The Foundations of the Science of War

Online Description

“The Foundations of the Science of War” is presented by Colonel J.F.C. Fuller as a pioneering effort to establish the study of warfare on a scientific basis, moving it beyond traditional, “alchemical” methods. Its core purpose is to provide military students with a systematic approach to understanding war’s fundamental principles and values, much like Copernicus or Newton did for their fields, thereby enabling them to become true “artists of war”

🔫 Author Background

Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, an author of works like “Tanks in the Great War,” devoted over fifteen years to studying and meditating on the system presented in “The Foundations of the Science of War”. His initial impetus came in 1911 from the conviction that a European war was imminent, prompting him to search for fundamental principles of war that were missing from existing military regulations. This quest led him to study Napoleon’s correspondence, from which he first deduced six working principles in 1912. Over time, his system evolved through articles, lectures, and other books, with his principles even being included in the 1920 Field Service Regulations. A significant influence on the book’s final form was Captain B.H. Liddell Hart’s “unsparing criticism,” which led to simplification and a re-evaluation of his principles. Fuller’s overarching aim was to apply the “method of science” to the study of war, a pioneering effort he compared to the contributions of Copernicus, Newton, and Darwin in their respective fields, moving beyond the “alchemy of war” to establish a true science upon which the art of war could be based. He noted that he was only an amateur scientist, but believed that understanding civil science was crucial for military progress.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

• Lack of Scientific Study in War: Fuller argues that the study of war is “chaotic” and lacks a systematic, scientific method. He criticizes the prevailing approach as “alchemy of war,” where facts are examined but their values are not understood, leading to “inconsistent sequences”

• Obsession with Traditions and Blind Adherence to Authority: A significant problem Fuller identifies is the “obsession of traditions” and a “peremptory adhesion unto authority” within military thought, which he believes has hindered progress. He likens military scholasticism to medieval religious scholasticism, where “reason was but the handmaid of faith”. This results in soldiers failing to think scientifically and making the same mistakes repeatedly

• Incapacity to See World Forces Accurately: Fuller points out that military shortsightedness stems from an “incapacity to see world forces in their true relationship,” often due to a civilian dislike of war that prevents its objective study

• Misunderstanding of War’s Fundamental Elements: He asserts that warfare is not solely a physical struggle but involves intertwined mental, moral, and physical forces. A major problem is the tendency to separate these, leading to fallacious “moral” and “matériel” schools of thought that ignore their interdependence

• Ineffective Command and Leadership: Fuller critiques the command structures that dilute the “will of the general,” such as direction by committees and delegation of responsibility without maintaining central control. He emphasizes that effective command should be autocratic in decision-making and animating, rather than a “command by soviets”

• Failure to Adapt to New Technologies and Conditions: He highlights the military’s inability to learn from past wars (e.g., the machine gun’s impact) and to foresee the implications of new inventions (like tanks and aircraft) on tactics and strategy, often being “enmeshed in surprises” because they are not organized to do otherwise

• Lack of Economic and Ethical Consideration in Warfare: Fuller argues that war should be conducted economically, minimizing harm and preserving the enemy as a potential future buyer. He also stresses the importance of ethical considerations, noting that the “ethical object” of war is the true foundation of peace

• Call for a Science of War and its Principles: His central argument is the urgent need to establish a “science of war” based on universal principles and laws derived from observation, reflection, and decision, similar to how natural sciences operate. These principles, stemming from the “law of economy of force,” should guide military thought, organization, and action to ensure efficient expenditure of force and ultimately achieve a “more perfect peace”.

📒 Sections

Preface

The preface introduces the author, Colonel J.F.C. Fuller, and states his aim to lay the foundation for a science of war (Fuller, 1925, p. 9). Fuller discusses the evolution of his “principles of war” over fifteen years of study and meditation. Initially, he derived six principles from Napoleon’s correspondence in 1912: Objective, Mass, Offensive, Security, Surprise, and Movement (Fuller, p. 19-20). By 1915, he added Economy of Force and Co-operation (Fuller, 1925, p. 20). In 1920, his principles were included in the Field Service Regulations (Fuller, 1925, p. 20). He later expanded these to virtually nineteen in 1923, before simplifying them to nine in 1925 (Fuller, p. 30-31).

Key Takeaways:

• Purpose of the Book: To provide a foundation of the science of war, encouraging military students to “think of war scientifically” to become “true artists of war” (Fuller, 1925, p. 22).
• Author’s Background: A self-proclaimed “amateur” scientist who stresses the need for soldiers to study civil science and philosophy (Fuller, 1925, p. 22).
• Critique of Current Military Thought: Military terminology lacks scientific definition (Fuller, 1925, p. 23). Soldiers are ignorant of their profession, and their “power of thought degenerates” (Fuller, 1925, p. 154).
• Author’s Ambition: To reduce war to a science, aiming to do for war what Copernicus did for astronomy, Newton for physics, and Darwin for natural history (Fuller, 1925, p. 24). He believes his book is the “first in which a writer has attempted to apply the method of science to the study of war” (Fuller, 1925, p. 24).

Chapter I: The Alchemy of War

This chapter argues that military history, while romantic, has lacked a true scientific study, akin to alchemy’s unscientific nature (Fuller, 1925, p. 336). Fuller contends that military thought, especially before and after the Great War, suffered from a “myopia” (Fuller, p. 40, 64), being obsessed with traditions and failing to apply scientific methods.

