How the War Was Won

Online Description

World War II is usually seen as a titanic land battle, decided by mass armies, most importantly those on the Eastern Front. Phillips Payson O’Brien shows us the war in a completely different light. In this compelling new history of the Allied path to victory, he argues that in terms of production, technology and economic power, the war was far more a contest of air and sea than of land supremacy. He shows how the Allies developed a predominance of air and sea power which put unbearable pressure on Germany and Japan’s entire war-fighting machine from Europe and the Mediterranean to the Pacific. Air and sea power dramatically expanded the area of battle and allowed the Allies to destroy over half of the Axis’ equipment before it had even reached the traditional ‘battlefield’. Battles such as El Alamein, Stalingrad and Kursk did not win World War II; air and sea power did.

🔫 Author Background

Phillips Payson O’Brien is a historian of modern warfare and grand strategy who, at the time of publication, served at the University of Glasgow and directed work on war studies there.  His research centers on the interaction of economics, technology, and strategy in twentieth‑century conflict, with particular focus on air and sea power.  He positions this book within rigorous archival and official-source traditions, drawing extensively on British and American government papers and postwar interrogations (e.g., USSBS). 

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

O’Brien argues that WWII was won primarily through the Allied attainment of air–sea supremacy that controlled mobility—deciding what could be produced, moved, and brought to the battlefield—rather than through decisive land battles.  He formalizes this with a three‑phase model of equipment destruction—pre‑production, production, deployment—to show that most Axis matériel was eliminated before ground contact.  The Allied bombing and shipping campaigns compressed Axis industrial options and strangled movement, making land outcomes derivative of the air–sea “super‑battlefield.” 

🧭 One-Paragraph Overview

The book reframes WWII as a global struggle over movement and industrial capacity across a vast “super‑battlefield” created by aircraft and fleets. The Allies prioritized aircraft, ships, and supporting technology; they then engaged Axis production lines, logistic networks, and transit flows, progressively raising non‑combat losses and forcing wasteful dispersal.  By 1943–44, the Atlantic shipping war was effectively won, the Luftwaffe was being destroyed faster than it could be fielded, and Japanese air–sea forces hemorrhaged equipment outside combat.  Strategic air campaigns (transportation and oil) and maritime interdiction reduced Axis mobility to a trickle, setting the conditions for 1944–45 land victories and ultimately collapse—well before dramatic finales like Berlin or the atomic strikes. 

🔑 Top Takeaways

• Control of mobility decides modern war. Air–sea power expands the battlespace and lets belligerents destroy enemy equipment before it sees combat. 

• Three‑phase destruction beats attritional land fighting. The Allies won by targeting pre‑production supplies, production facilities, and deployment flows, not by trading divisions head‑on. 

• Shipping + air cover = survival. Convoys with air support were “almost complete protection,” turning the Atlantic by mid‑1943 and ending Germany’s last modern offensive option. (p. 188) 

• Bombing shaped what Germany could build. Dispersal, the fighter shift, and maintenance/logistics breakdowns stemmed from the CBO, raising non‑operational losses and strangling output. 

• Japan lost in the air–sea approaches. Carrier and pilot pipelines, fuel, and merchant shipping were degraded; non‑combat aircraft losses (weather, training, ferrying) exceeded combat in key periods. 

• Grand strategy was a production–movement problem. Roosevelt, Leahy, Portal, King, Marshall, and Arnold wrestled to concentrate resources where they best choked Axis mobility. 

📒 Sections

Introduction

Summary: O’Brien defines the air–sea “super‑battlefield,” a space thousands of miles wide where equipment could be destroyed long before ground contact. He introduces the three-phase destruction model and argues that classic set‑piece land battles (e.g., Alamein, Kursk) had limited industrial significance compared to Midway‑style shocks to high‑value naval assets and the constant erosion of Axis logistics. He shows how Allied air–sea pressure multiplied non‑operational losses for the Luftwaffe and IJN, while submarine and convoy wars diverted vast Axis and Allied resources. The introduction positions the book against Eastern Front‑centric narratives, reframing victory around production control and mobility denial. 

Key Points:

• Air–sea power enlarged the battlespace and let Allies engage Axis systems early. 

• Three phases: pre‑production, production, deployment; most destruction occurred before battle. 

