Operational Culture and Air Power

🔫 Author Background

• The author of this dissertation is Fabian M. Jakšić Andrade, to whom the work is dedicated .
• The Betreuer (supervisor) for this dissertation is PD Dr. phil. Oberstleutnant John Zimmermann .
• No other specific information about the author’s education, career, or previous works is directly provided in the given sources.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

• The main issue addressed is that airpower employment is often viewed solely in strategic or tactical terms, rather than as an operational military faculty. German historical research on the Luftwaffe during World War II has largely concentrated on its capacity for “terror bombing,” despite this not being its primary envisioned, designed, or equipped role.
• The investigation aims to understand the military concept of “operational air war” (operativer Luftkrieg) to provide more accurate historical knowledge of the diverse possibilities for exercising airpower in the 20th century.
• The author seeks to connect leadership, command and control, and empirical operational practice to reveal an operational pattern for aerial endeavors within the Luftwaffe between 1939 and 1941, thereby filling a gap in existing literature.
• The primary hypothesis for the first section suggests that the operational concept of maneuver warfare was assimilated by German airpower theory from land military strategy, leading to a shared operational culture within the General Staff . This common ground facilitated a relatively smooth transition from airpower doctrine to battlefield application, but also hindered the Air Staff from developing a distinct, air-centric tradition.
• The second section’s purpose is to refute the historiographical thesis that assumes the Luftwaffe was merely a tactical air force . The author argues that the Luftwaffe’s operational failures were not due to abandoning strategic bombing, but rather a complex interplay of factors within its unique operational approach.

🧭 One-Paragraph Overview

This dissertation examines the German concept of “operational air war” (operativer Luftkrieg) from 1926 to 1943, challenging the prevailing historiographical focus on the Luftwaffe as a solely tactical or “terror bombing” force. The author argues that German airpower doctrine, although influenced by land maneuver warfare, developed a unique operational approach that integrated both strategic and operational, as well as tactical and cooperative, elements, aiming for a decision in war through joint efforts with surface forces. This study examines the evolution of this concept from theory to doctrine and then to practice, analyzing its strengths, weaknesses, and effectiveness in campaigns such as those in Poland, France, and Russia. By examining the Luftwaffe’s operational culture and actual performance, the research aims to provide a more nuanced historical understanding of German airpower employment during World War II, moving beyond oversimplified explanations of its eventual failures. The author aims to establish a middle ground between historical discussions of bombing warfare and those that label the Luftwaffe as a purely tactical air force, contributing a comprehensive and analytical rediscovery of its engagement.

🔑 Top Takeaways (5–10 bullets)

• Operational air war (operativer Luftkrieg) was a distinct German concept, not solely tactical or strategic, but a blend of both, characterized by its intent to achieve strategic decision through cooperation with other branches.
• The Luftwaffe’s doctrine was deeply rooted in the Prussian-German tradition of maneuver warfare (Bewegungskrieg), integrating airpower as an operational enabler for land forces.
• Early German airpower theory, codified in documents like L.Dv.16 (1935), prioritized gaining air superiority and supporting surface operations through both direct (battlefield support) and indirect (long-range interdiction) missions, rather than independent strategic bombing of cities.
• The widespread narrative of the Luftwaffe primarily engaging in “terror bombing” (e.g., Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam) is largely inaccurate for the period 1939-1942, as deliberate terror attacks were usually only authorized as retaliation and most bombings targeted legitimate military or industrial objectives.
• A shared operational culture between the Luftwaffe and Army General Staff, largely stemming from common training and a continental military outlook, enabled inter-service cooperation but also hindered the Luftwaffe from developing a distinct, independent airpower tradition.
• The ambiguity of “operativer Luftkrieg” allowed for flexibility but also led to confusion in command, making it challenging to establish clear priorities and often resulting in the dissipation of air forces across multiple objectives rather than a concentrated Schwerpunkt.
• The Spanish Civil War offered limited and sometimes misleading lessons for the future of operational maneuver warfare, particularly for large-scale mechanized operations, and did not definitively solidify a preference for direct army support at the expense of other airpower dimensions.
• The lack of long-range heavy bombers was a technical limitation, but the deeper issue was a doctrinal preference for airpower’s cooperative role within a combined arms strategy, rather than a belief in airpower as an independent, war-winning weapon.
• **Operational setbacks, such as those at Dunkirk or later in Russia, often resulted from overstretched resources, an inability to maintain air superiority in all critical sectors, and the challenge of translating ambitious operational concepts into sustained practical effectiveness in complex battlefield environments.

📒 Sections

PART I: OPERATIONAL AIR WAR FROM THEORY TO DOCTRINE (1926–1936)

Preface: The German Understanding of Operational Warfare

Summary: This preface introduces the German understanding of operational warfare, highlighting its evolution from the Prussian-German method of maneuver warfare. It describes how this concept aimed to restore movement to the offensive, distinguishing between tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war. The German approach, particularly Auftragstaktik (mission-type orders), emphasized decentralized responsibility, initiative, and rapid adaptation to unforeseen situations, extending beyond tactical decisions into the operational area. The preface also sets the stage for understanding how airpower was intended to fit into this operational scheme, emphasizing cooperation and the integration of new technologies to overcome positional warfare. It highlights the historical continuity of German operational thinking, which adapted over centuries to address Germany’s geostrategic dilemma of fighting on multiple fronts.

Key Points:

• Prussian-German method of application: Focused on maneuver war (Bewegungskrieg), aiming to restore movement to the offensive.

• Levels of war: Differentiates between tactical, operational, and strategic. Figures #1 (Steven Thomas’ levels of war diagram) and #2 (Milan Vego’s operational art diagram) are mentioned as illustrative.

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• Auftragstaktik (mission-type orders): Key leadership style emphasizing decentralized responsibility, initiative, determination, offensive thinking, obedience, consistency, and individual judgment. Commanders were given orders describing the overall situation and tactical details, but also the strategic purpose.

• Airpower integration: Explores how airpower fits into the German maneuver war operational scheme.

• Historical continuity: German operational thinking adapted over centuries to address the country’s central geographic position and resource inferiority, often seeking operational solutions for strategic dilemmas.

• Operational principles: Concentration on enemy’s centers of gravity, rapid employment of forces, and acting with utmost speed to seize initiative.

• Evolution of thought: Figures like Clausewitz, Moltke the Elder, and Schlieffen influenced the coupling of strategy and operations, making it difficult to differentiate them. Moltke adapted operational concepts with new technologies. Schlieffen focused on attack, maneuver, speed, and encirclement for decisive battles of annihilation, often under severe time pressure.

1. Maneuver War and the Prussian–German method of application

Summary: This section introduces the foundational concept of maneuver war, particularly as it was developed and applied within the Prussian-German military tradition. It outlines the general understanding of this form of warfare, characterized by its emphasis on movement, speed, and decisive engagement to overcome an enemy. The historical context highlights how this method evolved as a response to Germany’s specific geostrategic challenges, such as the potential for fighting on multiple fronts. The adoption of Auftragstaktik, which championed decentralized command and individual initiative, was integral to this approach, allowing for flexible and rapid adaptation on the battlefield. This tradition formed the bedrock upon which later military and airpower doctrines would be built, seeking to integrate new technologies to enhance the offensive capabilities.

Key Points:

• Core concept: Maneuver war (Bewegungskrieg) is a general concept for understanding warfare, and its German exercise is explored.
• Historical context: German operational tradition arose from a specific set of historical circumstances and a distinct geographical matrix, leading to military leadership consistently seeking operational solutions for strategic dilemmas.
• Auftragstaktik principles: Emphasized decentralizing responsibility and initiative, maintaining leadership ability in war, multiplying effective leadership capacity, and ensuring swift, appropriate responses to friction. Field commanders received “mission-type orders” explaining the strategic purpose.
• Key elements of Auftragstaktik: Determination, offensive thinking, independence, obedience, consistency, individual judgment, and leadership “right of way.” Individual initiative was considered crucial.
• German operational thinking: Aimed to exploit the strategic benefit of interior lines by challenging and defeating enemies individually and sequentially, before they could use concentric attacks. This involved increasing the operational tempo through speed, aggression, and surprise.

1.1. A general concept for understanding maneuver war and its German exercise.

Summary: This subsection elaborates on the general concept of maneuver war and its unique German application, highlighting its historical evolution. The German military leadership, confronted with the country’s central geographic position and resource constraints, consistently sought operational solutions to strategic problems, often through offensive maneuver warfare . This involved concentrating forces, acting with speed, and exploiting interior lines to defeat enemies sequentially. The success of this method relied heavily on the flexibility provided by Auftragstaktik, which empowered subordinate commanders to exercise initiative and adapt to fluid battlefield situations, thereby ensuring rapid responses to friction. This conceptual framework underpinned the entire German way of war, demonstrating a continuity that adapted rather than transformed over centuries.

Key Points:

• Definition of maneuver war: A general concept for understanding and exercising warfare, rooted in the Prussian-German tradition.
• German strategic dilemma: Military leadership repeatedly attempted to address Germany’s vulnerability, central geographic position, and inferiority in manpower/resources with operational solutions.
• Core military objective: Exploiting the strategic benefit of interior lines to defeat enemies individually and sequentially.
• Key principles for offensive operations: Utmost concentration on enemy’s centers of gravity, rapid employment of forces, and acting with utmost speed to seize the initiative.
• Clausewitz’s influence: Provided the theoretical basis, emphasizing active action and the re-attainment of the initiative.
• Moltke the Elder’s contributions: Structured operational thinking by combining existing notions with new technologies, giving structure to operations management. He preferred concrete historical analysis and distinguished war from politics, recognizing operations as planned military actions issued as directives. He promoted independence and personal initiative for commanders.
• Schlieffen’s legacy: Continued emphasis on attack, maneuver, speed, initiative, encirclement, surprise, and annihilation. His operational thinking was disclosed through memorandums and deployment plans, focusing on a rapid battle of annihilation, particularly in a two-front war.

1.2. How does Airpower fit into the German maneuver war operational scheme?

Summary: This subsection addresses how airpower was conceptualized to integrate into the German maneuver war operational scheme. Unlike some contemporary theories that advocated for airpower as an independent war-winning weapon, German thought, shaped by the lessons of WWI, viewed airpower primarily as an operational enabler and a vital component of a combined arms effort. The Luftwaffe was expected to secure air superiority, protect friendly forces, cover exposed flanks in Blitzkrieg-style operations, prevent enemy withdrawals, and provide direct close-support tasks for ground forces, including supplying units that could not be reached by other means. This approach highlighted airpower’s role in influencing land operations decisively, contributing to the “operational equilibrium” and the self-regulating aptitude of the German fighting system.

Key Points:

• Airpower as an operational enabler: A vital element for the success of maneuver war, but primarily as an operational enabler, not a war decider.
• Supporting combined arms: The Luftwaffe’s contribution was enormous in supporting land forces, securing air superiority, protecting flanks during the Blitzkrieg, and preventing enemy withdrawals.
• Contrast with other airpower theories: German thought did not embrace the idea of airpower revolutionizing methods for operational maneuver warfare or substituting a strong army. Instead, it focused on improving traditional land warfare through the integration of the third dimension.
• Operational results: The Luftwaffe secured air superiority, protected friendly forces, formed Schwerpunkte (focal points) against counterattacks, helped prevent enemy withdrawals, and launched raids on escaping forces.
• Flexibility and operational equilibrium: Mission command, applied to airpower, was believed to boost the self-regulating aptitude of the German fighting system, making it more flexible in overcoming disturbances and restoring “operational equilibrium”.
• **Rejection of an independent strategic air war: The concept of a “strategic air war” did not exist in German doctrine until 1943-44, emerging under the influence of Allied bombing. Prior to that, strategic bombing was considered a possibility but with lower priority.

