Military Strategy

Online Description

“No military service can long remain effective without searching self-criticism and continuous re-examination of its own ideas. Wylie, well known in the Navy, is a refreshingly and outspoken individual, thoroughly at home on the bridge of a ship, but equally at home in the semantics of dialectical discussion. He has produced a simple but relevant little work in an attempt to promote order in the discussion of strategy… . To the traditional theories of strategy-the maritime theory, the air theory, the continental theory-Wylie adds the ‘Mao theory’ of wars of national liberation… . [This book is] easier to read and understand and basically sounder than the great majority of the involved and tortuous rationalizations of the academic strategists.”- New York Times Book Review

🔫 Author Background

Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie, USN — career U.S. Navy officer with wartime and postwar sea duty; commanded destroyers, an attack cargo ship, and a heavy cruiser (WWII & after).
Staff & strategy posts — served in the Office of Naval Research, Chief of Staff at the Naval War College, and Deputy Commander in Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe.
Newport command — at the time of publication, he was Commander, Naval Base Newport (RI).
Author/thinker — frequent contributor to the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings; wrote Military Strategy to bring order to strategic thought.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Problem Wylie sees: strategy debates are too often ad hoc—driven by hunch, bias, or experience—rather than a disciplined intellectual activity.
His aim in the book: show why existing ways of thinking are “superficial and inadequate,” sketch their limits, and propose a general theory that yields more orderly, productive strategic thought.
Core claim: the aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy; strategy is about controlling the pattern of war—by manipulating its centers of gravity—to obtain political purposes.
Key tool & distinction: strategists combine sequential (stepwise, campaign-like) and cumulative (aggregated, statistical) strategies; success rests on balancing and timing them.
Ultimate determinant: notwithstanding technology, the man on the scene with a gun remains the final instrument of control.

📒 Sections

Preface

The preface introduces the author’s motivation and the book’s purpose. Wylie laments that strategy, despite profoundly affecting society, remains a “disorganized, undisciplined intellectual activity” (Wylie, p. 5). He notes that while professionals like Field Marshal Montgomery criticize past battles, their comments are often ad hoc, based on personal judgment or bias, differing little from amateurs (Wylie, p. 3-4).

Wylie’s goal in this book is to:

Indicate why existing methods of thinking about strategy are “superficial and inadequate” (Wylie, p. v).
Outline existing theories of strategy and their limitations (Wylie, p. 5).
Speculate on a general theory of strategy that could lead to “more orderly and productive strategic thought” (Wylie, p. v).

He emphasizes that a good theory doesn’t guarantee success but provides a “stable and orderly point of departure” for devising, executing, and criticizing strategy (Wylie, p. 6). He also clarifies that his opinions are his own and do not reflect official views of the Navy Department or Department of Defense (Wylie, p. 8-9).

1. The Military Mind and Strategy

This chapter criticizes the lack of systematic, objective study of the “military mind” and strategy, contrasting it with the intense study given to political and economic minds (Wylie, p. 10-13). Wylie asserts that strategic ideas have profoundly influenced human destinies, yet too few recognize “the controlling strategic concepts and theories hidden behind the glamor or the stench or the vivid, active drama of the war itself” (Wylie, p. 5).

He highlights that scholars have largely ignored the problem of war theories, focusing instead on specific current problems rather than conceptual aspects (Wylie, p. 19-20, fn). Wylie identifies seven significant contributors to the understanding and influence of war through ideas: Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Mahan, Corbett, Douhet, Liddell Hart, and Mao Tse-tung (Wylie, p. 20-21). He admits his book is “no pretense at the sorely needed scholarship” and that strategy’s intellectual framework and vocabulary are “not clearly outlined” and “almost nonexistent” (Wylie, p. 23-24).

Key points:

The discussion is about warfare, not battles, and strategy, not tactics (Wylie, p. 25-26).
The “secrets” of strategy are often unwarranted notions; basic patterns of strategic thought “should not be looked on as any kind of a secret” (Wylie, p. 28-29). More public understanding of these patterns leads to “more healthy…democracy in its strategic decisions” (Wylie, p. 29-30).
Strategy is not a “science” in the physical sense, but “strategic judgment can be scientific to the extent that it is orderly, rational, objective, inclusive, discriminatory, and perceptive” (Wylie, p. 31-32).

