The Science of Military Strategy 2013

Online Description

ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRANSLATION The Academy of Military Sciences of the People’s Liberation Army of China issued a revised edition of its “The Science of Military Strategy” (SMS) in 2013. A Chinese-language copy was obtained by Secrecy News but I have not found an English language copy, so I decided to translate it into English myself. I am not a scholar of the Chinese language, but hopefully you will excuse my illiteracy as this is the only English version available. I believe the translation is faithful to the original, however I have taken some poetic license in order to improve the readability. Some of the colloquial expressions such as “two legged losers” (page 210) and use of a “private white hair to attack and defend the network” (page 196) went completely over my head, so I didn’t make any attempt to edit them. I decided to limit the translated text on any given page in the original text to the same numbered page in this book. So, if you are unsure of the meaning of some of my edits - and, you happen to be a Chinese scholar - you will know what page to look for in the original Chinese edition. I must apologize because unfortunately, some text and sometimes complete pages of the copy I obtained were not legible, making accurate translation impossible. Where this occurs, I left that area blank so as to highlight that something is missing and added the word “Unintelligible”. At the last minute I decided to also include the text of “China’s Military Strategy” that was released by the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China in 2015. You will find that at the end of this book. It provides additional context to the 2013 document and should further clarify some of the meaning. Speaking about the Chinese language version of this book and the Science of Campaigns (2006), a team of authors from RAND Corporation who worked on a 2015 report stated: “To the best of our knowledge, these are the most authoritative publicly available sources on Chinese military thinking about the campaign level of warfare.”

🔫 Author Background

Name & role. Xiao Tianliang is the editor‑in‑chief of Science of Military Strategy (Revised 2020); he serves as Vice President of China’s National Defense University (NDU), holds the rank of lieutenant general, is a doctor of military science, professor, and doctoral supervisor, and is identified as an academic leader in the military strategy discipline (Xiao, 2020, p. 6).

“Xiao Tianliang, vice president of National Defense University, rank of lieutenant general, doctor of military science, professor, [and] doctoral tutor…” (Xiao, 2020, p. 6).

• Education. Graduated from Zhengzhou Antiaircraft Artillery Academy and National Defense University (Xiao, 2020, p. 6).

• Career highlights. Roles include acting platoon/company commander in a group army; Director, Military Strategy Teaching & Research Office at NDU; acting Deputy Commander of a Navy destroyer detachment; acting Deputy Chief of Staff, South China Sea Fleet; and Deputy Director/Director of NDU Strategy Teaching & Research Department (Xiao, 2020, p. 6).

• Previous works & areas of expertise. Monographs include Science Technology and Future Military Strategy; Research on War Control Issues; and Non‑War Use of Military Forces. He also helped lead/edit Contemporary China’s Military Strategy, Military Strategy Theory, New China’s Military Diplomacy, and Strategy (Xiao, 2020, pp. 6–7).

• International engagement. Studied at Georgetown University and delivered lectures in Japan, Zambia, and Tunisia (Xiao, 2020, p. 7).

• Awards & recognition. Recipient of China’s National Teaching Achievement Award (Second Prize); Military Teaching Achievement Award (First Prize); Military Talent Education Award; Military Science & Technology Progress Award; PLA Book Award; NDU’s Quality Class Award and Liu Bocheng Research Achievement Award; and selected for the Ministry of Education’s New Century Excellent Talent Support Program (Xiao, 2020, p. 7).

• Editorial team & collective authorship. The volume is a collective product published by National Defense University Press; Xiao serves as editor‑in‑chief with deputy editors Lou Yaoliang, Yuan (Wuchao), and Cai Renzhao; chapters are authored by multiple NDU scholars (Xiao, 2020, pp. 451–452).

“This book, a group product that was not made by just one person, will inevitably have limitations and deficiencies” (Xiao, 2020, p. 452).

