The New Makers of Modern Strategy

Online Description

The essential resource on military and political strategy and the making of the modern world The New Makers of Modern Strategy is the next generation of the definitive work on strategy and the key figures who have shaped the theory and practice of war and statecraft throughout the centuries. Featuring entirely new entries by a who’s who of world-class scholars, this new edition provides global, comparative perspectives on strategic thought from antiquity to today, surveying both classical and current themes of strategy while devoting greater attention to the Cold War and post-9/11 eras. The contributors evaluate the timeless requirements of effective strategy while tracing the revolutionary changes that challenge the makers of strategy in the contemporary world. Amid intensifying global disorder, the study of strategy and its history has never been more relevant. The New Makers of Modern Strategy draws vital lessons from history’s most influential strategists, from Thucydides and Sun Zi to Clausewitz, Napoleon, Churchill, Mao, Ben-Gurion, Andrew Marshall, Xi Jinping, and Qassem Soleimani. With contributions by Dmitry Adamsky, John Bew, Tami Davis Biddle, Hal Brands, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Elizabeth Economy, Charles Edel, Eric S. Edelman, Andrew Ehrhardt, Lawrence Freedman, John Lewis Gaddis, Francis J. Gavin, Christopher J. Griffin, Ahmed S. Hashim, Eric Helleiner, Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh, Seth G. Jones, Robert Kagan, Jonathan Kirshner, Matthew Kroenig, James Lacey, Guy Laron, Michael V. Leggiere, Margaret MacMillan, Tanvi Madan, Thomas G. Mahnken, Carter Malkasian, Daniel Marston, John H. Maurer, Walter Russell Mead, Michael Cotey Morgan, Mark Moyar, Williamson Murray, S.C.M. Paine, Sergey Radchenko, Iskander Rehman, Thomas Rid, Joshua Rovner, Priya Satia, Kori Schake, Matt J. Schumann, Brendan Simms, Jason K. Stearns, Hew Strachan, Sue Mi Terry, and Toshi Yoshihara.

🔫 Author Background

Hal Brands, the editor of The New Makers of Modern Strategy, is a prominent American scholar of foreign policy and grand strategy. He holds a BA in History and Political Science from Stanford University, and earned his MA, MPhil, and PhD in History from Yale University . He is currently the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and serves as a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute .

Brands also brings direct governmental experience to his academic work: he served as Special Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Defense for Strategic Planning and was lead writer for the Commission on the National Defense Strategy . His previous books—such as The Twilight Struggle and Danger Zone—investigate great-power rivalry, strategy, and U.S. foreign policy in the modern era .

Brands was motivated to produce The New Makers of Modern Strategy to update and extend the classic Makers of Modern Strategy volumes (first published 1943, updated 1986) for a new age marked by digital transformation, evolving military technologies, and intensifying geopolitical competition . He assembled a collection of forty‑five essays by top scholars covering strategy from the ancient world to the digital age—hoping readers would see how understanding historical strategic thought enriches current strategic judgment .

His goal was to help readers—especially citizens and policymakers from democratic countries—develop better strategic instincts by tracing how strategy has evolved, from Thucydides and Clausewitz to Xi Jinping and cyber‑era dilemmas . This volume offers both historical genealogy and contemporary relevance, illustrating how today’s strategic challenges connect to intellectual traditions spanning continents and centuries .

📒 Sections

📕 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz” (pp. 186-213)

This chapter delves into Carl von Clausewitz’s pivotal theoretical work, On War, emphasizing its analytical nature and enduring relevance.

Main Arguments:

• Analysis over Prescription: Clausewitz’s primary goal was to understand the nature of war, rather than to provide rules or prescriptions for its conduct. He believed that after the Napoleonic threat, identifying the permanent elements of war and how they function was more important than devising specific schemes.

“To devise effective strategic schemes and tactical measures mattered far less to him than to identify the permanent elements of war and come to understand how they function” (Paret, p. 126).

◦ Theory must be comprehensive, based on the constants or absolutes of its subject, not temporary phenomena.

“not to provide new principles and methods of conducting war; rather we are concerned with examining the essential content of what has long existed, and to trace it back to its basic elements” (Paret, p. 141, quoting Clausewitz).

