The Seven Military Classics Of Ancient China

Online Description

The Seven Military Classics is one of the most profound studies of warfare ever written, a stanchion in sinological and military history. It presents an Eastern tradition of strategic thought that emphasizes outwitting one’s opponent through speed, stealth, flexibility, and a minimum of force — an approach very different from that stressed in the West. Safeguarded for centuries by the ruling elite of imperial China, even in modern times these writings have been known only to a handful of Western specialists. This volume contains seven separate essays, written between 500 BCE and 700 CE, that preserve the essential tenets of strategy distilled from the experience of the most brilliant warriors of ancient China.

🔫 Author Background

• Ralph D. Sawyer is a scholar and translator renowned for his work on Chinese military history and strategic thought.
• He holds degrees from MIT and Harvard and has worked extensively in East Asian policy and defense consulting.
• His experience spans military intelligence, strategic planning, and historical analysis.
• Sawyer’s translation work focuses on bridging Eastern and Western military theory, making foundational Chinese texts accessible to modern readers.
• His deep understanding of classical Chinese philosophy and military tradition heavily influenced his interpretation and presentation of The Seven Military Classics.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

• This book aims to make the historically significant and contemporarily relevant Seven Military Classics of ancient China accessible to a general Western audience.
• Sawyer provides translations alongside extensive historical context and explanations of material aspects of warfare.
• He emphasizes that while strategic ideas remain relevant today, broader intellectual and philosophical dimensions warrant further exploration in future work.
• The central issue is that this vast Chinese military corpus has remained largely unknown in the West despite its enduring influence in Asia.

📒 Sections

Shi

Tags: #concepts #strategy #Sun-Tzu #Chinese-strategy

Definition

Shi is a complex and multifaceted concept from [[Sun-tzu’s Art of War]] and Chinese strategic thought. It resists easy translation but broadly refers to the strategic configuration of power, the potential energy inherent in a situation, or the momentum of events. It is about understanding and manipulating the total situation—terrain, timing, morale, psychology—to make victory the natural outcome of the situation’s unfolding. It is about shaping the battlefield so that circumstances favor you.

According to [[Toshi Yoshihara]]‘s analysis of other scholars, shi can be understood as “the full concentrated release of that latent energy inherent in one’s position” and the “advantage derived from positioning and mass”.

Metaphors from Sun Zi

Sun-tzu’s Art of War uses several metaphors to explain shi:

• Rushing Water: Momentum so powerful it sends boulders tumbling.

• Diving Hawk: The combination of speed, precision, and timing to deliver a fatal blow.

• Drawn Crossbow: The accumulation of latent, potential energy waiting to be released with devastating effect.

• Rolling Boulder: A round boulder rolling down a mountain combines potential energy (height) with momentum (speed) to become an unstoppable force.

  Application in Warfare

• The goal of the commander is to recognize and create shi. This involves maneuvering the enemy into a disadvantageous position before the battle is even fought.

• Examples: [[Battle of Maling]], [[Battle of Wei River]], [[Huai-Hai Campaign]].

Is it Uniquely Chinese?

• While central to Chinese thought, some scholars like [[Andrew Wilson]] argue it is universally understandable, comparing it to ideas from Caesar or [[Clausewitz - Peter Paret’s Analysis|Clausewitz]] about how discipline, morale, and timing combine in battle.

Strategic Culture

Tags: #concepts #strategy #international-relations

Definition

Strategic culture is a set of shared beliefs, values, and norms within a state’s national security community regarding the role, efficacy, and use of military force. It is shaped by historical experiences and foundational texts, and it is theorized to create stable, discernible preferences for how a state approaches security threats.

The Debate Over China’s Strategic Culture

Toshi Yoshihara highlights a central academic debate about China’s strategic culture, with both sides using Sun Zi’s Art of War as primary evidence:

1. The “Force-Averse” School (John K. Fairbank)

• Argues for a “pacifist bias” in Chinese tradition, influenced by Confucianism.

• Believes China deprecates the use of violence and prefers non-military means to achieve objectives.

• Cites Sun Zi’s maxim: “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”.

2. The “Realpolitik” School (Alastair Iain Johnston)

• Argues that beneath a rhetorical Confucian veneer lies a “hard realpolitik” worldview.

• Believes Chinese military classics see force as highly effective and welcome the “massive overproportionality in the use of violence”.

