MacArthur’s Airman

Online Description

Thomas Griffith offers a critical assessment of George C. Kenney’s numerous contributions to MacArthur’s war efforts. He depicts Kenney as a staunch proponent of airpower’s ability to shape the outcome of military engagement and a commander who shared MacArthur’s strategic vision.

🔫 Author Background

• U.S. Air Force officer and historian whose work focuses on airpower and command in the twentieth century.

• Completed graduate study in history under Richard Kohn at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; acknowledgments in the book name UNC scholars (Gerhard Weinberg, Don Higginbotham, Miles Fletcher) among his mentors.

• Taught and collaborated with the School of Advanced Airpower Studies (now SAASS); engaged with Air Force historical institutions and archives.

• Contributed to the University Press of Kansas’s “Modern War Studies” series; this book is a critical reassessment of Gen. George C. Kenney’s wartime leadership.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

• Griffith argues that Gen. George C. Kenney was a theater‐level innovator whose flexible leadership, intimate partnership with Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and pragmatic approach to doctrine made airpower decisive in the Southwest Pacific.

• The book seeks to correct an overreliance on official histories and Kenney’s own memoir by evaluating operations with newly available evidence (including signals intelligence), organizational choices, and results.

• Core problems addressed: how to build combat effectiveness from a depleted air force in 1942; how to gain and exploit air superiority across vast distances and harsh geography; and how to integrate air with ground and naval forces despite interservice friction.

🧭 One-Paragraph Overview

Griffith presents a theater study of the Southwest Pacific in World War II through the lens of Gen. George C. Kenney, MacArthur’s air commander. He traces Kenney’s prewar formation and then shows how, from mid‑1942, Kenney rebuilt a battered force, imposed training and maintenance discipline, and adopted low‑level attack methods, parafrag bombing, and skip‑bombing to neutralize Japanese shipping and airfields. Geography and logistics shaped operations: New Guinea’s mountains, jungle airstrips, and long supply lines demanded leapfrogging bases and constant air transport. Signals intelligence and aggressive reconnaissance helped the Fifth Air Force choose targets and time blows, culminating in the isolation of Rabaul, the drive to Hollandia, and the return to the Philippines. Throughout, Griffith emphasizes air superiority as the enabling condition for interdiction and close support. The book argues that Kenney’s improvisational style fit the theater’s constraints and explains why some of his tactics worked there but would not have in Europe.

🔑 Top Takeaways

• Air superiority first: Kenney insisted that controlling the air was the prerequisite for everything else; once won, interdiction and close support could be decisive.

• Adapt doctrine to theater: Low‑level attack, skip‑bombing, and parafrag tactics worked in New Guinea because Japanese antiaircraft defenses were comparatively light and targets concentrated along coastlines and airfields.

• Organize for agility: Forward echelons and decentralized command (e.g., Ennis Whitehead’s advanced HQ) let air units move with the ground advance and exploit fleeting opportunities.

• Training is combat power: Pulling units out of combat to fix navigation, bombing, and instrument skills reduced losses and raised mission effectiveness.

• Intelligence integration: Signals and photo‑reconnaissance, paired with patrols, shaped target sets and timing (e.g., convoy strikes culminating at the Bismarck Sea).

• Joint friction matters: Poor Navy–Army relations in SWPA imposed costs; success often depended on personal relationships (Kenney–MacArthur; Kenney–Whitehead).

• Logistics as strategy: Air transport, rapid airfield construction, and base leapfrogging enabled operational turning movements (bypassing strongpoints to isolate them).

• Memoir vs. history: Kenney’s postwar narrative is valuable but self‑serving; Griffith cross‑checks claims and restores nuance around who did what (e.g., credit shared with Whitehead and others).

📒 Sections

Chapter One: The Early Years

Summary:

Kenney’s family background wove New England and Nova Scotia together; economic shifts pushed the family to Massachusetts, where he came of age in Brookline. As a student at MIT he developed engineering and writing skills but left to support the family after his father departed. A formative moment came at the 1910 Harvard–Boston air meet when Claude Grahame‑White gave him a short hop; Kenney built a homemade monoplane soon after. Prewar jobs in surveying and construction taught him to solve practical problems, manage subcontractors, and improvise—habits that later defined his wartime leadership. Personal responsibilities and admiration for his sea‑captain grandfather’s daring forged a bias toward action and ingenuity.

Key Points:

• Working‑class Boston roots; MIT engineering training

  • Early journalism and entrepreneurial experience.