Key Definitions/Maxims:

• Alchemy of War: A state where “true facts have been examined, but their values have not been understood” (Fuller, 1925, p. 30). It is “an art without a science” (Fuller, 1925, p. 26).
• Alchemy (General Definition Applied to War): “A false classification of real facts combined with inconsistent sequences—that is, sequence not deduced by a rational method” (Fuller, 1925, p. 29).
• Science vs. Art (Archbishop Thompson, cited by Fuller): “A science teaches us to know, an art to do” (Fuller, 1925, p. 26).
• Military Myopia: The inability of military authorities to “see or foresee” the use of new technologies, leading them to be “obsessed by the idea of a war of movement” (Fuller, 1925, p. 34).
• Marshal Foch’s View: War “can be taught, but only as an art based on theory” (Fuller, 1925, p. 26). He believed “History is the base” for this theory (Fuller, 1925, p. 20).
• Fuller’s Counter: “We shall never arrive at understanding war—that is, knowing it well—until we have a science of war which will reveal to us its reality, and not solely an art which must of necessity deal largely with its appearances” (Fuller, 1925, p. 28).

Chapter II: The Method of Science

Fuller stresses the critical need for a scientific method in military study, contrasting it with the prevailing “unscientific foundations” and “military scholasticism” (Fuller, p. 71-73). He advocates for discarding blind authority and instead adopting a method based on reason, observation, reflection, and decision.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Critique of Authority: The military’s “whole military organization is obsessed by a military scholasticism which closely resembles the religious scholasticism of the Middle Ages” (Fuller, 1925, p. 39). This system is characterized by “Believe, and ask no questions” (Fuller, 1925, p. 39).
• Scholasticism (Locke, cited by Fuller): Consists in “empty verbalism and unverified assumption” (Fuller, 1925, p. 40).
• Science:
  • “Co-ordinated knowledge, facts arranged according to their values” (Fuller, 1925, p. 42).
  • “Organized common sense” (Thomas Huxley, cited by Fuller, p. 84).
  • Aim of Scientific Thought (W.K. Clifford, cited by Fuller): “To apply past experience to new circumstances” (Fuller, 1925, p. 59).
  • Aim of Scientific Method (F. Gotch, cited by Fuller): “The revelation of truth about things” (Fuller, 1925, p. 44).
  • Virgil’s Maxim: “Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas” (Fuller, 1925, p. 44).
• **Scientific Method Steps (Fuller, 1925, p. 51). 2. Reflection (Analysis): Marshal and classify facts, make generalizations/theories (Fuller, 1925, p. 44). 3. Decision (Synthesis/Hypothesis Testing): Apply theories to new phenomena, predict results, and discard theories if observations don’t correspond (Fuller, p. 95-96).
• Economy of Rational Thought: Foresight is the “highest form of judgment” (Fuller, 1925, p. 47). Napoleon’s success stemmed from “reflection, meditation” (Fuller, 1925, p. 48).
• **Truth (Fuller, 1925, p. 9). Rational thought “knows no compromise or moderation, only the extreme view is right” (Fuller, 1925, p. 48).
• Machinery of Rational Thought (Logic):
  • Aristotle’s Inferences: Analogical (particular to particular), Inductive (particular to universal), Deductive (universal to particular) (Fuller, p. 108-109).
  • Comte’s Maxim: “Induire pour deduire afin de construire” (Fuller, 1925, p. 49).
  • Bacon’s Inductive Method: Collect, observe, tabulate phenomena; note variations; exclude to discover cause (Fuller, 1925, p. 49).
  • Descartes’ Rules of Procedure: Never accept anything as true without evidence; separate into component parts (Fuller, 1925, p. 50).
• Imagination: Enables discovery of “causes and effects which, at the moment, are not rationally linked one with the other” (Fuller, 1925, p. 51). It works by hypothesis, which “is a theory which binds facts together” (Fuller, 1925, p. 52).
• Importance of Criticism (Cousin, cited by Fuller): “LA CRITIQUE EST LA VIE DE LA SCIENCE !” (Fuller, 1925, p. 53).
• Open-mindedness (Galileo, cited by Fuller): “WHO IS WILLING TO SET LIMITS TO THE HUMAN INTELLECT?” (Fuller, 1925, p. 53).

Chapter III: The Threefold Order

Fuller posits that all knowledge, including the study of war, is founded on a universal “threefold order” (Fuller, 1925, p. 54). This order is observed in nature and, crucially, in the organization and activities of man, serving as the “axle-pin” for his entire system (Fuller, 1925, p. 49).

Key Concepts/Axioms:

• Threefold Order (Fuller’s Postulate): The universe manifests as Space, Time, and Force (Fuller, p. 130, 176). Man’s knowledge is based on this (Fuller, 1925, p. 43). This is “the key to the understanding of all things” (Fuller, 1925, p. 214).
• Foundations of Knowledge: Mind working within space, time, and force realizes its surroundings as Knowledge and Belief, the intensity of which constitutes Faith (Fuller, 1925, p. 69).
• Architypal Organization: The human body is the primary “measuring-rod” and model for all organization, including military (Fuller, p. 143-144).
• **Threefold Organization of Man (Fuller, 1925, p. 179). 2. Control: The brain (power of action) with senses (stable base/information) and nerves (co-operation) (Fuller, p. 146, 148). 3. Maintenance: Internal organs, specifically the stomach (stable base/supply) with repair/evacuative organs (power of action) and blood (co-operation) (Fuller, p. 146-149).
• **Elements of Force (Fuller, 1925, p. 14). 2. Activity (Fuller, 1925, p. 21). 3. Co-operation (Fuller, 1925, p. 21).
• Threefold Nature of Man (Spheres of Force):
  1. Mental Sphere: Mind (thoughts, ideas, decisions) (Fuller, 1925, p. 99).
  2. Moral Sphere: Soul (sentiment, feeling) (Fuller, 1925, p. 64).
  3. Physical Sphere: Muscles (Fuller, 1925, p. 64). These three spheres form a trinity and “can never be separated” (Fuller, 1925, p. 64).
• Threefold Order of Man’s Activities:
  1. Desire to protect life: Man’s stable base (Fuller, 1925, p. 60).
  2. Power to work or to fight: Man’s active element (Fuller, 1925, p. 62).
  3. Ability to move: Man’s co-operative element (Fuller, 1925, p. 66).
• National Organization: A nation, like an individual, functions on a threefold purpose for its army: maintaining domestic tranquility, national security, and achieving moral persuasion through threat of force (Fuller, 1925, p. 66).