2. Methods of Studying Strategy

Wylie defines strategy as: “A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment” (Wylie, p. 13). This definition is not limited to military application, though the book largely focuses on it (Wylie, p. 33-34). A strategist must consider both the purpose and the system of measures (Wylie, p. 34).

He argues that strategy itself has no moral quality; its morality is judged by “the cultural value judgments of the critics” (Wylie, p. 15). However, the morality of the purpose and measures can affect the strategy’s validity by imposing “definite limits on both the purposes and the systems of measures that may be considered for adoption” (Wylie, p. 38-39).

Wylie then critiques common methods of studying strategy:

Classical method (poet/historian): Provides feel and facts, but analysts need to go further (Wylie, p. 41-42).
War-phases / Attitudinal descriptions (“defensive,” “offensive”): While Clausewitz used this sophisticatedly, it is generally insufficient for “penetrating analysis or for practical application in the strategic planning process” (Wylie, p. 45-46). It’s inherently post hoc, relying on assumed future facts (Wylie, p. 48).
“Principles of War” (e.g., objective, offensive, concentration): Wylie dismisses these as “logical nonsense” and an “unaware substitution of slogan for thought” (Wylie, p. 52-54). They are attempts to categorize common sense, not tools for strategic analysis (Wylie, p. 53-54).
Broadening horizons (political, economic, social factors): While improving strategists’ appreciation of their environment, this “does not bear directly on the subject of strategic patterns of thought” (Wylie, p. 55-57).

He states that he will present two less commonly recognized methods: analysis by operational pattern and analysis on a conceptual or theoretical foundation, believing the latter is “the more embracing and more fundamental and thus should be the more productive field for study” (Wylie, p. 57-58).

3. Cumulative and Sequential Strategies

Wylie introduces two “hitherto unrecognized general operational patterns of strategies”:

Sequential strategy: A war as a series of “discrete steps or actions,” where each action is “dependent on, the one that preceded it” (Wylie, p. 24). Examples include MacArthur’s and the Central Pacific drives in World War II, or the Normandy landings (Wylie, p. 61). Results can be forecast with accuracy (Wylie, p. 61-62).
Cumulative strategy: A war where the pattern is a “collection of lesser actions,” but these are “not sequentially interdependent” (Wylie, p. 24). Each is “no more than a single statistic” (Wylie, p. 24). Examples include psychological warfare, economic warfare, or the submarine campaigns in World War II (Wylie, p. 63). The thing that counts is the “cumulative effect” (Wylie, p. 24). Forecast of specific actions is not possible (Wylie, p. 63).

He notes that the US conducted both types against Japan in WWII, with the sequential drives and the cumulative tonnage war operating “essentially independent in the day-to-day activity” (Wylie, p. 25). He states that cumulative strategies have not been successful when operating by themselves (Wylie, p. 68), citing French guerre de course and German submarine efforts (Wylie, p. 68-69). However, when used “in conjunction with a sequential strategy, directed at a critical point within the enemy structure,” cumulative strategies have often been decisive (Wylie, p. 69).

Wylie suggests recognizing and integrating cumulative strategies into basic strategic thinking, and studying them more closely to determine their critical points (Wylie, p. 71-72). He believes this concept can help in judging the interrelationships between ground, air, and sea forces (Wylie, p. 73-74). He caveats that this concept is not a complete theory of warfare, but a “conceptual device that can be used within the outlines of one or more theories of warfare” (Wylie, p. 75-76), and it’s not susceptible to rigid mathematical tabulations (Wylie, p. 76).

4. The Case for Theory in Strategy

Wylie reiterates his criticism of the lack of disciplined study of warfare’s totality and its conceptual foundations (Wylie, p. 77-79). He argues that while military practitioners are often brilliant, they often “do not recognize that they are following, and are indeed bound by, definite theories” (Wylie, p. 79-80). This intuitive understanding limits their vision and hinders communication between practitioners of different theories (Wylie, p. 80-81).

He believes that recognizing the existence of “at least four—and possibly more—valid and practical theories of strategy” would lead to better study and allow strategists to “tailor his plans accordingly, having had the widest possible field for his intellect to operate in” (Wylie, p. 83-84). This would improve communication and understanding between different military branches (Wylie, p. 84).