Chapter 1: Defining Operativer Luftkrieg and German Airpower Employment

Summary: This chapter focuses on defining operativer Luftkrieg and understanding German airpower employment, exploring the operational tradition from Bewegungskrieg to air warfare. It elucidates how the German notion of “operational” was applied to aerial war, recognizing the interdependence between theory, doctrine, and operational practice. A central theme is the exploration of the operational narrative to determine if an individual military and operational culture existed within the Luftwaffe, ultimately concluding that a common operational culture was shared with the Army General Staff. This common ground, while facilitating a smooth transition of land-based operational concepts to airpower, also potentially hindered the Air Staff from developing its own distinct air-centric tradition.

Key Points:

• German notion of “operativ”: Elucidates how this concept, derived from land military strategy, was applied to aerial warfare.
• Interdependence: Highlights the relationship between theory, doctrine, and operational practice in shaping airpower employment.
• Operational culture: Explores whether the Luftwaffe had a distinct operational culture or shared one with the Army General Staff. It concludes that they shared a common operational culture, which both enabled and constrained its development.
• Continuity in war-waging methods: Identifies elements of continuity in German war-waging methods that were manifested in operational practice.
• Air General Staff: The final part of the chapter focuses on the Air General Staff, analyzing its deficiencies and their impact on the air campaign.
• Focus of the chapter: To understand the operativ character of the Luftwaffe through internal analysis of its command and control structure.

2. The Operational Tradition from Bewegungskrieg to operativer Luftkrieg

Summary: This section traces the evolution of the German operational tradition from Bewegungskrieg (maneuver warfare) to operativer Luftkrieg (operational air war). It establishes that the concept of movement and decisive battle was deeply ingrained in Prussian-German military thought, influenced by figures like Clausewitz, Moltke the Elder, and Schlieffen. The transition to operational air war involved adapting these principles of concentrated effort, speed, surprise, and envelopment to the third dimension, recognizing airpower’s potential to affect decision at a campaign level. The early air staff, particularly under Hans von Seeckt and Helmuth Wilberg, diligently studied these traditions and lessons from WWI to integrate airpower effectively, laying the theoretical foundation for future air operations that prioritized cooperation with surface forces.

Key Points:

• Prussian–German approach to maneuver war: Focused on restoring movement to the offensive, characterized by concentration, speed, and seizing the initiative.
• Integration of new technologies: The German approach to maneuver warfare adapted to integrate new technologies, such as the tank, to overcome the limitations of positional warfare. This extended to airpower as a “third dimension”.
• Influence of military thinkers:
  • Clausewitz: Emphasized active action and regaining the initiative, linking strategy and operations, though successors narrowed his teachings.
  • Moltke the Elder: Structured German operational thinking by combining existing notions with new technologies, adapting them to update operations management. He focused on moving mass military forces faster, using flanking attacks, and adapting to situations to ensure battlefield concentration. He also promoted independence and personal initiative for commanders.
  • Schlieffen: Continued Moltke’s emphasis on attack, maneuver, speed, initiative, encirclement, surprise, and annihilation. His operational thinking focused on rapidly defeating enemies sequentially in a two-front war, viewing an “operation” as a targeted maneuver of major army units.
• Early airpower planning (Truppenamt): Under Hans von Seeckt and Maj. Helmuth Wilberg, a “shadow Air General Staff” (TA-L), systematically analyzed WWI lessons and foreign doctrines to establish air employment principles, ensuring airpower was a central attribute of the “German way of war”.
• Lack of interest in strategic bombing post-WWI: Due to heavy losses and small damage from WWI bombing campaigns, the air service decided against strategic bombing of enemy homelands as a serious military option in 1921.

2.1. The Prussian–German approach to maneuver war: Restoring movement to the offensive

Summary: This subsection delves into the Prussian-German approach to maneuver warfare, highlighting its fundamental goal of restoring movement to the offensive . Rooted in the country’s geostrategic position, this tradition emphasized exploiting interior lines to defeat enemies sequentially in the event of a potential two-front war. Key principles included acting with utmost concentration on the enemy’s centers of gravity and with utmost speed to seize and maintain the initiative. The concept of Auftragstaktik was central, promoting decentralized command and individual initiative to adapt to unforeseen situations and exploit opportunities on the battlefield, which Moltke the Elder championed as essential for achieving operational objectives.

Key Points:

• Core objective: To restore movement to the offensive in warfare.
• Geopolitical context: Germany’s central position and potential for a two-front war drove the need for mobile operational warfare, exploiting interior lines.
• Principles of offensive operations:
  • Utmost concentration: Identify and attack enemy centers of gravity with fewest viable actions.
  • Utmost speed: Rapid employment of forces, avoiding unnecessary time expenditures.
• Auftragstaktik (mission command): Advocated by Moltke the Elder, it granted commanders significant autonomy to exercise judgment and initiative, reacting quickly to battlefield friction. It was seen as crucial for the performance of the military organization.
• Moltke the Elder’s contributions: Adapted existing notions and new technologies to update operations management, emphasizing the ability to move forces faster, use flanking attacks, and adapt to situations to achieve battlefield concentration. He believed that strategy was a “pattern of thought” and that operational commanders needed a broader perspective.
• Schlieffen’s legacy: Continued Moltke’s emphasis on attack, maneuver, speed, encirclement, surprise, and annihilation, specifically aiming for a rapid battle of annihilation in a two-front war scenario . He saw “operation” as a targeted maneuver of major army units.

2.2. The German reclaim of operational maneuver war: The integration of new technologies

Summary: This section describes the German “reclaim” of operational maneuver warfare through the integration of new technologies following WWI. Despite the devastating experience of positional warfare, German military thinkers like Hans von Seeckt and the Truppenamt officers sought to re-emphasize movement and decisive operations. They recognized the transformative potential of tanks and motorized transport, viewing them as means to overcome the stalemates of the Great War by combining attack, fire, and maneuver for rapid and decisive operations. This period was marked by experimentation with armored and motorized units in war games, fostering a doctrine that emphasized air-ground cooperation, laying the groundwork for the future Blitzkrieg style of warfare.

Key Points:

• Post-WWI focus: Reclaiming maneuver war to overcome positional warfare.
• Hans von Seeckt’s vision: Saw the tank as a potential “special branch” capable of combining attack, fire, and maneuver to enable rapid and decisive operations.
• Truppenamt’s role in innovation: Departments like T1, T2, T3, T4 worked on expanding general staff departments and exploring new tactical and operational concepts.
• Doctrine for mechanized operations: Ludwig Siebert’s 1929 book became the standard doctrine, portraying heavy tanks as breakthrough weapons and lighter tanks, accompanied by infantry, for deep penetration, with tanks in reserve for counterattacks.
• Air-ground cooperation: Gen. Oswald Lutz, commander of the first panzer division, insisted on air-ground cooperation and training, paving the way for major armored campaigns.
• Importance of speed and shock: Armored vehicles were seen as crucial for achieving shock action and maintaining momentum, which is essential for maneuver warfare.

3. German Operational Warfare and the Integration of the Third Dimension

Summary: This section examines the integration of the “third dimension”—airpower—into German operational warfare. Building on traditional land-centric maneuver warfare concepts, the German military sought to adapt these principles to aerial operations, recognizing airpower’s potential to contribute decisively to overall campaign objectives. This integration was not about creating an independent strategic air force focused solely on bombing cities, but rather on developing an air arm that could function cooperatively with the army and navy, either through battlefield support or deep interdiction against enemy sources of strength. The early doctrine, particularly Richtlinien f. d. Führung Operativer Luftkriege (1926) and later L.Dv. N.16: Luftkriegführung (1935) formalized this approach, balancing tactical, operational, and strategic tasks within a joint warfare framework.

Key Points:

• Integration goal: To adapt traditional operational warfare principles to the “third dimension” (airpower).
• Cooperation over independence: German doctrine emphasized the joint application of airpower for shared objectives, rendering airpower an “operational enabler” within a combined-arms framework.
• Operativer Luftkrieg as an alternative: Presented as an alternative to purely strategic bombing, allowing airpower to make a strategic contribution while cooperating with surface forces.
• Early doctrinal documents:
  • Richtlinien f. d. Führung Operativer Luftkriege (1926): The first field manual for German air force employment, it introduced “operational air war” as a German approach to strategic bombing, but stressed joint warfare and adapted the operativ tradition to aerial war, balancing Douhet and Clausewitz. It identified industry, transportation, and enemy armed forces/facilities as targets.
  • L.Dv. N.16: Luftkriegführung (1935): The comprehensive doctrine that remained in force until 1945, reflecting operational thinking for airpower within military strategy and outlining a broad vision for airpower. It outlined air superiority, direct/indirect support, and attacks on enemy sources of power.
• Defining strategic targets: The German Air Staff defined strategic targets not simply as “located deep in the enemy homeland,” but also in terms of their “cumulative operational effect” on surface operations.
• Figure #3: Illustrates the organizational structure of the administrative bodies of the Reichswehr.

3.1. A doctrine for Operativer Luftkrieg: Operational air war or operational cooperation?

Summary: This section explores the debate between operational air war as an independent concept and operational cooperation within German airpower doctrine . Following WWI, there was an argument for an independent air force, but strong opposition, particularly from the Reichsmarine, often limited its autonomy. The development of doctrine in the interwar period, under figures like Walther Wever, aimed to reconcile the need for an independent air force with the imperative of supporting army and navy operations. L.Dv. N.16: Luftkriegführung (1935) reflected this tension, outlining a vision for airpower that recognized its strategic potential but primarily within an integrated war strategy emphasizing operational coordination with surface forces. While it acknowledged independent long-range missions, the document prioritized air superiority and support for ground/naval operations.

Key Points:

• WWI origins of air force independence: Proposal for a separate air service with its own General Staff in 1916 was dismissed due to Reichsmarine opposition, but led to structural reorganization of Luftstreitkräfte.
• Interwar doctrinal development: Maj. Helmuth Wilberg and later Gen. Walther Wever were key figures in shaping air doctrine, with Wilberg editing the “Grüne Post” series and authoring Richtlinien f. d. Führung Operativer Luftkriege (1926).
• L.Dv. N.16: Luftkriegführung (1935):
  • Balance: Sought a “third way” between solely tactical and purely strategic air war. It combined awareness of Germany’s continental position with airpower potential and the need for combined arms.
  • Air superiority: First mission, overriding others, achieved by raids on hostile airfields and air-to-air combat.
  • Support missions: Direct (battlefield air interdiction, CAS) and indirect (long-range interdiction against enemy sources of power, aiming to break down the flow of support from homeland to front) support to the army and navy. Prioritized over independent missions in practice.
  • Strategic responsibility: Consolidated the Luftwaffe’s status as a strategic weapon by emphasizing its pivotal role in achieving a decision in war through air superiority and attacks on enemy sources of power.
  • Targets: Industry, transportation, enemy armed forces and support facilities, major cities, armaments, food distribution. Obliteration of hostile air force assets and airfields is given top priority.
  • Retaliation: Permitted for “terror attacks” from 1942 onwards, but only as retaliation and with careful consideration of its psychological effect.
• “Operativer Luftkrieg” definition: A broad term encompassing both strategic-level independent bombing and strategic interdiction for combined arms efforts, not strictly defined to avoid unalterable dogma.
• Figure #4: Illustrates the organization and cooperation between the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, 1939.