• Non‑combat aviation losses (Luftwaffe/IJN) surged with Allied pressure. 

• Midway mattered via irreplaceable carriers, not aircraft counts. (pp. 4–5) 

• The book moves focus away from Eastern Front determinism. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Conceptual shift from land attrition to mobility control; quantification of destruction outside battle; globalized logistics as the real front. 

Section: 

Air and Sea Power and the Control of Mobility

Summary: Establishes mobility as the decisive currency of modern war: what gets produced, moved, and arrives safely defines outcomes. Strategic bombing compelled Germany to disperse and misallocate, while Japan failed to engage Allied production through a coherent shipping war. The super‑battlefield lens clarifies why destroying factories, railways, fuel, and merchantmen eclipsed frontline exploits. 

Key Points:

• Mobility is the lever linking industry to battle. 

• German dispersal and AA deployments reflected Allied coercion at scale. 

• Japan underused submarine and air interdiction to engage U.S. production. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Technology + economy; logistics as target; strategic adaptation vs. doctrinal inertia. 

Chapter 1: The Dominance of Air and Sea Production

Summary: Across all powers, two‑thirds or more of wartime construction went to air and sea systems; army weapons were comparatively cheap. The chapter surveys how Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan allocated manpower, materials (notably aluminum), R&D, and plant to aircraft, ships, engines, and naval aviation—shaping every later campaign. Germany’s increasing fighter focus and factory dispersal, Britain’s MAP‑led aircraft mobilization, American mass production (e.g., B‑24), and Japan’s heavy investment yet fragile inputs show a common economic profile with divergent strategic competence. 

Key Points:

• Air–sea construction dominated budgets and development costs. 

• Germany’s structural shift to fighters foreshadowed attritional defeat in the air. 

• U.S./UK ramped aircraft and escort shipping at unprecedented scales. 

• Japan’s output rivaled the USSR in 1942–44 but was brittle in inputs. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Industrial priorities as strategy; aluminum/fuel constraints; anticipatory adaptation. 

Section 1.1: Germany

Summary: Germany poured increasing shares into aircraft (especially fighters) and anti‑air, dispersed production, and tied down labor in protection/repair—evidence that the CBO bent the economy. Despite rising gross output, the Luftwaffe’s non‑operational losses and deployment wastage soared under fuel scarcity and training cuts, undercutting field strength. 

Key Points:

• Fighter‑centric pivot and factory dispersal (1943–44). 

• Maintenance/logistics deficits magnified wastage. 

• Aluminum and AA priorities cannibalized other sectors. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Economy bent by air coercion; deployment losses as strategic effect. 

Section 1.2: Great Britain

Summary: Under MAP, Britain sustained a high aircraft share, integrated labor across ministries, and absorbed early bomber/engine losses while optimizing convoy protection technologies. British planning linked production to Atlantic survival, generating a virtuous loop: escorts + radar + air cover reduced sinkings, protecting industrial flow. 

Key Points:

• Aircraft/engine mobilization and coordinated planning. 

• Early recognition of convoy speed/air cover effects. (p. 188) 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Production married to maritime protection; scientific operational analysis. 

Section 1.3: United States

Summary: U.S. mass production (airframes, engines, escort carriers) scaled decisively; B‑24 and A‑20 lines illustrate high‑throughput systems feeding both theaters. U.S. choices reflected Roosevelt’s priority for air/sea tools and the necessity of transoceanic lift. 

Key Points:

• Aircraft/shipbuilding surges backed by integrated logistics. 

• Strategic lift and maritime protection as design constraints. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Industrial tempo as combat power; inter‑theater fungibility. 

Section 1.4: Japan

Summary: Japan invested heavily in naval aviation and ships but depended on vulnerable shipping for oil/ore; constraints on aluminum and fuel, and later catastrophic merchant losses, undermined aircraft and fleet readiness. Non‑combat aircraft losses and training shortfalls compounded the decline. 

Key Points:

• High air–sea spend but fragile inputs and training. 

• Merchant/oil tonnage collapse fatally limited operations (1944–45). 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Resource geography; the primacy of maritime logistics. 