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🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Science of Military Strategy (2020) systematizes a comprehensive PLA theory of strategy that guides both the use and construction of military power—across war and non‑war contexts and new domains—and updates China’s strategic theory to the “new era” (from informatization toward intelligentization), undergirded by enduring active defense principles (Xiao, 2020, pp. 15, 24–27, 452).

Direct quotes:

• “The science of strategy is a theoretical system about strategy and a discipline that studies the overall guiding laws for the use and construction of military forces.” (Xiao, 2020, p. 15).

• “Strategy is the overall planning and guidance for the use and construction of military forces.” (Xiao, 2020, p. 25).

• “To strengthen the country and the army, strategy is first.” (Xiao, 2020, p. 24).

• “Since the founding of New China, it has always adhered to the military strategy of active defense, which fully reflects the essential characteristics of China’s strategic cultural traditions.” (Xiao, 2020, p. 27).

• The 2020 revision aims “to better adapt to the overall trend… from informatization to intelligence, [to] reveal the characteristics and laws of military conflict in the new era, [and] reflect the latest achievements in national defense and military reform.” (Xiao, 2020, pp. 451–452).

Key problems the book addresses:

• Foundations of strategy. Defines strategy’s meaning, elements, characteristics, and influencing factors (Ch. 1), positioning strategy as the top‑level guide for military affairs (Xiao, 2020, pp. 15, 24–25).

• A five‑link model of strategic practice. Operationalizes strategy through strategic judgment → decision‑making → planning → implementation → evaluation (Part I overview) (Xiao, 2020, p. 24).

• Crisis management & deterrence. Develops frameworks for preventing/handling military crises (Ch. 7) and strategic deterrence concepts and guidance (Ch. 8) (Xiao, 2020, TOC pp. 10–12).

• New domains of conflict. Extends strategy to space, cyberspace, deep‑sea, polar, biological, and intelligent domains (Ch. 9), reflecting the changing character of warfare (Xiao, 2020, TOC p. 11).

• War planning & conduct. Details war planning (Ch. 10), war operations (Ch. 11), battle situation control (Ch. 12), and operational guidance (Ch. 13) (Xiao, 2020, TOC pp. 11–12).

• Non‑war & overseas operations. Provides strategic guidance for non‑war military operations (Ch. 14) and the overseas use of forces (Ch. 15) (Xiao, 2020, TOC p. 12).

• Force construction for the “new era.” Articulates service‑specific construction and capability requirements for Army, Navy, Air Force, Rocket Force, Space, Cyberspace, Joint Logistics, Armed Police, and Reserve forces (Chs. 16–25), aligning modernization with strategic aims (Xiao, 2020, TOC pp. 13–14).

SMS 2020 is best understood as the PLA’s authoritative, institutionally curated textbook on strategy—edited by Xiao—whose thesis is to codify a whole‑of‑force, whole‑of‑domain approach to using and building military power for China’s “new era,” while reaffirming active defense as its doctrinal bedrock (Xiao, 2020, pp. 24–27, 451–452).

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📒 Sections

Book overview

SMS is a PLA professional text that lays out foundational strategy concepts (Part I), guidance for crisis/war and new domains (Part II), and force‑building guidance across services and support forces (Part III).
It embeds “Chinese characteristics” of strategy—people’s war, active defense, and tech‑driven modernization—within contemporary joint, multi‑domain competition. (Xiao, 2020/2022, pp. 27–32).
Chapters explicitly address space, cyber/electromagnetic, deep‑sea, polar, biological & intelligent domains and the overseas use of military forces, framing deterrence and conflict control in peacetime and war.

Part I — Foundations (Chs. 1–6)

Chapter 1 — Introduction to Strategy (pp. 12–38)

Main points

Defines strategy and its elements (environment; objectives & interests; means & methods; implementation of strategic guidance). (Xiao, 2020/2022, pp. 12, 20).
Contrasts Western and Chinese strategic cultures; emphasizes China’s long‑standing active defense orientation. (pp. 27–31).
Introduces people’s war in the information age and tech‑enabled mass participation. (pp. 29–30).