3.1.1 The German “strategic bombing debate” and operativer Luftkrieg (1924–35)

Summary: This section details the German “strategic bombing debate” between 1924 and 1935, highlighting how operativer Luftkrieg emerged as an alternative to Anglo-American theories of strategic air war. Unlike Douhet or Mitchell, German doctrine, shaped by the failed WWI bombing campaigns, did not advocate for winning wars solely through independent strategic bombing of enemy cities or morale. Instead, it prioritized attacking military targets in the rear zone (BAI) and hostile air forces to directly affect the front, while also defending against foreign air raids. Key figures like Robert Knauss and Erwin Gehrts advocated for a strong bomber fleet for deterrence and strategic strikes against war industries. However, the prevailing Air Staff view, influenced by Helmuth Wilberg, remained focused on the joint application of airpower and cooperation with surface forces.

Key Points:

• Post-WWI rejection of strategic bombing: German airmen, aware of the failure of the 1917-18 strategic bombing campaigns, decided against it as a serious military option in 1921.
• Focus on tactical and interdiction: Early doctrine in the 1920s focused on bomber units as army support, employed against military targets in the rear zone (BAI) that directly affected front-line troops. Long-range interdiction was planned for the night, recognizing the insufficient self-protection.
• Critique of foreign theories:
  • Douhet and Mitchell: Their ideas of breaking civilian morale and destroying vital centers were discussed. Still, the Air Staff accepted Douhet’s ideas only half-heartedly, preferring Mitchell’s and Mecozzi’s views on air supremacy and air-ground support. Douhet’s theories were seen as having a narrow application, relevant mainly to his own country.
  • Col. Amedeo Mecozzi (Italian theorist): His ideas for organizing an air force into strategic bomber, naval air, and ground assault components, with the latter as the main branch, resonated with German thinking.
• Air defense emphasis: Significant attention was given to air defense procedures, including camouflage, gas-proof installations, and advancements in flak guns, reflecting concerns about Germany’s vulnerability to air raids.
• Calls for bomber fleet: Dr. Robert Knauss, Lufthansa’s director, advocated for a large bomber fleet for deterrence and strategic strikes on war industries and population centers, foreseeing a “Risikoluftwaffe”.
• Doctrinal manuals: Despite calls for strategic bombing, Air Staff manuals in the 1930s remained tactical in nature, focusing on defeating enemy military forces rather than demoralizing populations. *Operativer Luftkrieg was developed as an alternative that combined strategic contributions with surface force cooperation.
• “Grüne Post” (1923–26): A series of air manuals edited by Helmuth Wilberg, which, despite being labeled as foreign publications, represented the Air Staff’s views on air warfare, serving as a theoretical base for the Richtlinien f. d. Führung Operativer Luftkriege . These outlined two air forces: one for ground support and a second for “operational air war” with relative independence.

3.1.2. Actual viability of Operativer Luftkrieg: Compromising with surface operations?

Summary: This section questions the actual viability of Operativer Luftkrieg, particularly whether it necessitated compromising with surface operations. While the doctrine aimed for a balanced approach between independent strategic actions and cooperative support, the practical implementation often leaned towards the latter due to logistical limitations and the inherent German military culture of combined arms. L.Dv.16 implicitly recognized airpower’s strategic role within an operational scope, characterized by cooperation rather than autonomous long-range bombing. The initial lack of interest in strategic air operations post-WWI, combined with concerns about Germany’s vulnerability to foreign air raids, further prompted the Air Staff to develop principles for cooperative missions, emphasizing air superiority and interdiction in support of ground forces.

Key Points:

• Balancing independence and cooperation: Operativer Luftkrieg was meant to be a “third way” for airpower employment, balancing tactical, operational, and strategic tasks .
• Preference for cooperation: German doctrine, including L.Dv.16, viewed joint warfare as realistic and prioritized cooperation with land and naval forces.
• Strategic role defined by operational scope: Airpower had a strategic role exercised within an operational scope, primarily through cooperation. Independent long-range bombing was not its primary feature, but was to be performed only when no other option for decision existed.
• Targets: Attacks on enemy population and industries were secondary; the air force was to support the overall operational effort. Strategic targets were not simply “located deep in the enemy homeland” but those with “cumulative operational effect”.
• Limitations: The concept was broad and sometimes vague, making it difficult to establish clear priorities for implementation.
• The Air Force’s status: The claim of airpower as a crucial instrument for victory and its ability to decisively strike the enemy’s homeland was partly an attempt to vindicate the Air Force’s status as an independent service.

3.2. Finding doctrinal common ground: «L.Dv. N.16: Luftkriegführung»

Summary: This section focuses on L.Dv. N.16: Luftkriegführung, the key doctrinal document published in 1935, which aimed to provide a comprehensive portrayal of the Luftwaffe’s operational doctrine and warfare approach. Organized by Maj. Helmuth Wilberg under Gen. Walther Wever’s direction, this concise document of 280 paragraphs outlined a broad vision for airpower that remained largely consistent throughout 1939–1945. It combined an awareness of Germany’s continental position and the necessity for inter-service coordination with a keen perception of airpower’s potential. The doctrine emphasized offensive airpower as the best defense against enemy air raids and consolidated the Luftwaffe’s strategic responsibility, positioning it as a pivotal branch of the Wehrmacht for achieving decision in war through air superiority and diverse support missions.

Key Points:

• Purpose: To outline the Luftwaffe’s operational doctrine and warfare approach, mirroring army regulations like H.Dv. 487 and H.Dv. 300.
• Creation: Organized by Maj. Helmuth Wilberg and commissioned by Gen. Walther Wever, published in 1935.
• Core vision: A synthesis of existing doctrine, Wever’s views, and Air Staff perspectives, providing a broad, largely unchanged vision for 1939-1945.
• Offensive defense: Assumed enemy air force would open hostilities with bombing, countered by taking the war to the foe’s territory, forcing them to fight over their home front. This aggressive approach was deemed the best defense and helped the organization cope with scarce material resources.
• OCA (Offensive Counter Air) mission: Of utmost operational importance, aiming to fight the enemy air force from the start to reduce its power, protect German forces/territory, and free up the air force for other missions.
• Support categories: Direct support (battlefield air interdiction) and indirect support (long-range interdiction against enemy sources of power, aiming to break down the flow of support from homeland to front).
• Mission priority (ideal sequence):
  1. Gain air superiority (raids on airfields, air-to-air combat).
  2. Support land/navy operations, continuing the air superiority battle with partial forces and focusing on war industry.
  3. Raids on enemy materiel industries and supply system (strategic interdiction), although this mission was never intended to be fully independent of surface operations.
• Combined vs. individual attacks: Guidelines are provided for when each type of attack is recommended, depending on target distribution, timing, and weather conditions.
• Schwerpunkt principle: Stressed concentration on a few categories of vital targets, avoiding an offensive against all enemy sources of power to preserve units.
• “Third way” for airpower: Balanced tactical, operational, and strategic tasks, functioning within an operational framework, though the term operativer Luftkrieg itself remained broad and connected to the German operational tradition.
• Retaliation: Retaliation attacks were explicitly tied to enemy “terror attacks” and required understanding enemy morale to avoid strengthening resistance.

3.3. The “operational air war” narrative in German military journals (1935–39)

Summary: This section analyzes the “operational air war” narrative in German military journals, primarily Militär–Wochenblatt and Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau, between 1935 and 1939. These journals served as a platform for military-theoretical preparation, reflecting the General Staff’s thinking on future warfare and the implementation of L.Dv. 16. While operational air war didn’t dominate military considerations, it was central to the aerial war narrative. Contributions from various officers, like Maj. v. Rohden, emphasized long-range bombing as the core of the independent air force mission, though this position differed from Wilberg and the T-2 staff. The discourse highlighted ongoing debates about the role of naval airpower and the need for operational-tactical adaptation in inter-service cooperation, indicating that practical cooperation often resulted in simultaneous independent combat operations regulated by higher command.

Key Points:

• Publications: Militär–Wochenblatt (journalistic character) and Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau (more significant for general warfare, Gesamtkriegsführung, and operativer Luftkrieg).
• Dominant narrative: Operational air war dominated the aerial war narrative, with an absence of purely strategic airpower articles (unless foreign translations) and a limited presence of tactical airpower discussions outside army/navy specific writings.
• Key contributors: Obst. Lt. v. Belli, Obst. Bülow, Obst. Lt. Gravenhorst, Obst. Immanuel, Gen. Ludwig, Hptm. Meier–Welder, KptLt. Messner, Obst. Nagel, Maj. v. Rohden, and Hptm. Sorge.
• Maj. Hans–Detlef Herhudt v. Rohden: Placed the independent mission of the air force at the center of his theories, largely equating operational air war with long-range bombing. His theory was published as Vom Luftkriege. Gedanken über Führung und Einsatz moderner Luftwaffen (1938).
• Naval airpower debate: Publications by KptLt. Messner and Obst. Nagel discussed the air force’s role in sea warfare, indicating that air units were often considered a tactical weapon, and cooperation usually resulted in simultaneous independent operations regulated by High Armed Forces Command.
• Wever’s balanced approach: Gen. Walther Wever’s conception for air warfare contained both operational-strategic and tactical-cooperative elements, with a practical differentiation between indirect (behind the front, striking sources of strength) and direct (battlefield support) missions.

4. Operational Culture within the Luftwaffe General Staff (1935–39)?

Summary: This section explores the operational culture within the Luftwaffe General Staff from 1935 to 1939, particularly its shared organizational culture derived from the Army General Staff. The study highlights that the Luftwaffe’s leadership, initially comprising many former army officers, fostered a Gesamtkriegsführung (total warfare) mindset, which integrated airpower into a shared operational air-land vision. This common operational ground facilitated the translation of land-based maneuver warfare concepts to airpower doctrine, but it also meant the Air Staff struggled to develop its own distinct, purely air-centric tradition. The ambiguous definition of operativer Luftkrieg itself, encompassing various missions from direct tactical support to independent long-range strikes, further blurred the lines, while providing flexibility, and also led to confusion and a gradual dominance of land operations’ philosophy within the air force.

Key Points:

• Shared organizational culture: The Luftwaffe General Staff, with many former army officers, inherited and shared an organizational culture with the Army General Staff.
• Notion of «Gesamtkriegsführung»: A shared operational air-land vision for total warfare, implying an indivisible bond between ground and aerial functions.
• Influence of Army thinking: This common operational ground enabled a smooth transition of maneuver warfare concepts to airpower, but also prevented the Air Staff from developing a fully independent airpower tradition.
• Leadership challenges:
  • Hans Jeschonnek (Chief of General Staff): His youth was a disadvantage, and Hermann Göring often made important decisions without consulting him, leading to a “parallel administration” and distracting Jeschonnek from strategic concerns. He was seen as a “consulting adviser and operational assistant” by Erhard Milch.
  • Göring’s influence: His “almost total faith” in the Stuka dive-bomber’s accuracy and low cost, combined with its ability to minimize damage to civilian areas, was significant.
• Ambiguity of “operativer Luftkrieg”: The term was too broad and fostered “foggy thinking,” making it difficult to establish clear priorities and functional structures for strategic-operational air force use.
• Primacy of the army: The OKW’s organizational structure clearly showed the army’s general staff as the most predominant, with the Air Section primarily acting as a liaison.
• Continental military mentality: A deeply embedded mindset that perceived “no fundamental difference in the tactics of earth and air warfare,” influencing the Luftwaffe’s structure to operate in cooperation with, rather than independently from, ground operations.
• Figure #5: Illustrates the organizational structure of the administrative bodies of the Wehrmacht.
• Figure #6: Shows positions at OKW as filled by the three Wehrmacht sections, 1942.