Wylie emphasizes that the “continuing evolution and refinement of the theories should be a task for the scholars, not for the practicing military men” (Wylie, p. 34). However, military men and those who influence strategy should “recognize that the theories do exist… and should understand the general conceptual framework within which they and their colleagues actually practice their professions” (Wylie, p. 86-87). He defines a theory as “simply an idea designed to account for actuality or to account for what the theorist thinks will come to pass as actuality” (Wylie, p. 34). Its validity is measured by how closely its postulates “coincide with reality” (Wylie, p. 87-88).

5. The Existing Theories

Wylie identifies three generally recognized major theories of war strategy and one newly emergent: the continental, maritime, air theories, and the Mao theory of “wars of national liberation” (Wylie, p. 89-90). He notes their histories and structures differ, making direct comparison difficult (Wylie, p. 90).

I. THE MARITIME THEORY

Has “a long record of practice and a fairly clear pattern of theory” (Wylie, p. 39).
Consists of two parts:
1. Establishment of control of the sea: Clearly described by Corbett, though Mahan “sensed it” (Wylie, p. 94). This means “complete knowledge and complete control of everything that moves by sea” (Wylie, p. 40), though often a “governing degree of control” suffices (Wylie, p. 97).
2. Exploitation of the control of the sea toward establishment of control on the land: This second part was only recently described in theoretical terms (Wylie, p. 95-96). Historically, exploitation was diffuse, primarily economic (blockade) with political/social by-products (Wylie, p. 97-98).
Direct projection of force from sea to land (amphibious assault) was nearly impossible until WWII, when necessary “technical requirements” (boats, vehicles, armor, guns, radios, management) became available (Wylie, p. 100-101).
A recent technological extension is the submarine-launched Polaris missile, which relies on “pre-launch security” from sea control for its “extension of power from the sea onto the land” (Wylie, p. 102-103).

II. THE AIR THEORY

Unique in that it “was born as an idea rather than developed from experience” and “has never been adequately put to practice” (Wylie, p. 92).
Wylie uses Giulio Douhet as the “best basic source” for air theory concepts, noting his significant influence in the U.S. (Wylie, p. 104-106).
Douhet’s basic beliefs (from The Command of the Air):
- War form depends on “technical means of war available” (Wylie, p. 43).
- Air power and poison gas “will completely upset all forms of war” (Wylie, p. 43).
- Air power allows ravaging the enemy’s country by chemical/bacteriological warfare (Wylie, p. 108).
- To prevent enemy air attacks, one must “destroy his air power before he has a chance to strike at us” (Wylie, p. 44).
- Aerial offensives target “industrial and commercial establishments; important buildings… transportation arteries and centers; and certain designated areas of civilian population” using explosives, incendiaries, and poison gas (Wylie, p. 109-110).
- “To have command of the air means to be in a position to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability to fly oneself” (Wylie, p. 44).
- “To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat” (Wylie, p. 110-111).
- Defense must aim at “conquering the command of the air” (Wylie, p. 44).
- Advocates “a progressive decrease of land and sea forces, accompanied by a corresponding increase of aerial forces” (Wylie, p. 45).
- New war character leads to “swift, crushing decisions” (Wylie, p. 45).
- An Independent Air Force is “completely free of any preoccupation with the actions of the enemy force” (Wylie, p. 45).
The Douhet theory’s “potential validity” was enhanced by nuclear weapons, where “destruction is equivalent to control” (Wylie, p. 119-120).
Three problems with air theory today:
1. Uncertainty of nuclear weapon use (Wylie, p. 120).
2. Extensibility into aerospace theories, requiring a correlation between destruction and control (Wylie, p. 120-121).
3. Determining “what kind of control is desired, and under what circumstances will destruction or the threat of destruction bring about the desired measure of control?” (Wylie, p. 48).

III. THE CONTINENTAL THEORY

The soldier’s conception of “strategy” differs from the sailor’s or airman’s due to terrain, which is “the fixed field within which he operates” and “the limitation within which he must function” (Wylie, p. 122-123). This leads to the concept of “theater” (Wylie, p. 124-125).
Unlike naval or air forces, the soldier aims to “maintain contact until the war is over”; for the soldier, “the shading between a tactic and a strategy is a fuzzy and not too important one” (Wylie, p. 51).
The third governing factor is the ultimate objective: “The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces and his will to fight” (Wylie, p. 130-131), which Wylie attributes to Clausewitzian theory (Wylie, p. 131-132).
Clausewitz’s convictions: Destruction of enemy military force is the main principle, effected by engagements, with great battles producing great results, and the general commanding in person (Wylie, p. 133-134).
This theory explains the soldier’s view that air and naval forces primarily “transport the soldier to the scene of action and support him after he gets there” (Wylie, p. 54). The soldier is “the only one of the military men who cannot do his part of the war alone” (Wylie, p. 138-139).
This concept also explains the soldier’s insistence on controlling supporting forces and a centralized national military staff (Wylie, p. 139-140).
Wylie questions if “destruction of the enemy’s army” is always a valid assumption, citing the intact Japanese army in 1945 and Dienbienphu where political reasons led to surrender (Wylie, p. 141-142).

