Strategy

Online Description

“The most important book by one of the outstanding military authorities of our time.”—Library Journal Strategy is a seminal work of military history and theory, and a perfect companion to Sun-tzu’s The Art of War and Carl von Clauswitz’s On War. This is the classic book on war as we know it. During his long life, Basil H. Liddell Hart was considered one of the world’s foremost military thinkers. In his writing, he stressed movement, flexibility, and surprise. He saw that in most military campaigns, it was vital to take an indirect approach. Rather than attacking the enemy head-on, one must dislocate their psychological and physical balance. With key examples from World War I and World War II (think trench warfare vs Blitzkreig), Liddell Hart defines the practical principles of waging war—“Adjust your end to your means,” “Take a line of operation which offers alternate objectives”—and proves they are as fundamental in the worlds of politics and business as they are in warfare.

🔫 Author Background

Sir B. H. Liddell Hart (1895-1970) was a distinguished British Army captain and a prolific military correspondent for leading London newspapers, having authored approximately thirty books on military subjects.

His forward-thinking ideas on mechanized warfare, mobility, and air warfare, developed in the 1930s, were notably adopted by the Germans in World War II, with prominent generals such as Guderian and Patton acknowledging their significant influence on their strategies.

Liddell Hart’s motivation for writing “Strategy” stemmed from an extensive historical survey of military campaigns, notably while serving as the military editor for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. This comprehensive study led him to perceive the consistent superiority of the indirect approach over direct confrontation throughout history. He realized that this was not merely a military concept, but a fundamental “law of life in all spheres”.

The book, a second revised edition, embodies the results of twenty-five years of further research, building upon his earlier work, “The Decisive Wars of History,” and was updated to include analyses of World War II and the development of nuclear weapons and guerrilla warfare. His aim was to crystallize these lessons into practical axioms, advocating for the postponement of direct battle until the enemy’s moral balance is sufficiently dislocated.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Main Argument or Central Idea

The central argument of “Strategy” is the consistent superiority of the indirect approach in warfare over direct confrontation, a conclusion drawn from an extensive historical survey of military campaigns.

This indirect approach is presented not merely as a military concept but as a fundamental “law of life in all spheres”, applicable beyond the battlefield to areas like politics, commerce, and human interaction.

The core thesis is that effective results in war are rarely attained unless the approach has such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it, focusing on dislocating the enemy’s psychological and physical balance as a vital prelude to overthrow.

Liddell Hart advocates for postponing direct battle and attack until the enemy’s moral dislocation renders a decisive blow practicable, arguing that supreme excellence lies in breaking resistance without fighting.

The book aims to distil these historical lessons into practical axioms for the conduct of war, emphasizing surprise, mobility, and the exploitation of weakness rather than brute force.

Key Problems Addressed

1. The prevailing, often flawed, military doctrine of direct confrontation

• Liddell Hart critiques the Clausewitzian emphasis on “the destruction of the enemy’s main forces on the battlefield” and the idea that “blood is the price of victory”
• He asserts that this dogma led to ineffective, costly, and mutually exhausting mass-slaughter in wars like World War I

2. The neglect of psychological factors in military strategy

• He highlights that the issue of war and battle constantly turns on moral factors
• The true aim of strategy is the dislocation of the opponent’s mind and dispositions

3. The limitations of conventional and linear warfare

• The book demonstrates through historical examples (e.g., American Civil War, World War I) how direct, frontal advances often lead to stalemate or disproportionate losses
• This occurs due to predictable lines of expectation and the enemy’s ability to consolidate resistance

4. Adapting strategy to new technologies and forms of conflict

• The revised edition specifically addresses how developments in mechanized warfare, air power, nuclear weapons, and guerrilla warfare necessitate a re-evaluation of traditional strategic thinking
• These new instruments further enhance the potential of the indirect approach

5. The crucial relationship between strategy and grand strategy (policy)

• Liddell Hart stresses that military strategy must always serve a political end
• Grand strategy must look beyond immediate military victory to the subsequent peace, ensuring the nation does not become exhausted in the process

📒 Sections

Preface to the Second Revised Edition

Main Idea: Liddell Hart foresaw that the development of nuclear weapons, while powerful, would not fundamentally alter the nature of strategy or eliminate the need for “conventional weapons.” Instead, he predicted that it would incentivize the development and increased use of “unconventional methods,” particularly guerrilla-type strategy. This trend has been confirmed by subsequent experience.

Key Quotes:

“I ventured to predict that the new development would not radically change the basis or practice of strategy and would not free us from dependence on what are called ‘conventional weapons,’ although it was likely to be an incentive to the development of more unconventional methods in applying them” (Hart, 16).

“Experience has clearly confirmed the trend predicted at that time. Above all, such experience has emphatically borne out the forecast that the development of nuclear weapons would tend to nullify their deterrent effect, thereby leading to the increasing use of a guerrilla-type strategy” (Hart, 16-17).

Preface (Original)

Main Idea: The initial hope that the atomic bomb would assure swift victory and world peace proved to be an illusion, leading to heightened anxiety and a sense of insecurity. This outcome demonstrated that military victory alone is insufficient to guarantee peace, emphasizing the critical need for “grand strategy” to guide pure military strategy with a broader, long-term perspective. Atomic power, by making direct warfare potentially “suicidal,” paradoxically forces a return to indirect methods, which embody the intelligent properties of strategy. The “indirect approach” is presented as a fundamental “law of life” applicable not only to warfare but to all spheres of human interaction where conflict of wills or interests exists.

Key Quotes:

“The outcome has been the latest of many lessons that pure military strategy needs to be guided by the longer and wider view from the higher plane of ‘grand strategy’” (Hart, 20).

“By carrying destructiveness to a ‘suicidal’ extreme, atomic power is stimulating and accelerating a reversion to the indirect methods that are the essence of strategy—since they endow warfare with intelligent properties that raise it above the brute application of force” (Hart, 24-25).

“The indirect approach had a much wider application—that it was a law of life in all spheres: a truth of philosophy. Its fulfillment was seen to be the key to practical achievement in dealing with any problem where the human factor predominates, and a conflict of wills tends to spring from an underlying concern for interests” (Hart, 27-28).