4.1. From the Army to the Air General Staff: A shared organizational culture

Summary: This subsection delves into the formation of a shared organizational culture that permeated both the Army and the Air General Staff, especially as the Luftwaffe was being established. Many of the initial Luftwaffe officers came from the Army, bringing with them a land-centric operational mindset that emphasized maneuver warfare and combined arms operations. This common background fostered a collective understanding of war-waging methods, but it also meant that the nascent Air Staff struggled to develop a distinct airpower doctrine that prioritized independent aerial operations over supporting ground forces. The prevailing view was that airpower should serve the overall operational effort, either by enforcing decision independently or through cooperation, implicitly linking its function to existing ground strategies. This shared culture, while facilitating early integration, ultimately contributed to a Luftwaffe that became increasingly dominated by a philosophy aligned with land operations.

Key Points:

• Origin of Air Staff officers: Many former army officers, including Walther Wever, Hans Jeschonnek, and Albert Kesselring, transitioned to the Air General Staff.
• Shared operational culture: This background led to a common understanding and approach to warfare, rooted in land military strategy.
• Impact on Luftwaffe doctrine: The Air Staff’s struggle to develop a distinctive tradition was a consequence of this shared culture.
• Command and leadership issues: Horst Boog’s research highlights leadership problems within the Luftwaffe, including the underestimation of quartermaster services, neglect of air transport, insufficient pilot training, and a lack of understanding of the impact of air technology.
• Jeschonnek’s challenges: His youth and Göring’s tendency to make decisions without consulting him led to Jeschonnek being effectively reduced to a “consulting adviser and operational assistant”.
• Wehrmacht structure: The primacy of the army was evident in the OKW’s organizational structure, where the Air Section primarily served as a liaison.
• Lack of clear strategic intention: Within the Luftwaffe, “no clear strategic or operational intention existed in practice,” making it difficult for Air Staff officers to advocate for operativer Luftkrieg effectively.

4.2. The notion of «Gesamtkriegsführung»: A shared operational airland vision

Summary: This subsection examines the concept of Gesamtkriegsführung (total warfare) and how it shaped a shared operational air-land vision within the German military. This notion underpinned an indivisible bond between ground and aerial functions, suggesting that airpower was not a standalone war-winning tool but an integral part of a comprehensive, combined-arms approach to achieving strategic objectives. While recognizing airpower’s potential for independent strikes deep into enemy territory, the prevailing doctrine, as articulated in L.Dv.16, emphasized that air war was based on cooperation and served the overall operational effort. This shared vision, although initially contributing to operational successes, ultimately led to a Luftwaffe philosophy increasingly dominated by the needs of land operations, causing problems when truly independent air missions were required.

Key Points (bullets):

• Concept of Gesamtkriegsführung: Represented a shared operational air-land vision for total warfare.
• Indivisible bond: This concept entailed an indivisible bond between ground and aerial functions, influencing the reason for both initial successes and ultimate failures.
• Operational coordination: Gen. Walther Wever’s most critical contribution was establishing priorities for L.Dv.16, emphasizing cooperation and introducing the “vertical envelopment” (vertikaler Umfassung) concept, where airpower sealed off encirclements.
• Luftwaffe’s role: Became the operational enabler of the “decisive battle” by preventing enemy armies from escaping envelopment.
• Combined arms environment: L.Dv.16 envisioned the air force operating within a combined arms environment, aiming to reconcile the air arm’s autonomy with the traditional services’ preferences.
• Air-naval cooperation: Despite theoretical developments and intentions for combined operations (e.g., dive-bombers against shipping), a covert inter-service rivalry between the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine persisted, and actual naval air doctrine was weak.
• Impact of operational philosophy: While leading to successes like the Battle of the Bzura, this approach failed at Dunkirk due to the air force’s design for cooperative, not independent, operations.

PART II: OPERATIONAL AIR WAR FROM DOCTRINE TO PRACTICE (1939–1943)

Interchapter 2: The Kampfgeschwader: Mission and Employment within the context of Operativer Luftkrieg

Summary: This interchapter focuses on the Kampfgeschwader (KG) bomber units, decoding their mission and employment within the context of Operativer Luftkrieg. KGs were primarily designed for independent medium-range tasks in the enemy’s rear, aiming to hinder industrial production and conduct direct strategic interdiction to prevent war material and reinforcements from reaching the front. These targeting practices were intended to achieve overall decision at a campaign level. The chapter offers a descriptive framework for how the Kampfgeschwader was organized and deployed to fulfill this operational role. It also explores Germany’s engagement in the Spanish Civil War to determine if the Luftwaffe developed a clear proclivity for direct army support operations, finding that the Spanish context, with its limited scope for maneuver warfare, provided varied and sometimes misleading experiences for the application of operativer Luftkrieg.

Key Points:

• Kampfgeschwader (KG) mission: Conduct independent medium-range tasks in enemy rear to hinder industrial production and strategic interdiction (war material, reinforcements).
• Operational objective: Achieve overall decision at a campaign level.
• Organization and deployment: A descriptive framework is offered for how KGs were organized and deployed for their operational role.
• Spanish Civil War experience:
  • Limited scope for maneuver warfare: Spain’s geography and the nature of the conflict (multiple-front struggle, guerrilla-type) offered little opportunity for large-scale mechanized operations and Bewegungskrieg.
  • Early air-ground cooperation: Maj. Helmuth Wilberg, drawing from his WWI experience, pioneered ground support tactics and organized “indirect support missions”.
  • Guernica bombing (1937): A controversial event, it set a precedent for indiscriminate bombing practices, though the primary military objective was to neutralize communication juncture points, not terrorize civilians. Orders from Italian Ministry of Aviation specified bombing the bridge and avoiding the village for political reasons.
  • Impact on doctrine: The Spanish experience did not definitively prove a proclivity for direct army support at the expense of other airpower dimensions like strategic bombing, despite initial successes in tactical support. It showed problems with coordinating air activities with ongoing military endeavors (ground signals).
  • “Shuttle attack” tactic: Proved very effective, sending one flight to drop bombs and return, while the next flight took over, maintaining continuous pressure.
• Operational vs. Strategic bombing: The KG’s mission was primarily “military bombing” rather than deliberate obliteration bombing, with terror attacks authorized solely as retaliation from 1942.

5. Kampfgeschwader operational bombing and the terror bombing narrative

Summary: This section critically examines Kampfgeschwader’s operational bombing and challenges the prevailing “terror bombing” narrative often associated with the Luftwaffe. The author argues that German air doctrine did not primarily envision or equip the Luftwaffe for the terror bombing of cities. Instead, KG units were intended to intervene in the near and rear areas of surface operations, targeting military objectives and enemy sources of strength (Kraftquellen) to achieve a strategic impact on the war. While events like Guernica, Warsaw, and Rotterdam are frequently cited as examples of terror bombing, the sources suggest these attacks were often against legitimate military or military-economic targets, or had specific operational intentions, with civilian casualties being an anticipated side effect rather than the primary motivation. The lack of long-range heavy bombers also limited the Luftwaffe’s capacity for an all-out terror bombing campaign.

Key Points:

• Challenging the terror bombing narrative: The Luftwaffe was not envisioned, designed, or equipped for terror bombing as its primary mode of warfare.
• Primary mission: To intervene in near and rear areas of surface operations, targeting military-relevant objectives and enemy sources of strength (Kraftquellen) to affect the whole course of the war.
• Definition of Kraftquellen: “All the facilities and installations that serve to supply and support enemy combat forces”.
• Lack of long-range bombers: The absence of four-motor, long-range bombers limited the KG units from engaging in all-out terror bombing campaigns or protracted independent bombing missions.
• “Military bombing”: The KG’s mission remained “military bombing” for most of WWII, with terror attacks authorized solely as retaliation from spring 1942.
• Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry: Identified as attacks against legitimate military or military-economic targets, or defended cities. The Belgrade bombing is noted as having no consensus on its nature.
• Guernica (1937): While it became a symbol of anti-fascist struggle and set a precedent for indiscriminate bombing, operational orders specified bombing a bridge and avoiding the village for political reasons, making it a “military bombardment” to neutralize communication points.

5.1. Conceptual problems with Operativer Luftkrieg and German airpower application

Summary: This section addresses conceptual problems with Operativer Luftkrieg and its application in German airpower. The term itself was ambiguous, encompassing various meanings, from indirect long-range interdiction to independent bombing and operational coordination with ground forces, leading to “foggy thinking” within the General Staff. While it aimed to provide a “third way” between purely tactical and strategic air war, the inherent German military culture leaned towards land-centric operations, often framing air missions as supplementary. This broad definition meant that achieving a focused Schwerpunkt (main point of effort) for airpower was difficult, as resources were often dissipated across multiple, sometimes conflicting, objectives . The failure to clearly differentiate between independent air operations and long-range interdiction had fatal consequences, particularly highlighting a missed lesson from Westfeldzug.

Key Points:

• Ambiguity of Operativer Luftkrieg: The term was broad, encompassing:
  • Indirect support/deep long-range interdiction: Air missions against operational targets, affecting surface battle from a distance. Bombardments on hostile war industries sometimes fell here.
  • Long-range autonomous bombing (“independent bombing”): Missions deep behind enemy lines against Kraftquellen for overall warfare, easily confused with “strategic air war”.
  • Operational coordination: Air fleet concentration on different fronts, always in cooperation with land forces, enabling jointness and direct/indirect support.
• Conceptual clarity issues: The broadness of the term fostered “foggy thinking” and made it difficult to establish clear priorities and functional structures for strategic-operational air force use.
• Impact of continental military mentality: The deeply embedded belief that “there is no fundamental difference in the tactics of earth and air warfare” meant the Luftwaffe was structured to cooperate with, rather than operate independently from, ground forces.
• Lack of Schwerpunkt: The wide range of tasks meant air forces were often divided among multiple targets, preventing sufficient concentration for decisive long-term effects. This was a key lesson missed from Frankreichfeldzug.
• Independent bombing viability: The independent feature was often inviable due to the binding of significant air forces and the necessity of achieving air superiority as a prerequisite for strikes in the rear.
• Göring’s view: Believed Germany uniquely had an “operational combat air force” capable of focused, decisive blows, in contrast to other powers that split their air forces for escort functions. He saw two types: an operational combat force (KGs) and an operational escort force (StGs, JGs).
• Confusion in leadership: Confusion arose within the Air Staff and top German military leadership regarding the difference between operational and strategic air war, sometimes equating “operational” with “strategic” and then with “tactical” support for the army.