• War as a “Remarkable Trinity”: Clausewitz famously defined real war as a composite of three dominant tendencies: violence and passion (associated with the people), uncertainty, chance, and probability (associated with the army and its commander), and political purpose and effect (associated with the government).

“Its dominant tendencies, Clausewitz declared, ‘always make war a remarkable trinity,’ composed of violence and passion; uncertainty, chance, and probability; and political purpose and effect” (Paret, p. 151).

• War as “Continuation of Policy”: A central tenet is that war is inherently political, serving as an instrument of policy. The military viewpoint must always be subordinate to the political.

“Because war is the continuation of policy, ‘there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it’” (Paret, p. 150).

◦ He saw war as “an extreme but natural expression of policy”.

• Critique of Simplistic Theories: Clausewitz rejected attempts to reduce war to mere science or mathematical formulas. He criticized thinkers like Bülow and Jomini for creating “definitive doctrines around thoughts and recognitions haphazardly arrived at,” arguing they generalize from ideas of limited or temporary validity.

◦ He sought a method to test theories against reality, emphasizing that if history showed victories with “inadequate” bases or losses with “adequate” ones, then such theories couldn’t stand.

Supporting Ideas & Details:

• Relevance to the Nuclear Age: Despite being written in the early 19th century, On War remains relevant because its questions about understanding and controlling war have become even more critical in the nuclear age.

“Clausewitz’s most important theoretical work, On War, is read more widely today than at any time since it was first published in the 1830s” (Paret, p. 125).

• “Friction” and “Genius”: Key concepts for analyzing the “untidy” reality of war.

◦ Friction accounts for all the unforeseen impediments (e.g., weather, misunderstood orders) that hinder the execution of plans. By conceptualizing these, Clausewitz made them a “firm component of an analytic description”.

◦ Genius refers to the psychological qualities like initiative and creativity, necessary for command, especially in war’s “obscure field” of psychology.

• Culminating Point of Attack: Clausewitz posited that an offensive operation reaches a “culminating point” where its strength diminishes, and it becomes vulnerable to counterattack.

• Incompleteness of On War: The manuscript was unfinished at his death. It focuses heavily on Napoleonic strategy, operations, and tactics, but does not systematically address technological, administrative, or economic factors, nor naval warfare. However, Paret argues this doesn’t invalidate the theoretical structure, as concepts like friction and escalation apply universally.

• Ethical Stance: Clausewitz separated military theory from political ethics. He believed the morality of going to war was a political question, not one for military theory. He was more concerned with understanding war’s reality than adjusting it to an ethical system.

• Limited Direct Impact on Practice: While widely read, On War’s influence on how wars are actually fought has been elusive. Its impact is more apparent in theoretical and historical thinking about war.

“If we examine the conduct of war since Clausewitz wrote, we will find little evidence that soldiers and governments have made use of his theories” (Paret, p. 168).

📗 Peter Paret, “Napoleon and the Revolution in War” (pp. 123-142)

This chapter examines Napoleon’s contribution to modern warfare, highlighting the revolutionary changes he embodied rather than purely theoretical innovations.

Main Arguments:

• Embodiment of Revolutionary Changes: Napoleon’s military methods were not entirely original but rather a culmination and exploitation of ideas and policies enabled by the French Revolution. He applied the transformed military potential unleashed by the Revolution.

“Napoleonic strategy was not created by the emperor alone. It was made possible because he had the genius and the compulsion to combine and exploit the ideas and policies of others” (Paret, p. 16).

• Practical Genius over Written Theory: Napoleon did not write comprehensive treatises on his strategic ideas. His strategy was “recorded on the battlefield”. His approach was highly pragmatic and adaptive.

“Napoleon never wrote a comprehensive account of his ideas on war” (Paret, p. 82).

• Revolution in Logistics: The French Revolution fundamentally altered army supply by compelling soldiers to requisition resources from occupied territories (the principle of la guerre nourrit la guerre—“war feeds war”), breaking from the reliance on fixed magazines.

“Supplying the now very large number of troops in the field was made possible in part by the only break with eighteenth-century practice for which the Revolution was responsible: compelling the soldier to requisition, on the principle that la guerre nourrit la guerre” (Paret, p. 81).

