Cry Havoc

Online Description

Did the arms race of the 1930s cause the Second World War? In Cry Havoc, historian Joseph Maiolo shows, in rich and fascinating detail, how the deadly game of the arms race was played out in the decade prior to the outbreak of the Second World War. In this exhaustively researched account, he explores how nations reacted to the moves of their rivals, revealing the thinking of those making the key decisions — Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, Stalin, Roosevelt — and the dilemmas of democratic leaders who seemed to be faced with a choice between defending their nations and preserving their democratic way of life. An unparalleled account of an era of extreme political tension, Cry Havoc shows how the interwar arms race shaped the outcome of World War II before the shooting even began.

🔫 Author Background

• Joseph Maiolo is a Senior Lecturer in International History in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London [1].
• He is the author of The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939: Appeasement and the Origins of the Second World War in Europe (1998) [1, 2].
• He has co-authored An International History of the Twentieth Century (2nd ed. rev. 2008) and edited The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues (2003) [3].
• Maiolo has won several awards, including the Julian Corbett Award in Modern Naval History [1].

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

• The book’s main argument is that the interwar arms race (1931–1941) was a complex, “independent, self-perpetuating and often overriding impersonal force that shaped events” [4]. It was “the supreme wrecker of all master plans” [5].
• Maiolo challenges the conventional view that reduces the origins of World War II to simple choices made by “wicked dictators” versus “naïve appeasers” [4]. Instead, he stresses “the remorseless logic of rearmament and military mobilization in shaping their choices” [6].
• The central idea is to provide “the first truly global history of interwar militarization” [7] by combining political, diplomatic, military, and economic elements of arming into one international history [5].
• The book addresses the key problem of how the arms race “shaped the outcome of World War II before a single shot was fired” [1]. It also explores the dilemma faced by democratic leaders: how to arm effectively against the escalating threat of “totalitarian war” without succumbing to totalitarian methods themselves, which were seen as irreconcilable with parliaments, free markets, and social progress [8, 9].

🧭 One-Paragraph Overview

Cry Havoc argues that the global arms race between 1931 and 1941 was a driving, self-perpetuating force that inexorably pushed the world towards World War II, shaping its outcome even before the first shot was fired. Author Joseph Maiolo challenges the simplistic narrative of “wicked dictators” versus “naïve appeasers,” asserting that the “remorseless logic of rearmament and military mobilization” fundamentally influenced national leaders across the globe. Drawing on sources in multiple languages, the book provides a comprehensive international history, detailing how totalitarian states like Germany, Italy, and Japan deliberately transformed their economies and societies for “total war,” often emulating each other’s multi-year plans for autarky and military production. Concurrently, it explores the profound dilemma faced by democracies such as Britain, France, and the United States: how to rearm sufficiently to deter aggressive totalitarian adversaries without sacrificing their liberal values, free markets, and individual liberties. This competitive pressure led to a pervasive “emulate-or-capitulate logic” that profoundly altered the political, economic, and social landscapes of all major powers during this critical decade.

🔑 Top Takeaways (5–10 bullets)

• The interwar arms race (1931-1941) was an independent, self-perpetuating, and ultimately overriding force that shaped global events, not merely a consequence of national leaders’ decisions [4-6].
• The concept of “future war” evolved into “totalitarian war,” implying that an efficient war economy required sacrificing freedom, parliaments, free markets, and social progress, driving nations towards autarky and centralized control [8, 9].
• Axis powers (Germany, Italy, Japan) aggressively pursued multi-year plans to transform their entire economies into self-sufficient “war machines,” often inspiring and emulating each other’s totalitarian methods [10-16].
• Democracies (Britain, France, US) faced a profound dilemma: how to rearm on a scale necessary to counter totalitarian threats without adopting the “dictatorial methods” and centralized control that threatened their own liberal values and economic freedoms [9, 17-20].
• Intelligence and perceptions of rival capabilities, often exaggerated or misinformed, played a crucial role in accelerating the arms race and influencing national policy decisions across all major powers [21-27].
• Leaders like Stalin, Mussolini, and Hitler were often admired by “total-war systematizers” in other nations (including democracies) for their ability to mobilize and regiment their societies, highlighting the pervasive “emulate-or-capitulate” logic [8, 28, 29].
• The book provides a global perspective, integrating political, diplomatic, military, and economic dimensions to demonstrate the complexity of interwar militarization [5, 7].
• The arms race significantly “shaped the outcome of World War II before a single shot was fired”, emphasizing the pre-emptive nature of military-industrial preparations [1].
• The United States, despite its isolationist tendencies and fears of “war socialism,” eventually recognized the need to abandon limited efforts and “take the plunge and hope to outgun the Axis” to escape the “vicious circle” of global military rivalry [30-32].

📒 Sections

Introduction

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): The introduction frames World War I as a “titanic siege fought between economies and societies” [33], which left an indelible imprint on survivors and shaped the belief that technocratic elites could rationally plan industrial economies for political aspirations [33]. Despite an initial post-war impulse to demobilize and restore pre-1914 economic practices like the gold standard [34], the interwar period saw a different dynamic emerge. The book challenges the conventional historical view that attributes World War II primarily to the choices of “wicked dictators” outsmarting “naïve appeasers” [4]. Instead, it posits that the arms race itself was an “independent, self-perpetuating and often overriding impersonal force” that relentlessly shaped events and “wrecked all master plans” [4, 5].

To present this complex reality, the author combines political, diplomatic, military, and economic elements into an international history, arguing that “future war” became synonymous with “totalitarian war” [5, 8]. This new paradigm demanded that entire nations transform into self-sufficient “war machines,” driven by an “emulate-or-capitulate logic” [8]. A key dilemma explored is how democratic nations grappled with the challenge of arming against the escalating threat of total war without succumbing to the totalitarianism they opposed, fearing that efficient war economies were incompatible with their core values [8, 9].

The narrative traces these struggles from the vantage points of pivotal political figures, including Stalin, Mussolini, Roosevelt, Hitler, and Churchill, to illustrate how they confronted this pervasive underlying dynamic of armaments competition [35]. The book aims to offer readers a nuanced understanding of the interwar years as a critical chapter in the tragic history of twentieth-century armaments [36].

Key Points (bullets):

• World War I transformed warfare into a “titanic siege” of economies and societies, inspiring the idea of centrally planned industrial economies for national goals [33].
• The book’s central thesis is that the arms race (1931-1941) was a complex, “independent, self-perpetuating,” and “overriding impersonal force” that shaped events and “wrecked all master plans,” challenging simplistic explanations of WWII’s origins [4, 5].
• The concept of “future war” became interchangeable with “totalitarian war,” necessitating the transformation of entire nations into self-sufficient war machines [8].
• Democracies faced the dilemma of how to arm against totalitarian threats without compromising their parliaments, free markets, and social progress [8, 9].
• The study integrates political, diplomatic, military, and economic elements to provide a global international history of interwar militarization [5, 7].

Chapter 1: Deep War and Red Militarism

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 1 opens with Joseph Stalin’s rare apology to Mikhail Tukhachevsky in May 1932, acknowledging his earlier “extremely negative” judgment of Tukhachevsky’s “super-rearmament” plan as “red militarism” [36-38]. This episode highlights the early Soviet debates over military strategy and industrial capacity. Tukhachevsky, described as an “archetypal future war systematizer,” envisioned a massive Soviet military of six to eight million men supported by robust defense industries [39, 40]. His 1928 “Future War” plan, a 750-page document, outlined a panoramic struggle for survival against “global capitalism” [41].

Despite the fears of “counter-revolution” and economic ruin initially expressed by Stalin [38], Tukhachevsky’s arguments for swift rearmament and huge investments in defense industries proved overwhelming. The Red Army, turning perceived “shadows into clear-cut intentions” [42], aggressively adopted new technologies like Vickers and Christie tanks, which were seen as crucial for “fast attack” and disorganizing enemy plans [43].

Stalin’s eventual concession in 1932, acknowledging the economic feasibility of a large mobilized army, reflected a growing understanding that industrial strength was paramount for national security, especially in response to perceived “Alarms” in the Far East [40, 44]. This chapter thus establishes the Soviet Union’s early and intense commitment to militarization driven by a total war ideology.