• In this view, deception and stratagem are tools meant to supplement and enable the devastating use of force, not replace it.

  The fact that Sun Zi’s Art of War can support both conclusions highlights its ambiguity and the difficulty in defining a single [[Chinese Way of War]].

  Sun-tzu’s Art of War

#MilitaryClassics #Strategy #AncientChina #SunWu #Deception #Leadership #StrategicPower #Intelligence

[[Sun-tzu’s Art of War]], also known as Military Strategy, is the preeminent military treatise in Asia, widely studied and translated in the West. It is traditionally attributed to the historical [[Sun Wu]], active around 512 B.C., though its precise composition date and authorship are debated by scholars.

Core Philosophy and Strategy

Sun-tzu’s approach is thoroughly analytical, mandating careful planning and overall strategy before any campaign. His central question is how to achieve victory with maximum results and minimum destruction.

Key principles include:

• Attacking Plans and Alliances: The highest realization of warfare is to subjugate the enemy without fighting, by attacking their plans and alliances first, resorting to direct combat only as a last resort.

• Rational Self-Control: Commanders must avoid personal emotions (anger, fear) and rash actions, making decisions based on extensive, detailed analysis.

• Manipulation of the Enemy: Create opportunities for an easy victory by:

• Classifying and exploiting terrain.

• Using orthodox ([[cheng]]) and unorthodox ([[ch’i]]) troops (direct and indirect attacks).

• Luring the enemy into untenable positions with promises of gain.

• Enervating them by causing fatigue before attack.

• Concentrating forces on vulnerable points.

• Deception: Warfare is fundamentally a “Way of deception”. This involves constantly creating false appearances, spreading disinformation, and employing trickery to keep the enemy from knowing where or how to attack.

• Unknowability and Intelligence: Be unfathomable to the enemy, while rigorously gaining detailed knowledge of them through spies.

• Strategic Configuration of Power ([[Shi]]): Maneuver the army to achieve such a great tactical advantage that its attack impact is like “the sudden onrush of water cascading down from mountain peaks”.

• Spirit ([[ch’i]]): The essential, vital energy of life for troops. A general must maintain and manipulate troop spirit, avoiding the enemy when their spirit is strong and exploiting its diminishment.

• Logistics and Economy: Prolonged warfare leads to enervation and state impoverishment; swift campaigns are paramount. Obtaining provisions from the enemy is more efficient.

Structure and Content

The Art of War consists of thirteen chapters, each focusing on a specific topic, though relationships between passages can be complex. The chapters cover:

1. Initial Estimations: Fundamental factors for assessing war (Tao, Heaven, Earth, generals, laws).

2. Waging War: Economic and logistical considerations of prolonged campaigns.

3. Planning Offensives: Emphasizes subjugating the enemy without fighting; attacking plans, alliances, then armies, and lastly cities.

4. Military Disposition: Making oneself unconquerable and exploiting the enemy’s conquerability.

5. Strategic Military Power: Leveraging the strategic configuration of power and the interplay of orthodox and unorthodox tactics.

6. Vacuity and Substance: Compelling the enemy, striking their weak points, and remaining formless.

7. Military Combat: Turning adversity into advantage, logistics, and unifying men’s ears and eyes.

8. Nine Changes: Adaptability to different situations and terrain.

9. Maneuvering the Army: Deploying in various terrains and discerning enemy movements/intentions.

10. Configurations of Terrain: Detailed analysis of six terrain types and six types of ill-fated armies.

11. Nine Terrains: Categorizing terrain for strategic action and unifying troop will.

12. Incendiary Attacks: Using fire in warfare and knowing when to attack or desist.

13. Employing Spies: The critical role of five types of spies for gaining advance knowledge.

Authorship and Influence

While debated, it’s likely a historical [[Sun Wu]] composed the core, which was then transmitted and refined, possibly by his descendant [[Sun Pin]]. The text’s philosophical sophistication and reflection of [[Taoism]] suggest a connection to the state of Ch’i. Archaeological finds (Lin-i Han tomb) largely confirm the traditional form of the text.

T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings

#MilitaryClassics #Strategy #AncientChina #ChouDynasty #Revolution #Leadership #Deception #T’aiKung

The [[T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings]] is a military classic purportedly recording political advice and tactical instructions from the T’ai Kung to Kings Wen and Wu of the [[Chou Dynasty]]. It is unique among the classics as it’s written from the perspective of revolutionary activity, aiming to overthrow the powerful [[Shang Dynasty]].