Chapter 2: The Air and Sea War and the Phases of Equipment Destruction

Summary: O’Brien details pre‑production (raw inputs, power, labor), production (plants, tooling, dispersal), and deployment (training, ferry, maintenance) as cumulative kill chains. Allied pressure forced Germany and Japan into costly dispersal and emergency pipelines that yielded soaring non‑operational losses (e.g., 25% wastage from pilot error amid fuel‑starved training). (pp. 100–101) 

Key Points:

• Pre‑production targeting (oil, aluminum, shipping) cascaded across the system. 

• Production attacks + dispersal created throughput friction. 

• Deployment wastage (training, ferry flights, maintenance shortfalls) crippled field strength. (pp. 100–101) 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Systemic attrition; the economics of “wastage” as a strategic outcome. 

Section 2.1: Pre‑Production Destruction

Summary: Allies undermined Axis inputs through submarine warfare, mining, and early oil prioritization debates (e.g., 1940 RAF analyses of synthetic fuel). 

Key Points:

• Oil and raw materials framed what could be built. 

• Merchant losses translated directly into factory slowdowns. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Resource denial as strategy; early target‑system thinking. 

Section 2.2: Production and Destruction

Summary: Bombing forced dispersal and defensive build, tying down labor and material; throughput fell despite higher gross output on paper. Fighter‑heavy policies signaled coerced reallocation. 

Key Points:

• Factory dispersal and repair cycles as hidden drains. 

• Shift to fighters reduced offensive options and increased training demand. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Coercive economics; “defensive investment” paradox. 

Section 2.3: Deployment and Destruction

Summary: Fuel scarcity cut training hours; ferry/operational transit saw extraordinary loss rates; maintenance and spares in forward areas lagged rail/road capacity—producing non‑combat losses that dwarfed battlefield attrition in periods. (pp. 100–101) 

Key Points:

• Training-hour collapse (e.g., to ~40 hours) → ~25% aircraft wastage. (p. 101) 

• Logistics shortfalls translated into readiness failure. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Readiness as attrition; logistics as a combat multiplier. 

Chapter 3: The Air and Sea War to November 1940

Summary: The early war revealed basic mechanics: escort convoys worked, air cover mattered, and strategic bombing was not yet destructive at scale. British assessments began prioritizing oil and shipping even as capability lagged. Lessons from 1940 set agendas for 1941–42: build escorts and aircraft, accelerate radar/ASW, and refine bombing priorities. 

Key Points:

• Convoy doctrine validated; air gaps identified. 

• Oil/transport as future targets emerged in 1940 RAF planning. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Learning under fire; aligning targets with means. 

Chapter 4: Grand Strategists and the Air and Sea War

Summary: Profiles the decision‑makers and their preferences. Roosevelt and Leahy consistently prioritized the air–sea war; Arnold and Marshall configured U.S. forces around strategic bombing and expeditionary lift; King pushed naval priorities; British chiefs split—Portal pressed transportation/oil bombing while Alanbrooke emphasized land tempo; Churchill balanced politics and production while backing Atlantic control. 

Key Points:

• American inner circle (Leahy/King/Marshall/Arnold, plus Hopkins) shaped production and theater priorities. 

• British debates (Portal vs. Harris; Alanbrooke’s land focus) animated targeting doctrine. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Bureaucratic politics in strategy; target‑system preferences as identity. 

Section 4.1: The Americans — Leahy, King, Marshall, Arnold, Hopkins

Summary: Leahy emerges as the coordinating strategist; King’s maritime priorities sometimes clashed with joint efficiency (e.g., early reluctance to integrate Atlantic air commands); Marshall/Arnold backed CBO and theater‑level air superiority as prerequisites for invasion. 

Key Points:

• Leahy’s influence on priority‑setting; King’s Atlantic choices scrutinized. 

• Air supremacy prerequisite to cross‑Channel assault. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Jointness problems and their correction; sequencing campaigns. 

Section 4.2: The British — Alanbrooke, Portal, Pound, Cunningham

Summary: Alanbrooke pressed Mediterranean options and ground tempo; Portal fought for strategic bombing against transportation/oil; naval leaders prioritized Atlantic security and carrier strength. Churchill arbitrated, generally backing Atlantic control and air resources. 

Key Points:

• Persistent Portal–Harris friction over targets. 

• Mediterranean vs. Overlord tradeoffs framed 1943. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Targeting doctrine as statecraft; maritime compellence. 