Key quote

“Strategy is the overall planning and guidance for the use and construction of military forces.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 12).

Key terms: strategy; strategic culture; active defense; people’s war.

Chapter 2 — Strategic Judgment (pp. 39–52)

Main points

Strategic judgment rests on dialectical and systems thinking and comprehensive analysis of the environment. (pp. 39–41).
Requirements include objectivity, comprehensiveness, foresight, and timeliness. (pp. 46–49).

Key quote

“Strategic analysis and evaluation are the basis for making correct strategic judgments.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 39).

Chapter 3 — Strategic Decision (pp. 53–62)

Main points

Decision‑making is the core link of strategic work; integrates judgment, planning, and implementation. (p. 53).
Emphasizes scientific, democratic, and law‑based procedures; risk control. (pp. 59–62).

Key quote

“Strategic decision‑making is the core link of strategic activities.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 53).

Chapter 4 — Strategic Planning (pp. 63–74)

Main points

Planning translates strategy into goals, pathways, resources, and timelines. (p. 63).
Discusses types (long/medium/short‑term; overall vs. specialized) and functions (guidance, coordination, evaluation). (pp. 64–71).

Key quote

“Strategic planning is a scientific plan for the implementation of strategy… to achieve strategic goals.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 63).

Chapter 5 — Strategy Implementation (pp. 75–89)

Main points

Focus on mechanisms, organizational guarantees, and supervision to ensure execution. (pp. 75–78).
Stresses iteration and adjustment amid change. (pp. 82–86).

Key quote

“Successful strategy implementation is the ultimate guarantee for achieving strategic objectives.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 75).

Chapter 6 — Strategic Evaluation (pp. 90–111)

Main points

Assessment monitors the gap between goals and realities and feeds back to decisions. (p. 90).
Emphasizes measurable indicators and dynamic re‑evaluation through a war’s life‑cycle. (pp. 105–111).

Key quote

“Strategic assessment is to assess changes in the strategic situation, capabilities, and objectives to provide timely feedback for adjustment.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 90).

Part II — Strategic Guidance in Military Struggle (Chs. 7–15)

Chapter 7 — Prevention & Handling of Military Crises (pp. 112–131)

Main points

Defines military crisis and differentiates prevention vs. disposal/handling phases. (pp. 112–114).
Highlights early warning, escalation control, and resolution mechanisms. (pp. 115–122).

Key quote

“Military crisis refers to a state in which the parties are in extreme opposition and the outbreak of war is imminent.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 112).

Chapter 8 — Strategic Deterrence (pp. 132–172)

Main points

Presents integrated deterrence (“mixed deterrence”: nuclear/conventional, military/non‑military) with “two equal emphases”—deterrence and actual combat readiness. (pp. 132–140).
Focuses on credibility, capability display, and resolve signaling as determinants of effect. (pp. 145–160).

Key quote

“Strategic deterrence… uses strength, will, and strategy to intimidate the enemy and curb war.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 132).

Chapter 9 — Military Conflict in New Domains (pp. 173–205)

Main points

Space as the “new commanding height” with offensive/defensive capabilities. (p. 173).
Cyberspace/Electromagnetic confrontation is continuous and blurs peace/war, offense/defense; strategic‑level effects from technical actions. (pp. 193–196; 237).
Intelligentized warfare relies on AI‑enabled decision loops and human‑machine teaming. (p. 201).

Key quote

“Space is a new commanding height of military struggle…” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 173).

Chapter 10 — War Planning (pp. 206–220+)

Main points

Characterizes contemporary war: shorter cycles, higher precision, tighter constraints (political, legal, moral). (pp. 206–210).
War determination & operation design: targeting priorities, campaign sequencing, resource orchestration. (pp. 214–219).