Key Concepts

• Benevolent Ruler Doctrine: A strong proponent of the ruler’s focus on people’s welfare to gain their support and loyalty, creating a prosperous state that attracts others.

• Total Warfare: Utilizes every available method to achieve victory, including:

• Consciously planning to employ normal means of production for warfare.

• Feigning and dissembling to deceive the enemy.

• Using bribes and gifts to induce disloyalty and chaos.

• Providing “tools for self-destruction” like music, wine, women, and rarities to debilitate the enemy.

• Mandating complete secrecy.

• General’s Authority: The general must be carefully selected and formally invested with absolute authority over all military matters, free from ruler interference.

• Organization and Unity: Emphasizes the need for unity and thorough integration in both military and civilian spheres, with a clear command hierarchy and specialized staff.

• Battle Tactics: Analyzes numerous situations, including advantageous terrain, assault methods against fortifications, night attacks, psychological warfare, and deception.

• Enduring Principles: Key principles like deception and surprise remain valid for military and business contexts. Other tactics include inciting confusion, overawing the enemy with displays of force, emphasizing speed, and gathering intelligence.

Structure and Dating

The book is nominally attributed to the T’ai Kung, a revered figure honored as the first famous general and progenitor of strategic studies. While the present book likely dates from the [[Warring States Period]], some scholars believe it preserves older traditions.

The “Six Secret Teachings” is divided into six sections, though only the first two (Civil and Martial) clearly align with their titles. The other four (Dragon, Tiger, Leopard, Canine) delve into more specific tactical studies:

• Civil T’ao: Focuses on moral, effective government, economic prosperity, and the implementation of rewards and punishments.

• Martial T’ao: Continues the discussion on political measures, emphasizing attracting the disaffected, using subterfuge, and cultivating virtue to win without direct battle.

• Dragon T’ao: Primarily concerns military organization, general selection and commissioning, communication, secrecy, and fundamental tactical principles.

• Tiger T’ao: Covers military equipment, tactical principles, and extrication from adverse battlefield situations, emphasizing speed, maneuverability, and ambushes.

• Leopard T’ao: Focuses on tactical solutions for difficult terrains (forests, mountains, ravines) and confronting superior forces.

• Canine T’ao: Details the employment of chariots, infantry, and cavalry in various tactical situations, including their comparative effectiveness, and selection/training of elite units.

Archaeological discoveries of bamboo slips in a [[Han Dynasty]] tomb confirmed that portions of the text assumed their present form by the early Han era, challenging claims of it being a much later forgery. However, anachronisms like mentions of crossbows and cavalry tactics (which emerged seven to eight hundred years after the T’ai Kung) indicate significant revisions and a final compilation no earlier than the 4th century B.C.. The text likely absorbed concepts from the broader military thought tradition, potentially influencing or borrowing from works like [[Sun-tzu’s Art of War]].

---

Historical Context and Evolution of Warfare

Chinese military thought originated with neolithic village conflicts thousands of years ago, evolving with weapon development, tactical innovations, and power structures. By the 2nd century B.C., China had experienced a thousand years of conflict, leading to the conscious study of battlefield lessons and command experience – giving birth to the science of military tactics and strategy.

The Shang Dynasty (c. 1766-1045 B.C.) was a theocratic state relying on the nobility’s military skills. Their army featured chariots (though initially for prestige/transport rather than direct combat) and infantry. Key weapons included the ko (halberd), spears, and compound bows. Objectives focused on imposing royal suzerainty, capturing prisoners, and seizing riches.

The Chou Dynasty (c. 1045-256 B.C.) overthrew the Shang, utilizing extensive chariot employment and adopting a more “revolutionary” approach to conflict rather than ritualistic combat. The Chou consolidated power through a feudal system, enfeoffing powerful clan members who established walled towns. Early Chou armies were primarily composed of nobility, with chariots dominating as a symbol of power and mobility.

The Spring and Autumn Period (722-481 B.C.) saw the decline of central Chou authority, leading to intense internecine strife and the rise of state power. Warfare expanded, incorporating greater numbers of peasants as integral elements, shifting away from individual combat ethics. Chariot forces remained important but infantry grew more numerous. Iron and steel technology began to appear, initially for agricultural implements. This era highlighted the essential need for individuals proficient in military arts.