Chapter 5: Understanding the Air and Sea War, Dec 1940–Mar 1942

Summary: Britain refined the shipping war (convoy speed, escorts, early carriers) and wrestled with strategic bombing’s feasibility—oil rose as a logical aim but means were short. Across 1941, practice outpaced technology at sea but not in the air. The period culminated in the 1942 U‑boat crisis off the U.S. coast—an avoidable shock that catalyzed unified convoy/air measures and deepened Allied resolve to fight a production–mobility war. 

Key Points:

• Convoy speed >12–15 kn strongly reduces vulnerability; air cover decisive. (p. 188) 

• Oil targeting logic established in 1940; capability lags. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Design rules for maritime survival; matching targets to capability. 

Chapter 6: Grand Strategy in Action: Prioritizing the Air and Sea War

Summary: 1942–43 choices concentrate Allied resources where they best engage Axis production. Casablanca/Trident/Quadrant deliberations elevate CBO, escorts, and amphibious lift for Overlord while constraining Mediterranean diversions. The Allies deliberately engage German production by forcing fighter defense, dispersal, and rail repair—absorbing Axis labor and metals while thinning frontline power. (p. 217) 

Key Points:

• Overlord supremacy affirmed; air superiority as prerequisite. 

• “Engagement of German production” as a strategic aim. (p. 217) 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Coercive allocation; invasion as effect of air–sea control. 

Chapter 7: Winning the Shipping War

Summary: The Atlantic turns on science‑driven convoy design (speed/size), escort carriers, radar/ASW, and integrated command. The 1942 U.S. coastal disaster (526 ships/2.83M tons in 6 months) dramatized stakes; by May–June 1943, U‑boat losses and withdrawals made Allied control nearly complete. Convoyed ships with air cover suffered a fraction of losses versus independents; Ultra aided but was subsidiary to these operational improvements. (pp. 232–33, 242–43)

Key Points:

• Air‑covered convoys ≈ “almost complete protection.” (p. 188) 

• 1942 crisis spurred U.S. adoption of proven convoy/air practices. (p. 232) 

• Ultra helpful, not decisive; independent vs. convoy loss differential huge. (pp. 242–43) 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Technoscience + production + command unity; protecting the production line at sea. 

Chapter 8: The War in Europe in 1943—Strategic Bombing and the Land War

Summary: 1943 is the hinge: the CBO ties down German labor in air defense, dispersal, repair, and fighter production; non‑operational Luftwaffe losses spike; U‑boat defeat frees Atlantic flow; Allied air attacks begin to pressure critical nodes (transport, selected industry). The land war’s scope is geographically limited relative to the sprawling air–sea front. 

Key Points:

• Air–sea fighting area dwarfs land fronts; national effort follows. 

• CBO destroys/engages more production than Eastern Front land combat. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Scaling effects; primacy of the air–sea economy. 

Chapter 9: The War in Europe in 1944

Summary: Transportation and oil campaigns bite hard; German fighter losses and pilot training collapse; rail and fuel constraints paralyze maneuver. The air umbrella enables Overlord and subsequent breakout by denying Luftwaffe interference and strangling German movement. German industry’s shifts to defense cannot restore mobility. 

Key Points:

• Transportation targeting validated in France and Germany. 

• Fighter loss/training spiral overwhelms Luftwaffe capacity. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Mobility denial → operational paralysis; invasion as culminating effect. 

Chapter 10: The Air and Sea War Against Japan, 1942–4

Summary: IJN/IJA aviation suffers immense non‑combat losses and pilot‑training shortfalls; radar and carrier integration give the U.S. a qualitative edge (e.g., Guadalcanal). Allied submarines and mining hack at shipping; by late 1944 merchant and tanker tonnage collapses, aviation fuel stocks plunge, and B‑29 basing/sea control bring the Home Islands under sustained attack. 

Key Points:

• Japanese naval aviation loses more to operations/weather/training in 1943 than combat. 

• Shipping/oil strangulation undermines training and operations. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Maritime interdiction as decisive; training/fuel as binding constraints. 

Chapter 11: The End of the War

Summary: By 1945 Germany is immobilized; Japan’s fleets, tankers, and rail/industry are shattered. O’Brien foregrounds perspectives (e.g., Leahy) that, by mid‑1945, air–sea pressure alone would force Japanese collapse without a continental invasion—reflecting how mobility control had already determined outcomes. (p. 478) 

Key Points:

• Air–sea dominance closed options before ground climaxes. 