“As in war, the aim is to weaken resistance before attempting to overcome it; and the effect is best attained by drawing the other party out of his defences” (Hart, 29).

Part I: Strategy From Fifth Century B.C. To Twentieth Century A.D.

Chapter I: History as Practical Experience

Main Idea: For soldiers, indirect practical experience gleaned from history is more valuable than direct experience, due to its wider scope. The moral factors in warfare are more constant and predominant than the ever-changing physical factors. A broad historical study is essential to form a robust theory of war and sound judgment, avoiding narrow or fallacious conclusions. The author’s extensive survey consistently revealed that effective results in war are rarely achieved unless the approach is indirect, ensuring the opponent’s unreadiness and leading to psychological and physical dislocation.

Key Quotes:

“I prefer to profit by others’ experience” (Hart, 34).

“History is universal experience—the experience not of another, but of many others under manifold conditions” (Hart, 37).

“The predominance of moral factors in all military decisions. On them constantly turns the issue of war and battle. In the history of war they form the more constant factors, changing only in degree, whereas the physical factors are different in almost every war and every military situation” (Hart, 38-39).

“Throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it” (Hart, 43-44).

“In most campaigns the dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical balance has been the vital prelude to a successful attempt at his overthrow” (Hart, 44).

Chapter II: Greek Wars—Epaminondas, Philip, and Alexander

Main Idea: This chapter illustrates early forms of indirect approach in Greek warfare. Themistocles’ deceptive ruse at Salamis lured the Persian fleet into a narrow strait, negating their numerical superiority and securing a decisive naval victory. Pericles’ grand strategy aimed to exhaust enemy endurance without direct battle. Lysander’s attack on Athens’s economic objective (grain supply) created a psychological and fearful situation that allowed for tactical surprise and a swift military decision. Philip of Macedon’s rise to supremacy involved an indirect political pretext and a strategic change of direction to deceive and dislocate opponents.

Key Quotes:

“It is worth noting that the opportunity for this decisive naval battle was obtained by a ruse which might be classified as a form of indirect approach—Themistocles’ message to Xerxes that the Greek fleet was ripe for treacherous surrender” (Hart, 53).

“By taking an economic objective Lysander could hope at the least to drain their strength; through the exasperation and fear thus generated, he was able to produce conditions favourable to surprise and so obtain a swift military decision” (Hart, 61).

“Once more it is the challenger who is seen to have grasped the value of the indirect approach. Even the pretext for Philip of Macedon’s attempt to secure the supremacy was indirect” (Hart, 65).

Chapter III: Roman Wars—Hannibal, Scipio, and Caesar

Main Idea: Hannibal’s indirect overland invasion of Italy aimed to rally local support, and his march through difficult marshes achieved crucial surprise against the Romans. His strategy at Trasimene involved a “mental application of the manoeuvre against the enemy’s rear,” exploiting Flaminius’s character to draw him into a trap. The Battle of Cannae exemplified a tactical “ju-jitsu” where Hannibal’s unconventional disposition enveloped the Roman forces. Fabius’s “Fabian strategy” was a grand strategy focused on attrition and demoralization rather than direct engagement. Scipio Africanus consistently used indirect approaches, first in Spain to cut Hannibal’s strategic base, then by invading Africa to force Hannibal’s return. Scipio’s success in Africa stemmed from systematically cutting off Carthaginian supplies and allies and luring Hannibal into battle on unfavorable terms, rather than engaging in costly sieges. Caesar’s campaigns also demonstrated the power of “narrow indirectness of approach” and exploiting time and surprise.

Key Quotes:

“It seems more probable that Hannibal’s indirect and overland route of invasion was due to the aim of rallying the Celts of Northern Italy against Rome” (Hart, 72).

“This was a mental application of the manoeuvre against the enemy’s rear, based on searching inquiries about his opponent’s character” (Hart, 77).

“The strategy of Fabius was not merely an evasion of battle to gain time, but calculated for its effect on the morale of the enemy—and, still more, for its effect on their potential allies” (Hart, 79-80).

“By a masterly combination of surprise and timing, Scipio had first deprived the Carthaginian armies of Cartagena, their main base in Spain, as a prelude to depriving them of their allies and overthrowing their armies” (Hart, 90-91).

“Instead of moving on Carthage, Scipio systematically lopped off her supply areas and allies… by restoring his own ally, Masinissa, to the throne of Numidia he ensured for himself the cavalry resources to counter Hannibal’s best weapon” (Hart, 96-97).

Byzantine Wars—Belisarius and Narses

Main Idea: Belisarius’s campaigns illustrate the power of psychological warfare and strategic restraint. He understood that true victory involves compelling an opponent to abandon their purpose with minimal loss to oneself, often preferring to avoid direct battles. He masterfully used deception, such as staging a military “play” to exaggerate his force’s size, to dislocate enemy minds and deter aggression. Narses, too, employed clever tactical traps, like at Taginae, by exploiting enemy assumptions and creating defensive positions with offensive potential.

Key Quotes:

“Belisarius… was content to shepherd the invaders back on their homeward course. Such restraint did not please his troops. Aware of their murmurs he tried to point out to them that true victory lay in compelling one’s opponent to abandon his purpose, with the least possible loss to oneself” (Hart, 108).

“Belisarius staged a military ‘play’… so that the latter might imagine that he had been met at what was one of the outposts of a great army” (Hart, 121).

Chapter V: Medieval Wars

Main Idea: While often characterized by “drab stupidity,” medieval warfare occasionally showcased strategic brilliance, particularly from the Normans. William of Normandy’s 1066 invasion used effective strategic distraction. Edward I’s Welsh wars involved a strategic method of conquest through systematic pressure and economic strangulation. The French under du Guesclin successfully employed a Fabian policy of attrition, avoiding main battles and securing local successes through surprise. Mongol warfare, led by Jenghiz Khan and Sabutai, stands out for its sophisticated indirect approaches, deception, and rapid maneuvers to achieve strategic surprise and envelopment on a vast scale.