• 1910 air meet flight with Grahame‑White sparks aviation calling

  • Tries building a Bleriot‑style monoplane; it crashes into the Saugus River.

• Early adulthood shaped by family hardship and practical problem‑solving

  • Construction management sharpened logistics and coordination skills.

• Identity and nationality tensions (American vs. Nova Scotian ties)

  • Persistent pride in American identity.

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Chapter Two: Army Aviator—World War I

Summary:

Kenney entered the Signal Corps’ pilot pipeline in 1917, enduring compressed ground and flight training that many found rudimentary. Sent to France, he joined the 91st Aero Squadron, flying Salmson 2A2s on deep reconnaissance. He survived crashes, earned two confirmed victories, and received the Distinguished Service Cross, but the unit suffered heavy losses. The experience etched key convictions: realistic training saves lives; air superiority is foundational; and leadership and morale matter as much as machines. Those lessons—learned under antiaircraft fire, weather, and massed German fighter attacks—shaped his refusal in WWII to send undertrained crews into combat and his insistence on winning the air before anything else.

Key Points:

• Training gaps in 1917–18

  • Many pilots reached the front with minimal gunnery or formation experience.

• Deep‑reconnaissance missions at altitude in the Toul sector and St. Mihiel

  • Formation tactics, adaptation to AA fire, and photo coverage for ground HQ.

• Meuse–Argonne operations

  • Second victory; DSC for pressing a critical photo mission under attack.

• Takeaways Kenney carried forward

  • Train hard, seize and keep air superiority, cultivate morale and recognition.

• Nickname and reputation

  • “Bust‑em‑up George” after a crash; admired for coolness under fire.

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Chapter Three: Preparation for Command—The Inter‑War Years

Summary:

Kenney’s interwar career blended technical schooling with staff and teaching roles. After border duty in Texas, he studied at the Air Service Engineering School and worked on aircraft acceptance, quality control, and armament ideas (e.g., parachute‑retarded “high‑drag” bombs for low‑level delivery). He taught at the Air Corps Tactical School, synthesizing “attack” aviation doctrine oriented toward interdiction and rear‑area disruption rather than trench strafing. Army schools (Leavenworth, War College) gave him the language of larger operations and connections with future ground leaders, even as they slighted airpower. As GHQ Air Force formed (1935), Kenney served as operations chief under Frank Andrews, pushing mobility, instrument training, and realistic exercises—until bureaucratic fights and his outspoken style led to a punitive exile to the Infantry School, a brief observation‑squadron command, and then Wright Field work on the prewar expansion. A 1940 observer tour in France convinced him to drive urgent equipment upgrades at home.

Key Points:

• Technical grounding and R&D

  • Acceptance/testing of bombers; explored wing‑gun layouts; parachute‑retarded bombs.

• Tactical School instructor—attack aviation

  • Emphasis on interdiction targets (columns, bridges, airfields) and low‑level delivery.

• Service education and networks

  • War College committees (including “Orange” plan); relationships with Eichelberger, Sutherland.

• GHQ Air Force operations/training (1935–36)

  • Massive rise in instrument flying competency; mobility exercises.

• Bureaucratic clashes

  • Disputes over B‑17s and GHQ Air Force authority; reassigned away from GHQ.

• Prewar expansion & materiel leadership

  • Coordination across industry; advocacy after observing French and German equipment.

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Chapter Four: Taking Command—August 1942 to January 1943

Summary:

Arriving in Australia in mid‑1942, Kenney found a tired, undermaintained air force. He reorganized maintenance and supply, stood up forward echelons, and empowered Ennis Whitehead to command at the front. Training was overhauled; navigation and bombing proficiency were nonnegotiable. Tactically, Kenney redirected emphasis to low‑level attack and strafing against airfields and shipping, with rapid field modifications of A‑20s and B‑25s to mount heavy forward‑firing guns. He pushed the use of parafrag bombs against parked aircraft and insisted on reconnaissance and intelligence‑driven targeting. By early 1943 the Fifth Air Force was a harder‑hitting, faster‑moving instrument.

Key Points:

• Immediate maintenance and training reforms

  • Ground time to fix engines, instruments, and crew skills before combat.

• Forward command with Whitehead

  • Split HQ enabled rapid reactions and closer support to ground operations.

• Tactical innovation under theater conditions

  • Strafing B‑25s/A‑20s; parafrag bombs; low‑level approaches to avoid heavy flak belts.