Chapter IV: The Object of War

This chapter defines the multi-faceted objects of war, emphasizing that war is not merely a military act but intrinsically linked to biological, national, ethical, economic, and political objectives. Fuller argues for a holistic understanding of war’s aims, rooted in the foundational law of causation.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Foundation of War: The **law of causation (Fuller, 1925, p. 30). This is axiomatic for scientific method (Fuller, 1925, p. 200).
• Biological Causes of War:
  1. Security of life: Based on the instinct of pugnacity (Fuller, 1925, p. 70).
  2. Maintenance of life: Based on the instinct of hunger (Fuller, 1925, p. 72).
  3. Continuity of race: Based on the instinct of sex (Fuller, 1925, p. 72).
• Peace and War (William James, cited by Fuller): “Every up-to-date dictionary should say that ‘peace’ and ‘war’ mean the same thing, now in posse, now in actu. It may even reasonably be said that the intensely sharp competitive preparation for war by the nation is the real way, permanent, unceasing; and that battles are only a sort of public verification of mastery gained during the ‘peace’ intervals” (Fuller, 1925, p. 72).
• National Causes/Objects of War:
  1. **National Object (Fuller, 1925, p. 76). Achieved by “conquest of the will of the hostile nation” (Fuller, 1925, p. 77).
  2. **Ethical Object (Fuller, 1925, p. 75). Fighting cleanly is applauded (Fuller, 1925, p. 78).
  3. **Economic Object (Fuller, 1925, p. 78). Soldier must understand this (Fuller, 1925, p. 139).
• Political Object (Clausewitz, cited by Fuller): War is not merely a political act, “but also a real political instrument, a combination of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means” (Fuller, 1925, p. 82). “State policy is the womb in which war is developed” (Fuller, 1925, p. 82).
• Economic Rules/Maxims for Political Power (based on Ramsay Fairfax, cited by Fuller):
  • War aims for better or to ensure against worse conditions (Fuller, 1925, p. 82).
  • Economic results of war’s conclusion must be considered (Fuller, 1925, p. 82).
  • “Every man killed means a loss of capital. Every shilling expended is a mortgage of a shilling’s worth of production after the war” (Fuller, 1925, p. 82).
  • Each operation must contribute to final victory in proportion to its cost (Fuller, 1925, p. 83).

Chapter V: The Instrument of War

This chapter focuses on the “instrument” of war, which is the nation itself, encompassing its political, civil, and military aspects. Fuller returns to the analogy of the human body to explain the optimal organization, maintenance, and control of this instrument, particularly its military component.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• **War (Fuller, 1925, p. 32).
• Military Instrument (Lloyd, cited by Fuller): “An army is the instrument with which every species of military action is performed; like all other machines, it is composed of various parts; and its perfection will depend, first, on that of its several parts; and, second, on the manner in which they are arranged; so that the whole may have the following properties, viz. strength, agility, and universality; if these are properly combined, the machine is perfect” (Fuller, p. 203-204).
• Essential Properties of an Army (Lloyd, cited by Fuller): Strength (collective vigour/weapon-power), Agility (quickness of manoeuvre), Universality (Fuller, 1925, p. 88).
• Structure of the Military Instrument: Pre-eminently tactical, enabling “resistance, pressure, and movement” (Fuller, 1925, p. 224).
• Threefold Structure of Fighting Force:
  1. Protective troops (Fuller, 1925, p. 91).
  2. Combat troops (Fuller, 1925, p. 91).
  3. Pursuit troops (Fuller, 1925, p. 91).
• Maintenance of the Instrument: Consists of Supply (stable element), Repair (active element), and Transportation (Fuller, 1925, p. 91).
• Control of the Instrument:
  • Unity of Command: “The more the will of the commander is single, the more economic will be the expenditure of force” (Fuller, 1925, p. 93).
  • Napoleon’s Maxim: “In war men are nothing; it is one man who matters” (Fuller, 1925, p. 93).
  • Napoleon’s Maxim: “The secret in war does not lie in the legs; it resides entirely in the brain that sets the legs in motion” (Fuller, p. 217-218).
  • Machiavelli’s Maxim: “Let only one command in war: several minds weaken an army” (Fuller, 1925, p. 93).
• Requirements for Control: Information, Decision, Communication (Fuller, 1925, p. 98).
• Higher Control: Advocates for a generalissimo who is a “thinking man,” supported by a staff from all three services, to correlate national power and military effort, freeing fighting commanders from political interference (Fuller, p. 268-269).
• Military Requirements for Study:
  1. Knowledge of the powers and limitations of the instrument (Fuller, 1925, p. 331).
  2. Knowledge of the powers and influences of conditions (Fuller, 1925, p. 331).
  3. Knowledge of how to expend force profitably (Fuller, 1925, p. 331).