Key Quotes:

“Du Guesclin’s principle was: ‘No attack without surprise’” (Hart, 138).

“The strategy and tactics of the Mongols are dealt with more fully in the author’s earlier book Great Captains Unveiled—which was chosen as textbook for the first experimental Mechanized Force in 1927” (Hart, 142).

Chapter VI: The Seventeenth Century—Gustavus, Cromwell, Turenne

Main Idea: The Thirty Years’ War was largely indecisive due to conventional direct approaches. Wallenstein’s effective strategy against Gustavus Adolphus involved threatening supply lines and refusing direct battle, disrupting the Swede’s moral ascendancy. In contrast, Cromwell’s leadership in the Second Civil War showcased a clear “strategy of indirect approach,” focusing on cutting enemy communications and striking at their rear, leading to decisive victories like Preston and Dunbar. Turenne’s later campaigns similarly emphasized breaking free from fixed fortress-bases and relying on a combination of “surprise and mobility” to achieve strategic decision and security.

Key Quotes:

“Although it had not dislocated, it had disturbed the moral ascendancy which Gustavus’s many victories had gained him, and thereby loosened his hold over the German states” (Hart, 145).

“It is a different picture when we come to the Second Civil War, with Cromwell as the ruling mind… He took a longer and wider view, his object being to cut off the invading Scots, led by Hamilton, from their source of supply and their base in Scotland” (Hart, 150).

“Turenne… cut loose from such a base of operations, and sought in the combination of surprise and mobility not only a decision but his security” (Hart, 159-160).

Chapter VII: The Eighteenth Century—Marlborough and Frederick

Main Idea: The War of the Spanish Succession, despite frequent direct engagements, was punctuated by Marlborough’s “brilliant indirect approaches” that served as key turning points. His methods often involved deceiving opponents to draw them into unfavorable attacks. Blenheim, while a risky gamble, decisively shattered the French reputation for invincibility. Frederick the Great, though renowned for his “interior lines” strategy and swift maneuvers, is criticized for his indirectness being “too direct,” relying heavily on mobility without sufficient psychological surprise, which resulted in high costs and unsustainable victories. Wolfe’s victory at Quebec, seemingly a gambler’s last throw, succeeded due to a combination of deception, limiting enemy movement, and spreading out their forces, leading primarily to mental and moral dislocation of the command.

Key Quotes:

“The degree of dislocation caused in the French forces does not seem to warrant the measure of their collapse. …Quebec is an illuminating example of the truth that a decision is produced even more by the mental and moral dislocation of the command than by the physical dislocation of its forces” (Hart, 181-182).

“The main one [lesson from Frederick’s campaigns] would appear to be that his indirectness was too direct. To express this in another way, he regarded the indirect approach as a matter of pure manoeuvre with mobility, instead of a combination of manoeuvre with mobility and surprise” (Hart, 188).

Chapter VIII: The French Revolution and Napoleon Bonaparte

Main Idea: Napoleon’s genius lay in his dynamic application of ideas from earlier theorists like Bourcet, particularly “calculated dispersion” and threatening “alternative objectives.” His major contribution was developing wider strategic combinations utilizing the new divisional system. The success of the French in 1794 resulted from a “definitely indirect strategic approach.” Bonaparte’s Italian campaigns demonstrate the conversion of defensive positions into decisive indirect approaches. He skillfully aimed at the “joint” (vulnerable connection) rather than the “point” (strongest area) of the enemy, and his “strategic barrage” (blocking retreat routes) was a key innovation. Later in his career, Napoleon increasingly relied on mass and direct frontal assaults, which, while sometimes achieving victory, were less economical and ultimately contributed to his downfall. The Peninsular War illustrated the effectiveness of England’s grand-strategic indirect approach, primarily through supporting Spanish guerrilla warfare, which disproportionately drained French strength and morale more than direct battles. Wellington’s strategy in the Peninsula relied on calculating French supply limitations and constructing the Lines of Torres Vedras, highlighting an indirect approach towards a military-economic objective.

Key Quotes:

“It clearly suggests that what he really meant was not ‘point,’ but ‘joint’—and that at this stage of his career he was too firmly imbued with the idea of economy of force to waste his limited strength in battering at the enemy’s strong point” (Hart, 201).

“This strategic barrage was Bonaparte’s chief contribution to the strategy of indirect approach” (Hart, 208).

“But the real effect of England’s grand-strategic indirect approach in Spain has been obscured by the traditional tendency of historians to become obsessed with battles” (Hart, 214).

“Hence it is a clear deduction that the overwhelming majority of the losses which drained the French strength, and their morale still more, was due to the operations of the guerrillas, and of Wellington himself, in harrying the French and in making the country a desert where the French stayed only to starve” (Hart, 216-217).

Chapter IX: 1854-1914

Main Idea: The Crimean War exemplified the “barrenness of the direct approach.” The American Civil War provided crucial strategic lessons, particularly from Sherman. Farragut’s capture of New Orleans and Grant’s successful Vicksburg campaign (achieved by audacious indirect maneuvers and cutting loose from lines of supply) were decisive in fragmenting the Confederacy and cutting off its resources. Sherman’s “march to the sea” further demonstrated the power of psychological dislocation through threatening alternative objectives, relying on mobility and deception to undermine enemy confidence, often achieving results without direct battles. Historical analysis reveals that the decisive blows in the Civil War were struck in the Western theatre by Grant and Sherman, not the Eastern theatre, despite common historical focus. Moltke’s swift victories in 1866 and 1870, though seemingly direct, often capitalized on the extreme inferiority and blunders of his opponents, and sometimes benefited from unintended strategic indirectness due to widely dispersed initial dispositions. The Russo-Japanese War, however, demonstrated the failures of a predominantly direct approach against a logistically vulnerable enemy, resulting in indecisive bloodshed.

Key Quotes:

“There is no question that the moral effect of this march upon the country at large… was greater than would have been the most decided victory” (Hart, 258-259, quoting Confederate general Alexander).