• Intelligence fusion

  • Photo coverage and signals intercepts to cue convoy and airfield strikes.

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Chapter Five: The Papuan Campaign—August 1942 to January 1943

Summary:

Airpower had to contend with mountains, weather, and few runways as the Kokoda Track and Buna–Gona fights unfolded. Kenney’s forces ferried troops and supplies across ranges with C‑47s, interdicted coastal barges, and battered Japanese airfields to reduce pressure on the ground battle. Low‑level attacks and parafrags suppressed Japanese aircraft at their strips, while medium bombers hit coastal shipping and forward dumps. The campaign forged joint routines for air transport, close support, and interdiction, and it validated Kenney’s belief that aggressive training and maintenance translate into battlefield endurance.

Key Points:

• Air transport as lifeline over the Owen Stanleys

  • Sustained infantry logistics when surface routes failed.

• Coastal interdiction against barges and small convoys

  • Reduced reinforcement and resupply to Buna–Gona.

• Airfield suppression with parafrags/strafe

  • Parked aircraft destroyed; runways cratered to keep pressure off ground troops.

• Proof of concept

  • Training + maintenance reforms paid off in sortie rates and reliability.

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Chapter Six: Moving Westward—January 1943 to June 1943

Summary:

With the Papuan line secured, Kenney focused on severing Japanese reinforcement routes along the Bismarck Sea approaches. Reconnaissance and codebreaking cued convoys; low‑level bomber/strafer teams refined skip‑bombing with delayed fuses. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea (March 1943) became the signature demonstration: coordinated medium bombers and strafers shattered a major convoy, confirming that well‑trained air units, exploiting surprise and theater‑specific tactics, could destroy enemy mobility at scale. The victory accelerated Japanese erosion in New Guinea and validated Kenney’s emphasis on air superiority and interdiction.

Key Points:

• Targeting shipping lanes through recon + SIGINT

  • Predictive cueing of convoys for massed strikes.

• Skip‑bombing + strafing integration

  • Delayed‑fuse 500‑lb bombs at mast‑height coupled with gun passes.

• Battle of the Bismarck Sea as operational turning point

  • Transport losses crippled Japanese reinforcement capability.

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Chapter Seven: Isolating Rabaul—June 1943 to January 1944

Summary:

Rather than storm the strongest Japanese bastion in the theater, Kenney’s air arm joined a wider strategy to isolate Rabaul. Systematic neutralization of satellite airfields and shipping gradually choked the fortress, while long‑range bombers and fighters expanded coverage as new forward bases opened. Attrition air battles accompanied a relentless campaign against runways, supply areas, and anchorages. The isolation of Rabaul showcased Griffith’s central theme: air superiority plus interdiction could produce decisive operational effects while sparing ground forces the cost of frontal assault.

Key Points:

• Airfield webs around Rabaul targeted to deny launch/recovery

  • Repeated runway cuts and depot strikes.

• Maritime strangulation

  • Shipping losses and mining made Rabaul logistically inert.

• Leapfrogging bases forward

  • Fighters escort farther, extending lethal reach without seizing the fortress.

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Chapter Eight: Westward to Hollandia—January 1944 to October 1944

Summary:

Kenney synchronized base construction, transport, and fighter cover to enable deep leaps—most dramatically with the Hollandia–Aitape operation (April 1944). Fifth Air Force masked the approach by wrecking Japanese airpower from Wewak to Hollandia, then supported surprise landings far behind enemy lines. Rapid seizure and improvement of airstrips compressed time between lodgment and sustained air operations. The move unhinged Japanese dispositions in New Guinea and opened a runway‑to‑runway path toward the Philippines.

Key Points:

• Pre‑assault neutralization of enemy air complexes (e.g., Wewak)

  • Left landing areas uncovered at H‑hour.

• Operational art of the “air leap”

  • Engineering, transport, and fighter radius aligned to jump the line.

• Fast conversion of captured strips

  • Immediate fighter/bomber operations from newly seized fields.

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Chapter Nine: Return to the Philippines—October 1944 to December 1944

Summary:

As MacArthur returned to the Philippines, FEAF (consolidating Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces) suppressed Japanese air across the archipelago, protected sea lanes into Leyte, and struck enemy shipping and air bases from the Visayas to Luzon. The appearance of organized kamikaze attacks complicated the air‑sea fight, but Kenney’s units adapted with intensified CAPs, radar cues, and base dispersal. Air transport again proved decisive in shuttling troops and materiel as FEAF expanded airfield networks to sustain the drive north.