Key Points (bullets):

• Joseph Stalin initially condemned Mikhail Tukhachevsky’s “super-rearmament” plan as “red militarism” that would “ruin the economy of the country” [36, 38].
• Tukhachevsky, an “archetypal future war systematizer,” advocated for massive military and industrial mobilization, exemplified by his 1928 “Future War” plan detailing a struggle against “global capitalism” [39, 41].
• The Red Army enthusiastically adopted advanced tank designs (Vickers, Christie) for “fast attack” strategies, seeing them as essential for future conflicts [43].
• Stalin’s later apology and acceptance of the feasibility of a large mobilized Red Army underscored the growing realization of the link between industrial capacity and national security, especially due to “Alarms” in the Far East [40, 44].

Chapter 2: Colonel Ishiwara Goes to Manchuria

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 2 introduces Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, a pivotal figure in Japan’s militarization drive, whose career was marked by headstrong individualism and a deep study of warfare [45]. Having witnessed Germany’s economic collapse in World War I, Ishiwara concluded that national economic strength was paramount for total war, leading him to believe that Japan’s economy had to be mobilized to compete on a “titanic scale” [34, 46]. His visit to Germany and observation of the Soviet Five Year Plan transformed him into a “planomaniac” with a corporatist vision for Japan’s “national defense state” [47].

In 1931, Ishiwara, as chief of operations for the Kwantung army, spearheaded the conquest of Manchuria, an enclave larger than France and Germany combined [11, 48]. This new territory, Manchukuo, was envisioned as “a deliberate emulation of Russia’s forced industrialization,” a vast military-industrial bastion to be raised against the Soviet Union [11]. Army planners imposed their will, establishing what amounted to an “economic general staff” to control resources and direct industrial development [11, 49].

By 1936, a five-year plan was initiated for Japan-Manchukuo, aiming to achieve military strength 80% the size of the Red Army in the Far East by 1941 [50, 51]. This plan prioritized steep annual increases in heavy industries like steel, metals, fuel, and aircraft, demonstrating a profound commitment to state-controlled industrial expansion to sustain a future army [51]. Despite temporary setbacks due to political resistance, the goals of a controlling “national defense state” continued to gain traction [52].

Key Points (bullets):

• Colonel Ishiwara Kanji, influenced by Germany’s WWI economic failure and the Soviet Five Year Plan, advocated for Japan’s economic mobilization for total war [33, 46, 47].
• Ishiwara led the establishment of Manchukuo as a strategic enclave, directly emulating Soviet forced industrialization to build a powerful armaments economy against the USSR [11].
• Japanese army planners effectively created an “economic general staff” to assert state control over the economy [11, 49].
• A five-year plan was launched to achieve military parity with the Red Army in the Far East by 1941, with significant increases in heavy industry targets [50, 51].

Chapter 3: “Rearm and Get Ready”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 3 recounts Adolf Hitler’s consolidation of power and his immediate drive for German rearmament. In February 1933, shortly after becoming Chancellor, Hitler addressed military commanders, declaring his “supreme goal” as the recovery of German political power, which necessitated stamping out “Marxism, pacifism and democracy” and transforming the military into the state’s most important institution [53]. This vision included acquiring “living space” to the east, as outlined in Mein Kampf [54-56].

Defense Minister General Werner von Blomberg, having visited the Soviet Union and the United States, was deeply impressed by the modern state’s capacity to organize industry and society for “grand political purposes” [57]. He, along with figures like Colonel Georg Thomas, became an evangelist for the “rational pursuit of industrial-age total war,” believing that modern conflict was “no longer a clash of armies, but a struggle for the existence of the peoples involved” [58].

Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler’s “financial wizard,” played a crucial role by implementing the “New Plan” in September 1934 [59, 60]. This bureaucratic mechanism controlled foreign exchange and prioritized raw material imports for rearmament, effectively curbing civilian consumption to build Germany’s military strength [60]. The chapter also highlights the rapid development of the Luftwaffe, with figures like Robert Knauss advocating for bomber fleets and Hitler strategically announcing conscription to surprise his adversaries, embodying the aggressive push to “Rearm and Get Ready” [61, 62].

Key Points (bullets):

• Adolf Hitler, upon becoming Chancellor in February 1933, outlined his “supreme goal” of German political power recovery through rearmament and the acquisition of “living space” in the east [53-56].
• Defense Minister General Werner von Blomberg and Colonel Georg Thomas were “evangelists for the rational pursuit of industrial-age total war,” advocating for state organization of industry and society for grand political aims [57, 58].
• Hjalmar Schacht, as financial wizard, implemented the “New Plan” (1934) to centralize control over foreign exchange and raw materials, prioritizing military rearmament over civilian needs [59, 60].
• The chapter details the rapid and aggressive rearmament of the Luftwaffe, with Hitler using strategic announcements like conscription to gain an advantage [61, 62].

Chapter 4: “We Are Moving Among Giants”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 4 delves into Benito Mussolini’s Italy, illustrating his conviction that “the whole Nation must be militarized” for war [63]. Mussolini, a former socialist, leveraged post-World War I anxieties and the perceived failings of parliamentary democracy to implement the stringent national unity, social discipline, and economic controls he believed were indispensable for total war [64-66]. He cultivated the image of a “warrior-chieftain” and pursued an expansionist vision of empire and autarky, driven by a “siege mentality” similar to that found in Japan and the Soviet Union [67-69].

Italy established a Supreme Defense Commission and a Subcommittee for the Preparation of National Mobilization in 1923, aiming to “apply the discipline of the frontline” to the entire Italian population and economy [70, 71]. Despite initial economic liberalism, Mussolini’s long-term goal was state control over the economy to overcome Italy’s “deficiency in raw materials” and achieve self-sufficiency for war [69-71].

Mussolini’s relationship with the military elite was complex. Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Italy’s top soldier, often deliberately delayed the dictator’s aggressive war plans, such as against Yugoslavia, to buy time for genuine rearmament and diplomatic maneuvering [72-74]. Mussolini’s Four Power Pact in 1933, which proposed a directorate to revise peace treaties, also aimed to contain German rearmament while Italy pursued its own imperial ambitions, notably in Ethiopia, often relying on stolen British intelligence to gauge London’s resolve [75-77].

Key Points (bullets):

• Mussolini’s core belief: The entire nation must be militarized, viewing peace as merely a preparation for war and empire [63, 67].
• Fascism offered the promise of national unity and economic controls deemed essential for “total war,” which parliamentary democracy appeared incapable of delivering [66, 78].
• Italy established a Supreme Defense Commission and other bodies for “all-embracing mobilization” of the population and economy [70, 71].
• Mussolini pursued autarky and state control over the economy to overcome Italy’s “deficiency in raw materials” and prepare for total war [69, 70].
• Marshal Pietro Badoglio often strategically delayed Mussolini’s aggressive war timelines (e.g., against Yugoslavia) to ensure Italy had sufficient time and resources to rearm [72-74].
• Mussolini’s Four Power Pact (1933) aimed to manage European tensions and German rearmament while he pursued Italian imperial ambitions in East Africa, using intelligence to assess British opposition [75-77].

Chapter 5: “Should We Accept the Rearmament of Germany?”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 5 explores the hesitant and divided responses of France and Britain to Germany’s rearmament, particularly their struggle to reconcile democratic values with the demands of an escalating arms race. After the devastation of World War I, France initially demobilized, focusing on defensive strategies like the extensive Maginot Line to secure its frontier [79, 80]. French military leaders, such as General Maxime Weygand, expressed deep concern over postwar demobilization and political divisions, fearing they compromised France’s ability to withstand another total war [81]. Politicians like Prime Minister Édouard Daladier prioritized financial considerations over military spending, even in the face of chilling intelligence about German military build-up [21, 82].

In Britain, a similar initial reluctance prevailed, marked by the “ten-year rule” that assumed no major war for a decade [83]. However, mounting evidence of German and Japanese rearmament prompted figures like Sir Maurice Hankey to lobby for increased armaments, leading to the creation of the Defence Requirements Committee [84, 85]. Neville Chamberlain initially cut defense spending, but alarm over Germany’s burgeoning air force, especially Hitler’s false claim of air parity in 1935, compelled Britain to launch its own air force expansion program, Scheme A [22, 86-88].

Both nations thus grappled with internal political and economic constraints, slowly and reactively adjusting their policies. While intelligence reports underscored the growing German threat, domestic priorities and the desire to avoid a return to the “total war” economy of 1914-1918 often delayed decisive action, reflecting the “remorseless logic” of rearmament that leaders struggled to master [5, 6].