Key quote

“The characteristics of modern war include increasing constraints from politics, morality, and law…” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 206).

Chapter 11 — War Operation (pp. 221–264)

Main points

Covers strategic reconnaissance & early warning; projection; counter‑fire strike; front‑line offensive/defense; joint domain operations (cyber, electronic, space); public opinion, legal & psychological warfare. (pp. 221–254).
Emphasizes information dominance and joint firepower‑information confrontation. (pp. 231–248).

Key quote

“Public opinion struggle, legal struggle, and psychological offense and defense are important components of war operations.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 221).

Chapter 12 — Battle Situation Control (pp. 265–278)

Main points

Defines war/battle situation and lays out control at opening, development, and end phases. (pp. 236–268).
Control hinges on time‑space shaping, force posture, firepower‑information leverage, and decision tempo. (pp. 269–276).

Key quote

“Battle situation control is to guide, restrain, and change the process of war to achieve one’s strategic intent.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 236).

Chapter 13 — Operational Guidance (pp. 279–322)

Main points

Guiding principles: grasp overall situation; concentrate main effort; seize opportunities; combine offense/defense; integrate firepower, information, and maneuver. (pp. 279–289).
“Art of guidance” emphasizes deception, surprise, and tempo management. (pp. 290–309).

Key quote

“Operational guiding principles must grasp the overall situation, emphasize main efforts, and seize opportunities.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 279).

Chapter 14 — Non‑War Military Operations (MOOTW) (pp. 323–352)

Main points

Defines MOOTW and catalogs disaster relief, counter‑terrorism, stability maintenance, rights protection, evacuation, maritime law enforcement. (pp. 323–335).
Stresses legal/coordination frameworks and information support. (pp. 336–352).

Key quote

“Non‑war military operations are military activities that use military forces to respond to crises, complete urgent and dangerous tasks, and safeguard national interests under conditions short of war.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 323).

Chapter 15 — Overseas Use of Military Forces (pp. 353–360)

Main points

Frames overseas interests & security and corresponding tasks (escorts, evacuations, base/point support, international cooperation). (pp. 353–356).
Emphasizes legal‑diplomatic coordination and joint projection/sustainment. (pp. 356–360).

Key quote

“Overseas interests are continuously expanding… ‘overseas use of force’ refers to using military forces to safeguard overseas interests and security.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 353).

Part III — Strategic Guidance for Force Construction (Chs. 16–25)

Chapter 16 — Guidance for Military Force Construction & Development (pp. 361–364)

Main points

Orient construction toward quality‑and‑efficiency, combat‑readiness, and informatization & intelligentization. (pp. 361–363).

Key quote

“Transform from scale‑and‑quantity to quality‑and‑efficiency… with combat‑readiness oriented construction.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 361).

Chapter 17 — Army Construction & Development (pp. 365–371)

Main points

Pursues “two transformations”: from regional to trans‑regional mobility; from platform‑centric to system‑of‑systems operations. (p. 365).

Key quote

“Promote the ‘two transformations’… raise overall operational capability and system‑of‑systems advantages.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 365).

Chapter 18 — Navy Construction & Development (pp. 372–380)

Main points

Evolves from offshore defense to offshore defense + far‑seas protection; enhance nuclear/conventional, surface/sub‑surface, air/sea system‑of‑systems. (p. 372).

Key quote

“The Navy has gradually evolved from offshore defense to offshore defense and far‑sea protection.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 372).

Chapter 19 — Air Force Construction & Development (pp. 381–387)

Main points

Build a strategic air force with integrated air‑space offense/defense, firepower‑information‑mobility. (p. 381).

Key quote

“A strategic air force with integrated air‑space offense and defense, and firepower‑information‑mobility.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 381).

Chapter 20 — Rocket Force Construction & Development (pp. 388–391)

Main points

Provide reliable nuclear deterrence and conventional precision strike, strengthen C4ISR, survivability, and rapid response. (pp. 388–390).