• Shift to Decisive Battle and Annihilation: Napoleon’s campaigns moved away from the limited, maneuver-focused warfare of the 18th century towards seeking rapid, decisive engagements and the destruction of the enemy’s main army.

He “condemned the dispersal of forces as a vicious habit that made it impossible to achieve important results” (Paret, p. 82).

Jomini observed that Napoleon’s system “presente une application constante de ces principes invariables” of “operating with the greatest possible force in a combined effort against the decisive point”.

Supporting Ideas & Details:

• Impact of the French Revolution on Warfare:

◦ Mass armies: The levee en masse (universal military service) enabled the creation of unprecedentedly large forces.

◦ Nationalism: The stimulation of “national self-consciousness” provided a new moral energy to troops.

◦ Tactical Flexibility: French armies adopted new, more flexible tactics like rushing columns and dispersed skirmish lines (tirailleurs), departing from rigid, solid formations.

◦ Artillery Reform: Reforms by Gribeauval and others in the 1760s made French artillery highly mobile and effective, capable of supporting infantry closely.

• Napoleon’s Conception of War: He viewed war as a “mass of physical and moral forces,” comparable to mechanics in its calculable elements. He emphasized the importance of moral factors and the “will to conquer”.

• Jomini’s Interpretation and Influence: Antoine-Henri Jomini was a significant interpreter of Napoleonic warfare, seeking to extract “invariable scientific principles” from his campaigns.

Jomini championed concentration of force, the strategic value of interior lines, and the relationship between logistics and combat.

He believed Napoleon’s success validated these principles, showcasing a “radical theory of warfare” that emphasized offensive action, massing forces, and relentless pursuit.

Jomini’s efforts, though criticized by Clausewitz for being “narrow, simplistic, and superficial” and abstracting war from its political context, were highly influential in shaping later military thought, arguably more so than Clausewitz in some professional circles.

“Jomini, more than Clausewitz, deserves the dubious title of founder of modern strategy” (Paret, p. 87).

• Inspiration vs. Direct Influence: Napoleon’s campaigns served as a rich source of inspiration for subsequent strategists, such as Schlieffen. However, demonstrating direct causal influence from specific historical campaigns to later strategic plans is often complex due to the constantly changing factors in war.

• Problems with “Wars of Opinion”: As Napoleon faced “wars of opinion” (national or civil wars, like in Spain or Russia), his usual principles of massed offensive action became problematic, forcing him to divide forces and deal with insurgent elements. Jomini found this subject difficult and generally advised avoiding such wars.

📗 Peter Paret, “Jomini” (pp. 143-185)

Overview

In the chapter “Jomini” from Peter Paret’s Makers of Modern Strategy, John Shy presents Antoine-Henri Jomini as a pivotal figure in modern military thought, comparable to Napoleon and Clausewitz, primarily for his role in transforming the study of warfare into a “scientific” pursuit focused on prescriptive strategic techniques (Shy, 1986, p. 143).

Jomini’s Core Strategic Ideas

Jomini’s theories are built upon the belief that the art of war rests on “certain and fixed principles, which are by their nature invariable” (Shy, 1986, p. 148, quoting Lloyd). He contended that Napoleon’s success stemmed from a superior application of these principles (Shy, 1986, p. 146). Key among these were:

Massing Force at the Decisive Point: Jomini asserted that all effective strategic combinations must “conform to the basic principle ‘of operating with the greatest possible force in a combined effort against the decisive point’” (Shy, 1986, p. 152). This involves concentrating superior force against a vulnerable enemy point. A “decisive point” could be a road junction, river crossing, supply base, or an exposed enemy flank (Shy, 1986, p. 153).
Offensive Action and Relentless Pursuit: He stressed the necessity of the offensive, arguing that the initiative should not be ceded to the enemy, and that commanders must inspire troops through “boldness and courage” (Shy, 1986, p. 152). Victory, he believed, required the relentless pursuit of a defeated foe (Shy, 1986, p. 152).
Interior Lines of Operation: This concept, which he saw exemplified in Frederick the Great’s victory at Leuthen and Napoleon’s Italian campaigns, involves a force positioned “between—‘inside’—separated enemy forces” to defeat each in turn (Shy, 1986, p. 168).
Logistics (“Communications”): Jomini recognized the critical link between logistics and combat, using the term “communications” to describe the vital lines that maintain a military force’s connection to its national power and supply (Shy, 1986, p. 250, 254-255).