Key Points (bullets):

• Post-WWI, France prioritized demobilization and defensive projects like the Maginot Line, while military leaders worried about national disunity hindering total war readiness [79-81].
• French politicians, including Édouard Daladier, initially prioritized financial stability over military spending, despite intelligence reports on German rearmament [21, 82].
• Britain’s “ten-year rule” for defense planning was challenged by German and Japanese rearmament, leading figures like Sir Maurice Hankey to push for increased armaments [83-85].
• Neville Chamberlain, initially cost-conscious, approved major air force expansion (Scheme A) in 1934 in response to growing concerns over German air power [22, 86, 87].
• Both democracies showed a hesitant, reactive approach to rearmament, balancing military necessity with domestic political and economic considerations [5].

Chapter 6: The Military-Industrial Complex

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 6 delves into the American military’s efforts to prepare for total war after World War I, particularly the development of the Industrial Mobilization Plan (M-Day Plan) in 1930 [89]. This plan, influenced by the WWI experience, envisioned converting the United States into a “gigantic war machine” [90] through extensive state control over industry, labor, and propaganda, a model admired and dubbed the “American style” by Soviet planners [91, 92]. However, this vision of state-led mobilization met strong resistance from American businessmen and political conservatives who feared “war socialism,” “regimentation” of industry, and “military dictatorship” [93-95]. Bernard Baruch, a key WWI industrial mobilizer, advocated for a civilian-led “super-agency” to manage industry and prevent military overreach [95].

President Herbert Hoover attempted to dispel fears of wartime dictatorship, while his successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, adopted central planning principles through the New Deal to address the Great Depression [96-98]. Roosevelt saw the federal government as the legitimate embodiment of the nation, necessary to safeguard democracy from the “tyrannical accretion of economic power by boardroom plutocrats” [98, 99]. Agencies like the National Recovery Administration, though part of the New Deal, were criticized for resembling “Socialism, Communism, Fascism, Nazism and National Regimentation” [100, 101].

Despite the growing militarization in Europe, Roosevelt initially resisted full-scale mobilization, fearing it would undermine democratic liberties and New Deal reforms [99, 102, 103]. Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, who helped refine the M-Day Plan, later warned of the “military-industrial behemoth” potentially wreaking “havoc with the nation’s liberties” if fully unleashed [104]. Roosevelt also acknowledged the inescapable logic that while disarmament was desirable, it was impossible unless other nations also disarmed [105].

Key Points (bullets):

• The US War Department’s Industrial Mobilization Plan (M-Day Plan, 1930) aimed to convert the US into a “gigantic war machine” with extensive state control [89, 90].
• American businessmen and conservatives feared “war socialism” and “military dictatorship,” advocating for business self-regulation over state control [89, 93, 95].
• President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal embraced state intervention, partly inspired by WWI’s central planning, to protect democracy from corporate power [98, 106].
• New Deal agencies like the National Recovery Administration faced criticism for resembling European “totalitarian regimes” [100, 101].
• Dwight D. Eisenhower, a drafter of the M-Day Plan, later coined the term “military-industrial complex” and warned of its potential threat to liberties [104].
• Roosevelt, despite recognizing the need to arm, initially resisted full-scale mobilization, prioritizing the preservation of democratic liberties [102, 103, 107].

Chapter 7: The Naval Arms Races Begin

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 7 details the re-ignition of naval arms races in the mid-1930s, beginning with the controversial Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935 [108]. This agreement, which permitted Germany to build a fleet 35% the size of the Royal Navy, was seen by Britain as a pragmatic way to manage German rearmament and prevent an uncontrolled naval build-up [108-110]. German Admiral Erich Raeder, however, viewed it as an opportunity to secretly pursue a much more ambitious shipbuilding program, aiming to restore Tirpitz’s legacy and lull Britain into a false sense of security while preparing for future conflict [111-113]. Raeder was an expert on cruiser warfare, not solely battleships, and crafted his plans accordingly [114].

Concurrently, the United States, under President Franklin D. Roosevelt, embarked on its own significant naval expansion. Roosevelt, with a deep personal and political affinity for the navy, supported a substantial building program authorized by the Vinson-Trammell Act (1934), aiming to achieve naval parity with the British and deter Japan [105, 112, 115]. This build-up was driven by strategic assessments of potential conflicts, particularly in the Pacific, where the US sought to deter Japanese aggression [112, 116].

In the Pacific, Japan, initially constrained by economic depression and the Washington Naval Treaty, paradoxically saw naval disarmament talks as a relief from the financial burden of an unbridled arms race [116, 117]. However, the Japanese Imperial Navy also harbored ambitions to deter the US, leading to internal debates and strategic compromises. Figures like Admiral Katō Tomosaburō skillfully navigated these international limitations, while others sought to exploit them for Japan’s long-term strategic advantage [117, 118]. Ultimately, these naval agreements, despite their intention to limit arms, often fueled further competition and strategic deception among the great powers.

Key Points (bullets):

• The Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935) allowed Germany to build a fleet 35% the size of Britain’s, which German Admiral Erich Raeder used as a cover for more ambitious, secret naval expansion to lull Britain [108, 111, 113].
• US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, a strong proponent of naval power, oversaw significant naval expansion through acts like the Vinson-Trammell Act (1934) to achieve parity and deter rivals, particularly Japan [112, 115].
• Japan, despite economic constraints, strategically navigated naval disarmament talks (e.g., Washington Conference) to maintain its deterrent capabilities against the US in the Pacific [116-118].
• International naval agreements, intended to limit arms, often became instruments of strategic maneuvering and inadvertently accelerated, rather than curbed, naval competition [113, 119].

Chapter 8: “We Have Reached a Plateau”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 8 describes the relentless intensification of the arms race, particularly with Hitler’s Four Year Plan, launched in August 1936 [12]. This plan, influenced by Soviet multi-year economic models, aimed to make Germany ready for war within four years by achieving economic autarky and an “unbeatable armed force” [12, 28, 120]. Hermann Göring was appointed to implement it, consolidating state control over raw materials and industrial production, though he faced resistance from figures like Hjalmar Schacht over steel allocation [118, 121, 122].

Mussolini, inspired by Hitler and driven by his own “siege mentality,” launched parallel autarky initiatives, cutting fuel imports and stockpiling vital raw materials. He believed Italy had to achieve “the maximum economic self-sufficiency” to prepare for titanic struggles [123]. Mussolini viewed Britain as Italy’s primary foe and sought closer alignment with Germany, dreaming of new imperial “coups” by exploiting Anglo-German hostility [124-126]. Intelligence, some of it potentially fabricated or stolen British documents, played a crucial role in cementing the Axis, reinforcing the belief that Britain was merely buying time to rearm [23, 127, 128].

This shared perception within the Axis that a total war with Britain was inevitable and that time was against them accelerated their rearmament efforts [129, 130]. However, both Germany and Italy faced significant material and labor shortages. By late 1937, German officials like Göring conceded they had reached an armaments “plateau,” acknowledging that “All that was humanly possible to launch and organise in advance we have already done” [131]. Italian military chiefs also complained about unmet targets and the dire state of their forces [123, 132]. This period highlights the relentless, competitive nature of the arms race, pushing even totalitarian states to their limits.

Key Points (bullets):

• Hitler’s Four Year Plan (1936) aimed for German autarky and wartime readiness within four years, explicitly emulating Soviet multi-year planning [12, 28, 120].
• Hermann Göring was appointed to centralize economic control for rearmament, leading to conflicts over resource allocation (e.g., steel) [118, 121, 122].
• Mussolini, influenced by Hitler, initiated his own autarky policies, believing Italy needed “maximum economic self-sufficiency” to face a total war against Britain, its perceived primary foe [123, 124, 126].
• Alleged “secret British documents” suggesting Britain was rearming to buy time fueled Axis leaders’ belief in the inevitability of a showdown and accelerated their preparations [23, 128, 129].
• Despite ambitious plans, both Germany and Italy experienced significant material and labor shortages, with German officials admitting to an armaments “plateau” by late 1937 [131-134].