6. The Kampfgeschwader’s Mission in the context of Operativer Luftkrieg

Summary: This section details the specific mission of the Kampfgeschwader within the framework of Operativer Luftkrieg. The primary task of these horizontal bombers was not to target cities and industrial plants indiscriminately, but to neutralize opposing air forces on the ground to break their ability to sustain and regenerate, and to attack enemy sources of strength in support of overall operational efforts. Their missions included long-range interdiction behind enemy lines, aiming to disrupt logistics and reinforcements, and supporting the Kesselschlacht (encirclement battles) by sealing off encircled enemy forces. Despite the emphasis on cooperation, the KG also had a recognized independent bombing role, though this was often constrained by resource limitations and the prevailing operational context that prioritized direct support to the army . The training regime for bomber pilots reflected these diverse roles, emphasizing precise bomb delivery for military targets.

Key Points:

• Primary tasks of horizontal bombers:
  • Neutralize opposing air forces on the ground to break their ability to sustain and regenerate.
  • Target enemy sources of strength (Kraftquellen) to suppress matériel flow to the front.
• Operational impact: Their role was to affect overall operational effort, including enabling the Kesselschlacht (encirclement battles) through vertical envelopment.
• Distinction between “strategic bombing” and “independent bombing”: While the first aims for decision on ground and air supremacy, the second requires air superiority as a prerequisite to strike targets in the rear, reinforcing strategic decision on ground.
• Bomber deployment principles: To increase bombing effect, bombers had to intervene in mass; targets were to be secured sequentially (not simultaneously), avoiding fragmentation of forces; and maintaining flexibility to re-focus the main effort. Attacks with inadequate resources led to unnecessary losses.
• Squadron leader responsibilities: Included bomb quantity, flight path, altitude, bomb type, military/technical training, liaison with command post, mission proposals, and instructing crews. Alternate targets closer to the front lines were assigned if primary targets couldn’t be reached.
• Training regime for bomber pilots: Emphasized a wide range of sorties far behind enemy lines, often over water and at night, attributing to their “less excitable, tougher, and more self-possessed” demeanor compared to fighter pilots. Training involved A-License, B1 (advanced single-engines), and B2 (advanced navigation, twin-engine aircraft).
• Fl.B.K. (Flight Operations Company) organization: Comprised sections responsible for aircraft maintenance, armoring, engine mechanics, wireless, parachutes, and instruments, indicating complex logistical support for KG units.
• Bomb damage mechanisms: Direct hits (rare), shrapnel damage (larger area, but often insufficient for hard targets), and blast (effective against soft targets, but dissipates rapidly).
• Dunkirk experience: The Luftwaffe’s failure to enforce an aerial blockade on the BEF evacuation due to prioritizing political targets (Paris) over military ones (Dunkirk). This highlighted a lack of strategic appreciation for independent air operations.

6.1. The training regime of a Kampfgeschwader horizontal-bomber combat pilot

Summary: This subsection details the training regime of Kampfgeschwader horizontal-bomber combat pilots, distinguishing it from that of fighter pilots. Bomber crews were characterized by their “less excitable, tougher, and more self-possessed” nature, attributed to their wide-ranging sorties deep behind enemy lines, often at night and over water. The training program was comprehensive, involving various license grades from A to B2, covering advanced single-engine planes, navigation, and twin-engine aircraft. Specialized training was also required for Stuka (dive-bomber) crewmen, who had to undergo physically demanding test dives. This training ensured pilots were prepared for complex missions involving precise bomb delivery, acknowledging that the primary task was not indiscriminate bombing but targeting military objectives.

Key Points (bullets):

• Distinction from fighter pilots: Bomber crews were considered less excitable, tougher, and more self-possessed due to their wide-ranging sorties far behind enemy frontiers, often over water, at night, and at slower speeds.
• Training licenses: Included A-License (3 months), B1 (advanced single-engine planes), and B2 (advanced navigation, introduction to twin-engine aircraft).
• Stuka crew training: Required 15 physically demanding test dives as passengers to confirm suitability for vertical bomber training; those who failed were transferred to transport units.
• Importance of precision: Squadron leaders were responsible for bomb type, flight path, altitude, and ensuring crews understood the mission’s overall purpose to avoid mistakes.
• Targeting flexibility: If main targets couldn’t be found or reached, replacement targets closer to the front lines were assigned, still serving an “overall operational intention.”

PART III: OPERATIONAL AIR WAR IN PRACTICE (1939–1943)

7. The Polish Campaign (Fall Weiß): Tactical air support or operativer Luftkrieg?

Summary: This chapter examines the Luftwaffe’s role in the Polish Campaign (Fall Weiß) in 1939, questioning whether its performance was primarily tactical air support or an application of operativer Luftkrieg. The campaign served as a “grand experiment” for the German military, with details of organization and methods still in flux. While initial plans for an ambitious operativ air campaign were groundbreaking, early complaints about the lack of Close Air Support (CAS) led to last-minute revisions favoring ground operations, diverting the main strike force to interdict enemy communications and mobilization. Despite this shift towards battlefield support, the underlying operational approach to air war and the joint operations culture meant that air support, both direct and indirect, was integrated into the broader operativ effort. The Luftwaffe achieved initial successes by disrupting Polish air defenses and supporting army advances, but also suffered from outdated intelligence and a general lack of planning regarding reconnaissance efforts.

Key Points:

• First illustration of operational performance: The Polish campaign served as the first case study for the air force’s operational performance.
• “Grand experiment”: Fall Weiß was seen as a “grand experiment” for the German army and Luftwaffe, with its organization and methods still in flux, especially regarding tank deployment and air support.
• Ambitious operativ outline: Initial plans for the air campaign were groundbreaking, envisioning a pivotal role for an independent air force.
• Shift to direct air support: OKH demands for greater CAS led to last-minute revisions, reducing bombing on hostile air forces and postponing “Wasserkante” (naval operations) in favor of disrupting enemy mobilization through short- and long-range interdiction.
• Early successes and challenges:
  • Initial air attacks: Aimed at Polish airfields, but often based on outdated intelligence, leading to partial damage as Polish air force (PLW) dispersed its aircraft.
  • Air superiority: Luftwaffe achieved complete air superiority within a few days, destroying most PLW aircraft on the ground or during initial engagements.
  • City bombing: Despite reports of 94 bombardments on cities and localities on September 1st, 1939, these were likely battle-air-support missions targeting traffic chokepoints and lines of communication, not terror bombing. Warsaw was initially a target of opportunity for an interdiction nature, not primarily for city bombing.
  • Warsaw bombing (Sept 1939): Interpreted as an extension of ground operations to force a speedy end to the campaign, rather than operativ bombing in the independent sense. Lack of concrete bombing plans for “Wasserkante” for Warsaw. Colonel v. Richthofen requested “large-scale experiment as devastation and terror raid” against the capital, leading to authorization for “partial strikes against housing blocks and neighborhoods” and a leaflet warning for surrender. The final raid used incendiaries, and its effectiveness in enforcing decision was doubtful.
• “Rebirth of operational tradition”: Airpower’s intervention, particularly in Kesselschlacht (encirclement battles) like Kutno and Radom, was seen by the German General Staff as a “rebirth of their operational tradition,” enhancing maneuver warfare by sealing off enemy breakout attempts.

8. The French Campaign (Fall Gelb and Fall Rot): The true beginning of operativer Luftkrieg

Summary: This chapter examines the French Campaign, encompassing both Fall Gelb and Fall Rot, positing it as the true beginning of operativer Luftkrieg in practice. Fall Gelb, with its innovative Sichelschnittplan, involved a daring armored thrust through the Ardennes, heavily reliant on coordinated air support to isolate and encircle the Allied armies. The Luftwaffe’s role here was to enable the rapid advance of mechanized forces, primarily through offensive counter-air (OCA) missions and interdiction, rather than a prolonged independent air war. Fall Rot, the follow-up operation, saw the Luftwaffe undertaking independent bombing strikes against French lines of communication and targets around Marseille, showcasing a more distinct operativ element, though still with a strong emphasis on joint objectives. Despite its successes in supporting ground operations and influencing the psychological breakdown of enemy forces, the campaign also exposed the conceptual problem of dissipating airpower across too many targets, hindering a concentrated Schwerpunkt.

Key Points (bullets):

• Purpose: To analyze the Luftwaffe’s operational performance during Fall Gelb and Fall Rot, emphasizing bomber activities.
• Sichelschnittplan (Fall Gelb): A bold, unconventional plan orchestrated by Erich v. Manstein and Heinz Guderian, involving a heavily armored thrust through the Ardennes, exploiting a perceived operational gap for a “strategic battle of decision”.
• Luftwaffe’s role in Fall Gelb: Crucial for initial successes, with airpower seen as a co-star in the “Blitzkrieg” method, effectively coordinating with tank and motorized divisions. OCA missions aimed to eliminate enemy air forces.
• Air superiority campaign: Involved surprise attacks on French and British airfields. Despite destroying hundreds of Allied planes, the blow was not crippling due to Allied reserves stationed further back.
• Battle of Sedan (May 1940): Dive-bombers (Ju-87s) played a crucial psychological role in demoralizing French defenders during the Meuse crossing, making the greatest damage psychological rather than physical. Level-bombers also supported against fortifications.
• Dunkirk (Operation Dynamo, May-June 1940):
  • Luftwaffe’s failure: Unable to prevent the evacuation of British Expeditionary Force (BEF) due to poor weather, supply problems, and the prioritization of other targets (like Paris) by OKW .
  • Strategic misjudgment: OKL perceived airspace over Dunkirk as “secondary importance” and approached independent activities like isolating a battlefield (similar to Kutno), showing a lack of appreciation for strategic gains from independent air operations .
  • Naval interdiction: Ju-87s were effective “ship busters” against evacuation ships, causing severe damage and sinkings, but overall failed to enforce a blockade.
• Fall Rot (Battle of France, June 1940):
  • Planning: Involved independent bombing strikes at lines of communications in the Rhône area and targets in Marseille to prevent French reinforcements, and bombardment of French aviation assets around Paris . This showcased a more distinct “operativer Luftkrieg” element.
  • Marseille mission: First time independent air bombing took precedence over OCA in the West; raids targeted ports and rail networks, not the city itself.
  • Operation Paula (Paris bombing, June 1940): Hugo Sperrle’s initiative, aimed at influencing Parisian morale and crushing French matériel potential by attacking airfields and factories, not primarily “terrorizing” civilians. Despite achieving some surprise, it disappointed in inflicting a “mortal blow” to the French air force (AdlA).
• Conceptual lesson: The Frankreichfeldzug demonstrated that the Schwerpunkt principle and operativer Luftkrieg were mutually exclusive when air forces were divided among too many targets. The air force was tied to multiple fronts (French, Atlantic, England, homeland defense).

9. The Eastern Front (Barbarossa): The breaking point of operativer Luftkrieg

Summary: This chapter analyzes the Luftwaffe’s activities during Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union, highlighting it as the “breaking point” for operativer Luftkrieg. While the campaign presented an initial opportunity to apply prewar airpower conceptions of supporting combined arms offensives, the vastness of the front and the continuous demands for direct army support increasingly pushed the Luftwaffe into a tactical role. Initial plans aimed for a multi-phase aerial offensive, but the operational reality, marked by a lack of clear Schwerpunkt and Hitler’s shifting objectives (Leningrad, Ukraine, then Moscow), dissipated air assets. Despite initial successes in achieving air superiority and supporting ground advances through intense BAI and interdiction, the sustained attrition and logistical challenges on the Eastern Front, coupled with the misuse of bombers for ground attack and airlift, exposed the limits of the Luftwaffe’s “operational effectiveness”.