“The military genius of the great confederate leaders, Lee and Jackson, the unrivalled fighting capacity of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the close proximity of the rival capitals, have caused a disproportionate attention to be concentrated upon the eastern theatre of war. It was in the west that the decisive blows were struck” (Hart, 266).

“If confidence be half the battle, then to undermine the opponent’s confidence is more than half—because it gains the fruits without a fight” (Hart, 263).

Chapter X: Conclusions From Twenty-Five Centuries

Main Idea: A comprehensive survey of military history reveals that decisive results are rarely achieved through a direct strategic approach against the enemy’s main army. Instead, the indirect approach is “by far the most hopeful and economic form of Strategy.” Successful commanders consistently avoid direct attacks on strong positions, even preferring difficult or hazardous indirect routes (e.g., over mountains, deserts, swamps) because natural obstacles are more calculable than human resistance. Psychological advantage is paramount, often secured before any physical clash. The indirect approach fundamentally involves “lure” and “trap,” aiming for the “dislocation of the opponent’s mind and dispositions.” The two core maxims derived are: (1) Do not attack an enemy who is on guard, and (2) Postpone battle until the enemy is morally dislocated and a decisive blow becomes practicable.

Key Quotes:

“In only six of these campaigns—those which culminated at Issus, Gaugamela, Friedland, Wagram, Sadowa, and Sedan—did a decisive result follow a plan of direct strategic approach to the main army of the enemy” (Hart, 283-284).

“This high proportion of history’s decisive campaigns, the significance of which is enhanced by the comparative rarity of the direct approach, enforces the conclusion that the indirect is by far the most hopeful and economic form of Strategy” (Hart, 285).

“Natural hazards, however formidable, are inherently less dangerous and less uncertain than fighting hazards. All conditions are more calculable, all obstacles more surmountable, than those of human resistance” (Hart, 286).

“In almost all the victor had his opponent at a psychological disadvantage before the clash took place” (Hart, 287).

“The soundest strategy in any campaign is to postpone battle and the soundest tactics to postpone attack, until the moral dislocation of the enemy renders the delivery of a decisive blow practicable” (Hart, 291).

Part II: Strategy of the First World War

Chapter XI: The Plans and Their Issue in the Western Theatre, 1914

Main Idea: The French Plan XVII, a purely frontal offensive, disregarded historical lessons and fortified defenses. The British implicitly accepted a direct role with the French, neglecting their traditional naval mobility. Schlieffen’s German plan, though ultimately marred in execution by Moltke (the Younger), was designed as a subtle indirect approach through a massive right-wing sweep to encircle the French, relying on a disproportionately weak German left wing to entice the French forward. The Battle of the Marne was decided not by direct force but by a “jar” (Maunoury’s flank attack) creating a “crack” in the German line, leading to a decisive moral crack in the German command. Exaggerated fears of phantom British and Russian landings psychologically influenced the German retreat before the Marne, suggesting that an early indirect British deployment at Antwerp could have been decisive. The subsequent “race to the sea” became an obvious and indecisive series of outflanking attempts, leading to entrenched stalemate.

Key Quotes:

“The real subtlety and indirectness of the plan lay, not in this geographical detour, but in the distribution of force and in the idea which guided it” (Hart, 299). “The battle of the Marne was decided by a jar and a crack. The jar administered by Maunoury’s attack on the German right flank caused a crack in a weak joint of the German line, and this physical crack in turn produced a moral crack in the German command” (Hart, 311). “Historians may well conclude that this party of temporary visitors to Ostend, together with the Russian myth, were the primary cause of the victory of the Marne” (Hart, 314).

Chapter XII: The North-Eastern Theatre

Main Idea: On the Eastern Front, strategic plans were fluid, but Russian mobilization rates were a major variable. German and Austrian strategic differences existed, with Germany prioritizing the Western Front and Austria seeking an immediate offensive in the East. The Russians, under French pressure, undertook an unprepared offensive against Germany. The Eastern Front eventually saw trench warfare, but the “crust was less firm”. Ludendorff advocated a wide, geographically indirect approach (through Vilna) to strike at the Russian rear, but Falkenhayn preferred a limited, direct tactical breakthrough at Dunajec. This Dunajec offensive, while achieving tactical surprise and a “snowball” effect, failed to decisively cut off or annihilate the Russian forces.

Key Quotes:

“The real story of 1915 on the Eastern Front is that of the tussle of wills between Ludendorff, who desired to reach a decision by a strategy that was at least geographically an indirect approach, and Falkenhayn, who considered that he could lame Russia by a direct break-through which would temporarily paralysed the body” (Hart, 327-328).

“Here we can see an illuminating example of the difference between the indirect approach and what is commonly called surprise. Surprise of time, place, and force was achieved; but the Russians were merely rolled back in snowball fashion” (Hart, 330).

Chapter XIII: The South-Eastern or Mediterranean Theatre

Main Idea: This section argues for a wider grand-strategic perspective, proposing that blows in other theaters (like the Balkans) could act as strategic flank attacks, consistent with traditional British amphibious strategy. Initial Allied resistance to such ideas, preferring Western Front concentration, was criticized. The Dardanelles campaign, though a sound strategic concept to relieve Russia, failed due to fumbling execution, lack of surprise, and inadequate forces. In contrast, Allenby’s Palestine campaign was a “masterpiece” of indirect approach, aiming to paralyze Turkish forces by cutting communications and lines of retreat, with air power disrupting command. Lawrence of Arabia’s guerrilla strategy focused on “pin-pricks” to disperse and demoralize the enemy over direct confrontation. The decisive victory in Palestine was achieved by mobile forces that exploited the indirect approach’s “sustained surprise”

“The German lines in France may be looked upon as a fortress that cannot be carried by assault and also that cannot be completely invested, with the result that the lines may be held by an investing force while operations proceed elsewhere” (Hart, 335, quoting Kitchener).

“The fault was not in the conception but in the execution. If the British had used at the outset even a fair proportion of the forces they ultimately expended in driblets, it is clear that Constantinople would have fallen, Russia have been saved, and the war shortened” (Hart, 344).