Chapter 9: Guns and Butter

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 9 explores the “guns and butter” dilemma faced by Britain and France as they grappled with the imperatives of rearmament while attempting to preserve democratic norms. In Britain, Neville Chamberlain initially resisted calls for national “planning,” preferring to avoid state intervention in industry and public backlash over “profiteering on armaments” [135-137]. However, the escalating air arms race, fueled by intelligence (sometimes exaggerated) about German strength, intensified demands for aircraft production, raising concerns about industrial capacity and the need for new labor practices [138-140]. British officials feared that competing with totalitarian regimes, which disregarded “economic essentials and social decencies,” might force Britain to adopt “dictatorial methods” [140, 141].

In France, the Popular Front government under Socialist leader Léon Blum, despite its commitment to social justice and disarmament, was compelled to confront the urgent need for rearmament in the face of German aggression [142, 143]. Blum, who admired Roosevelt’s New Deal, sought a middle path between unbridled capitalism and Soviet-style planning, ultimately approving the nationalization of arms industries and increasing military spending [144]. However, he wrestled with the challenge of balancing democratic values with the demands of an “all-embracing military effort,” facing financial instability and resistance from private capital [145, 146].

The chapter highlights internal debates: Winston Churchill, though a strong advocate for rearmament, was not an “abstract systematizer” but a pragmatic practitioner [147, 148]. Lord Weir, an industrial adviser, emphasized coordinating arms procurement through “shadow” industries rather than outright state control, fearing “military communism” [149, 150]. Ultimately, the intense pressure of the arms race forced both democracies to reluctantly move towards greater state control, making sacrifices in social programs and labor rights to boost defense production, reflecting the “tragic irony” of a peaceful nation compelled to strain all its resources for military effort [141, 151-153].

Key Points (bullets):

• The “guns and butter” dilemma forced democracies to balance military spending with civilian needs and democratic values against totalitarian threats [135, 140].
• Britain initially resisted centralized economic “planning” but was compelled by the air arms race to increase defense spending, fearing that competing with totalitarian “slave labour” might necessitate “dictatorial” methods [136-138, 140, 141].
• France’s Popular Front government under Léon Blum, despite its socialist and disarmament ideals, reluctantly moved to nationalize arms industries and increase military budgets to counter German rearmament [142, 144-146].
• Debates emerged over the extent of state intervention needed, with figures like Lord Weir advocating for “shadow” industries to out-produce enemies without adopting full “military communism” [149, 150].
• Both France and Britain, facing internal divisions and financial pressures, were forced to make significant compromises, including curtailing social programs and labor rights, to accelerate armaments [141, 151, 152].

Chapter 10: “Next Time We’ll Urge On the Other Side”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 10 examines the Soviet Union’s rearmament and diplomatic strategy under Joseph Stalin. In 1935, Mikhail Tukhachevsky analyzed Hitler’s “gigantic armaments” plan, predicting intensive development of offensive forces [154]. Stalin, however, deliberately revised Tukhachevsky’s articles to emphasize the German threat to Britain and France, believing that Germany aimed to weaken “capitalist-imperialist” rivals, thereby creating opportunities for the USSR [155]. Despite Stalin’s occasional preference for economic growth and consumer goods, Tukhachevsky continually pushed for massive military modernization, particularly air power, often using fears of preemptive capitalist attacks to justify accelerated arming [25, 156-158].

Stalin’s foreign policy, fronted by Maxim Litvinov, adopted “collective security” not as an end in itself, but as a tactical tool to manipulate foreign powers and slow down historical change until the Soviet Union could exploit global instability [158, 159]. However, Stalin’s deep paranoia led to the devastating Great Purge in 1937, where Tukhachevsky and hundreds of other top officers were executed on fabricated charges of spying for Germany [160, 161]. This severely weakened the Red Army’s leadership and exposed profound industrial and mobilization planning failures, with many plans being “unrealistic” or “out of date” [162].

Despite widespread propaganda extolling Soviet military capabilities, foreign intelligence often underestimated its offensive strength [125, 163]. The Munich Agreement (1938), which excluded the Soviet Union, reinforced Stalin’s belief in Western hostility and convinced him that “no one intended to risk a general war in Europe on behalf of the Soviet Union” [164]. This dramatic shift in the diplomatic landscape led to the eventual, though ultimately failed due to “incompatible aims,” Anglo-French-Soviet alliance negotiations in 1939, as Western powers belatedly sought Soviet support against an emboldened Hitler [165, 166].

Key Points (bullets):

• Mikhail Tukhachevsky predicted Hitler’s intensive rearmament, but Stalin strategically re-directed the narrative to emphasize the German threat to Britain and France [154, 155].
• Stalin’s “collective security” diplomacy was a tactical tool to exploit capitalist rivalries, not to achieve lasting peace [158, 159].
• The Great Purge (1937) led to the execution of Tukhachevsky and hundreds of Red Army officers on false charges, severely impacting military leadership and revealing industrial mobilization failures [160-162].
• Despite Soviet propaganda, foreign intelligence often underestimated the Red Army’s offensive capabilities [125].
• The Munich Agreement (1938), by excluding the USSR, confirmed Stalin’s distrust of Western powers, setting the stage for diplomatic shifts [164].
• Negotiations for an Anglo-French-Soviet military alliance in 1939 failed due to “incompatible aims,” highlighting the deep mistrust between the potential allies [165, 166].

Chapter 11: “They Are Serious, the Englishmen”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 11 illustrates the escalating arms race and the growing, albeit reluctant, acknowledgment within Germany and Italy that a confrontation with Britain was inevitable. German officials, like Hermann Göring, by late 1937, confessed to reaching an armaments “plateau” due to steel shortages and industrial coordination issues [121, 122, 131, 133, 134]. This forced a psychological shift, with Göring having to “accustom my airmen to consider the British as their potential enemies” [131]. Mussolini, convinced by (potentially false) intelligence that Britain was merely using diplomacy to buy time for its own rearmament, sought closer alignment with Hitler [23, 126, 167]. His state visit to Germany in September 1937 solidified the Axis, with both dictators sharing the belief that a total war with Britain was on the horizon within “three, four or—better still—five years” [26, 130, 168].

However, Italy’s military ventures, such as its deep involvement in the Spanish Civil War, exposed its economic and industrial weaknesses, leading to significant setbacks and increased reliance on German aid [169-171]. Meanwhile, British intelligence reports on German rearmament became increasingly alarming, fueling domestic calls for greater defense spending and a shift from appeasement to a more confrontational stance [26, 172]. Sir Robert Vansittart, a staunch anti-appeaser, pushed for a concentration on arming against Germany, contributing to internal debates over resource allocation among Britain’s military services [172, 173].

A widespread concern within both totalitarian and democratic military circles emerged regarding the social discipline and economic organization required to win a “total war” [27, 29, 174]. This often led to a grudging admiration for the perceived efficiency of totalitarian methods, even as democracies sought to avoid replicating them fully [29]. By late 1937, the accelerating arms race compelled all major powers to intensify their preparations for what appeared to be an inevitable, existential conflict, driven by a logic of “emulate-or-capitulate” [8, 175].

Key Points (bullets):

• By late 1937, German officials (e.g., Göring) acknowledged reaching an armaments “plateau” due to material shortages and had to mentally prepare for Britain as a primary enemy [121, 131, 133, 134].
• Mussolini, convinced by intelligence (including stolen British documents) that Britain was rearming to gain time, sought to solidify the Axis with Hitler, both believing a total war with Britain was inevitable within 3-5 years [23, 26, 126, 127, 130].
• Italy’s military ventures, such as the Spanish Civil War, exposed its industrial and economic limitations, increasing its reliance on Germany [169-171].
• British intelligence heightened warnings about German rearmament, prompting calls for increased defense spending and a shift towards deterrence, leading to internal debates over resource allocation [26, 172, 173].
• Military planners in both totalitarian and democratic states developed a “grudging admiration” for the “social discipline” and “economic organization” of totalitarian regimes in preparing for total war [29, 174].

Chapter 12: ”… A Different Kind of Nation”?

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 12 details the mounting international crisis of late 1937 and early 1938, beginning with Hitler’s consolidation of power through the purge of conservative military leaders like Blomberg and Fritsch [174, 176]. This move eliminated internal opposition to his aggressive war plans. Mussolini, despite Italy’s near bankruptcy from rearmament and the Spanish intervention, continued to pursue imperial ambitions, exploiting the Anglo-German standoff and dreaming of new “coups” [172, 177, 178]. The Anschluss—Germany’s annexation of Austria in March 1938—further inflamed European tensions and forced Britain and France to urgently re-evaluate their defense strategies [175, 176].