Chapter VI: The Mental Sphere of War

This chapter delves into the mental faculties that control war: reason, imagination, and will. Fuller argues that these elements, especially when cultivated as “genius,” are the true drivers of strategy and effective military action, emphasizing the importance of mental warfare over brute physical force.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Controlling Faculties of Mental Sphere: Reason, Imagination, Will (Fuller, p. 235-236).
• Element of Reason: The “highest form of consciousness” (Fuller, 1925, p. 129). All conscious actions emanate from it (Fuller, p. 239-240).
• Element of Imagination: Crucial in war, which is not an “exact science” (Fuller, p. 240-241). It allows for hypothesis and sensing the “moral” worth of an antagonist (Fuller, p. 241-242).
• Element of Will: The “gravity of the mind,” the “motive force which attempts to accomplish reason by cause and effect” (Fuller, 1925, p. 102). It indicates what it “will be tomorrow by what it is today” (Fuller, 1925, p. 102).
• Influence of Genius: A “natural gift for doing what is right and shunning what is wrong” (Fuller, 1925, p. 104). Genius is the “mainspring of strategy” and manifests in surprise (Fuller, 1925, p. 105).
• Qualifications of the Great Captain:
  1. Imagination operating through reason.
  2. Reason operating through audacity.
  3. Audacity operating through rapidity of movement (Fuller, 1925, p. 106).
• Military Thought: Requires understanding organization, force, and circumstances (Fuller, 1925, p. 109).
  • Maxim for Planning: “Maintain organization, work within the limitations of the force at our disposal, and foresee the changes in conditions” (Fuller, 1925, p. 110).
• Grand Strategy: The “correlation between national power and military effort” (Fuller, 1925, p. 111). It includes “all the forces which are to be expended in the struggle” (Fuller, 1925, p. 331).
• Grand Tactics: The duty of the grand tactician is to arrange forces according to resistance (Fuller, 1925, p. 113).
  • Grand-Tactical Object: The “destruction of the enemy’s plan,” which “will so reduce his will to win that he must either surrender or accept terms of peace” (Fuller, 1925, p. 114).
  • Decisive Point (Fuller’s view): “Not the body of the hostile army,” but “the will of the enemy’s commander” (Fuller, 1925, p. 116). Grand tacticians aim for “mental destruction,” not physical (Fuller, 1925, p. 15).
• Purposes of the Fighting Forces:
  • Army: “To gain command of the enemy’s land” (Fuller, 1925, p. 116). Its ultimate objective is “peaceful occupation” (Fuller, p. 290-291).
  • Fleet: To protect armies and supplies, achieve “command of the sea” (Fuller, 1925, p. 117).
  • Air Force: To provide information/local protection, and “to attack the will of the hostile people” through “command of the air” (Fuller, 1925, p. 118).

Chapter VII: The Moral Sphere of War

Fuller explores the moral dimension of war, emphasizing that moral forces are critical, permeating the “spirit which permeates the whole being of war” (Clausewitz, cited by Fuller, p. 299). He argues that leadership and discipline must transcend blind obedience to cultivate courage, comradeship, and character, transforming fear into a controlled weapon.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Moral Aspect of War (Clausewitz, cited by Fuller): “The moral forces are amongst the most important subjects in war. They form the spirit which permeates the whole being of war” (Fuller, 1925, p. 120).
• Animation (Jackson, cited by Fuller): What distinguishes a mechanic from a genius general, forming soldiers into “heroes” (Fuller, 1925, p. 121). It is “one mind illuminating many minds, by one heart causing thousands to beat in rhythm” (Fuller, p. 304-305).
• Moral Elements in War (classified by Fuller):
  1. Fear: An “essential element” that, when controlled, becomes a “most potent weapon” (Fuller, p. 311, 323). It “unhinges the will” and “paralyses the reason” when uncontrolled (Fuller, 1925, p. 23).
  2. Courage (Clausewitz, cited by Fuller): The “first in danger,” the “crystalline lens through which all appearances pass before reaching the understanding” (Fuller, 1925, p. 128). “There never was a great general who was wanting in boldness” (Fuller, 1925, p. 128).
  3. “Moral” (Fuller’s term): Draws strength from self-sacrifice, patriotism, loyalty, comradeship, self-respect, and skill (Fuller, p. 320, 333). It is the “magic of moral” to compel fear to obedience (Fuller, 1925, p. 130).
• Relationship of Will and Moral Elements: Reason gives expression to will, which traverses the moral sphere; fear must be balanced by moral for will to influence the physical sphere (Fuller, p. 314-315).
• Generalship: Control must rest on one man (Fuller, 1925, p. 130). The moral aim of generalship is to fuse the general’s reason with the soldier’s reason, operating as “one mental force” (Fuller, p. 339-340).
  • Napoleon’s Maxim: “An army is nothing without a head” (Fuller, 1925, p. 131).
  • Jackson’s View: A great general’s influence “connects and binds the whole together imperceptibly, but firmly and securely. Such confidence in a leader is the charm against a panic” (Fuller, p. 341-342).
  • Qualities of a General: Resolution, caution, wisdom (Fuller, 1925, p. 132).
  • Fuller’s Conclusion: Originality, coupled with a clear head and resolute character, is the “greatest gift of generalship” (Fuller, 1925, p. 134).
• Foundations of Human Nature: Character differentiates men; Instincts lead to unconscious impulses (Fuller, 1925, p. 122).
• Crowd Psychology: A heterogeneous crowd is governed by uncontrolled desires (Fuller, 1925, p. 143). Factors influencing crowds: distant (race, religion), immediate (images, catchwords), future (Fuller, 1925, p. 143).
• Co-operative Group: A homogeneous group where differences are harmonized (Fuller, 1925, p. 144). An army should be a unified group, integrating from sections to the national group-spirit (Fuller, 1925, p. 144).
• Military Crowd: An army is a highly organized crowd that tends to revert to its crowd-form under stress (Fuller, 1925, p. 146). Peace-time training must cultivate “moral” so that “when intellect and reason fail, man is not ruled by his instincts and sentiments alone, but by his moral” (Fuller, 1925, p. 146).
• Factors Influencing “Moral”: Limitations to task, ability, encouragement, protection, immunity (Fuller, p. 362-363).
• Relationship between Moral and Physical: “Moral multiplies physical force, and physical force multiplies moral” (Fuller, 1925, p. 15). No “guts versus guns” dichotomy (Fuller, 1925, p. 140).
• Psychology of Battle: A “complex psychological crisis” where moral can evaporate under fear (Fuller, p. 377-378).