IV. THE MAO THEORY

Referred to as “war of national liberation,” which Wylie considers more accurate than “guerrilla warfare” (Wylie, p. 57).
Mao Tse-tung is its “father” (Wylie, p. 147), with Ho Chi Minh, Vo Nguyen Giap, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara as key propagators (Wylie, p. 147).
This is a Chinese communist theory, distinct from Russian communist theory (Marx-Lenin-Stalin) which focused on the urban proletariat (Wylie, p. 149-150). Mao “reworked the theory and used the rural peasant” as his base (Wylie, p. 150-151), a crucial difference (Wylie, p. 151).
The theory’s purpose is “to destroy an existing society… and to replace them with a completely new state structure” (Wylie, p. 59).
Process: Starts with a “small, puritanically fervent group of believers,” expands with political indoctrination, then combines “guerrilla warfare with political, social, and economic warfare” against the incumbent government (Wylie, p. 152-153). Success leads to organized hostility, collapse of the old government, and its replacement by communist apparatus (Wylie, p. 153).
Key quotations:
- Mao: “There is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive battle” (Wylie, p. 60). “small units acting independently play the principal role” (Wylie, p. 60). “The tactics of defense have no place” (Wylie, p. 60).
- Guevara: “The guerrilla is—above all else—an agrarian revolutionary” and “a social reformer” (Wylie, p. 156-157). “Popular forces can win a war against an army” (Wylie, p. 61). “One does not necessarily have to wait for a revolutionary situation… it can be created” (Wylie, p. 61). “rural areas are the best battlefields for revolution” (Wylie, p. 157-158).
- Giap: “it was first and foremost a people’s war” (Wylie, p. 61). “no clearly-defined front… The front was nowhere, it was everywhere” (Wylie, p. 63). “necessary to accumulate thousands of small victories to turn them into a great success” (Wylie, p. 61). “combining military operations with political and economic action” (Wylie, p. 62).
Opposite of Clausewitz: The Mao theory is “almost complete oppositeness” to the continental theory, focusing on small units, no decisive battles, and rural areas, not massed armies and great engagements (Wylie, p. 163-164).
Cumulative vs. Sequential: The “normal strategy of the continental or Clausewitz theory is a sequential strategy,” but “a main weight of the Mao theory is based on a cumulative, not a sequential, concept” (Wylie, p. 63). The “guerrilla part of the effort is a cumulative one,” while the “political part” is sequential (Wylie, p. 165).

6. The Limitations of Existing Theories

Wylie argues that the three Western theories (continental, maritime, air) are treated as general theories but are actually “specific theories, each valid under certain specific conditions and diminishing in validity as the limits of reality…depart from the tacitly identified ideal on which they are predicated” (Wylie, p. 170-171). This leads to “marked and sometimes heated arguments” between proponents, as each assumes their theory is universally best (Wylie, p. 168-170). He uses the Korean War strategic bombing debate as an example: the strategic bombers were capable, but the “assumptions did not coincide with reality” for that specific conflict (Wylie, p. 171-172). A true general theory of strategy must meet stringent requirements:

Applicable to “any conflict situation, any time, any place” (Wylie, p. 67).
Applicable under “any restrictions or limitations” (Wylie, p. 67).
Must absorb the realities of existing specific theories (continental, maritime, air, Mao) (Wylie, p. 173-174).
Must not be so vague as to be “formless and unusable” (Wylie, p. 67). Wylie discusses two ways of constructing theories:

Tautological theories: Logically consistent but cannot be applied to real situations (Wylie, p. 174-175). Price: “exists in vacuo” (Wylie, p. 67).
Empirical theories: Explain only past facts (continental, maritime theories) (Wylie, p. 176). Price: “cannot be applied to future events with consistent rigor” (Wylie, p. 68). He states his general theory will draw on both and acknowledges it will be largely “speculative” at first (Wylie, p. 177). Wylie considers Liddell Hart’s concept of the indirect approach as the only one that “approaches these requirements” (Wylie, p. 68). Liddell Hart applies it primarily to the continental theory but extends its applicability beyond purely military, including psychological, economic, and political activities (Wylie, p. 178-180). His core idea: “the strategist should unbalance the enemy’s system” to achieve success, ideally “without even having to fight” (Wylie, p. 180-181). Wylie notes Liddell Hart’s theory is more receptive to Mao’s concepts than Clausewitz’s (Wylie, p. 182). However, Wylie finds a “defect in the concept of the indirect approach as it is now postulated” due to an “incomplete vocabulary,” making it “formless…slippery, nebulous, loose, and…difficult in its deliberate application” (Wylie, p. 183-184). He concludes that if any two theories of strategy are not compatible, then “neither of them is a valid general theory” (Wylie, p. 71). This is unique to strategy among social disciplines, as war is “intercultural” and a general theory “must be universal” (Wylie, p. 192). The limitations of the existing four major theories stem from their lack of universality in underlying assumptions:

Continental theory (Clausewitz): Assumes armies must meet and be defeated, and that maritime/air war need not be governing factors (Wylie, p. 193-194).
Maritime theory: Assumes maritime communications are “a necessary element of influence” (Wylie, p. 74).
Air theory: Assumes “control of a people can in fact be exercised by imposition (or threat of imposition) of some kind of physical destruction” from the air (Wylie, p. 195).
Mao theory: Based on the assumption that “rural masses exist and can be used as the base of revolution” (Wylie, p. 74). A general theory would bring “order to the consideration and resolution of conflicting opinions,” moving beyond compromise to “generally prevailing mutual understanding as to common aims” (Wylie, p. 197-198).

7. Assumptions Underlying a General Theory

Wylie proposes four basic assumptions as foundations for a general theory of war strategy:

“Despite whatever effort there may be to prevent it, there may be war” (Wylie, p. 78). This acknowledges the necessity for armed forces and ensures focus on “realities of war” (Wylie, p. 205-207).
“The aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy” (Wylie, p. 79).
- He challenges the aphorism “wars are a continuation of policy by other means” (Wylie, p. 79). For a nonaggressor, war is “a nearly complete collapse of policy” (Wylie, p. 80). Prewar policies are often “utterly invalid” in war (Wylie, p. 210). While it can be a “continuation of a basic policy of national survival,” more specific interpretations are dangerous (Wylie, p. 212-213). For an aggressor, there might be continuity (Wylie, p. 213).
- He also challenges the traditional Clausewitzian aim of “defeat of the enemy army” (Wylie, p. 82). This “narrows the vision” and denies consideration of actions that “might more readily and easily achieve the needed measure of control” (Wylie, p. 216-217).
- The desired control should not be “so extreme as to amount to extermination” (Wylie, p. 83), but also not “so tenuous as to foster the continued behavior of the enemy as a hazard to the victor” (Wylie, p. 83).
“We cannot predict with certainty the pattern of the war for which we prepare ourselves” (Wylie, p. 219-220). This means the primary requirement for peacetime war planning is not a single rigid plan, but a “spectrum of war-plan concepts, for the broadest possible conceptual span of strategies for war” (Wylie, p. 220-221). Planning for certainty is “the greatest of all military mistakes” (Wylie, p. 85).
“The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun” (Wylie, p. 85). This “man is the final power in war. He is control. He determines who wins” (Wylie, p. 85). While other means influence, ultimate control requires the potential or actual presence of the soldier (Wylie, p. 225-226). This directly contrasts with the pure Douhet theory (Wylie, p. 227). Wylie considers the first three assumptions “critical” for his argument’s continuance, while the fourth is subject to differing opinions but he believes it “necessary” unless proven otherwise (Wylie, p. 226-229).