Key Points:

• Purpose: Focuses on aerial activities in Barbarossa until the bombing raid on Moscow, proving that this type of airpower application included tactical and strategic features.
• Context: Hitler’s decision for Barbarossa was partly a temporary abandonment of the air war on England, seen as a “Blitz campaign” to defeat Germany’s last continental adversary.
• Operational objectives: OKH favored a direct route to Moscow, while Hitler preferred flank targets (Leningrad, Ukrainian resources), leading to a plan without a clear Schwerpunkt once operations began.
• Luftwaffe’s attitude: Mixed feelings about the invasion; some saw it as catastrophic, others like Hans Jeschonnek saw it as an opportunity for operativer Luftkrieg to return to its combined arms support role.
• Phased offensive: OKL planned to execute the aerial offensive in distinct phases, unlike previous campaigns that combined missions simultaneously.
• Initial successes (OCA): Luftwaffe achieved near total air superiority within days by destroying thousands of Soviet aircraft on the ground, but this initial advantage masked deeper problems with Soviet air strength underestimation.
• Shift to army support: The Luftwaffe was increasingly pushed into a direct army support role (CAS). Commanders like Wolfram v. Richthofen noted that ground troops became “outrageously spoiled” by continuous air support and sought to subordinate the air force.
• Interdiction efforts: Aerial missions against Soviet rail lines commenced early, but defined areas of main effort for railway interdiction were achieved only on singular occasions due to the vastness of the front and the numerous tasks. Key sectors included Leningrad, Smolensk, and Kiev.
• Battle of Kiev (Sept 1941): Shifted emphasis between direct support and air action in the far rear to seal off the pocket, involving numerous raids on locomotives and wagons. KG and StG units flew many sorties for interdiction and pocket support.
• Moscow bombing (“Taifun”, Oct 1941): Moscow was an objective within the army’s projected zone of operations, giving air operations an interdiction nature to seal off the battlefield, rather than a long-range, independent bombing character. Bombers were reinforced, but small nuisance raids in December caused minimal damage.
• Breaking point: The vastness of the Eastern Front, open flanks, logistical difficulties, and sustained attrition proved the limits of operativer Luftkrieg when constantly diverted to direct tactical support. The misuse of level-bombers for ground attack and airlift tasks (e.g., at Demyansk, Kholm, Stalingrad) inflicted enormous losses on the air force.

Chapter 3, Subsection 10: Fall Weiß (The Polish Campaign)

Summary:

The German invasion of Poland, codenamed Fall Weiß, was conceptualized as a two-pronged offensive from Pomerania/East Prussia in the north and Silesia/Slovakia in the south, designed to encircle and defeat the main Polish army along its frontier. While the Luftwaffe was still undergoing its build-up and faced challenges like obsolete equipment and munitions shortages, the Polish theater offered a crucial opportunity to apply the principles of operativer Luftkrieg. Initial German assessments of having obliterated the Polish Air Force (PLW) on the ground proved to be overoptimistic and based on outdated intelligence, as the PLW had dispersed its forces. The campaign showcased the Luftwaffe’s close support capabilities, with air raids effectively assisting ground advances by demoralizing defenders and disrupting communications, ultimately leading to the rapid Polish defeat and the siege of Warsaw.

The bombing of Warsaw, initially targeting military installations, evolved into more indiscriminate attacks, driven by the urgency to secure a strategic decision as the ground offensive stalled. This operation, referred to as “Wasserkante,” was partly justified as retaliation and aimed for extensive destruction in densely populated areas, utilizing a mix of explosives and incendiaries despite the lack of a concrete bombing plan. Technical limitations and poor visibility during wartime conditions made a clear distinction between “discriminate” and “indiscriminate” bombing virtually impossible, inadvertently setting a precedent for subsequent “city-bombing” practices seen in Rotterdam and Belgrade.

Ultimately, Warsaw’s surrender was coerced by a combination of sustained artillery fire, air bombardment, and a critical lack of supplies, rather than pure “terrorization.” The Polish campaign served as a grand experiment for the German army and Luftwaffe, with many organizational and tactical details still in flux, highlighting both strengths in operational agility and weaknesses in strategic clarity.

Key Points:

• Fall Weiß Operational Plan: Involved concentric drives by two army groups to encircle the Polish army, with the main knockout blow intended from the south.

• Luftwaffe’s State of Readiness: The Luftwaffe was not fully operational, with some squadrons using obsolete equipment, severe shortages of aerial bombs and munitions, and units requiring further training.

• “Operativer Luftkrieg” Application: The Polish campaign provided a unique chance to test the concept of operativer Luftkrieg.

• Polish Defensive Strategy: Poland’s deployment of troops along a 1,900 km frontier and its confusing mobilization plan, driven by political rather than strategic considerations, inadvertently favored the German offensive.

• Initial Air Superiority Misconception: German air reconnaissance initially failed to detect the actual location of Polish operational air units, leading to an erroneous conclusion that the PLW had been destroyed on the ground, thereby shifting Luftwaffe priorities to close air support and battlefield interdiction.

• Tactical Air Support Effectiveness: Air raids significantly helped ground advances by striking bunker complexes and harassing retreating enemy formations. The psychological impact of aircraft noise (e.g., Hs-123s varying engine settings) demoralized Polish defenders.

• Warsaw Bombing (Wasserkante): Initially involved sporadic raids against counter-air targets. Later, ObdW ordered an extensive bombing effort on September 10th as “retaliation,” aiming for widespread destruction in densely populated areas, including an “operational target” near the largest Jewish district.

• Indiscriminate Bombing: The bombing method, particularly on September 25th, led to widespread destruction in residential areas, partly due to inexperience, poor visibility from smoke, and the chosen bomb mixture (explosives and incendiaries).

• Forced Surrender: The intense bombardment, combined with artillery fire and critical shortages of water and food, contributed to the demoralization of Polish leadership and defenders, forcing Warsaw’s surrender.

• Precedent for “City-Bombing”: The Warsaw bombing set a precedent for indiscriminate bombing practices, which were later mirrored in the destruction of Rotterdam and Belgrade, with psychological demoralization becoming a desired outcome.

• Damage Assessment: The siege resulted in approximately 1,500 civilian deaths (Polish claims up to 6,000) and 5,000 wounded, with about 40% of Warsaw’s buildings severely damaged and 10% entirely destroyed.

• Limited Long-Term Impact: The Luftwaffe’s bombing effort in Poland, while devastating locally, ultimately served as a “case of punishment bombardment” and was seen as an extension of ground operations rather than a purely operativer bombing.

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Chapter 3, Subsection 11: Fall Gelb (The Battle for France and the Low Countries)

Summary:

Fall Gelb, the German offensive into France and the Low Countries, was spearheaded by the audacious “Sichelschnittplan,” developed by Manstein and Guderian and adopted by Hitler as “Aufmarschanweisung Nr. 4.” This plan fundamentally departed from previous proposals by concentrating armored thrusts through the Ardennes, aiming for a rapid crossing of the Meuse at Sedan, and a swift advance to the Channel coast to encircle Allied forces in Belgium. The Luftwaffe played an integral and central role in the success of this breakthrough, particularly by providing continuous support for river-crossing operations at the Meuse, where dive-bombers and level-bombers neutralized enemy batteries and inflicted significant psychological damage on French defenders. The psychological effect of the dive-bombers’ sirens, reminiscent of tactics used in Poland, shattered the defenders’ morale, leading to retreats even when physical damage to fortifications was minimal.

Despite the Luftwaffe’s initial campaign against Allied airfields being less crippling than anticipated due to French and British dispersed reserves, its operations against naval targets during the Dunkirk evacuation (Operation Dynamo) were significant. German airpower accounted for 62 vessels destroyed and 45 severely damaged, although unfavorable weather conditions often hindered efforts, and ultimately, a large portion of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) managed to escape across the Channel. The Germans notably misunderstood the strategic relevance of Operation Dynamo, viewing the sector as “secondary importance” and failing to recognize the deeper implications of allowing the Allied personnel to retreat.

The campaign, while demonstrating the Luftwaffe’s efficiency in achieving air superiority and conducting behind-the-front interdiction, also exposed its limitations in conducting long-range independent missions and a fundamental lack of appreciation for the strategic gains such operations could yield. The reliance on “a system of improvisations” with insufficient resources and the failure to fully integrate naval cooperation would have long-term negative consequences for the Luftwaffe’s strategic capabilities.

Key Points:

• “Sichelschnittplan” Adoption: Hitler’s adoption of Manstein and Guderian’s plan (“Aufmarschanweisung Nr. 4”) focused on a main armored thrust through the Ardennes, a Meuse crossing, and encirclement of Allied forces in Belgium.

• Calculated Risks: The plan was daringly unconventional, involving maneuvering fast troops through challenging terrain with poor transport links, which presented enormous risks.

• Luftwaffe’s Decisive Contribution at Meuse: Airpower played a central role in the Meuse crossing, with dive-bombers and level-bombers providing continuous support, silencing enemy batteries, and causing severe psychological trauma to French defenders, even when physical damage was limited.

• Initial Air Campaign Outcomes: Luftwaffe strikes against Allied airfields caused significant German losses (around 350 planes), but were not crippling to the French and British due to dispersed reserves located far to the rear.

• Air-Ground Coordination Challenges: Communication issues between air and army forces led to “friendly fire” incidents, but these were not “operationally critical.”

• Operation Dynamo (Dunkirk): The Luftwaffe was tasked to break enemy resistance, prevent British escape across the Channel, and secure the southern flank of Army Group A.

• Naval Interdiction: German airpower destroyed 62 vessels and severely damaged 45 during the Dunkirk evacuation. Ju-87s proved effective “ship busters.”

• Failure to Prevent Evacuation: Despite successes, the Luftwaffe failed to impose an effective aerial blockade, allowing 338,226 men to escape to England, partly due to unfavorable meteorological conditions and the premature cessation of operations.

• German Strategic Misconception: The Germans misunderstood the strategic relevance of Operation Dynamo, underestimating the achievement of the Allies in retrieving their men.

• Operational Gap: The campaign highlighted that while Luftwaffe operations yielded strategic dividends, they were not always planned with a clear strategic purpose, leading to an “operational gap” where the focus remained on battlefield events rather than the “bigger picture.”

• Missed Lessons: OKL failed to fully appreciate the different nature and strategic gains of independent air operations versus long-range interdiction missions, continuing to approach independent activities with a battlefield isolation mindset.

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Chapter 3, Subsection 12: Fall Rot (The Continuation of the French Campaign)

Summary:

Fall Rot, the second phase of the German offensive in France, was initiated with a two-fold Luftwaffe plan focusing on independent bombing campaigns: one directed at rail communications and targets around Marseille in southern France, and another aimed at neutralizing the French Air Force (AdlA) assets and intimidating the government near Paris. This phase of operations was characterized by improvisation due to the rapid transition from Fall Gelb, leaving little time for meticulous planning. The independent bombing missions against Marseille’s ports and southern French rail networks marked a significant instance where independent air bombing took precedence over offensive counter-air (OCA) missions in the West. Similarly, “Operation Paula” targeted military and industrial installations around Paris, intended to have a “desirable influence on the morale of the capital,” but was hampered by vague targeting orders and did not deliver the anticipated “mortal blow” to the AdlA, though French airpower later declined due to supply disruptions from ground advances.