Methodology and Historical Interpretation

Jomini’s method was to reduce the complexity of warfare to a small number of crucial factors and prescribe actions for victory (Shy, 1986, p. 131). He sought to reveal the “secret of French victory” by showing how Napoleon better applied these principles (Shy, 1986, p. 146). Although he drew inspiration from General Henry Lloyd’s pursuit of “invariable principles,” Jomini sharply criticized Lloyd’s cautious approach and Frederick the Great’s limitations, advocating for Napoleon’s daring, rapid advances and willingness to live off the land (echoing Caesar’s “war could feed war”) (Shy, 1986, p. 148, 150).

He explicitly highlighted the “profound differences” between pre- and post-1789 warfare (Shy, 1986, p. 148, 151). While his theoretical work aimed for clarity and universal applicability, his historical narratives, often focused on command decisions, also reinforced traditional views of warfare (Shy, 1986, p. 99).

Personality and Career’s Influence

Shy suggests that Jomini’s personal ambition, frustration, and insecurity profoundly shaped his work (Shy, 1986, p. 155). Described as “troublesome, bright but obnoxious” as a youth, he remained “quarrelsome, tactless” throughout his life (Shy, 1986, p. 154). Never entrusted with actual troop command, he found “no complete satisfaction in writing books about war” (Shy, 1986, p. 156). His experiences as a “headquarters staff officer” led him to perceive war primarily in “personal, heroic terms, controlled by the masterful commander,” often losing sight of larger, impersonal forces (Shy, 1986, p. 156, 91). He “wrote to publish, and he published to impress” (Shy, 1986, p. 157).

Significant Influence and Legacy

Jomini achieved an international reputation, with his Summary of the Art of War being translated into many languages (Shy, 1986, p. 153, 110). His work was praised by Napoleon himself, who reportedly considered him for military education leadership (Shy, 1986, p. 143). Jomini provided the nascent military profession with a “prestige of science” and a rationale for its autonomy, arguing that governments should trust their “ablest military commander” to wage war according to “scientific principles” without political “interference” (Shy, 1986, p. 100, 102).

His influence extended to the United States (West Point used his texts) and Germany (where many military writers were his “ardent pupil[s]” or “staunch adherent[s]”) (Shy, 1986, p. 144, 145, 209). Alfred Thayer Mahan explicitly sought to apply Jominian principles to “sea power,” making him a “maritime counterpart” (Shy, 1986, p. 148). Even in the twentieth century, figures like Liddell Hart and early air power theorists (e.g., Douhet) adopted his didactic, prescriptive approach and the concept of massing force against decisive points (Shy, 1986, p. 151, 152, 153). Jominian “Principles of War” are still found in modern military doctrines (Shy, 1986, p. 154).

Criticisms and Weaknesses

Despite his enduring influence, Shy details several weaknesses in Jomini’s work:

Reductionism and Prescription: While intentional, this led to oversimplification (Shy, 1986, p. 131).
Failure to Test Counter-Examples: Jomini often explained away historical cases that did not conform to his theories rather than allowing them to broaden his understanding (Shy, 1986, p. 132).
Assumption of Symmetrical Forces: His assumption that military units of equal size were “essentially equal” limited his theory’s applicability, particularly to “popular wars” (like those in Spain and Russia) or coalition strategies, and made it “peculiarly unsuited to qualitative analysis” of technological change (Shy, 1986, p. 133, 134, 135).
Blurring of Distinctions: Though he acknowledged that political and tactical realms were not subject to his scientific analysis, he frequently “wanders freely” into these areas, prescribing actions and citing principles as if they applied universally across all levels of military operation (Shy, 1986, p. 136).
Ambiguity: His writing contained inherent ambiguities, such as whether victory depended on strict adherence to principles or the genius of a commander, or whether the aim of strategy was territorial control or the destruction of enemy forces (Shy, 1986, p. 137, 138).

Summary

In essence, Jomini’s profound impact stemmed from his fusion of romantic sensibility with an obsession for scientific principles, packaging complex military history into a clear, simple, and repetitive message that appealed deeply to generations of soldiers seeking unchanging truths and practical utility in the conduct of war (Shy, 1986, p. 108, 140).