8. The Development of a General Theory

Wylie proposes his general theory based on the four assumptions. For the aggressor, war is an attempt to establish control by military means (Wylie, p. 230). For the conservator, it’s a scramble to avoid falling under enemy control (Wylie, p. 232). A state of “equilibrium” may arise where neither side has a clear advantage (Wylie, p. 233-234). At this point, “the critical decisions of the war are made” (Wylie, p. 88). The aggressor may need to shift strategic direction (rarely happens), while the conservator faces the decision to “deliberately take control of the pattern, shift the center of gravity of the war to a scene or to a character of his own choosing” (Wylie, p. 235-236). The basic problem facing the strategist is: “Where shall be the center of gravity of the war? Shall it be where the opponent wants it for his purposes, or where the strategist wants it?” (Wylie, p. 90). Controlling the “strategic weights or centers of gravity” is “the fundamental key to the conduct of warfare” (Wylie, p. 90). This involves moving the center of weight toward points that are “most critical to the opponent and are, at the same time, most vulnerable” (Wylie, p. 91). Wylie’s fundamental theme for a general theory of strategy is: “The primary aim of the strategist in the conduct of war is some selected degree of control of the enemy for the strategist’s own purpose; this is achieved by control of the pattern of war; and this control of the pattern of war is had by manipulation of the center of gravity of war to the advantage of the strategist and the disadvantage of the opponent” (Wylie, p. 242-243). “The successful strategist is the one who controls the nature and the placement and the timing and the weight of the centers of gravity of war, and who exploits the resulting control of the pattern of war toward his own ends” (Wylie, p. 91). He illustrates this with historical examples:

Scipio Africanus vs. Hannibal: Scipio shifted the center of gravity from Italy to Spain (Hannibal’s supply base), then to Africa (near Carthage), and finally to Carthage’s food supply, forcing Hannibal to conform to Scipio’s chosen pattern (Wylie, p. 244-247).
US Civil War: The Confederacy initially set the pattern. Grant’s pressure in the West and Sherman’s march into the heart of the Confederacy manipulated the center of gravity, leading to Appomattox (Wylie, p. 247-249). Sherman’s campaign was supported by the cumulative effect of the Union blockade (Wylie, p. 250-251).
World War I: Germany set the initial pattern. Allied attempts to shift the center of gravity (e.g., Dardanelles) failed. The “cumulative strategy” of the Allied maritime blockade was crucial in the eventual victory (Wylie, p. 251-256).
World War II: Wylie views it as three separate wars (Western Europe, Russia, Pacific). In Western Europe, the Allies “took charge of the strategic pattern” by establishing and exploiting centers of gravity in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and Normandy (Wylie, p. 257-258). In the Pacific, after an initial Japanese pattern, the US shifted the “main center of weight…to the Central Pacific” to sever Japanese communications and strike at the Empire’s heart (Wylie, p. 260-262).

9. Observations on the Application of Theory

Wylie believes his proposed general theory can provide a “common and basic frame of reference” for various talents (military, political, economic, philosophical) toward a common aim (Wylie, p. 262-263). The limited theories fit within the general theory “to the extent that the assumptions of the limited theories mesh with the realities of whatever may be the situation at hand” (Wylie, p. 263-265). He offers three observations:

Invalidating opponent’s assumptions: One can “exclude from the conflict some key element of an opponent’s strength by deliberately keeping one of his specific assumptions from becoming reality” (Wylie, p. 100).
- Korean War “air sanctuary”: Both sides implicitly agreed not to attack each other’s strategic air bases, thus keeping “strategic bombing…apart from the existing reality” (Wylie, p. 266-267).
- South Vietnam “strategic hamlet” program: Aimed at preventing communist control of the peasantry, thereby invalidating a basic assumption of Mao’s theory (Wylie, p. 268).
- Laos: Lack of maritime access makes applying maritime strength difficult, showing how the problem becomes harder when “underlying premises of the maritime concept are not directly applicable” (Wylie, p. 269-270).
- Poland (1939): British maritime strength couldn’t support Poland against Germany because Poland was “not accessible by sea,” making the British guarantee lack a “basic premise” for maritime power (Wylie, p. 271).
- Conclusion: “If we could deliberately make his theory invalid, we have gone a long way toward making his actions ineffective” (Wylie, p. 102).
Limitations of statistical analyses (e.g., “cost effectiveness”): These techniques worked beautifully for aircraft, missiles, and air defense (Wylie, p. 273-274) because the “air theory is predicated on delivery of destruction. Destruction is a finite and measurable phenomenon” (Wylie, p. 104). However, they “ran into snags” when applied to ground (armored division) or naval forces (ships) (Wylie, p. 275).
- Reason: “Destruction is not so clearly the cornerstone of the continental and the maritime concepts of war” (Wylie, p. 104). The soldier’s aim is “control over the enemy by overcoming his army,” and the sailor’s aim is “control of the sea and extend…control from the sea onto the land” (Wylie, p. 276-277).
- For the soldier and sailor, destruction is only one component of control; presence, political, or economic pressures are equally important (Wylie, p. 277-278). “Control of this type, in its more sophisticated sense, is probably better described as ‘influence’” (Wylie, p. 104).
- Key takeaway: “Destruction is measurable… control is a matter of living people, and thus must…remain a matter of human judgment” (Wylie, p. 279-280).
Inclusion of non-military forms of control (philosophy, politics, economics): The general theory provides a framework for these “common efforts toward a common aim” (Wylie, p. 99).
- Control is exercised in many ways beyond military means, including diplomacy (mutual agreement), economics (self-interest), and philosophy (most subtle, pervasive, and persuasive) (Wylie, p. 281-282).
- He highlights the “control exercised today by the philosophy of communism” (Wylie, p. 106) and how Western societies have missed the root problem in rural-peasant societies, where Mao’s theory is most dangerous (Wylie, p. 283).
- He suggests adapting Western philosophy to local realities, citing Mao’s adaptation of Marx to the rural peasant in China (Wylie, p. 286-287).
- He uses the fictional example of Father Finian in The Ugly American, who devised a strategy “firmly rooted in the reality of the scene of action” and a “locally viable philosophic base” (Wylie, p. 288-289). The fighters must “believe in what they fight for. The basic assumptions must fit the reality” (Wylie, p. 108).