Key Points:

• FEAF formation and massed effects

  • Coordinated bomber/fighter sweeps and interdiction throughout the island chain.

• Anti‑shipping and base‑suppression focus

  • Kept Japanese reinforcement and aviation from contesting the lodgment.

• Counter‑kamikaze adjustments

  • More CAPs, radar control, and dispersal to mitigate losses.

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Chapter Ten: Luzon and Beyond—January 1945 to August 1945

Summary:

On Luzon, FEAF pounded airfields, rail lines, and choke points while supporting ground advances on Clark Field and Manila. As the campaign dispersed across the archipelago and into Borneo with Allied ground forces, Kenney continued to isolate garrisons by destroying transport and small craft while maintaining air superiority. By mid‑1945, FEAF’s reach was broad, even as very‑long‑range bombing of the Home Islands fell to a separate command. Kenney attended the surrender in Tokyo Bay—an acknowledgment of the theater air arm’s role in dissolving Japanese mobility and airpower across the Southwest Pacific.

Key Points:

• Systematic interdiction on Luzon

  • Bridges, yards, and fields kept enemy off balance as ground forces advanced.

• Peripheral offensives (Southern Philippines, Borneo)

  • Airpower made many positions untenable without costly assaults.

• Endgame

  • Sustained air superiority; theater culmination with Japan’s surrender.

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Chapter Eleven: Conclusion

Summary:

Griffith concludes that Kenney’s leadership style—pragmatic, flexible, and relentlessly focused on effects—fit the Southwest Pacific’s constraints. Success flowed from insisting on training and maintenance, devolving authority forward, inventing or adapting tactics to local conditions, and integrating intelligence to hit enemy mobility and airpower. The book also underscores limits: Kenney’s approach depended on a specific enemy and environment; Navy–Army friction imposed costs; and memoir narratives overstate individual agency. Still, the record demonstrates how theater air commanders could reshape campaigns and spare lives by isolating rather than storming strongholds.

Key Points:

• Theater matters: terrain, logistics, and enemy capabilities shaped viable air tactics.

• Leadership as adaptation: organize, train, and innovate for effects.

• Historical correction: balances Kenney’s memoir with archival evidence and other actors’ roles.

🥰 Who Would Like it?

• Military historians, students of WWII in the Pacific, and professionals studying joint/combined operations and airpower at the operational level.

• Helpful but not mandatory to know basic Pacific War chronology and airpower terminology.

• Reading level: upper‑undergraduate to graduate; conceptually clear, evidence‑driven narrative.

📚 Related Books

• George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports — primary memoir offering Kenney’s view.

• Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun — broad U.S. war in the Pacific with attention to air.

• D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur — MacArthur’s strategy and command context.

• Eric Bergerud, Fire in the Sky — air war in the South/Southwest Pacific from the cockpit up.

• Edward J. Drea, MacArthur’s Ultra — signals intelligence context shaping SWPA operations.

• Richard B. Frank, Guadalcanal — complementary view of air‑sea‑land interplay in the theater.

✍️ Key Terms

• Air Superiority / Air Control: The condition that allows friendly forces to operate without prohibitive interference; Kenney’s nonnegotiable first task.

• Interdiction: Air attacks against enemy movement and logistics (bridges, roads, convoys) to prevent forces from reaching the fight.

• Skip‑Bombing: Low‑altitude release that “skips” bombs into ship hulls; paired with strafing to suppress AA fire.

• Parafrag Bombs: Small fragmentation bombs with parachutes to arm and detonate above ground; effective against parked aircraft and soft targets.

• GHQ Air Force: Pre‑WWII U.S. Army air headquarters (1935–39) that centralized operations and training of combat air units.

• FEAF (Far East Air Forces): Consolidated theater air command in SWPA (5th and 13th Air Forces) supporting the Philippines return and beyond.

• Leapfrogging (Base Hopping): Seizing or building forward airfields to bypass strongholds, isolate garrisons, and extend fighter/bomber reach.

• Close Air Support (CAS): Air action against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces, requiring detailed integration with ground maneuver.

• Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): Intercepts and codebreaking used to cue targets like convoys and air movements.

❓Open Questions

• How much did signals intelligence, versus aerial reconnaissance, drive targeting success in key strikes such as the Bismarck Sea?

• To what extent did Ennis Whitehead and other subordinates originate/execute innovations later associated with Kenney?

• What were the hidden costs of low‑level tactics (e.g., cumulative aircrew fatigue, survivability tradeoffs) even in a “permissive” AAA environment?