“For it aimed to make the British the masters of all, and all forms of, the Turkish communications. To cut an army’s lines of communication is to paralyse its physical organization. To close its line of retreat is to paralyse its moral organization. And to destroy its lines of intercommunication—by which orders and reports pass—is to paralyse its sensory organization, the essential connection between brain and body” (Hart, 349-350).

Chapter XIV: The Strategy of 1918

Main Idea: The naval blockade was the most fundamental and “decisive agency” of World War I, progressively stifling Germany’s economy and morale, leading to collapse. This grand-strategic indirect approach lured Germany into its final, ultimately self-defeating, 1918 offensive. Ludendorff’s 1918 offensive, while seeking tactical surprise with new infiltration methods, failed strategically due to a lack of understanding of the indirect approach and dissipation of reserves. The attack on the “joint” between French and British armies (Arras-La Fére sector) highlights the strategic importance of vulnerable connections. Foch’s “Hundred Days” strategy involved a series of local offensives to maintain initiative and economically tax German reserves, a “border-line case” of indirect approach. However, the ultimate Allied Western Front offensive was direct and costly. The truly decisive blow came from the far-distant Allied Salonika offensive, an indirect approach that triggered Bulgaria’s collapse and, combined with the blockade, induced Germany’s surrender. The shock of perceived strategic impotence and surprise was more decisive for the German command’s nerve than physical losses.

Key Quotes:

“The naval blockade had tended more and more to govern the military situation. …the blockade was seen to assume larger and larger proportions; to be, more and more clearly, the decisive agency in the struggle” (Hart, 358-359).

“Helplessness induces hopelessness, and history attests that loss of hope, not loss of lives, is what decides the issue of war” (Hart, 360).

“a joint is the most sensitive and profitable point of attack, and that a penetration between two forces or units is more dangerous if they are assembled shoulder to shoulder than if they are widely separated and organically separate” (Hart, 371).

“the true aim in war is the mind of the hostile rulers, not the bodies of their troops; that the balance between victory and defeat turns on mental impressions and only indirectly on physical blows” (Hart, 393).

Part III: Strategy of the Second World War

Chapter XV: Hitler’s Strategy

Main Idea: Hitler’s campaigns demonstrated a new dimension of the indirect approach, both militarily and psychologically. He paradoxically achieved concealment by being overtly clear about his intentions (Mein Kampf), showing that the most direct approach can sometimes be the least expected. Unlike orthodox German military thinkers who prioritized battle (like Clausewitz’s misinterpretations of “blood is the price of victory”), Hitler adopted Lenin’s axiom that “the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy”. His core strategy was to “destroy the enemy from within,” using “intellectual weapons” and “moral bombardment” to paralyze will rather than relying on costly physical destruction. Hitler understood grand strategy as the coordination of all national resources (military, economic, diplomatic, propaganda) to achieve political ends with a view toward post-war peace. He aimed for paralysis, not annihilation, recognizing its economy and potency. Hitler exploited the Allies’ “false move” of guaranteeing Poland and Rumania without securing Russian support, trapping them into an unfavorable offensive position.

Key Quotes:

“concealment can often be found in the obvious, and that in some cases the most direct approach can become the least expected” (Hart, 398).

“It was Lenin who enunciated the axiom that ‘the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow both possible and easy’” (Hart, 399).

“Our strategy is to destroy the enemy from within, to conquer him through himself” (Hart, 403).

“A strategist should think in terms of paralysing, not of killing” (Hart, 413).

“Direct pressure always tends to harden and consolidate the resistance of an opponent—like snow which is squeezed into a snowball, the more compact it becomes, the slower it is to melt” (Hart, 414).

Chapter XVI: Hitler’s Run of Victory

Main Idea: Hitler’s early victories in Poland and Western Europe showcased the power of high-speed mechanized warfare combined with the indirect approach. The Polish campaign (Plan White) was a successful example of a geographically and psychologically indirect approach, using a “baited gambit” and “ju-jitsu effect” through a wide pincer movement that trapped Polish armies. For the Western offensive, Manstein’s radical proposal to thrust through the Ardennes (the “line of least expectation”) with armored forces, capitalizing on Allied anticipation of a 1914-style attack, proved decisive. The Allies’ Plan “D” played directly into German hands by advancing deep into Belgium, setting them up for a flank counter-stroke. The rapid Meuse crossing at Sedan and the subsequent advance demonstrated strategic flexibility by threatening “alternative objectives”. However, Hitler’s nervous halt order at Dunkirk, influenced by fears of bogging down and a small British counter-stroke, was a critical error that allowed the British Expeditionary Force to escape, preventing a decisive end to the war in the West and eventually contributing to Hitler’s downfall.

Key Quotes:

“It was inspired by the idea of upsetting the opponent’s balance in a compound way—through achieving the unexpected in direction, time, and method, preceded by the fullest possible distraction and followed by the quickest possible exploitation along the line of least resistance to the deepest possible range” (Hart, 438).

“Manstein proposed that the centre of gravity should be shifted from the right to the centre, and that the principal thrust should be made through the Ardennes, as the line of least expectation” (Hart, 442).

“A special advantage of the break-through at Sedan was that, being on a central axis, it could swing in any direction and threaten alternative objectives” (Hart, 449).

“Here he paid the penalty for his halt order at Dunkirk. If he had prevented the British forces escaping through this one remaining bolt-hole, the subsequent conquest of Britain would probably have been possible” (Hart, 458).

Chapter XVII: Hitler’s Decline

Main Idea: Hitler’s political approach was too direct and lacked the subtlety to disarm opposition or attract broad support, hindering his consolidation of conquered territories. In Russia, early successes by German panzer groups achieved deep penetrations and encirclements. However, Hitler’s decision to pause the panzers and subsequently divert forces to Leningrad and Ukraine, instead of concentrating on Moscow, allowed Russian forces to extricate themselves and prolonged the campaign, leading to a costly stagnation. The Japanese were forced into war by an oil embargo. Their victories in the Pacific, like Malaya and Java, demonstrated effective indirect approaches, often using outflanking maneuvers and sea-air movements to bypass defenses. MacArthur’s “log-splitting” strategy in the Philippines, striking midway to isolate Japanese forces, was a successful indirect approach. In North Africa, Wavell’s Sidi Barrani offensive was a decisive indirect “raid”. Rommel’s daring desert flank attacks caused panic, but British command changes and Rommel’s logistical weaknesses, exacerbated by Allied sea and air power, ultimately led to his defeat. The Allied “Torch” landings in North Africa were indirect, creating “leverage on the back of the French forces” to secure lodgements. Rommel’s counter-offensive at Faid Pass and Kasserine highlighted the importance of striking at a “joint” and moving widely enough to ensure unexpectedness.