The Warring States Period (403-221 B.C.) was characterized by a phenomenal surge in the scale of conflict, with armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands. States focused on seizing lands, exterminating armies, and annexing territory . Fortified cities became critical focal points, leading to advanced siege warfare techniques. The crossbow became widespread, and cavalry emerged, adopted from “barbarian” practices due to constant pressure from steppe horsemen. This period saw the development of an extensive body of military theory.

Key Themes and Enduring Relevance

Despite being ancient, these works continue to experience “new vitality in Asia”, influencing military, business, and personal spheres. Their principles are applied in modern management, daily life, and even popular culture.

Core concepts reflected across the classics include:

• Deception and Surprise: Essential for manipulating the enemy.

• Strategic Configuration of Power ([[shih]]): Leveraging advantageous momentum like water cascading down a mountain.

• Orthodox ([[cheng]]) and Unorthodox ([[ch’i]]) Tactics: Employing both direct and indirect approaches to gain victory.

• Importance of Intelligence and Spies: Gaining knowledge of the enemy’s true situation.

• Generalship and Leadership: The general’s character, authority, and non-interference from the ruler.

• People’s Welfare and Motivation: A prosperous, contented populace is the foundation for state strength and military success.

• Rewards and Punishments: Crucial for discipline and motivation.

• Avoiding Protracted Warfare: Emphasizing swift, decisive campaigns due to the high cost of prolonged conflict.

The Classics

The compilation, established in the [[Sung Dynasty]], comprises the orthodox foundations for military thought. The specific texts include:

• [[T’ai Kung’s Six Secret Teachings]]

• [[Sun-tzu’s Art of War]]

• The Methods of the Ssu-ma (Ssu-ma Fa)

• Questions and Replies Between [[T’ang T’ai-tsung]] and [[Li Wei-kung]]

• [[Wei Liao-tzu]]

• Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung

While their exact chronology and authorship are debated, modern archaeological finds, like the bamboo slips from the [[Han Dynasty]] tomb in Lin-i, have confirmed the antiquity of many portions.

Conclusion

The author’s focus is on providing accessibility and historical context for a general Western reader, acknowledging that deeper philosophical and intellectual issues will be explored in future works. This approach highlights the timeless validity of these ancient strategies and their continued impact.

Wei Liao-tzu

#MilitaryClassics #Strategy #AncientChina #Legalism #Confucianism #Governance #Leadership #WeiLiao

The [[Wei Liao-tzu]] is a military classic purportedly named after [[Wei Liao]], a strategist who may have been a student of [[Lord Shang]] or an adviser to the first [[Ch’in Dynasty]] emperor [130, 131]. It advocates for the integration of civil and martial principles for state survival [131]. Unlike some other classics, it appears to be primarily the work of a theoretician rather than a commander [132].

Key Doctrines and Policies

Wei Liao’s work emphasizes drastic, thoroughly implemented policies to strengthen the state, particularly relevant after Wei’s defeats in the [[Warring States Period]] [57, 133].

Core tenets include:

• Human Effort as Sole Determinant: Rejects reliance on Heaven, spirits, or divination; human effort is the only means to achievement [134-136].

• Agriculture and People as Basis: A state’s prosperity depends on fully developing agricultural resources and nurturing a large, contented populace. Well-fed people are loyal and strong [57, 58, 137].

• Humanistic Values & Authoritarian Control: Advocates for rulers to cultivate Virtue, benevolence, and righteousness (Confucian values) [59, 138]. However, it also demands draconian measures to suppress heterodoxy and anything inimical to agriculture and warfare [139].

• Benevolent Warfare: Emphasizes minimizing opposition by preserving enemy fields/orchards, not plundering towns, and securing the welfare of the populace to encourage surrender, contrasting with the brutal policies of some states like Qin [140, 141].

• Strict Organization and Unity: Believes in a strict hierarchical organization solidified by a mutual guarantee system (units of five and ten) that bonds men at all levels, ensuring discipline and collective responsibility. This system meant even family members couldn’t conceal crimes [142-145].

• Rewards and Punishments: Essential for control and motivation. Punishments should be severe and apply to all ranks, while rewards should be generous and reach the lowest ranks [63, 146, 147].