In Britain, the Anschluss prompted demands for greater state control over industry and labor to accelerate rearmament, with officials often comparing their peacetime efforts to the “war footing” of totalitarian enemies [179, 180]. Air Minister Lord Swinton, for instance, pushed for a massive bomber fleet, highlighting the intense competition for defense budgets [181]. In France, the political instability caused by the Anschluss led to Léon Blum’s brief return as premier, where he again attempted to implement “totalitarian” economic methods, such as imposing exchange controls, to compete with the Axis, but was ultimately blocked by the Senate [153, 182-184]. Édouard Daladier, who succeeded Blum, swiftly adopted decree powers and pushed for accelerated arming, even contemplating revoking the forty-hour workweek to boost industrial output, reflecting a growing willingness to adopt authoritarian measures to match German industrial “regimentation” [185-188].

The Czech crisis of May 1938, though a false alarm of German attack, infuriated Hitler, who interpreted it as a loss of prestige and hardened his resolve to “smash Czechoslovakia” [189-191]. Paradoxically, German generals like Ludwig Beck warned against a premature war, arguing that Germany was not yet ready for a total war against an “overwhelming coalition” of a rapidly rearming Britain and France [192-195]. This chapter vividly demonstrates how democracies felt compelled to adopt methods increasingly resembling those of their totalitarian adversaries to ensure national survival, posing the question of whether they were becoming “a different kind of nation” [196, 197].

Key Points (bullets):

• Hitler consolidated power by purging conservative military leaders (Blomberg, Fritsch) who opposed his aggressive war plans [174, 176].
• Mussolini, facing Italy’s economic strain, pursued imperial ambitions, exploiting European tensions for new “coups” [172, 177, 178].
• The Anschluss (March 1938) intensified British and French rearmament efforts, leading to calls for state control over industry and labor and increased air force spending [179, 181, 198].
• Léon Blum’s attempt in France to adopt “totalitarian” economic methods (e.g., exchange controls) to compete was politically blocked [153, 183, 184].
• Édouard Daladier, Blum’s successor, swiftly used decree powers to accelerate arming, including contemplating revoking the forty-hour workweek, emulating German industrial efficiency [185-188].
• The false Czech crisis of May 1938 hardened Hitler’s resolve to “smash Czechoslovakia,” interpreting it as a blow to German prestige [189, 191].
• German generals (e.g., Ludwig Beck) warned against a premature total war, arguing Germany was not ready for a conflict against a rearming Anglo-French coalition [192, 194, 195].
• The chapter highlights the dilemma of democracies adopting authoritarian measures to compete with totalitarian states, questioning their own identity [196, 197].

Chapter 13: The Great Acceleration, 1938–39

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 13 details the dramatic acceleration of the arms race following the Munich Agreement of September 1938, which, despite initial relief, was quickly understood by many leaders as merely a “short respite” before further conflict [199-201]. Hitler, emboldened by Munich and convinced of Anglo-French “decadence,” immediately intensified German rearmament [202, 203]. He revived the Reich Defense Council to “regiment the whole economy with ruthless coherence,” implementing centralized planning, wage/price controls, and strict raw material allocation [202, 204]. A key priority was the Z Plan for a great battle fleet to challenge Britain and prepare for war in the west [205-207].

In Britain, Prime Minister Chamberlain, despite his hopes for peace, faced overwhelming pressure to “ratchet up British military and economic efforts” [206]. Intelligence reports, such as the “Crisis and After” memo, starkly revealed Hitler’s aggressive intentions and the perceived need for universal military service, further hardening British attitudes, especially after Kristallnacht in November 1938 [17, 107, 208, 209].

France, under Édouard Daladier, also viewed Munich as a prelude to war and implemented drastic economic measures, including ending the forty-hour workweek, to boost arms production and emulate German efficiency [210-213]. Anglo-French staff talks intensified, focusing on how to win a long war against the Axis by leveraging their economic superiority and preventing Germany from accessing Eastern European resources [214-216]. However, Axis aggression continued with Italy’s annexation of Albania [217] and Hitler’s final preparations for the invasion of Poland [218]. Despite concerns from his own generals about Germany’s readiness, Hitler, convinced of Anglo-French weakness, launched the attack on September 1, 1939, initiating World War II [207, 218, 219].

Key Points (bullets):

• The Munich Agreement (September 1938) was swiftly recognized as a “short respite” preceding a new, intense phase of the arms race [201, 210].
• Hitler immediately accelerated German rearmament, reviving the Reich Defense Council for centralized economic control, and prioritizing the Z Plan for a major battle fleet against Britain [202, 204, 205, 207].
• Britain moved away from appeasement; intelligence confirmed Hitler’s expansionist goals, leading to accelerated rearmament and calls for conscription, particularly after Kristallnacht (November 1938) [17, 206, 208, 209].
• France under Daladier implemented severe economic measures, including ending the forty-hour workweek, to boost arms production and match perceived totalitarian efficiency [212, 213].
• Anglo-French military cooperation deepened, focusing on a “long war” strategy, relying on their combined economic superiority and preventing German access to Eastern European resources [214-216].
• Axis aggression continued with Italy’s annexation of Albania [217] and Hitler’s final plans to invade Poland, despite internal military concerns about German readiness [218, 219].

Chapter 14: “The Acid Test … Is Whether Anyone Is Ready to Disarm”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 14 addresses America’s cautious but inevitable shift towards rearmament, framed by the lingering question of whether any nation was truly ready to disarm [220]. President Franklin D. Roosevelt initially prioritized his New Deal social and economic reforms, but as totalitarian threats escalated in Europe and Asia, he gradually recognized the pressing need for military preparedness [30, 221]. He harbored deep fears, however, that large-scale wartime mobilization could lead to “military dictatorship” or “war socialism,” potentially undoing the progressive achievements of the New Deal and ceding power to big business or the army [102, 222, 223]. He dismissed the army’s comprehensive M-Day Plan as setting up a “second government” [223, 224].

The Munich Agreement (1938) served as a turning point, prompting Roosevelt to lament America’s lack of preparedness: “Had we had this summer 5,000 planes and the capacity to immediately produce 10,000 per year… Hitler would not have dared to take the stand he did” [225, 226]. He immediately called for a massive increase in aircraft production. Despite this, he continued to face resistance from industrialists unwilling to expand capacity without long-term guarantees [227].

After the fall of Poland in September 1939, Roosevelt began the difficult process of “bending neutrality” to aid Britain and France, pushing for a “gigantic expansion of American air power” while carefully navigating domestic isolationist sentiment [224]. The chapter illustrates Roosevelt’s challenging balancing act: to safeguard democratic liberties and New Deal reforms while simultaneously preparing the nation for a potential global conflict, a task he recognized as inherently paradoxical in a world driven by “emulate-or-capitulate” logic [30, 102, 103].

Key Points (bullets):

• President Franklin D. Roosevelt, while focused on the New Deal, increasingly recognized the need for rearmament amidst rising totalitarian threats [30, 221].
• He greatly feared that extensive wartime mobilization could lead to “military dictatorship” or “war socialism,” undermining democratic liberties and New Deal reforms [102, 222, 223].
• The Munich Agreement (1938) was a critical turning point, leading Roosevelt to demand a massive increase in aircraft production and lament America’s insufficient air power [225, 226].
• Roosevelt resisted full implementation of the army’s M-Day Plan, seeing it as an overreach of military and business power that could create a “second government” [223, 228].
• After the fall of Poland (1939), Roosevelt began discreetly aiding Britain and France, pushing for a “gigantic expansion of American air power” while contending with domestic isolationism [224].

Chapter 15: “Miracles Cannot Happen”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 15 examines the critical question facing Britain and France during the “Phoney War” (late 1939-early 1940): could democracies defeat totalitarianism without becoming totalitarian themselves [18, 19]? Geoffrey Crowther of The Economist observed that both nations were adopting “dictatorial methods” and centralized industrial control, much like Germany, but argued that their democratic safeguards would prevent permanent totalitarianism [19, 229]. In Britain, despite Prime Minister Chamberlain’s preference for a “halfway war economy,” the government eventually enacted emergency laws by May 1940, giving it “full control of ‘everybody and everything’” to maximize “guns” production [230-232]. The New York Times even proclaimed “Britain Goes Totalitarian—For the Duration” [232].