Key Quotes:

“His political approach had been too direct. It was subtle enough to cause dissension in the threatened countries, but not to disarm opposition” (Hart, 460).

“he seems to have visualized a Cannae-like operation of super-large dimensions, in which the already created threat to Moscow would draw the Russian reserves to that sector. of the front, thus making it easier for the German wings to gain their flank objectives, Leningrad and the Ukraine” (Hart, 470).

“MacArthur’s seaborne armada appeared off the island of Leyte, midway between the two major islands, and there disembarked its forces. That stroke not only drove a wedge into the midst of the Philippines, but drove a wider Strategic wedge between Japan and the larger part of her Pacific conquests” (Hart, 494).

“This counter-offensive is, in analysis, a very significant lesson in the study of the indirect approach, since it brings out the importance of not only choosing a joint for the main stroke, but also the importance, if it is physically indirect, of moving wide enough to ensure unexpectedness” (Hart, 516-517).

Chapter XVIII: Hitler’s Fall

Main Idea: After Stalingrad, Hitler’s rigid insistence on offensive action and holding ground, rejecting strategic withdrawals, became a major factor in Germany’s decline. Manstein’s proposed “baited gambit” at Kursk, designed to lure Russians into a trap, was strategically astute, but delays and Hitler’s impatience led to a direct German attack that the Russians, with “shrewder judgement,” successfully countered. Hitler’s insistence on holding resource areas (like Nikopol) over strategic flexibility created dangerous strains. The Allied invasion of Sicily successfully exploited enemy demoralization and diverted forces due to effective deception plans. The Italian campaign was characterized by Allied directness at Salerno, which led to high costs and near-disaster due to landing where expected. The Normandy invasion was successful due to its indirectness (Normandy as the “line of least expectation” and threatening alternative objectives), combined with Allied air superiority that crippled German communications. The German counter-thrust at Avranches was too direct and failed. The Allied sweep through France was a triumph of maneuver, space, and speed, bypassing resistance and creating continuous strategic bypasses. The Battle of the Bulge, a German counter-offensive, relied on meteorological surprise but was ultimately contained by American tenacity and Montgomery’s swift reserve deployment. Ultimately, Allied victory was due to exploiting German overstretch and the inherent power of the defensive when skillfully employed, underscoring the maxim “Let ‘em come to ye, and they’ll beat theirselves”

“Manstein proposed to Hitler a plan to repeat it in a more calculated way with a baited gambit. The Mius River sector… was thus highly probable that the Russians’ spring offensive would take it as a target. Manstein therefore suggested that the defending force there should be thinned out, and should fall back when the Russians attacked, drawing them into the trap” (Hart, 528).

“The words italicized have an underlying significance. For they make it clear that the enemy profited by the probability that the Allied plans would be governed by conformity to an accepted limitation. The outcome showed the limited results of choosing the course of ‘most expectation’” (Hart, 544-545).

“In choosing the Normandy route, the Allied Command operated on a line which alternatively threatened the important ports of Havre and Cherbourg, and was able to keep the Germans in doubt until the last moment as to which was the objective—thus fixing them on the horns of a dilemma” (Hart, 553).

“Space and speed had formed the dual key by which the Allied armies had unlocked the gates of the West. Manoeuvre had triumphed where assault had been repeatedly baffled” (Hart, 563).

“Long ago, that famous pugilist Jem Mace, summed up all his experience of the ring in the maxim: ‘Let ‘em come to ye, and they’ll beat theirselves.’ Kid McCoy later expressed the same idea in his teaching: ‘Draw your man into attack—and get him so that he has both hands out of business and you have one hand free’” (Hart, 576-577).

Part IV: Fundamentals of Strategy and Grand Strategy

Chapter XIX: The Theory of Strategy

Main Idea: Liddell Hart criticizes Clausewitz’s definition of strategy for narrowing it to battle and encroaching on policy. He prefers Moltke’s definition focusing on the practical adaptation of means to an object. He argues that a “limited aim” strategy (like Fabian strategy) can be wise for a “conservative” state, focusing on draining the enemy rather than outright destruction. Grand strategy is defined as coordinating all national resources (economic, military, moral, financial, diplomatic, commercial, ethical) to achieve the political object of war, always looking beyond the war to the subsequent peace. Strategy itself aims to diminish resistance through “movement and surprise,” reducing fighting to a minimum. The perfection of strategy is a decision without serious fighting. The true aim of strategy is “dislocation”, creating a situation so advantageous that battle, if necessary, is sure to be decisive. This involves taking the “line of least resistance” and, psychologically, the “line of least expectation”. “Distraction” (mystifying, misleading) leads to the “dislocation” of the enemy’s mind and forces. True “concentration” of force is a “product of dispersion,” using minimal force elsewhere to enable maximum effect at a weak point. Strategic planning benefits from “alternative objectives” to create dilemmas for the opponent. Cutting communications near the enemy’s force has immediate impact, while cutting them nearer the base has a greater, strategic effect on the commander’s mind. Modern conditions (air-power, motor power) necessitate a “dispersed strategic advance” to achieve mystification and full value from mobility.

Key Quotes:

“Moltke reached a clearer, and wiser, definition in terming strategy ‘the practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object in view’” (Hart, 581).

“the role of grand strategy—higher strategy—is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the politcal object of the war—the goal defined by fundamental policy” (Hart, 588).

“The perfection of strategy would be, therefore, to produce a decision without any serious fighting” (Hart, 596).