• Japanese oil/merchant collapse and B‑29/sub blockade proved decisive. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Strategic culmination via strangulation; rethink of “decisive battle.” 

Conclusion: The Supremacy of Air and Sea Power and the Control of Mobility

Summary: The Allies’ victory flowed from their ability to govern movement at global scale: protect their own production flows while destroying Axis capacity and transit before battle. The “super‑battlefield” concept and three‑phase destruction model synthesize the narrative and recenter causality on air–sea power. 

Key Points:

• Mobility control is the general theory of victory. 

• Land outcomes were downstream from air–sea economics and interdiction. 

🎭 Central Themes

• Mobility as power: Who moves safely, wins. 

• Systemic destruction: Pre‑production→production→deployment attrition beats frontline attrition. 

• Industrial coercion: Bombing and blockade reshape enemy economies and choices. 

• Science of protection: Radar/ASW/convoy design and air cover as decisive enablers. 

• Grand strategy as allocation: Leaders win by directing resources against enemy mobility. 

📖 Historiographical Context

O’Brien contests Eastern Front determinism by quantifying how air–sea campaigns engaged larger fractions of Axis production than land theater losses.  He disputes overstatements of Ultra in the Atlantic while acknowledging its value, attributing the decisive turn to convoy/air integration and production tempo. (pp. 242–43)  He engages strategic bombing debates—arguing for the combined effect of oil/transportation campaigns and the economic “engagement” of German industry—against claims that bombing remained subsidiary. 

🧩 Frameworks & Methods

• Super‑battlefield lens to recast geography/scale of conflict. 

• Three‑phase destruction model (pre‑production, production, deployment) as analytical scaffold. 

• Quantitative synthesis of production, loss, and deployment data (e.g., Luftwaffe non‑operational losses; IJN monthly losses). 

• Policy analysis from high‑level deliberations (Casablanca/Trident/Quadrant) and Chiefs’ papers. 

🤷‍♂️ Actors & Perspectives

Franklin D. Roosevelt

• U.S. President; orchestrated resource prioritization and coalition strategy.

• Prioritized air/sea production and Atlantic control. 

• Sustained focus on air superiority as invasion precondition. 

• Enabled integrated bomber/escort/escort‑carrier programs shaping outcomes. 

William D. Leahy

• Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief; coordinator across services.

• Emphasized maritime lines and air supremacy for decisive effect. 

• Increasingly confident by 1945 that sea/air power alone could force Japanese capitulation. (p. 478) 

• Influenced sequencing and resourcing of CBO and Overlord. 

Ernest J. King

• U.S. CNO; championed naval priorities.

• Initially resisted some joint measures (e.g., Atlantic air command unification), later aligned; his stance evolved under 1942 shocks. 

• Pushed escort carriers and ASW that proved decisive at sea. 

George C. Marshall & Henry H. “Hap” Arnold

• U.S. Army Chief of Staff & AAF Commander.

• Framed CBO and air supremacy as prerequisites to invasion; evolved from early optimism to data‑driven targeting (transport/oil). 

• Directed massive training/logistics pipelines enabling 1944 air dominance. 

Winston Churchill

• UK PM; balanced politics with maritime realism; defined Atlantic control as “dominating.” (p. 232) 

• Pushed U.S. to adopt convoys/air cover swiftly during 1942 crisis. 

Sir Charles Portal & Sir Arthur Harris

• RAF Chiefs (CAS & Bomber Command).

• Portal advocated oil/transport emphasis; Harris favored city‑area attack; their debate shaped 1943–44 targeting. 

• By 1944, transportation/oil priorities gained ascendancy. 

Alan Brooke (Alanbrooke)

• British CIGS; emphasized land tempo/Mediterranean opportunities; skeptical of strategic bombing at times; ultimately accommodated air–sea primacy for Overlord. 

Karl Dönitz

• German U‑boat chief; led Germany’s most “modern” campaign; defeat by mid‑1943 closed Germany’s last path to victory. (p. 230) 

Albert Speer

• Armaments minister; acknowledged deployment/production wastage (e.g., ferry losses, training). (pp. 100–101) 

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

• 1939–1940 — Early convoy validation; air cover limits and Atlantic “air gap” recognized — sets design rules for 1941–42. 