• Could Kenney’s approach have transferred to Europe, or was it inseparable from SWPA geography and Japanese defenses?

• How far did interservice friction (especially with the Navy) constrain campaign tempo or risk?

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “From then on, I knew that was what I was going to do.” (p. 19)

• “If a cat has kittens in the oven, you don’t call them biscuits.” (p. 21)

• “Ground school remains more of a nightmare than a dream.” (p. 26)

• “Any dammed fool can land if the motor is running. I just wanted to see what would happen in case the motor quit.” (p. 27)

• “We lost a lot of people in that 91st Squadron.” (p. 25)

• “I stick to one basic principle—get control of the air before you try anything else.” (p. 16)

• “Men and morale that wins wars—not machines.” (p. 16)

• “Bust‑em‑up George.” (p. 29)

• Some strategic‑bombing advocates claimed a “well planned, well organized, well flown air attack will constitute an offensive that cannot be stopped.” (p. 33)

• “I’ve got to get home and help undo a hell of a lot of mistakes we’ve been making in our plane construction.” (p. 59)

• The GHQ Air Force tempo left him at home “something like 39 days” that first year. (p. 54)

🤷‍♂️ People

• George C. Kenney (1889–1977) — Theater air commander (5th Air Force; later FEAF); operational innovator and MacArthur’s airman.

• Douglas MacArthur — SWPA theater commander; strategic partner whose intent Kenney translated into air operations.

• Ennis C. Whitehead — Kenney’s deputy; ran the forward operational HQ; pivotal executor of tactics and daily fighting.

• Frank M. Andrews — Architect of GHQ Air Force; Kenney’s patron; model for centralized air operations/training.

• H. H. “Hap” Arnold — Chief of the Air Corps/AAF; backed Kenney’s emphasis on training and materiel fixes.

• Oscar Westover — Chief of the Air Corps before Arnold; institutional opponent during GHQ Air Force disputes.

• Malin Craig — Army Chief of Staff; figure in the B‑17 and GHQ authority debates.

• William “Billy” Mitchell — WWI air leader and interwar advocate; awarded Kenney the DSC; shaped early air doctrine debates.

• Robert L. Eichelberger — Army corps/army commander in SWPA; interwar acquaintance; later ground counterpart in theater.

• Richard K. Sutherland / Stephen Chamberlin — MacArthur’s senior staff; War College contemporaries of Kenney.

• Ken Walker — 5th Bomber Command leader; emblematic of early New Guinea bomber fights and sacrifices.

• Claude Grahame‑White — Prewar aviator whose 1910 flight helped set Kenney’s path.

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

• 1889‑08‑06 — Birth of George C. Kenney — Yarmouth, Nova Scotia; upbringing later in Brookline, MA shapes identity and opportunities.

• 1910‑09 — Harvard–Boston Air Meet flight — Short hop with Claude Grahame‑White ignites a lifelong aviation vocation.

• 1917–1918 — WWI Training and Combat — Ground school, Issoudun, and deep‑recon flights with the 91st; 2 victories; DSC.

• 1919–1920 — Border duty and Regular commission — Early command exposure; hard lessons on maintenance and training.

• 1920–1926 — Engineering School and Tactical School — Technical and doctrinal foundations; authorship on attack aviation.

• 1932–1933 — Army War College — Theater‑level perspective; networks with future SWPA leaders.

• 1935–1936 — GHQ Air Force Ops/Training — Instrument training surge; mobility exercises; staff combat rehearsal.

• 1938–1941 — Prewar Expansion — Wright Field production work; 1940 observer tour in France informs materiel changes.

• 1942‑07 — Assumes SWPA air command — Rebuilds ailing force; begins training/maintenance reforms and tactical innovation.

• 1943‑03 — Battle of the Bismarck Sea — Skip‑bombing and strafers annihilate a major convoy; operational shift.

• 1943‑06 to 1944‑01 — Isolation of Rabaul — Systematic airfield/shipping suppression neutralizes the fortress without storming it.

• 1944‑04 — Hollandia–Aitape Leap — Deep jump enabled by base building and air neutralization unhinges Japanese defense.

• 1944‑10 to 1944‑12 — Return to the Philippines — FEAF suppresses Japanese air and shipping, underwrites Leyte lodgment.

• 1945‑01 to 1945‑08 — Luzon and Beyond — Interdiction and CAS support conclude SWPA campaigns; Kenney attends surrender.