Concurrently, the Luftwaffe was extensively engaged in direct support operations for the army, providing crucial assistance during breakthroughs across the Somme and Marne rivers, which significantly contributed to the rapid collapse of French defenses and the eventual occupation of Paris. However, the ambitious scope of assigned air missions, ranging from reconnaissance and close air support to long-range independent bombing, created a dispersion of resources that contradicted the Schwerpunkt (concentration of effort) principle. This multi-mission approach meant that the Luftwaffe often lacked the concentrated operational weight needed to enforce decision at the theater of war level, revealing a major weakness in its operativer Luftkrieg doctrine when stretched across too many objectives without overwhelming air superiority.

Despite successful interventions, Fall Rot highlighted that while the Luftwaffe could achieve strategic dividends, its operations were not always planned to that specific purpose, leading to an “operational gap” where the focus on battlefield events obscured the “bigger picture.” The failure to impose an aerial blockade at Dunkirk during Fall Gelb, which recurred with naval interdiction efforts during Fall Rot, further underscored the lack of a “lessons learned” process and the deeply embedded continental military mindset.

Key Points:

• Fall Rot Air Campaign Objectives: Included independent bombing of rail communications and targets around Marseille and a campaign to neutralize AdlA assets near Paris, aimed at intimidating the French government.

• Improvisational Nature: The campaign was largely based on improvisation due to insufficient time for preparation following Fall Gelb.

• Rhône-Marseille Independent Bombing: This was the first time independent air bombing took precedence over OCA missions in the West, targeting ports and rail networks deep in hostile territory.

• Operation Paula (Paris Bombing): Aimed at military and industrial targets around Paris to influence morale and destroy the AdlA. However, it was compromised by vague orders (“Paris!”) and achieved less decisive impact than anticipated, leading to continued strikes on airfields.

• AdlA Decline: The French Air Force’s decline was primarily due to the disruption of its supply organization by the German ground advance, rather than solely the initial air strikes.

• Extensive Ground Support: The Luftwaffe provided critical close air support for German army advances across the Somme and Marne, enabling breakthroughs and the rapid collapse of French defenses, leading to the occupation of Paris.

• Schwerpunkt Principle Contradiction: The ambitious range of missions assigned to the Luftwaffe for operativer Luftkrieg led to a dispersion of resources, conflicting with the Schwerpunkt (concentration of effort) principle and undermining decisive effects.

• Operational Ineffectiveness: Attempting to fulfill too many missions simultaneously prevented the air units from achieving the operational weight needed to enforce decision at the theater of war level.

• Naval Interdiction Limitations: Despite attacks on French ports and mine-laying, the Luftwaffe failed to impose an effective aerial blockade, allowing significant French and British evacuations.

• Strategic Gap and Continental Mindset: The focus on battlefield events rather than overarching strategic planning created an “operational gap.” A deeply embedded continental military mentality contributed to the undervaluing of autonomous aerial activities and long-range bombing.

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Chapter 3, Subsection 13: Eastern Front (Operation Barbarossa)

Summary:

Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, was launched amidst significant strategic disagreements between Hitler, who prioritized economic objectives in the flanks (Leningrad, Ukraine), and OKH, which favored a direct advance towards Moscow. The final operational plan, “Aufmarschanweisung Nr. 35,” lacked a clear Schwerpunkt due to its ever-increasing objectives, setting the stage for future operational challenges. The Luftwaffe’s initial campaign achieved overwhelming tactical surprise, delivering devastating blows to the Soviet Air Force (VVS) by destroying thousands of aircraft on the ground and in the air, effectively crippling Soviet airpower until late 1942. However, the campaign soon revealed the limits of the Luftwaffe’s operativer Luftkrieg doctrine, as it struggled to maintain the pace of the ground advance, encountered “friendly fire” incidents, and found that Soviet railway interdiction had limited long-term effects due to rapid repairs and the vast, underdeveloped road network.

Strategic diversions, such as the Kyiv encirclement, while tactically successful, consumed critical time and resources needed for the advance on Moscow, ultimately proving to be an “operational diversion.” The Moscow bombing campaign, initiated in July 1941, was conducted on a limited scale and largely failed to achieve significant operational impact, facing strong Soviet defenses, low intensity of raids, and dwindling Luftwaffe resources exacerbated by severe fuel shortages and high attrition rates. A strategic realignment in December 1941 to target deep industrial objectives came too late, as Soviet industries had relocated to the Urals, and the Luftwaffe lacked the long-range heavy bombers and fuel necessary for such a campaign.

The Eastern Front exposed the fundamental inadequacy of the “German way of thinking the air war” against a resilient opponent with vast recuperating powers and geographical scale. The Luftwaffe suffered from widespread strategic incoherence from OKW and OKH, which undermined the concentration of airpower and jeopardized the successful conduct of operativer Luftkrieg. The operational effectiveness of airpower often ended at the army’s tactical comfort zone, leading to the misuse of level-bombers for close ground attack and airlift tasks, inflicting enormous losses on the air force.

Key Points:

• Strategic Disunity: Operation Barbarossa suffered from a lack of clear Schwerpunkt, with Hitler prioritizing economic targets in Leningrad and Ukraine, while OKH favored a direct military thrust towards Moscow.

• Initial Air Campaign (OCA) Success: The Luftwaffe achieved complete tactical surprise, inflicting massive losses (estimated 6,857 to 8,000 aircraft by October) on the VVS by targeting airfields and engaging in air-to-air combat, effectively crippling Soviet airpower.

• New Weaponry: The SD-2 cluster bomb was widely used, significantly increasing the Luftwaffe’s effectiveness against ground troops and vehicles, but was unreliable and often led to aircraft losses.

• Ground Support Challenges: Luftwaffe struggled to keep pace with fast-moving ground forces, leading to coordination issues, “friendly fire” incidents, and the need for “rolling attacks” as seen at the Meuse crossing.

• Ineffectiveness of Railway Interdiction: Soviet railway lines, though easily disrupted, were quickly repaired (e.g., Babrujsk bridge rebuilt in 36 hours), diminishing the operational effect of interdiction efforts. The poor Soviet road network further limited alternative targeting options.

• Strategic Diversions: Campaigns like the Battle of Kyiv, while resulting in large encirclements and capture of Soviet troops, were ultimately “operational diversions” that cost the Wehrmacht critical time for its advance on Moscow.

• Moscow Bombing Campaign Failure: Initial raids on Moscow were limited in scale (127-195 planes on the first night) and largely ineffective due to strong Soviet defenses, low intensity, and dwindling German resources. Subsequent raids also decreased in impetus.

• Resource Depletion and Attrition: By late 1941, the Luftwaffe faced alarming serviceability rates (37% for bombers), severe fuel shortages, and insufficient replacements for matériel and personnel, critically undermining its combat effectiveness.

• Late Strategic Realignment: A directive in December 1941 instructed the Luftwaffe to target deep industrial objectives (e.g., Leningrad, Moscow, Gorky), but this strategic shift came too late, as Soviet industries had largely evacuated, and the Luftwaffe lacked the necessary long-range bombers and fuel.

• Strategic Incoherence: The Luftwaffe suffered from a widespread lack of strategic clarity and vacillations from OKW and OKH, which prevented the effective concentration of airpower against decisive objectives.

• Limits of “Operational Effectiveness”: The campaign demonstrated that the “operational effectiveness” of airpower often ended at the army’s tactical comfort zone, leading to the misuse of level-bombers for ground-attack and airlift tasks and inflicting enormous losses.

• Revival of Strategic Bombing Interest (1943): Despite prior dismissals, the growing distress of the Wehrmacht by 1942-43 led to a renewed interest in strategic bombing within OKL, culminating in proposals to target Soviet power plants in the Moscow-Upper Volga region. However, the efficacy of such attacks was met with skepticism regarding lasting effects.

Conclusion

Summary: The conclusion synthesizes the research findings on the German understanding of operational warfare and operativer Luftkrieg, particularly within the Luftwaffe. It reiterates that maneuver warfare, deeply embedded in Prussian-German military tradition, shaped the concept of operations. Operativer Luftkrieg emerged as an adaptation of this land-centric strategy to air warfare, characterized by cooperation and aiming for strategic decision through joint efforts rather than purely independent bombing. The dissertation highlights that while L.Dv.16 implicitly recognized airpower’s strategic role within an operational scope, the lack of interest in independent strategic air operations post-WWI and the Army’s skepticism ensured airpower remained primarily a cooperative element. Despite Gen. Wever’s efforts to balance strategic-operational and tactical-cooperative elements (e.g., vertical envelopment), the Luftwaffe often became overstretched and ultimately dominated by tactical army support, especially on the Eastern Front, revealing the limits of its operational effectiveness when divorced from its intended cooperative framework.

Key Points (bullets):

• Maneuver warfare as foundation: The German General Staff’s preference for maneuver warfare and the operational level of war was deeply embedded in their military tradition.
• Decoding operativer Luftkrieg: The research aimed to interpret German war-waging notions from a contemporary understanding to provide accurate knowledge of operational airpower exercise.
• Doctrinal framework (L.Dv.16): Implicitly defined airpower’s strategic role within an operational scope, prioritizing cooperation over long-range autonomous bombing.
• Reasons for cooperative emphasis: Not blind faith in airpower decisiveness, but conviction that enemy forces were best defeated through “joint operational effort,” influenced by the failure of WWI bombing campaigns and vulnerability to foreign air raids.
• Walther Wever’s contribution: Critical for establishing priorities in L.Dv.16, integrating a strategic-operational and a tactical-cooperative component, and introducing the “vertical envelopment” concept (sealing off cauldrons from the air).
• Air force as operational enabler: The Luftwaffe became the enabler of the “decisive battle” by preventing enemy escapes from encirclement, as seen in the Battle of the Bzura.
• Critique of “projecting backwards”: Warns against assuming a different war outcome if Germany had possessed heavy bombers earlier, highlighting Wever’s actual critical contribution in setting priorities.
• Evolution of airpower philosophy: Despite Wever’s balanced approach, the Luftwaffe became increasingly governed by a philosophy of airpower attached to land operations, which was a product of a shared operational thinking infrastructure rather than a full devotion to tactical army support.
• Limitations of the study: Focuses on the first part of WWII, mostly neglecting naval cooperation (except theoretically), and excludes the Battle of Britain (except planning stage). Source material is almost entirely in German.

🥰 Who Would Like it?

• Military historians and specialists interested in German airpower, the Luftwaffe, and operational theory during World War II and the interwar period.
• Scholars studying the evolution of military thought, particularly the adaptation of land-centric operational concepts to air warfare.
• Readers seeking a nuanced understanding of German air doctrine beyond the conventional “terror bombing” or purely tactical air force narratives.
• Individuals interested in the conceptual problems of airpower application and inter-service cooperation in historical contexts.