In France, Prime Minister Daladier struggled with internal divisions and the fear that total war would inexorably lead to “totalitarian Bolshevism” [233, 234]. His successor, Paul Reynaud, intensified efforts to boost arms output, including abolishing the forty-hour week, but still faced resistance to full state control from industrialists and some politicians who feared a slide towards “authoritarianism” [235-238]. Allied military leaders like General Gamelin understood that Anglo-French economic superiority would eventually outgun Germany in a long war, but they worried about political resolve and the ability to sustain such an effort [239].

The chapter also recounts Allied debates over peripheral strategies, such as aiding Finland or cutting Swedish iron ore supplies to Germany, which sometimes diverted resources and proved indecisive [240-242]. The swift German victory in Norway and the eventual Fall of France in May 1940 shattered the “accepted wisdom” of long, grinding wars, leading many to credit “Blitzkrieg” as a new, rapid strategy [243, 244]. This devastating defeat highlighted the failures of Allied planning (e.g., Gamelin’s Dyle-Breda plan) and the critical importance of initiative and adaptability in warfare [243, 245, 246]. The capitulation of France was seen by some on the right as a verdict on the nation’s “decadent” pluralistic society, reinforcing the insidious logic that only totalitarian states could win total wars [247, 248].

Key Points (bullets):

• Democracies faced the dilemma of whether they could defeat totalitarianism without adopting “dictatorial methods” themselves [18, 19].
• Britain enacted emergency laws for “full control of ‘everybody and everything’” by May 1940, leading The New York Times to declare “Britain Goes Totalitarian—For the Duration” [232].
• France, under Daladier and Reynaud, implemented measures like abolishing the forty-hour week to boost arms production, despite fears of sliding into “totalitarian Bolshevism” or authoritarianism [233, 235-237].
• Allied military leaders believed their economic superiority would win a long war, but worried about political will and internal divisions [239].
• The Fall of France (May 1940) and the rapid German “Blitzkrieg” shattered the pre-war assumption of long, attritional total wars, demonstrating the critical importance of operational surprise and speed [243, 244].
• The defeat exposed flaws in Allied military planning (e.g., Gamelin’s Dyle-Breda plan) and fueled the belief that democratic states were inherently disadvantaged against totalitarian ones [246-248].

Chapter 16: Wars of Rapid Decision?

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 16 addresses the re-evaluation of warfare after Germany’s swift victory in France, which challenged the pre-war assumption of prolonged, attritional total wars [244]. Italian General Alberto Pariani had advocated for “wars of rapid decision,” believing the Axis must seek quick battlefield victories through “breakthrough and maneuver” to counter the Allies’ superior economic strength [249]. However, even Pariani equivocated as Italy’s significant inferiority in armaments became apparent, fearing a longer war [250]. Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Italy’s most famous soldier, fiercely opposed Pariani’s unrealistic ideas, lobbying for his removal and revealing the dire state of Italy’s military readiness [251, 252].

Mussolini, initially declaring Italy “non-belligerent” in 1939 due to these weaknesses, became emboldened by Germany’s successes [30, 253, 254]. Despite warnings from his foreign minister, Ciano, Mussolini plunged Italy into a disastrous “parallel war” in June 1940, convinced the Allies were “finished” [253, 255, 256]. This venture quickly failed, with the Italian military suffering setbacks and becoming reliant on German assistance as its war economy stagnated [256, 257].

Meanwhile, Hitler, after his Western triumph, faced the strategic dilemma of how to defeat Britain. He contemplated Operation Sea Lion (invasion) and a “maritime empire” against the Royal Navy, but increasingly turned his attention eastward [258, 259]. Believing time was against him due to accelerating American rearmament, Hitler decided to launch Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, despite internal military concerns about disrupting raw material supplies [260-262]. This decision was heavily influenced by his “pseudoscientific biological racism” and Manichean vision of a titanic fight against “Jewish-Bolshevism,” seeing the Soviet Union as a source of vast resources for global domination [263-265].

In response, Stalin, initially “thunderstruck” by France’s collapse and aware of the Red Army’s shortcomings (revealed by the Winter War against Finland), dramatically intensified Soviet rearmament [266, 267]. He shifted to an offensive strategy, even contemplating a preemptive strike against Germany (Zhukov’s May 15, 1941 plan), but remained cautious about provoking Hitler [268-271]. This period showcases the rapid, often chaotic, shifts in strategy and rearmament driven by the brutal realities of modern total war.

Key Points (bullets):

• Germany’s “Blitzkrieg” victory in France prompted a re-evaluation of warfare, favoring “wars of rapid decision” over long attritional conflicts [244, 249].
• Italian General Alberto Pariani advocated for swift battlefield decisions, but Italy’s military inferiority led to an initial declaration of “non-belligerency” in 1939 [30, 249, 250].
• Mussolini, emboldened by German successes, launched a “parallel war” in June 1940, which quickly faltered due to Italy’s military and economic weaknesses [256, 257].
• Hitler, facing the challenge of defeating Britain and concerned by accelerating US rearmament, decided to invade the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa) [258, 260, 261].
• Hitler’s decision for Barbarossa was deeply rooted in his “pseudoscientific biological racism” and vision of a fight against “Jewish-Bolshevism” for “living space” and resources [263-265].
• Stalin, shocked by France’s collapse and aware of Red Army weaknesses, accelerated Soviet rearmament and adopted offensive plans, even contemplating a preemptive strike against Germany, though remaining cautious [266-271].

Chapter 17: “Is Total War, Then, the Path to Freedom?”

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): Chapter 17 explores America’s reluctant and paradoxical path towards total war, grappling with the question: “Is total war, then, the path to freedom?” [15]. Japan, under Prime Minister Konoe, increasingly adopted totalitarian economic models, inspired by Germany and the Soviet Union, to achieve autarky and expand its “Co-Prosperity Sphere” in Asia, leading to aggressive moves into Indochina to secure vital resources [15, 272-275].

In the United States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, while facing calls for full mobilization after the fall of France, resisted appointing an “arms czar” or adopting “complete” national mobilization [276, 277]. He deeply feared that such measures would transform America into a “totalitarian” state, undermine the New Deal’s social progress, and cede political power to business or the military, seeing his role as protecting freedom from economic tyranny [102, 278, 279]. However, his military chiefs, particularly Admiral Harold R. Stark and General George Marshall, increasingly advocated for total mobilization, viewing Britain’s survival as crucial for US security against a globe-spanning totalitarian Axis [277, 280, 281].

The British plea for financial aid in November 1940 forced Roosevelt to abandon any thoughts of a limited effort, realizing that America would be compelled into an “open-ended war” if Britain fell [31, 281]. He reluctantly made concessions to corporations to boost arms production, signaling a retreat from some New Deal aspirations, but still delayed systematic planning for total war [282, 283]. This changed after Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, when Roosevelt finally ordered the drafting of the Victory Plan, a comprehensive program for equipping US and Allied forces, leveraging America’s vast industrial economy as a war-winning combination [283-286]. In Japan, despite internal debates and economic shortages, the Imperial Conference in December 1941 ultimately accepted that war with the US was “inevitable and perhaps even winnable,” driven by fears of economic “strangulation” and the need to secure resources [274, 275, 287]. This decision, led by General Tōjō, was a culmination of the “emulate-or-capitulate logic” that had defined the preceding decade [287, 288].

Key Points (bullets):

• Japan, under Prime Minister Konoe, adopted totalitarian economic models (inspired by Germany and USSR) to achieve autarky and expand its influence in Asia, leading to aggressive moves into Indochina to secure resources [15, 272-275].
• US President Roosevelt resisted full-scale “totalitarian” mobilization, fearing it would compromise democratic freedoms and New Deal reforms, prioritizing the protection of individual liberties [102, 276-279].
• US military leaders (e.g., Marshall, Stark) argued for total mobilization, viewing Britain’s survival as critical for American security against a totalitarian Axis [277, 280, 281].
• Britain’s financial crisis in late 1940 forced Roosevelt to commit to broader aid, abandoning a limited effort and acknowledging America’s eventual full mobilization [31, 281].
• After Hitler’s invasion of the USSR, Roosevelt finally ordered the drafting of the Victory Plan (1941), a comprehensive program for US and Allied armaments, leveraging America’s industrial strength [283-286].
• Japan, facing economic “strangulation” and convinced of the inevitability of conflict, decided at the Imperial Conference (December 1941) to go to war with the United States [274, 275, 287].