• 1940-12 — RAF staff identify oil as a priority target; capability lags. 

• 1941-09 — SC‑42 convoy disaster highlights under‑escorting; escorts increased thereafter. 

• 1941-12 — Arcadia affirms Germany‑first and Atlantic shipping priority. (p. 232) 

• 1942-01→06 — U.S. East Coast shipping crisis peaks (≈526 ships/2.83M tons lost); U.S. adopts robust convoy/air cover. (p. 232) 

• 1943-05 — U‑boat withdrawals mark Allied Atlantic dominance; shipping losses plummet. 

• 1943 — CBO ties down German labor/material; non‑operational Luftwaffe losses surge. 

• 1944-06 — Overlord proceeds under Allied air supremacy and transportation interdiction. 

• 1944–1945 — Oil/transport campaigns collapse German mobility; IJN shipping/oil tonnage and fuel stocks collapse. 

• 1945-05 — Germany surrenders after systemic immobilization. 

• 1945-08 — Japan capitulates; air–sea strangulation had already destroyed operational capacity. 

🧐 Critical Reflections

Strengths: Coherent causal model linking economy, technology, and operations; rich synthesis of air/sea data; persuasive reweighting of decisive factors from land to mobility. 

Weaknesses: Strategic bombing efficacy—especially 1943—remains debated; the book sometimes underplays Soviet adaptation/operational art as a complementary pressure on German allocation. 

Blind Spots / Questions: Granularity on Axis repair/turnaround cycles; comparative treatment of Japanese army aviation logistics versus IJN. Not found in provided source.

⚔️ Comparative Insights

• Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won — also stresses economic–technological advantage; O’Brien is sharper on mobility control and pre‑battle destruction. 

• Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction — details German economic limits; O’Brien shows how CBO/convoy war operationalized those limits. 

• Robert Pape, Bombing to Win — emphasizes coercion logic; O’Brien’s “engage production” lens highlights attritional economics more than signaling. 

• Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory — problem‑solving turn; O’Brien embeds those fixes within a global mobility framework. 

✍️ Key Terms

• Super‑battlefield: The vast air–sea arena where equipment is destroyed before land battle. 

• Three‑phase destruction: Pre‑production → production → deployment attrition model. 

• CBO (Combined Bomber Offensive): Allied air campaign engaging German production, transportation, and oil. 

• Air gap: Mid‑Atlantic zone once beyond Allied air cover; later closed by escort carriers/VLR aircraft. 

• Operational analysis: Scientific convoy design (speed/size) and radar/ASW integration. 

❓ Open Questions

• Could earlier, heavier oil/transportation targeting (with adequate accuracy) have shortened the war materially? Not found in provided source.

• What is the quantified share of Axis labor immobilized in repair/dispersal/AA by quarter in 1943–44? Not found in provided source.

• How do Japanese army vs. navy aviation training pipelines compare in wastage and hours? Not found in provided source.

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “The area of this air and sea battle might be termed a ‘super‑battlefield.’” (p. 35) 

• “There were three different phases … ‘pre‑production,’ ‘production’ and ‘deployment.’” (p. 35) 

• Convoys with air support provided “almost complete protection.” (p. 188) 

• By June 1943, victory over U‑boats was “almost total.” (p. 230) 

• “Ultra was an important, but ultimately subsidiary player in the war at sea.” (pp. 242–43) 

• “A situation was reached where the training schedule was reduced to 40 hours. The direct result was an aircraft wastage rate of 25 percent.” (p. 101) 

• Leahy’s 1945 view: with enemy fleets ruined, “no major land invasion … was ever authorized.” (p. 478) 

🥰 Who Would Like It?

Graduate seminars on strategy, air/sea power, logistics, and economic history; analysts of joint campaigning and defense acquisition; readers rethinking the causal weight of strategic bombing and maritime control. 

📚 Related Books

• Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won; The Bombing War 

• Adam Tooze, The Wages of Destruction 

• Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win 

• Paul Kennedy, Engineers of Victory 

• Marc Milner, The Battle of the Atlantic 

• Jonathan Parshall & Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword 

• Kenneth Werrell, Blankets of Fire