📚 Related Books

• Gerhard Groß (2016): The Myth and Reality of German Warfare. Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger: Considered the definitive standard account on German operational thinking, providing a crucial starting point for understanding the Luftwaffe’s operativ theory.
• Dirk Schreiber (2018): Die Luftwaffe und ihre Doktrin: Einsatzkonzeptionen bis 1971: Noteworthy for exploring the Luftwaffe’s struggle to find its own direction and assessing the dilemma of operational air war being “in between” strategic and tactical forms of airpower.
• Horst Boog (1982): Die deutsche Luftwaffenführung 1935-1945. Führungsprobleme Spitzengliederung Generalstabs- Ausbildung: Paramount for understanding the Luftwaffe’s General Staff, its leadership problems, and organization.
• James Corum (1997): The Luftwaffe. Creating the Operational Air War: Relevant for its insights into the Luftwaffe’s creation and interwar airpower theory, though the author’s appraisal of its operativ nature is scrutinized in this dissertation.
• Edward Hooton (1994, 1997, 2010): Phoenix Triumphant, Eagle in Flames, The Luftwaffe. A Study in Airpower: Offers a wide-ranging operational history of the air force, specifically taking its operativ character into consideration and challenging simplistic tactical/strategic classifications.
• Richard Muller (1992): The German Air War in Russia: An excellent operations history account, revealing the strengths and weaknesses of German airpower doctrine on the Eastern Front.
• Robert Forczyk (2017, 2019): Case Red. The Collapse of France, Case White. The Invasion of Poland: Provides in-depth case studies of the French and Polish campaigns, correcting historiographical myths by using multi-language sources.
• Manfred Messerschmidt (1969): Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat. Zeit der Indoktrination: Elucidates the Luftwaffe’s leadership intention to use the air force for “operational” air war against enemy sources of strength, beyond just tactical support.

✍️ Key Terms

• Operativer Luftkrieg (Operational Air War): The central concept of the study; a German approach to airpower employment that aimed for strategic decision through a combination of strategic-operational and tactical-cooperative elements, often involving deep interdiction and support for surface operations, rather than solely independent strategic bombing.
• Bewegungskrieg (Maneuver War): The Prussian-German tradition of offensive warfare focused on restoring movement, speed, and decisive engagement to overcome an enemy, serving as the conceptual foundation for operativer Luftkrieg.
• Auftragstaktik (Mission Command): A leadership concept emphasizing decentralized responsibility, initiative, and the ability of subordinate commanders to act decisively within the overall strategic purpose, rather than following rigid, detailed orders.
• Kampfgeschwader (KG): German bomber units, central to the operativer Luftkrieg concept, tasked with medium-range independent missions for interdiction and attacking enemy sources of strength.
• Kraftquellen (Sources of Strength): Term used in German doctrine (L.Dv.16) to define targets for independent bombing and strategic interdiction, encompassing facilities and installations that supply and support enemy combat forces.
• L.Dv. N.16: Luftkriegführung: The Luftwaffe’s comprehensive doctrinal document published in 1935, outlining a broad vision for airpower that balanced air superiority, direct/indirect support to surface forces, and attacks on enemy sources of power.
• Gesamtkriegsführung (Total Warfare): A shared operational air-land vision within the German military, implying an indivisible bond between ground and aerial functions, integrating airpower into a comprehensive combined-arms approach.
• Schwerpunkt (Main Point of Effort/Focus): A critical principle in German operational thinking for concentrating forces at a decisive point, which was often difficult to achieve in practice for the Luftwaffe due to its broad mission scope.
• BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction): Missions to strike enemy forces or their immediate rear areas and reserves, usually to relieve a military campaign. In German doctrine, this could be an indirect, operational mission.
• OCA (Offensive Counter Air): Missions to fight the enemy air force, ideally by destroying aircraft on the ground or in the air, to gain and maintain air superiority.
• Vertical Envelopment (vertikaler Umfassung): A concept introduced by Walther Wever, involving the use of airpower to seal off encircled enemy forces (cauldrons) from the air, enhancing the Kesselschlacht.
• Blitzkrieg: A term used by historians to describe German military successes, often emphasizing technology. However, the author and other historians argue it distorts the nature of German operations, which relied more on doctrine, tactics, organization, and battlefield leadership. It was more about effective coordination of tank and motorized divisions with airpower.

❓Open Questions

• The dissertation states that the “operational air war” concept was ambiguous and often led to “foggy thinking” when setting clear priorities. How did the Luftwaffe attempt to mitigate this lack of clarity in practical operational planning and execution throughout the war?
• While the study emphasizes the cooperative nature of operativer Luftkrieg, it also notes instances where independent air missions were attempted (e.g., Marseille, Operation Paula). What specific lessons were drawn from these independent operations, and how did they influence subsequent doctrinal adjustments beyond the initial L.Dv.16?
• The source mentions that the absence of primary source material for the Air General Staff, particularly for certain periods, necessitated interpolation from various documents to reconstruct a coherent operational history. To what extent might these gaps and the reliance on secondary sources influence the nuanced understanding of the Luftwaffe’s internal debates and decision-making processes regarding operativer Luftkrieg?
• The study focuses on the first part of World War II (1939-1943). How did the character of operativer Luftkrieg and the Luftwaffe’s operational effectiveness evolve or transform in the later phases of the war, as Allied air superiority became more pronounced and Germany faced increasing resource constraints?
• The dissertation acknowledges the “terrible implications” of guerrilla-type conflict in Spain. How did the Luftwaffe adapt its operational bombing strategies or tactical approaches to counter such unconventional warfare scenarios, beyond the focus on traditional maneuver warfare and industrial targets?

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “Focusing less on so–called terror bombing, but on the German bomber arm’s performance instead, this investigation strives to understand the military concept of ‘operational air war.’” (p. 11)
• “The foresight that comes as a consequence of hindsight is a notable hindrance to historical understanding.” (Colin S. Gray, quoted on p. 17)
• “The primary question for historians should never be what someone ought to have done, but why they did what they did.” (Robert M. Citino, quoted on p. 17)
• “It was that common operational ground, which enabled a relatively smooth transition between airpower doctrine and its later application on the battlefield.” (p. 20)
• “This created an indivisible bond between ground and aerial functions, which entailed the reason both for their initial successes and ultimate redounding failure.” (p. 14)
• “The military leadership repeatedly attempted to address Germany’s strategic dilemma with operational solutions, which would compensate for the vulnerability of the country’s central geographic position and its relative inferiority both in manpower and resources.” (Gerhard Groß, quoted on p. 36)
• “The history of operational thinking is the great narrative of the German Army during the era of the world wars and beyond… Because of differing military cultural concepts, the boundaries (p. 60)
• “There is no fundamental difference in the tactics of earth and air warfare.” (Gedanken zur Luftkriegsführung, quoted on p. 74)
• “Its main goal was to ensure C2 in actual battle, so that commanders could react quickly and appropriately to unforeseen situations.” (p. 69)
• “The Luftwaffe was planned to intervene in the near– and rear–area of the army’s operations, as well as over the navy’s departure sector; and not against targets in the enemy’s hinterland, like densely–populated cities.” (p. 60)
• “The operational air war came to refer, not exclusively but mostly to long–range bombing.” (p. 145)
• “The Luftwaffe understood strategic air warfare in operational terms, long–range interdiction and BAI were considered operational missions, for they served the overall operativ effort.” (p. 161)
• “This mindset was emulated in the air force’s structure, as it had been designed to affect decision ‘in cooperation with–,’ and not ‘independent from’ the operational effort on ground.” (p. 299)
• “The Schwerpunkt principle and operativer Luftkrieg were mutually exclusive. The air force found itself dividing its operations amongst a wide number of targets, few of which could be hit either often enough, heavily enough, or ruthlessly enough, to weaken hostile activities more than temporarily.” (p. 303)
• “The Luftwaffe of 1939–40 did not espouse any strategic bombing theory at all.” (John Keegan, quoted on p. 63)
• “The Luftwaffe’s fundamental limitations were not the consequence of its immaturity but of a deliberated decision, taken in 1937, to design it for short–range operations in support of the army, rather than for long–range strategic undertakings of its own.” (Telford Taylor, quoted on p. 63)

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

• 1916 — Proposal for German air service as a separate branch — Proposed to be coequal to army and navy, but dismissed due to strong opposition from the Reichsmarine .
• 1917–1918 — Luftstreitkräfte’s strategic bombing campaign — Conducted against British cities and Paris, but caused limited damage with severe German losses, leading to the campaign being called off .
• 1919 — Formation of “shadow Air General Staff” (TA-L) — Hans von Seeckt fashioned this within the Truppenamt, headed by Maj. Helmuth Wilberg, to keep airpower central to the “German way of war” .
• 1921 — Decision against strategic bombing — German airmen, learning from WWI failures, decided against the strategic bombing of enemy homelands as a serious military option .
• 1923–1926 — Publication of “Grüne Post” series — Maj. Helmuth Wilberg edited these air manuals, which contained the Air Staff’s views on air warfare and served as the theoretical base for future doctrine .
• 1926 — Issuance of Richtlinien f. d. Führung Operativer Luftkriege — The first German field manual for air force employment, it introduced the concept of “operational air war” and stressed joint warfare .
• 1929 — Ludwig Siebert’s book on armored tactics published — Atlas zu Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen: Ein Anschauungs–Lehrbuch became standard doctrine for mechanized operations .
• 1932 — Robert Knauss authors Luftkrieg 1936. Die Zertrümmerung von Paris — Foresaw an aerial war between Britain and France, with terror raids on population. Followed by a Geheime Denkschrift in 1933 advocating for a bridge, it set a precedent for indiscriminate bombing practices and became a symbol of terror bombing .
• 1938 — Herhudt v. Rohden publishes Vom Luftkriege — This work focused on the independent mission of the air force, equating operational air war mostly with long-range bombing .
• 1939-09-01 — German invasion of Poland (Fall Weiß) — Served as a “grand experiment” for the German army and Luftwaffe, with airpower rapidly securing air superiority and supporting ground advances, but also showing shifts towards direct army support [132-134].
• 1939-09-22 — Authorization for “partial strikes against housing blocks” in Warsaw — Following a request from Col. v. Richthofen for a “devastation and terror raid,” accompanied by a surrender leaflet .
• 1940-05-10 — German invasion of France and Low Countries (Fall Gelb) — Featured the Sichelschnittplan and effective coordination of panzer divisions with airpower, launching the Luftwaffe as a co-star in Blitzkrieg .
• 1940-05-13/14 — Battle of Sedan — Ju-87 dive-bombers inflicted significant psychological damage on French defenders during the Meuse crossing .
• 1940-05-26 – 1940-06-04 — Dunkirk Evacuation (Operation Dynamo) — Luftwaffe failed to prevent the evacuation of the BEF, partly due to poor weather, supply issues, and prioritizing other targets over military interdiction at Dunkirk .
• 1940-06-03 — Operation Paula (Paris bombing) — A large-scale air attack aimed at influencing Parisian morale and crushing French matériel potential by targeting airfields and factories around the capital .
• 1940-06-05 — German invasion of Southern France (Fall Rot) begins — Included independent bombing strikes at lines of communications in the Rhône area and targets around Marseille, marking a more distinct operativ element .
• 1941-06-22 — Operation Barbarossa (Invasion of the Soviet Union) — Presented an opportunity for the Luftwaffe to return to its combined arms support role, but the vastness of the front quickly pushed it into a direct army support role [156-158].
• 1942-03 – 1942-06 — Baedeker–Angriffe — Luftwaffe units indulged in bombing practices where civilian casualties were a desired result, authorized as retaliation attacks .
• 1942-05-30 – 1942-07-03 — Siege of Sevastopol — Represented the greatest concentration of tactical airpower during 1942, demonstrating the Luftwaffe’s willingness to solve direct army support problems .
• 1943 — «Aktion Russland»: Strategic interdiction bombing — A renewed, circumstantial interest in strategic interdiction against military-6].