• Spirit ([[ch’i]]) and Courage: The army’s spirit determines battle outcome. Measures are needed to ensure that the fear of punishment outweighs the fear of death or the enemy [148-150]. This leads to an army “committed to dying” [151, 152].

• Strategic & Tactical Refinements: Integrates and refines concepts from earlier military texts, emphasizing:

• Speed, deception, concentration of force [47].

• Assaulting weak points and avoiding strengths [47].

• Seizing and maintaining the initiative [47].

• Acting on complete intelligence [47].

• The interrelationship of orthodox and unorthodox forces [47].

Structure and Dating

The Wei Liao-tzu is divided into twenty-four chapters (in the Seven Military Classics edition), with the first twelve more philosophical and focused on grand strategy, and the latter twelve on organization, discipline, and command [69, 153].

Archaeological discoveries of bamboo slips from the Lin-i [[Han Dynasty]] tomb confirm the book’s antiquity, placing its composition around the end of the 4th century B.C. [69, 154]. The debates surrounding its authorship and relationship to the historical Wei Liaos are complex, but the text offers a unique blend of [[Confucianism]] and [[Legalism]], particularly relevant to its historical context.

Yoshihara - Sun Zi and the Search for a Timeless Logic of Strategy

Summary and Thesis

Yoshihara argues that while Sun Zi’s Art of War offers timeless, universal principles of strategy, its inherent ambiguity makes it a problematic source for defining a unique “Chinese Way of War”. The text is highly valuable as a complement to Clausewitz and for its emphasis on rationality, but its malleability leads to contradictory scholarly interpretations and the danger of strategic oversimplification.

Central Questions

1. What does the Sun Zi’s Art of War say about strategy as a universal concept?

2. What does the Sun Zi’s Art of War say about the peculiarities of Chinese strategy?

Key Premises

• Historical Context is Key: The work should be seen as a product of the Warring States period, not the Spring and Autumn period. It was likely written to legitimize a new professional military class over an older aristocratic one.

• Universal Principles Exist: The text contains transcendent logic applicable today, including:

• Rationality: Emphasizes cool, dispassionate calculation over emotion.

• Cost-Benefit Analysis: Preoccupied with the high costs of war and the need to conserve resources for long-term rivalries.

• Net Assessment: The call to “know oneself and to know the enemy” is a clear precursor to modern net assessment.

• Ambiguity Fuels Debate: The text’s vagueness allows it to be used as evidence for contradictory theories of strategic culture.

• John K. Fairbank School: Argues for a pacifist bias, emphasizing maxims like “subdue the enemy without fighting”.

• Alastair Iain Johnston School: Argues for a “hard realpolitik” worldview that embraces the overwhelming use of force as a normal tool of statecraft.

• Concepts like Shi are Contested: The unique “Chineseness” of concepts like shi (strategic concept) is debatable. While central to Chinese military thought, scholars like Andrew Wilson argue the ideas are universally understandable and not mystical.

Key Evidence and Case Studies

• Modern US Doctrine: The optimism of Joint Vision 2020’s goal of “full spectrum dominance” and “decision superiority” mirrors Sun Zi’s optimism about controlling the battlefield, showing the universal allure (and danger) of these ideas.

• Ancient Battles as Illustrations of Shi:

• Battle of Maling (341 BCE): General Sun Bin used deception (reducing cooking fires) to manipulate his enemy’s psychology and lure him into a perfectly timed ambush.

• Battle of Wei River (204 BCE): General Han Xin used a feigned retreat and a makeshift dam to divide and destroy a numerically superior enemy, turning the environment itself into a weapon.

• Modern Chinese Warfare:

• Huai-Hai Campaign (1948-49): Commander Su Yu’s plan was based on calculations of morale and momentum (shi), exploiting a previous victory to keep the Nationalists off-balance.

• Korean War - Chinese Intervention (1950): Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai used deception, secrecy, and feigned retreats to manipulate General MacArthur’s arrogance and lure UN forces into a massive trap.

Critique and Reflections

Yoshihara’s main contribution is a synthesis that cautions against essentialism. The primary weakness may be that the connection drawn to Joint Vision 2020 is illustrative rather than based on proven influence. The argument for the “universality” of concepts like shi (strategic concept) could also risk downplaying their unique cultural resonance in China.