Chapter VIII: The Physical Sphere of War

Fuller focuses on the tangible aspects of war: movement, weapons, and protection. He dismisses the idea that battles are lost only morally, arguing that physical strength, augmented by superior “tools,” is essential. He provides a detailed examination of military objects, tactical objectives, and strategic formations, emphasizing the need for scientific application in physical warfare.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Physical Aspect of War: “War is pre-eminently a physical struggle for mastership” (Fuller, 1925, p. 150).
• Critique of “Moral Only” View: De Maistre’s assertion that “a battle cannot be lost physically” is “common nonsense” (Fuller, p. 390-391).
• Winning War (Fuller’s Axiom): “What does win a war is the highest combination of these three forces [mental, moral, physical] acting as one force” (Fuller, 1925, p. 152).
• Importance of Tools (Carlyle, cited by Fuller): “Feeblest of bipeds! …Nevertheless he can use Tools; can devise Tools: with these the granite mountain melts into light dust before him… Nowhere do you find him without Tools; without Tools he is nothing, with Tools he is all” (Fuller, 1925, p. 152).
• Physical Elements of War:
  1. Protection (Fuller, 1925, p. 14).
  2. Offensive action (Fuller, 1925, p. 152).
  3. Movement (Fuller, 1925, p. 152). These three are the acts of guarding, hitting, and moving (Fuller, 1925, p. 154).
• Element of Weapons: Express offensive intent, with purposes to “kill, to injure, and to terrorize” (Fuller, 1925, p. 155). Types: shock-weapons, missile-weapons, chemical weapons (Fuller, 1925, p. 156).
  • Key Tactical Rule for Weapons: “In all circumstances missile-weapons must be employed to facilitate or ward off the shock” (Fuller, 1925, p. 157). More generally, “the longer-range weapons must be employed to facilitate or ward off the employment of the shorter-range weapon” (Fuller, 1925, p. 157).
• Element of Protection: Means of “economizing hitting-power” (Fuller, 1925, p. 158). Mobile direct protection (Fuller, 1925, p. 337).
• Military Objects:
  • Military Object: “Conquest,” meaning “that condition of success which will admit of a government imposing its will on the enemy’s nation” (Fuller, 1925, p. 159).
  • Objects of Military Art (adapting Lloyd): Endurance (organization), Secure Activity (tactics), Secure Mobility (Fuller, 1925, p. 160).
• Military Objectives:
  • Strategical Objective: The “rear of the enemy’s army, his supply depots, communications, and railheads” (Fuller, 1925, p. 161).
  • Tactical Objectives: Can vary (Fuller, 1925, p. 164). The “primary objective” is “the bull’s-eye of the target,” often the enemy’s artillery (Fuller, p. 425, 424). The “decisive point is the normally most sensitive point and not the numerically weakest point” (Fuller, p. 761-762).
• Strategical Formations:
  • Columns: “The soul of military operations” (Napier, cited by Fuller, p. 428). Forms include parallel order (Fuller, 1925, p. 165) and echeloned line (Fuller, 1925, p. 165).
  • **Lozenge Formation (Fuller, 1925, p. 14).
  • Motorized Armies: More flexible, can move extended, allowing increased locomobility (Fuller, p. 445-446).
• Threefold Order of Tactical Action: Demoralize, Disorganize, Destroy (Fuller, 1925, p. 90). A platoon, in miniature, repeats this (Fuller, 1925, p. 178).
• Critique of Physical Study: Study of the physical sphere has been “alchemical,” leading to demands on moral rather than addressing physical defects directly (Fuller, 1925, p. 125).

Chapter IX: The Conditions of War

This chapter examines the “conditions of war” —all external causes that change and modify the military instrument. Fuller categorizes these as military space, force, and time, emphasizing that understanding and adapting to these conditions, rather than being controlled by them, is essential for scientific military action.

Key Concepts/Maxims:

• Conditions of War: Every “possible cause which can produce an effect in the instrument” (Fuller, 1925, p. 181).
• Threefold Order of Conditions:
  1. Military Space (geography, topography, climate) (Fuller, p. 461, 473).
  2. Military Time (how to utilize time to best advantage; friction is its enemy) (Fuller, p. 461, 471).
  3. Military Force (interplay between own and enemy’s forces) (Fuller, p. 461, 473).
• Influence of Conditions: They influence the instrument’s three forces (mental, moral, physical) and their elements (Fuller, 1925, p. 332).
• Dual Power of Conditions: Each condition possesses a dual power of “assistance and of resistance” to the military instrument (Fuller, 1925, p. 13).
• Generalship and Conditions: Good generalship means “compelling an enemy to bore holes through the latter [steel] whilst we are boring holes through the former [wood]” (Fuller, 1925, p. 198).
• How to Deal with Conditions: A commander can (1) avoid it, (2) force it aside, or (Fuller, 1925, p. 199). The third course “masters the difficulty” and is “the test of good generalship” (Fuller, 1925, p. 199).
• Mental Conditions of War: Most important for the general, who “fights with his brain” (Fuller, p. 474-475). The plan is the “spirit-level and plummet-line of a general’s plan” (Fuller, p. 476-477).
• Moral Conditions of War: Influence the soldier by stimulating courage or fear (Fuller, 1925, p. 139).
• Physical Conditions of War: Lloyd considered the theatre of operations as “the great and sole book of war” (Fuller, 1925, p. 193).
• Forecasting Future Conditions: Requires political philosopher and scientist collaboration (Fuller, 1925, p. 194).