“dislocation is the aim of strategy; its sequel may be either the enemy’s dissolution or his disruption in battle” (Hart, 600-601).

“In the profoundest sense, it takes the line of least resistance. The equivalent in the psychological sphere is the line of least expectation. They are the two faces of the same coin” (Hart, 602).

“‘Stonewall’ Jackson aptly expressed this in his strategical motto—‘Mystify, mislead, and surprise’” (Hart, 603).

“true concentration is the product of dispersion” (Hart, 609).

“A plan, like a tree, must have branches—if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole” (Hart, 612).

“In general, the nearer to the force that the cut is made, the more immediate the effect; the nearer to the base, the greater the effect” (Hart, 614).

Chapter XX: The Concentrated Essence of Strategy and Tactics

Main Idea: The core principle of war is “concentration of strength against weakness.” Achieving this requires dispersing the opponent’s strength through your own calculated dispersion. This prevents the enemy from concentrating to meet your force. The author presents eight key maxims: ◦ Positive Maxims: 1. Adjust your end to your means (be realistic about capabilities) . 2. Keep your object always in mind, adapting your plan to circumstances (objectives must serve the ultimate purpose) . 3. Choose the line (or course) of least expectation (seek surprise) . 4. Exploit the line of least resistance (use tactical success and reserves wisely) . 5. Take a line of operation which offers alternative objectives (create dilemmas for the opponent) . 6. Ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible (adapt to success, failure, or partial success) . ◦ Negative Maxims: 7. Do not throw your weight into a stroke whilst your opponent is on guard (avoid direct frontal attacks) . 8. Do not renew an attack along the same line (or in the same form) after it has once failed (avoid predictability and allow time for enemy recovery) .

“The principles of war, not merely one principle, can be condensed into a single word—‘concentration’. But for truth this needs to be amplified as the ‘concentration of strength against weakness’” (Hart, 621).

“The essential truth underlying these maxims is that, for success, two major problems must be solved—dislocation and exploitation. One precedes and one follows the actual blow” (Hart, 628).

“For, in war, it is by compelling mistakes that the scales are most often turned” (Hart, 630).

“the unexpected cannot guarantee success. But it guarantees the best chance of success” (Hart, 631).

Chapter XXI: National Object and Military Aim

Main Idea: It is crucial to distinguish between the political object (the ultimate purpose of war, aiming for a “better state of peace”) and the military aim (the means by which forces serve that policy) . Military victory alone does not guarantee the political object. The author strongly criticizes the 19th-century dogma, largely derived from misinterpretations of Clausewitz, that the only true aim in war is the “destruction of the enemy’s main forces on the battlefield,” leading to mass-slaughter. Clausewitz’s own nuanced views, emphasizing psychological factors and recognizing the impracticality of “absolute war,” were often overlooked by his disciples who took his ringing phrases (e.g., “blood is the price of victory”) out of context. Post-World War I experience, particularly the decisive role of the naval blockade without major battles, highlighted the flaws in this direct-force dogma and necessitated a re-examination of war’s aims. The advent of armored forces and air power increased the relative importance of strategy over tactics, suggesting that future decisive results would come more from movement and strategic dislocation than from traditional battles. Therefore, the “true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this”

“The military objective is only the means to a political end. Hence the military objective should be governed by the political objective, subject to the basic condition that policy does not demand what is militarily—that, is practically—impossible” (Hart, 631-632).

“The object in war is a better state of peace—even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire” (Hart, 632).

“For more than a century the prime canon of military doctrine has been that ‘the destruction of the enemy’s main forces on the battlefield’ constituted the only true aim in war” (Hart, 634).

“By the reiteration of such phrases Clausewitz blurred the outlines of his philosophy, already indistinct, and made it into &@ mere marching refrain—a Prussian Marseillaise which inflamed the blood and intoxicated the mind” (Hart, 646).

“the true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this” (Hart, 674).

Chapter XXII: Grand Strategy

Main Idea: Grand strategy’s ultimate goal is to achieve a “better peace,” requiring constant consideration of post-war outcomes. Over-focusing solely on military victory can lead to national exhaustion and a flawed peace that sows the seeds for future conflicts. True progress and freedom are fostered by diversity and mutual toleration, rather than enforced unity or monopolies of power which often lead to corruption and disruption. The ideal grand strategy adapts to a nation’s fundamental policy, distinguishing between “acquisitive” and “conservative” states. For a conservative state, victory is achieved by frustrating the opponent’s objectives rather than self-exhaustion. War, though seemingly irrational, must be controlled by reason: efficient strategy conserves strength, brutal methods harden enemy resistance, and imposing excessive demands on the defeated can lead to future retaliation. “True victory” means the nation is better off after the war, which requires either swift results or economically proportionate effort. When evenly matched, wise statesmanship seeks negotiation or truce, and importantly, provides the opponent “a ladder by which he can climb down” from a strong position to ease their resistance. Historically, civilized states often fall due to internal decay and war exhaustion, not direct enemy assaults.

Key Quotes:

“The object in war is to attain a better peace—even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire” (Hart, 675).

“If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war” (Hart, 676).

“Self-exhaustion in war has killed more States than any foreign assailant” (Hart, 681).

“It is an elementary principle of strategy that, if you find your opponent in a strong position costly to force, you should leave him a line of retreat—as the quickest way of loosening his resistance” (Hart, 689-690).

“History reveals, also, that in many cases a beneficial peace could have been obtained if the statesmen of the warring nations had shown more understanding of the elements of psychology in their peace ‘feelers’” (Hart, 688).