Key quote

“The Rocket Force provides practical and effective nuclear deterrence and strategic strike capabilities.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 388).

Chapter 21 — Strategic Support Force (SSF) Construction & Development (pp. 392–402)

Main points

SSF focuses on space, cyber, electronic warfare, and information support as key support means in joint ops. (p. 392).

Key quote

“Cyberspace operations, intelligence support, and electronic warfare are key support means.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 392).

Chapter 22 — Cyberspace Power Construction & Development (pp. 403–416)

Main points

Trends: weaponization of software; military‑civil fusion; and non‑state actor participation. (pp. 403–404).
Capability requirements: reconnaissance, attack, defense, support & protection. (p. 404).

Key quote

“In cyber attack and defense… cyberspace attack capability is the core combat capability of cyberspace.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 404).

Chapter 23 — Joint Logistics Support Force Construction & Development (pp. 416–421)

Main points

Build joint energy‑gathering/global support, integrated finance‑storage‑supply, and fast & accurate medical support capacities. (pp. 416–417).
Embrace unmanned/intelligent support and human‑machine collaboration; deepen military‑civil fusion. (p. 418).

Key quote

“Unmanned intelligent support capabilities… promote leap‑forward, new‑generation changes in support capabilities.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 418).

Chapter 24 — Armed Police Force Construction & Development (pp. 422–434)

Main points

Roles in national security and social stability, under CMC leadership; focus on on‑duty security, emergency handling, counter‑terrorism. (pp. 422–426).

Key quote

“The Armed Police Force… plays an important role in maintaining political security, especially regime and institutional security.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 422).

Chapter 25 — Reserve Forces Construction & Development (pp. 435–441)

Main points

Reserve forces enable rapid mobilization, support & emergency response; modernization stresses quality over size, training reform, and equipment updates. (pp. 435–441).

Key quote

“According to the characteristics of the reserve force, the ability requirements are mainly embodied in three aspects: rapid mobilization, support, and emergency response.” (Xiao, 2020/2022, p. 440).

Cross‑cutting Chinese Strategic Concepts (for discussion)

People’s war in the information age: mobilizing technical talent and systems, not just manpower. (Xiao, 2020/2022, pp. 29–30).
Active defense: fundamentally defensive but operationally proactive—“We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.” (pp. 30–31).
Military reform & intelligentization: aim to win informatized and emerging intelligentized wars; develop asymmetric methods and integrate offense/defense. (pp. 31–35).

Key terms & quick definitions

Strategic deterrence — integrated use of military & non‑military means to coerce and shape adversary choices; stresses credibility and readiness. (Xiao, 2020/2022, pp. 132–140).
Battle situation control — shaping tempo, space, and decision cycles to guide the course of war. (pp. 236–268).
Cyber/electromagnetic warfare — continuous, ambiguous confrontation across peace/war thresholds; technical actions can yield strategic effects. (pp. 193–196; 237).

Five fast takeaways

PLA strategy tracks ends‑ways‑means with Chinese characteristics (people’s war, active defense). (Xiao, 2020/2022, ch. 1).
Deterrence and crisis control precede and shape war; non‑war operations and overseas use are integral missions. (chs. 7–8, 14–15).
New domains (space, cyber, intelligent) are central, not peripheral, to joint operations. (ch. 9).
War planning & operations emphasize legal/political constraints, information dominance, and joint fires–information integration. (chs. 10–11).
Force construction aligns to informatization/intelligentization, quality‑and‑efficiency, and joint support across all services, SSF, logistics, armed police, and reserves. (chs. 16–25).

Acknowledgment of source

All summaries and quotations in these notes are drawn directly from the CASI English translation of Science of Military Strategy (Revised in 2020), with page numbers from the book and file‑level citations embedded above.

🥰 Who Would Like it?

Everyone working PRC issues