Chapter X: The Law of Economy of Force

Fuller proposes the “Law of Economy of Force” as the fundamental, overarching law governing all military action. Derived from Herbert Spencer’s philosophy of universal force redistribution, this law dictates that all forces—mental, moral, and physical—must be expended at the highest profit, minimizing waste and maximizing effectiveness.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Uniformity of Force (G. Gore, cited by Fuller): “A general law or truth is arrived at by detecting a constant or uniformity amongst variables… . Rules are based upon laws, and laws are based upon facts” (Fuller, 1925, p. 202).
• Nature: “All is causal, nothing is casual” (Fuller, 1925, p. 202).
• Force (Herbert Spencer, cited by Fuller): “The ultimate of ultimates,” manifesting as “matter moving in space, the duration of the movement being time” (Fuller, p. 516-517).
• Motion (Herbert Spencer, cited by Fuller): “Always follows the line of greatest traction, or the line of least resistance, or the resultant of the two” (Fuller, 1925, p. 203).
• Law of Continuous Redistribution of Matter and Motion (Herbert Spencer, cited by Fuller): Every change is “a change towards integration or disintegration” (Fuller, p. 528-529).
• Law of Economy of Force (Fuller’s Fundamental Law of War): “The desired end will be achieved with the smallest expenditure of effort” (Herbert Spencer, cited by Fuller, p. 535). It ensures the “most profitable expenditure of force” (Fuller, p. 535, 594).
• Economy of Mental Force: Requires “economy of thought” (Mach, cited by Fuller, p. 541). “Discipline of mind must precede discipline of body” (Fuller, 1925, p. 210).
• Economy of Moral Force (G. Gore, cited by Fuller): “The fundamental rule of righteousness, that we should do unto others as we would have them do unto us under like circumstances, is evidently based upon the principle of causation, viz., that the same cause always produces the same effect under the same circumstances” (Fuller, p. 545-546).
• Economy of Physical Force: Visible in the evolution of weapons, aiming “to economize man’s strength, to economize in life, to economize in numbers, by perfecting the means of war” (Fuller, 1925, p. 212).

Chapter XI: The Principles of War

This chapter introduces Fuller’s nine core principles of war, derived directly from the Law of Economy of Force. These principles are abstract generalizations that guide the economical expenditure of mental, moral, and physical force within the military instrument, grouped into control, pressure, and resistance categories.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Value of Principles (Fuller’s view): They “eliminate self when judgments have to be formed, and so assist us to maintain that mental equilibrium which is only possible when the mind is attuned to the law of economy of force” (Fuller, 1925, p. 214).
• The Nine Principles of War (Fuller’s 1925 System, as clarified in p. 221):
  • Principles of Control:
    1. Direction of Force: Guiding force towards the objective; the “first principle of war” (Fuller, p. 573, 599).
    2. Determination of Force: Animating the instrument and controlling its sentiments (Fuller, 1925, p. 245).
    3. Mobility of Force: Endowing military operations with activity; if perfect, it would “coincide with the law of economy of force” (Fuller, p. 595, 599).
  • Principles of Pressure: 4. Concentration of Force: Seeking decision by massing superiority of force against the objective (Fuller, p. 575, 599). 5. Demoralization of Force (Surprise): Representing moral concentration; “the soul of every operation,” it attacks the enemy’s will by accentuating fear (Fuller, p. 583, 749, 750). 6. Disorganization of Force (Offensive Action): Exerting physical force to destroy or disorganize the enemy’s army or plan (Fuller, p. 591, 599).
  • Principles of Resistance: 7. Distribution of Force: Economically rearranging forces so that structure, maintenance, and control are maintained (Fuller, p. 575, 599). 8. Endurance of Force: Representing moral resistance; the power to withstand moral pressure (Fuller, p. 585, 599). 9. Security of Force: Representing physical endurance; protecting pressure while it’s exerted (Fuller, p. 594, 599).
• Three Groups of Principles:
  1. Principles of Control: Direction, Determination, Mobility (Fuller, 1925, p. 231).
  2. Principles of Pressure: Concentration, Surprise, Offensive Action (Fuller, 1925, p. 231).
  3. Principles of Resistance: Distribution, Endurance, Security (Fuller, 1925, p. 231).
• Constructive Value of Principles: They assist in achieving economy of force (Fuller, 1925, p. 232). Co-operation is the “tangible expression of economy of force” (Fuller, 1925, p. 232).
• Development of a Plan: Means must be “scientifically fitted to ends according to conditions” (Fuller, 1925, p. 233). Planning involves collecting conditions (information), applying principles (analysis), evaluating against elements of war, and synthesizing a plan guided by the principles (Fuller, p. 613-614).

Chapter XII: The Principles of Control

This chapter elaborates on the principles of control: Direction, Determination, and Mobility. Fuller emphasizes that effective control in war requires profound knowledge, clarity of purpose, and the willingness of a single, autocratic commander to impose his will, fostering initiative and adapting doctrine to evolving conditions.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Principle of Direction:
  • Starting Point of a Plan: “What have I got to do?” (Fuller, 1925, p. 236).
  • Line of Direction: “How am I going to do it?” (Fuller, 1925, p. 258). It should be based on policy, aiming for annihilation of enemy resistance and occupation (Fuller, 1925, p. 237).
  • Objects of Direction: To gain freedom of movement (strategical), freedom of action (tactical), and freedom of supply (Fuller, 1925, p. 237).
  • **Point of Direction (Fuller, 1925, p. 204).
    • Moral: The rear of the enemy’s army (Fuller, 1925, p. 161).
    • Physical: The arm or position essential to the enemy’s plan (Fuller, 1925, p. 161).
• Principle of Determination:
  • Purpose: To “animate his instrument” and define the plan’s limits (Fuller, 1925, p. 244). It is the resultant of originality (Fuller, 1925, p. 266).
  • Command: Solely within the province of “one man to animate the instrument in its highest degree” (Fuller, 1925, p. 245). Councils and committees cannot effectively govern armies (Fuller, 1925, p. 245).
  • Jomini’s View on Councils of War: They “can only produce unfortunate results” if there is difference of opinion, as operations must be “conducted by others than those who have originated and arranged them” (Fuller, 1925, p. 246).
  • **Freedom of Will (Fuller, 1925, p. 139).
  • Animation of Instrument (Jackson, cited by Fuller): A general must know “what man can do, and what he cannot do” and “the means by which his exertions are to be animated to the utmost extent” (Fuller, 1925, p. 249).
• Delegation of Responsibility: Should only occur for subordinate actions; the general-in-chief should command the main action as an “absolute autocrat” (Fuller, 1925, p. 252). “Command by soviets” (committees) leads to uneconomical war (Fuller, p. 671, 673).
• Meaning of Initiative: The “will to act,” which depends on the centralization of will (Fuller, p. 679, 681).
• Singleness of Purpose: Essential for determination. Policy must be “clean cut” and stable (Fuller, p. 682-683). The “will to win” is a duel between two brains and a struggle between two armies (Fuller, 1925, p. 255).
• Principle of Mobility:
  • Definition: “Endows all military operations with activity, whether offensive, protective, or logistical” (Fuller, 1925, p. 256). It governs the expenditure of force (Fuller, 1925, p. 256).
  • Relationship to Economy of Force: “If it were possible to move correctly, then this principle would coincide with the law of economy of force” (Fuller, 1925, p. 256).
  • Movement of Ideas: Depends on “liberty of thought” (Fuller, 1925, p. 259).
  • Doctrine: The “central idea of an army,” which must be “elastic enough to admit of mutation in accordance with change in circumstances” (Fuller, 1925, p. 260). It must allow any rational idea to move without friction (Fuller, 1925, p. 261).
  • Reserves: Form the “capital of the commander” and are crucial for maintaining mobility and influencing battle (Fuller, 1925, p. 263).