Chapter XXIII: Guerrilla War

Main Idea: In the nuclear age, the maxim “If you want peace, understand war” must specifically include guerrilla and subversive forms of conflict, as nuclear deterrence is unsuitable for these “subtler forms of aggression” and may even encourage them. Guerrilla warfare has gained significant importance in the 20th century. The US “massive retaliation” doctrine, following the H-bomb, was critiqued for increasing the possibilities of “limited war” and widespread local aggression. Guerrilla strategy emphasizes “hit and run,” “fluidity of force” over concentration, and multiple minor coups to achieve cumulative “distraction, disturbance, and demoralisation”. Its success depends on factors like the space-to-force ratio, superior local knowledge, and widespread civilian support, often achieved by blending appeals to national resistance with social and economic discontent. Guerrilla war now exploits the nuclear stalemate as a form of “camouflaged war”. While guerrilla forces impose strain on opponents, their effectiveness is often proportionate to their combination with strong regular armies engaging the main front. The author warns that fostering guerrilla warfare can have dangerous long-term consequences, potentially undermining internal stability even after the main conflict (e.g., France post-WWII). Therefore, a subtle and far-seeing counter-strategy is needed.

Key Quotes:

“If you wish for peace. understand war—particularly the guer-rilla and subversive forms of war” (Hart, 696).

“The aggression might be at limited tempo—a gradual process of encroachment. It might be of limited depth but fast tempo—small bites quickly made, and as quickly followed by offers to negotiate. It might be of limited density—a multiple infiltration by particles so small that they formed an intangible vapour” (Hart, 701).

“For guerrillas the principle of ‘concentration’ has to be replaced by that of ‘fluidity of force’” (Hart, 704).

“Guerrilla war is waged by the few but dependent on the support of the many” (Hart, 708).

“The development of guerrilla and subversive war was intensified with the magnification of nuclear weapons… Thus the concept of ‘cold war’ is now out of date, and should be superseded by that of ‘camouflaged war’” (Hart, 709).

Appendix I: The Strategy of Indirect Approach in the North African Campaign, 1940-42 (by Major-General Eric Dorman-Smith)

Main Idea: Dorman-Smith, a British General Staff officer, testifies that Liddell Hart’s theory of the indirect approach was instrumental in successful British operations in North Africa, specifically the Sidi Barrani offensive and the defensive stand at El Alamein. The Sidi Barrani attack exemplified indirectness in direction, method, and timing, using a rear assault to upset the enemy’s balance with minimal cost. O’Connor’s subsequent campaigns, including the Beda Fomm flank march, further demonstrated strategic and tactical indirectness. Holding Tobruk “daringly wrested the weapon of indirectness from Rommel”. Auchinleck’s defensive strategy at El Alamein in July 1942, employing a “chequer of localities” and mobile counter-strokes, embodied a three-way application of the indirect approach that frustrated Rommel. Dorman-Smith emphasizes that “obliquity” (indirectness) is a purely mental instrument for “critical and unorthodox” commanders, aiming for the “psychological disruption of the opposing command” and increasing one’s own “freedom of action”. He concludes that “Air superiority, however powerful, will never compensate for bad generalship on the ground”

“For the plan of attack that led to the annihilation of Graziani’s army at Sidi Barrani, and broke the first invasion of Egypt in 1940, was a perfect example of your strategy of indirect approach” (Dorman-Smith, in Hart, 717).

“This compound of indirect tactical moves completely upset the enemy’s balance. His resistance collapsed, and we rounded up the bulk of his army east of the escarpment at amazingly slight cost to our own forces, numerically much smaller, despite our marked air inferiority” (Dorman-Smith, in Hart, 721).

“Auchinleck’s handling of the Eighth Army in June and July 1942 not only saved the United Nations from very far-reaching defeat, but also provided students of war with a classical exposition of the application of the indirect approach” (Dorman-Smith, in Hart, 736).

“Air superiority, however powerful, will never compensate for bad generalship on the ground” (Dorman-Smith, in Hart, 747).

“The object of obliquity is to find the chink in the armour, the mental armour at that. One’s object is the psychological disruption of the opposing command, and the yardstick of success is the degree of freedom of action one enjoys at the end of the process” (Dorman-Smith, in Hart, 749).

Appendix II: ‘For By Wise Counsel Thou Shalt Make Thy War.’ A Strategical Analysis of the Arab-Israel War, 1948-49 (by General Yigael Yadin)

Main Idea: General Yadin, Chief of the General Staff, Israel Forces, asserts that strategic planning aims to prevent the enemy from using sound principles while enabling one’s own forces to exploit them, ideally determining the battle’s outcome “before the fighting begins” . He emphasizes that Liddell Hart’s strategy of indirect approach is “the only sound strategy”. Its application involves three key aims: (a) cutting enemy lines of communication (physical paralysis), (b) sealing off lines of retreat (undermining morale), and (c) disrupting administration centers (severing brain-limb links). The effect of cutting communications is immediate if done close to the main force, but greater if done further back near the strategic base. Flexibility through “alternative objectives” is crucial for maintaining the aim. Operations “Ten Plagues,” “Ayin,” and “Hiram” successfully applied these principles, using diversions, feints, and swift encirclements to achieve strategic surprise and collapse enemy resistance, often with minimal casualties.

Key Quotes:

“The fate of the battle will be strategically determined even before the fighting beings—or, at least, ensure that the fighting will proceed with maximum advantage to ourselves. Indeed, this is the secret of perfect strategic planning. Clausewitz’s famous saying that ‘blood is the price of victory’ is obsolete thinking” (Yadin, in Hart, 753-754).

“There is no doubt that the strategy of indirect approach is the only sound strategy; but the constitution of the indirect approach in strategy—as brilliantly defined, explained and elaborated by Captain Liddell Hart—is far wider and more complex than in the tactical field” (Yadin, in Hart, 755).

“The true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce a decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this” (Yadin, in Hart, 757, quoting Liddell Hart).

“A plan, like a tree, must have branches if it is to bear fruit; a plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole” (Yadin, in Hart, 760, quoting Liddell Hart).

“The enemy had been taken by surprise” (Yadin, in Hart, 787).

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🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological. In strategy, the longest way round is often the shortest way home.” (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 42)

“Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 11)

“The true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this.” (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 326)

“While the horizon of strategy is bounded by the war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace.” (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 554)

“Direct pressure always tends to harden and consolidate the resistance of an opponent—like snow which is squeezed into a snowball, the more compact it becomes, the slower it is to melt.” (Liddell Hart, 1991, p. 399)