Conclusion: The Race Goes On

Summary (1-3 paragraphs): The conclusion synthesizes the book’s central argument, asserting that by late 1941, the distinct regional arms races and conflicts in Europe and Asia had converged into a single, global war [287]. Japan and Germany, after a decade of aggressively provoking and accelerating these arms competitions, now hoped to establish an Axis-ruled “new world order” [287]. However, the book emphasizes that the ultimately successful counter-rearmament efforts, particularly spearheaded by the United States, eventually outstripped the Axis powers [32, 287].

The arms race itself is presented as a pervasive, self-perpetuating force characterized by escalating “intensity” and “remorseless logic” [6, 32]. It “wrecked the master plans of those who embraced the totalitarian trend and those who tried to resist it” [32]. Leaders on all sides, despite their intentions, found themselves unable to control the “great armaments trend” [32].

For the United States, escaping this “vicious circle” of mounting military rivalry ultimately required President Roosevelt to “take the plunge and hope to outgun the Axis” [32]. The conclusion posits that the challenges of global military rivalry remain ever-present, reviving the danger that the price of national security might become too high. It closes with the poignant observation that “The rules can change, and so can the stakes, but the race goes on” [289].

Key Points (bullets):

• By late 1941, distinct regional arms races and wars merged into a single global conflict [287].
• The counter-rearmament efforts, especially by the United States, ultimately outstripped the Axis powers [32, 287].
• The arms race is portrayed as an intensifying, “self-perpetuating” force that defied the control of all leaders, regardless of their political systems or intentions [4, 32].
• The United States ultimately had to embrace total mobilization to “outgun the Axis” and break free from the “vicious circle” of escalating military competition [32].
• The book concludes that global military rivalry remains a persistent challenge, warning that the price of security continues to carry a high cost, as “the race goes on” [289].

🥰 Who Would Like it?

• Military historians and scholars of international relations: Those interested in the origins of World War II, interwar militarization, and civil-military relations [3, 6, 7].

• Students of economic history and political science: Readers interested in how states organize their economies for war, the “guns and butter” dilemma, and the comparative study of totalitarian versus democratic mobilization [8, 9, 17, 127].

• General readers seeking a “truly global history” of the period, offering a complex narrative beyond conventional explanations [3, 7].

• Required background knowledge: An interest in 20th-century history, particularly the period leading up to World War II.

• Reading level: Accessible, vivid narrative with rich detail, suitable for “general readers” while offering depth for historians [3, 7].

📚 Related Books

• Similar books in the field:
  • The Royal Navy and Nazi Germany, 1933–1939 by Joseph Maiolo [1, 2]
  • The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues edited by Joseph Maiolo and Robert Boyce [3]
  • Works exploring the economic and social mobilization for total war in various countries during the 1930s (e.g., studies on the Soviet Five Year Plan, Japan’s “national defense state,” German rearmament economics) [8, 11, 12, 60].
• Contrasting viewpoints:
  • Why the Allies Won by Richard Overy [290] (mentioned in praise, often emphasizes Allied economic superiority and political will in WWII outcomes, which complements Maiolo’s focus on the process of the arms race).
  • Books that primarily focus on the individual decisions and ideological motivations of leaders (e.g., biographics of Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin) as the sole drivers of war, rather than the impersonal force of the arms race [4, 6].
• Recommended follow-up reading:
  • An International History of the Twentieth Century by Joseph Maiolo, Kirsten Schulze, Jussi Hanhimaki, and Antony Best [3].
  • Books on specific aspects of the interwar period mentioned, such as the Maginot Line [80], the New Deal [98], or the Great Purge [161].

✍️ Key Terms

• Arms race: A competition between two or more states to acquire the best and largest military forces [4, 7, 32, 291].
• Total War: A great power conflict requiring the full mobilization of a nation’s social and economic resources to win [8, 16, 33, 292].
• Totalitarianism / Totalitarian War: A political phenomenon (or type of war) where an efficient war economy and national mobilization are seen as incompatible with parliaments, free markets, and social progress, demanding absolute state control over society and economy [8, 9, 17, 19, 69, 100].
• Autarky: Economic self-sufficiency, often pursued by totalitarian states to reduce reliance on foreign imports for war preparation [8, 14, 15, 58, 67, 69, 107, 117, 123, 185, 293].
• Appeasement: A diplomatic policy of making concessions to an aggressive power to avoid conflict, often associated with British policy towards Nazi Germany [2, 4].
• Militarization: The process by which a society organizes itself for military conflict and increases its military capacity [1, 7, 294].
• Gold Standard: A monetary system where the value of currency is fixed to a quantity of gold, prevalent before WWI and partially restored in the 1920s [34].
• Five Year Plan: Economic development plans, notably by the Soviet Union (1928-1932) and emulated by Japan and Germany, focusing on rapid industrialization and military build-up [1, 7, 11, 12, 47, 50, 57, 156, 158, 295, 296].
• New Plan (Germany): A bureaucratic mechanism launched in September 1934 by Hjalmar Schacht to control foreign exchange and raw materials, prioritizing rearmament over civilian consumption [60].
• Maginot Line: A line of concrete fortifications, obstacles, and weapon installations built by France in the 1930s along its borders with Germany, to deter invasion and provide time for mobilization [80].
• M-Day Plan (US): The American Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1930, a blueprint for converting the US into a “gigantic war machine” with extensive state control in wartime [22, 89, 223, 228, 297].
• New Deal (US): President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s series of programs and reforms (1933-1939) aimed at economic recovery, relief, and reform during the Great Depression, which incorporated elements of central planning [92, 98, 102, 106, 221, 278].
• Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935): An agreement allowing Germany to build a fleet 35% the size of the Royal Navy, a key event in the naval arms race [108].
• Four Year Plan (Germany): Launched in 1936, headed by Hermann Göring, to make Germany ready for war within four years by achieving autarky and an “unbeatable armed force” [12].
• Popular Front (France): A left-wing political coalition in France (1936-1938) led by Léon Blum, which despite its socialist ideals, was forced to address rearmament [142, 298].
• Great Purge (Soviet Union): A campaign of political repression and persecutions in the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938, involving mass arrests and executions, severely impacting the Red Army’s leadership [161].
• Anschluss: The annexation of Austria into Nazi Germany on March 12, 1938 [176].
• Munich Agreement (1938): An agreement between Germany, France, Britain, and Italy, allowing Germany to annex the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, seen as a temporary reprieve from war [164, 199].
• Kristallnacht: The “Night of Broken Glass” on November 9–10, 1938, a pogrom against Jews throughout Nazi Germany and Austria, hardening international opinion [208].
• Blitzkrieg: German for “lightning war,” a military tactic involving rapid, overwhelming force and maneuver, famously effective in the early stages of WWII [243, 244].
• Operation Barbarossa: The code name for the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, starting on June 22, 1941 [18, 19].
• Victory Plan (US): A comprehensive US war plan drafted in 1941 to determine the overall production requirements needed to defeat the Axis, encompassing US and Allied forces [285, 286, 299].

❓Open Questions

• To what extent was the interwar arms race (1931-1941) truly an “independent, self-perpetuating, and overriding impersonal force” [4], rather than a direct consequence of specific political decisions, ideological objectives, and the inherent security dilemmas faced by states?
• Was there a viable alternative for democratic states (Britain, France, US) to counter totalitarian aggression without adopting at least some “dictatorial methods” and centralized economic and social controls, as famously questioned by Geoffrey Crowther: “Is democracy in Europe committing suicide in self-defence?” (p. 355)
• Given the internal debates and strategic dilemmas within each major power, could any single leader or group of leaders have effectively “mastered” or “bucked” the great armaments trend of the 1930s, or was the escalation inevitable regardless of individual choices [32]?