Chapter XIII: The Principles of Pressure

Fuller details the principles of pressure: Concentration, Surprise, and Offensive Action. He argues that these are active principles aimed at breaking the enemy’s will and physical strength, emphasizing weapon superiority over numerical superiority and the demoralizing power of the unexpected.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Principles of Pressure: Concentration, Surprise, Offensive Action (Fuller, 1925, p. 266). These are “active” principles (Fuller, 1925, p. 19).
• Principle of Concentration:
  • Clausewitz’s Maxims (cited by Fuller): “To reduce the weight of the enemy’s power into as few centres of gravity as possible… to confine the attack against these centres… to as few principal undertakings as possible… lastly, to keep all secondary undertakings as subordinate as possible. In a word, the first principle is to concentrate as much as possible” (Fuller, p. 709-710). Also, “to act as swiftly as possible” (Fuller, p. 710-711).
  • Napoleon’s Maxim (cited by Fuller): “Concentrate fire against a single point, and once the breach is made equilibrium is broken, all action becomes useless, and the place is taken” (Fuller, 1925, p. 267).
  • Foundation: Reserves are the “foundation of concentration” (Fuller, 1925, p. 270).
  • Nature of Force Concentrated (Fuller’s view): No longer “superiority of numbers,” but “superiority of weapons, means of protection, and movement” (Fuller, 1925, p. 271). Demands “selection of force as well as mass, and suitability of force as well as numbers” (Fuller, 1925, p. 272).
  • Lanchester’s “N-Square Law”: States that the “fighting strength of a force may be broadly defined as proportional to the square of its numerical strength multiplied by the fighting value of its individual units” (Lanchester, cited by Fuller, p. 738-739). This implies that weapon superiority can compensate for numerical inferiority (Fuller, 1925, p. 274).
  • **Carlyle’s Maxim on Gunpowder (Fuller, 1925, p. 16).
• Principle of Surprise:
  • Definition: The “soul of every operation. It is the secret of victory and the key to success” (Fuller, 1925, p. 278). It is the “demoralizing principle” (Fuller, 1925, p. 278).
  • Object: “To attack the will of the enemy by accentuating fear” (Fuller, 1925, p. 279), leading to panic (Fuller, 1925, p. 290).
  • Means: Effected by “superior direction,” “superior determination,” and “superior mobility” (Fuller, 1925, p. 279).
  • Clausewitz on Surprise (cited by Fuller): “In tactics, a surprise seldom rises to the level of a great victory, while in strategy it often finishes the war at one stroke” (Fuller, 1925, p. 283).
  • Chief Means of Strategical Surprise: Simplicity, secrecy, and speed of movement (Fuller, 1925, p. 283).
  • Influence of Tactical Organization: Organization should allow for maximum offensive, protective, and moving power (Fuller, 1925, p. 287).
• Principle of Offensive Action:
  • Misconception: Not simply “brute force” (Fuller, 1925, p. 296).
  • Object: “To establish a condition which will permit of policy taking effect” (Fuller, 1925, p. 289). Its “true object… is to strike at the enemy’s determination to continue to resist” (Fuller, 1925, p. 289).
  • Nature of Offensive: A “mental, moral, and physical act” (Fuller, 1925, p. 268). The “will to win” is the driving force, “power to endure” the staying force, and “ability to kill and to terrify” the deciding force (Fuller, p. 776-777).
  • Economical Offensive: “The moral attack is undoubtedly more economical than the physical attack” (Fuller, 1925, p. 289).
  • Strategical Offensive: Based on secure movement, aiming for ethical, economic, and military attacks (Fuller, p. 788-789).
  • Tactical Offensive: Involves delaying, pinning down, and attacking with superior force at a weak point (Fuller, 1925, p. 295). “The unlimited offensive—that is, an offensive a outrance—has nothing whatever to do with scientific warfare” (Fuller, 1925, p. 295).
  • Napoleon’s Maxim (cited by Fuller): “There are many good generals in Europe, but they see too many things at once. I seek the enemy’s masses in order to annihilate them” (Fuller, 1925, p. 297).
  • Object of the Offensive: To cause “mental paralysis as well as… physical destruction” (Fuller, 1925, p. 33).

Chapter XIV: The Principles of Resistance

This chapter details the principles of resistance: Distribution, Endurance, and Security. Fuller argues that effective resistance is not merely defensive but is an integral part of an offensive plan, aiming to conserve force and exploit the enemy’s weaknesses through strategic deployment, moral resilience, and superior protective measures.