10. Conclusion

Wylie concludes by reiterating that his discussion of strategy extends beyond military applications to include philosophy, politics, and economics, because “a general theory of strategy should be applicable in any conflict situation” (Wylie, p. 109). He emphasizes that “the military problem is only rarely isolable from the total social context” (Wylie, p. 109).

His core points are summarized:

Lack of good intellectual foundation for strategic thinking and criticism (Wylie, p. 292).
Strategy is a public concern for officials, the general public, and scholars (Wylie, p. 292).
Expositions on existing military theories (continental, maritime, air, and Mao’s as a military theory) and their limitations (Wylie, p. 292).
The common factor in all power struggles is the concept of control (Wylie, p. 293).
Military affairs are “inextricably woven into the whole social power fabric” (Wylie, p. 110). Therefore, a general theory of strategy “must…be a theory of power in all its forms, not just a theory of military power” (Wylie, p. 110).
He defines his theory’s form: Control is the purpose, and “the manipulations of the center of gravity of the situation are the measures for its accomplishment” (Wylie, p. 111).

He hopes his speculations “induce someone else either to refine and amend what I have offered, or to propose something different and better” (Wylie, p. 294-295), as “some method of bringing intellectual order into strategy is long overdue” (Wylie, p. 111).

✍️ Key Terms

Strategy — “A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.” (Wylie, p. 13).
Sequential strategy — a series of discrete, interdependent steps (e.g., island-hopping, Normandy to Germany) where each step leads to the next and can be forecasted. (Wylie, pp. 24–25).
Cumulative strategy — an aggregation of many independent actions (e.g., submarine tonnage warfare, blockade, certain air campaigns) whose effect is statistical and hard to time precisely. (Wylie, pp. 24–41).
Control — the purpose of war is to secure some degree of control over the enemy to force accommodation to one’s terms. (Wylie, p. 85 & pp. 90–91).
Center of gravity (strategic) — the focal point whose manipulation shifts the pattern of war and compels the enemy to conform; ideally a “national jugular” or neuralgic point. (Wylie, pp. 90–91).
Aggressor / Conservator — neutral terms Wylie uses for the side initiating change vs. the side defending the status quo within a struggle over control. (Wylie, pp. 85–86).
Theory (in strategy) — not prediction but a framework that orders facts, clarifies purpose/measures, and improves judgment; needed to avoid being prisoners of raw data. (Wylie, pp. 23–25; Preface vi).

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“Strategy is everybody’s business.” (Wylie, p. vi). fileciteturn3file16 “A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.” (Wylie, p. 13). “There are actually two very different kinds of strategies that may be used in war … the sequential … [and] the cumulative.” (Wylie, pp. 24–25, 40–41). “The aim of war is some measure of control over the enemy.” (Wylie, p. 85). “The successful strategist is the one who controls the nature and the placement and the timing and the weight of the centers of gravity of war.” (Wylie, p. 91). “The ultimate determinant in war is the man on the scene with a gun.” (Wylie, p. 85). “Some method of bringing intellectual order into strategy is long overdue.” (Wylie, p. 111).