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “Cry ‘Havoc,’ and let slip the dogs of war … —MARK ANTONY, in Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Scene 1” [300]
• “Joseph Maiolo has taken one of the most studied periods in international history and managed to find a completely new angle, not by denying the role of the national leaders but by stressing the remorseless logic of rearmament and military mobilization in shaping their choices.” — PROFESSOR SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN [6]
• “Cry Havoc offers the first definitive history of how the interwar arms race shaped the outcome of World War II before a single shot was fired.” [1]
• “The trouble with the conventional view is that it reduces everything to simple choices (to arm or not) and ignores the role of the arms race as an independent, self-perpetuating and often overriding impersonal force that shaped events.” (p. 27)
• “My aim in this narrative study is to correct the orthodoxy by telling the more complex tale of how politicians and military men the world over struggled to cope in vain with the arms race as an underlying dynamic, the supreme wrecker of all master plans.” (p. 28)
• “Planning trampled freedom: an efficient war economy was irreconcilable with parliaments, free markets and social progress.” (p. 29)
• “The compelling emulate-or-capitulate logic that drove the arms race forward.” (p. 29)
• Stalin, denouncing Tukhachevsky’s rearmament plan: “To carry out such a ‘plan,’ … would certainly ruin the economy of the country, and the Red Army: that would be worse than any counter-revolution.” (p. 34)
• Mussolini: “The whole Nation must be militarized.” (p. 68)
• Marshal Badoglio, warning Mussolini about war with Britain over Ethiopia: “I believe Italy cannot face a general conflict without the gravest catastrophe… . Our arsenals are empty. Our finances cannot stand up to five days of war.” (p. 93)
• Dwight D. Eisenhower, reflecting on the M-Day Plan: “when energized in the high-voltage hysteria of a national emergency, the aroused military-industrial behemoth could wreak havoc with the nation’s liberties.” (p. 123)
• Hitler, after the Munich Agreement, on British preparedness: “If the English have not got universal [military service] by the spring of 1939 they may consider their world Empire lost.” (p. 315)
• Roosevelt, after Munich, on US air power: “Had we had this summer 5,000 planes and the capacity to immediately produce 10,000 per year, even though I might have had to ask Congress for the authority to sell or lend them to the countries in Europe, Hitler would not have dared to take the stand he did.” (p. 347)
• Geoffrey Crowther, editor of The Economist: “Are the two great European democracies being driven, in an effort to defeat totalitarianism, to adopt all forms of totalitarianism itself? Will they ever be able to slough off their new martial uniforms and revert to the free-and-easy life of civilian countries? Is democracy in Europe committing suicide in self-defence?” (p. 355)
• French Prime Minister Reynaud, after German breakthrough in May 1940: “We have been defeated,” he told Churchill. “We are beaten,” Reynaud repeated tensely, “we have lost the battle.” (p. 385)
• Hitler, joking about the term: “The expression ‘Blitzkrieg’ is an Italian invention,” he joked at a gathering of Nazi insiders. “We picked it up from the newspapers. I’ve just learned that I owe all my successes to an attentive study of Italian military theories.” (p. 395)
• US Admiral Stark, on Britain’s importance for US security: “If Britain wins decisively against Germany, … we could win everywhere; but … if she loses the problem confronting us would be very great; and, while we might not lose everywhere, we might, possibly, not win anywhere.” (p. 434)
• The book’s conclusion: “As the arms race gathered force, it wrecked the master plans of those who embraced the totalitarian trend and those who tried to resist it. Those leaders who tried to master it found that they could not. Those leaders who tried to buck the great armaments trend found that they could not.” (p. 455)
• The book’s final sentence: “The rules can change, and so can the stakes, but the race goes on.” (p. 456)

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

• 1928 — Soviet “Future War” plan drafted — Outlined a grand strategy for survival against global capitalism, justifying massive rearmament efforts [41].
• 1930 — US War Department issues Industrial Mobilization Plan (M-Day Plan) — A blueprint for converting the US into a gigantic war machine under state control [89].
• 1931-09 — Mukden Incident; Japan invades Manchuria — Beginning of Japan’s expansionist policies and the creation of Manchukuo [301].
• 1931-11-07 — First Soviet-adapted Vickers and Christie tanks parade in Red Square — Symbolized the Soviet Union’s accelerating commitment to military modernization [43].
• 1932-05-07 — Stalin writes an apology to Tukhachevsky — Signaling Stalin’s reluctant acceptance of large-scale military and industrial mobilization plans [36, 40].
• 1933-01-30 — Adolf Hitler appointed Chancellor of Germany — Initiates Germany’s path to rearmament and recovery of political power [302].
• 1933-02-03 — Hitler addresses German military leaders — Outlines his “supreme goal” of rearmament and acquiring “living space” [53, 303].
• 1933-03 — Franklin Delano Roosevelt takes office in the US — Launches the New Deal amidst the Great Depression [88, 304].
• 1933-03 — Mussolini proposes the Four Power Pact — An attempt to contain German rearmament and revise post-WWI peace treaties [75].
• 1934-09 — Germany launches the New Plan — A centralized bureaucratic mechanism to control foreign exchange and raw materials for rearmament [60].
• 1934 — US Vinson-Trammell Act passed — Authorizes naval expansion to treaty limits, aiming for naval parity [112].
• 1934-07-18 — Britain approves Scheme A for air force expansion — The first major British rearmament program for air power [22].
• 1935-03 — Hitler proclaims German rearmament and conscription — Openly violates the Treaty of Versailles and challenges the international order [62, 154].
• 1935-06-04 — Anglo-German Naval Agreement signed — Allows Germany to build a fleet 35% the size of the Royal Navy, ostensibly to manage rearmament but exploited by Germany for covert expansion [108].
• 1935-10 — Italy invades Ethiopia — Mussolini’s imperial venture, revealing Italy’s economic vulnerabilities and straining international relations [76].
• 1936-07 — Spanish Civil War begins — Becomes a proxy conflict for Axis and Soviet/Allied powers, intensifying international tensions [117, 305].
• 1936-08 — Hitler issues Four Year Plan memorandum — Lays out Germany’s plan for autarky and readiness for total war within four years [12].
• 1936-10-24 — Axis Pact concluded between Germany and Italy — Formalizes their alignment, fueled by shared anti-British sentiments and intelligence [127, 130].
• 1937-05 — Soviet Great Purge intensifies — Mikhail Tukhachevsky and hundreds of Red Army officers are executed, severely weakening military leadership [161].
• 1937-07 — Japan invades China (Second Sino-Japanese War) — Escalates conflict in Asia, creating a “global storm center” [14].
• 1937-11-05 — Hossbach Memorandum — Hitler outlines his war plans to military leaders, including intentions for Austria and Czechoslovakia [168, 192].
• 1938-02 — Hitler purges Blomberg and Fritsch from military leadership — Consolidates his control and removes opposition to aggressive war plans [174, 176].
• 1938-03 — Anschluss: Germany annexes Austria — A major violation of the Treaty of Versailles, further escalating European tensions [176].
• 1938-05 — Czech crisis (false alarm) — Hitler perceives a loss of prestige and hardens his resolve to “smash Czechoslovakia” [189, 191].
• 1938-09-30 — Munich Agreement signed — Sudetenland ceded to Germany, temporarily averts war but accelerates the arms race [164, 199].
• 1938-11-09 — Kristallnacht (Night of Broken Glass) — Coordinated attacks against Jews in Nazi Germany and Austria, hardening international opinion [208].
• 1939-03-15 — Germany invades remaining Czech state — Blatant violation of Munich, triggers Anglo-French guarantees to Poland [165].
• 1939-04-07 — Italy annexes Albania — Mussolini’s attempt to restore political balance in the Axis [217].
• 1939-08-23 — Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed — Clears the way for Germany to invade Poland without Soviet intervention [219].
• 1939-09-01 — Germany invades Poland — Beginning of World War II in Europe [219].
• 1939-09-03 — Britain and France declare war on Germany — Official start of World War II [306].
• 1940-05-10 — Germany invades France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg — Rapid German victory using “Blitzkrieg” tactics, shocking the world [243, 246].
• 1940-06-10 — Italy enters World War II — Mussolini declares “parallel war” against France and Britain [256].
• 1941-06-22 — Operation Barbarossa begins — Germany invades the Soviet Union, initiating a massive Eastern Front [18].
• 1941-09-11 — US Victory Plan draft lands on Roosevelt’s desk — A comprehensive plan for US and Allied armaments to defeat the Axis [286].
• 1941-12-01 — Japanese Imperial Conference accepts war with US — Decision for war, driven by fears of economic “strangulation” [287].
• 1941-12-07 — Japan attacks Pearl Harbor — Leads to US entry into World War II (Implicit from [287]).