Key Definitions/Maxims/Concepts:

• Principles of Resistance: Distribution, Endurance, Security (Fuller, 1925, p. 225).
• Principle of Distribution:
  • Core Idea: Gaining “economy of force… by distributing force economically” (Fuller, 1925, p. 161).
  • Relationship to Attack: “We must think in one term—the protected attack—whether we are advancing, retiring, or standing still” (Fuller, 1925, p. 303).
  • Offensive vs. Defensive Distribution: The offensive requires masses of weapons and superior ability; the defensive requires sufficient men to protect the offensive (Fuller, p. 818-819).
  • Xenophon’s Insight (cited by Fuller): “Victory is not to be sought in distributing or concentrating masses of men, but in perfection of weapons” (Fuller, 1925, p. 309). Weapon-power and moral are the “two greatest sources of battle energy” (Fuller, 1925, p. 309).
  • Critique of Cordon System: It “infringes the principles of distribution and of concentration” by making the offensive inoperative due to faulty distribution (Fuller, p. 821-822).
• Principle of Endurance:
  • Discipline: The “mental, moral, and physical system applied to prepare the soldier for war” (Fuller, 1925, p. 311).
  • Influence of Weapons on Discipline: Each advance in physical means of war “demand[s] a change in military discipline” (Fuller, p. 837-838). Frederick the Great’s fear-based discipline (Fuller, p. 838-839) contrasted with Sir John Moore’s loyalty and affection (Fuller, 1925, p. 129). Modern warfare demands intelligent, determined leaders in small units (Fuller, p. 842-843).
  • Mental Discipline: Cultivating “knowledge, understanding, and wisdom” (Fuller, 1925, p. 314). “Ignorance, fear, and terror go together” (Gore, cited by Fuller, p. 846). Requires enabling men to “cultivate understanding” through examination and criticism (Fuller, 1925, p. 315).
  • Moral Discipline: Based on “respect,” fostered by intellectual and moral qualities of leaders (Fuller, 1925, p. 316).
  • Physical Discipline: Aims to economize moral force through correct use of means (Fuller, 1925, p. 317). Requires cultivating leadership, not automata (Fuller, 1925, p. 317).
  • Commander’s Endurance: “Power of overcoming conditions by foresight, courage, and skill” (Fuller, 1925, p. 318).
  • Physical Endurance: “One invulnerable man is worth a thousand vulnerable ones” (Fuller, 1925, p. 319).
• Principle of Security:
  • Definition: “The base of offensive action” (Fuller, 1925, p. 259).
  • Object of Defence (Clausewitz, cited by Fuller): “To preserve” the “endurance of offensive action” (Fuller, 1925, p. 320).
  • **Jomini’s Maxim (Fuller, 1925, p. 33).
  • Ethical Security: Requires “truth” in propaganda to avoid smearing oneself (Fuller, 1925, p. 22).
  • National Security: Direct (Fuller, 1925, p. 323).
  • Economic Security: Gold (Fuller, 1925, p. 323).
  • Military Security: Means of “gaining time at the expense of the enemy” (Fuller, 1925, p. 326). Imbuing troops with sense of security is chief duty (Fuller, 1925, p. 326).
  • Strategical Security: Placing forces in area of operations to threaten enemy’s initiative (Fuller, 1925, p. 254).
  • Tactical Security: “Choosing of a vulnerable target or the refusal to offer one” (Fuller, 1925, p. 327). Depends on “seeing and not being seen, on hitting and not being hit, on moving and not being moved” (Fuller, 1925, p. 327).
  • New Problems of Security: Influence of gas, aeroplane, and tank requires new methods, such as armored/gas-proof mechanical columns (Fuller, p. 879-880).

Chapter XV: The Application of the Science of War

In the concluding chapter, Fuller summarizes his system, reiterating that war can and must be reduced to a science for its forces to be effectively expended. He provides a practical guide for applying his method to the study of military history, the development of plans, and the solution of tactical problems, emphasizing foresight, analysis, and the continuous asking of “why” and “how.”

Key Concepts/Maxims/Summary:

• Purpose of the System: To establish the “theory and practice of war on a scientific footing” (Fuller, 1925, p. 330). Military history, lacking system, has been of “little value” (Fuller, 1925, p. 19).
• Core Requirements:
  1. Knowledge of the powers and limitations of the instrument (Fuller, 1925, p. 331).
  2. Knowledge of the powers and influences of conditions (Fuller, 1925, p. 331).
  3. Knowledge of how to expend force profitably (Fuller, 1925, p. 331).
• System’s Foundation: The instrument’s three forces (mental, moral, physical), influenced by three categories of conditions (material, human), governed by the Law of Economy of Force, which is expressed through the nine principles of war (Fuller, p. 888-890).
• Grouping of Principles (for rapidity of thought):
  • Principles of Control: Direction, Determination, Mobility (Fuller, 1925, p. 332).
  • Principles of Pressure: Concentration, Surprise, Offensive Action (Fuller, 1925, p. 266).
  • Principles of Resistance: Distribution, Endurance, Security (Fuller, 1925, p. 231).
• Fuller’s System in Seven Words:
  • Cause (Fuller, 1925, p. 333).
• Application to Military History:
  • Start by analyzing the peace treaty’s military, economic, and ethical aspects (Fuller, 1925, p. 159).
  • Discover the political object and intentions of contending parties (Fuller, p. 902-903).
  • Evalue the “respective instruments of war” using the nine principles as “grids” to sort facts by their values (Fuller, p. 905-906).
  • Constantly ask “why” and “how” of success and failure (Fuller, p. 914-915).
  • Project deductions into the future (Fuller, 1925, p. 320).
• Application to Plans and Problems:
  1. Ascertain object/purpose.
  2. Discover values/limitations of own and enemy’s means.
  3. Examine conditions’ assistance/resistance.
  4. Assume enemy is bold/intelligent.
  5. Apply principles to enemy’s means.
  6. Work out enemy’s plan(s).
  7. Apply principles to own means to defeat enemy (and counter their moves).
  8. Decide on force distribution (Fuller, p. 917-920).
• Maxim for the Ignorant: “When in doubt, hit out” (Fuller, 1925, p. 343).
• Napoleon’s Maxim (cited by Fuller): “The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack” (Fuller, 1925, p. 325).

☠️ Agree, Disagree, or Suspend

It is just bad.