevent trench warfare occurring again” by making supply unsustainable [p. 759, 760]. First conclusion: For a “man-power and shell-power basis” army, the “margin of safety on the line of communication… in the face of modern air action, would be such that no insurance company would consider it as a reasonable risk” [p. 761]. This applies even more forcefully in countries with less developed infrastructure than Northern France [p. 762]. 2. Single lines of supply: Fatal maintenance difficulties in past wars were often due to single lines of supply (e.g., river for Townsend in Mesopotamia, Trans-Siberian railway for Russians in Manchuria, Turkish rail to Gallipoli, Kantara pipeline to Palestine) [p. 763, 764]. The Suez Canal is a “very vulnerable artery” benefiting from Palestine’s depth in air defence [p. 764, 765]. ▪ Far East example (Japan vs. Soviet): Japanese anxiety about Russian air bases near Vladivostok, and Russian concern for Vladivostok and garrisons at the end of the “immensely long line of the Trans-Siberian railway” [p. 765, 767]. Russian efforts to double-track and build new lines highlight the vulnerability [p. 767, 768]. ▪ Second conclusion: “in a future war against a highly equipped enemy, no army can afford to be dependent on a single line of supply within hostile bombing range” [p. 770]. 3. Staffs must think wider and use larger maps: Air forces can assist armies by “operating from bases far distant… against objectives on the enemy’s line of communication a long way from the front—in effect, by attacking his communications from a flank” [p. 771, 772]. Examples: Japanese air force cutting railway at Chita from Manchukuo, British bombers from Cyprus against Turkish railways [p. 772, 773]. This is the third conclusion [p. 773]. 4. Influence on the strategic concentration of armies: Initial movements to concentration areas (e.g., German 1914: 11,000 trains for 3 million men) present “enormous possibilities of dislocation” [p. 773, 774]. Railways are least elastic when congested [p. 775]. ▪ However, highly developed frontier areas (Franco-German) have abundant railways [p. 775]. Modern road transportation and mechanization increase flexibility [p. 777, 778]. Detrainment areas will be deeper, reducing vulnerable accumulations [p. 778, 779]. ▪ In less developed countries, where railways are fewer and roads poor (e.g., Budapest-Belgrade line for Serbia), the situation is “very different” [p. 779, 780]. ▪ Fourth conclusion: Initial concentration of large “man-power” armies in well-served countries cannot be stopped but “can be delayed” [p. 780, 781]. 5. Preventing concentration in specific conditions: Fifth conclusion: “in a country where communications are scarce… above all where the enemy’s initial concentration depends upon a single line of railway, it is probable that it can actually be prevented” [p. 782]. Against a “third-rate Power with a weak and inefficient air force,” this is “almost to a certainty” [p. 782]. 6. Dispositions in the concentration area: Future concentrations must differ from “huge agglomerations of troops in comparatively small areas” [p. 783]. Nelson’s idea of concentration (reaching decisive point with superior force in time via good information) is a model [p. 783]. Sixth conclusion: Develop a “new technique” for disposition, reconnaissance, intercommunication, and movement [p. 784]. 7. Forward movement from the area of concentration: The first stage where air action delays may be significant [p. 784]. Invading armies (e.g., German in Belgium 1914) present “enormous columns on the roads,” making the air striking force a “weapon of the utmost strategical value” [p. 785, 786]. ▪ An invading army becomes “more and more susceptible to air attack” as it moves forward [p. 786]. ▪ Efficacy of air attack enhanced by “carefully co-ordinated programme of strategic demolitions,” canalizing enemy LoC and increasing susceptibility [p. 787, 788]. ▪ Coordinating air and armoured forces: Tank raids compel enemy to concentrate maintenance/supply installations, creating “excellent and vulnerable targets for the air force, and vice versa” [p. 789, 790]. ▪ Seventh conclusion: Forward movement of WWI-model armies can be seriously delayed, potentially fatally. The “most dangerous situation for an army is when it is well forward at the end of long lines of communication.” Action by “every agency of attack on those communications—air, tanks, and demolitions—must be correlated and co-ordinated” [p. 791, 792]. 8. Influence on railway for minor strategic movements: Railways were used for “larger form of tactics or battle-field strategy” (e.g., German operations against Russians in East Prussia) [p. 792, 793]. But constant strain and existing difficulties (refugee traffic, evacuations, accidents) meant the system could not have functioned under “additional stress of constant dislocation from the air” [p. 794, 795]. ▪ Eighth conclusion: “in future the railway can no longer be regarded as an instrument of major tactics; because rapid movements of troops on a large scale… will no longer be safe, or even practicable, within effective bombing range of a powerful air force” [p. 796]. This means movements will take “much longer,” allowing enemy warning and new dispositions [p. 796]. 9. Air striking force in battle (converting “break-in” into “break-through”): Air action holds the key to maintaining attack momentum and preventing enemy reserves from reaching the threatened point [p. 797, 798].

Ninth conclusion: “the primary task of the air striking force in a land battle must be to isolate the area attacked from reinforcement and supply” (Slessor, 799). 10. Correlation of ground and air plans:

Winston Churchill (1917): “For our air offensive to attain its full effect it is necessary that our ground offensive should be of a character to throw the greatest possible strain upon the enemy’s communications” (Slessor, 800). ▪ Tenth conclusion: “Land and air operations must be deliberately planned to get the best out of each other” [p. 801]. The ground plan may be “profoundly influenced by the air factor” [p. 801]. Example: Allied concentration of air power on Soissons bottleneck could have “pulled tight the string of the bag” on 30 German divisions in July 1918 [p. 803]. The task of ground forces is to penetrate/defeat forward troops, while the air force’s is to prevent/block enemy reinforcement/supply, creating opportunity for ground forces [p. 804, 805]. • General Conclusion: ◦ The days of “National Armies on the traditional, early twentieth-century, man-power and shell-power model are inevitably numbered” for serious warfare against a first-class enemy [p. 808]. ◦ Air power is “the most decisive one, of a number of factors favouring the rise of the small, highly mobile, hard-hitting, armoured and mechanized army of to-morrow” [p. 808, 809]. > The “Army of a Dream”: Consists of frontier defence forces (garrisons, AA, coast defences) (Slessor, 809), mobile armoured counter-attack forces (backed by motorized infantry/sappers, machine-guns, anti-tank weapons) (Slessor, 810), and a long-range air striking force that will “carry the war into the enemy’s country, cut the communications behind his fighting troops, and co-operate with the armoured force in the counter-attack” (Slessor, 811). This may be a “fantasy” but might involve “fundamental modifications… difficult and drastic” for British army organization (Slessor, 811).