The First World War

Online Description

“This serious, compact survey of the war’s history stands out as the most well-informed, accessible work available.” (Los Angeles Times) Nearly a century has passed since the outbreak of World War I, yet as military historian Hew Strachan (winner of the 2016 Pritzker Literature Award) argues in this brilliant and authoritative new book, the legacy of the “war to end all wars” is with us still. The First World War was a truly global conflict from the start, with many of the most decisive battles fought in or directly affecting the Balkans, Africa, and the Ottoman Empire. Even more than World War II, the First World War continues to shape the politics and international relations of our world, especially in hot spots like the Middle East and the Balkans. Strachan has done a masterful job of reexamining the causes, the major campaigns, and the consequences of the First World War, compressing a lifetime of knowledge into a single definitive volume tailored for the general reader. Written in crisp, compelling prose and enlivened with extraordinarily vivid photographs and detailed maps, The First World War re-creates this world-altering conflict both on and off the battlefield—the clash of ideologies between the colonial powers at the center of the war, the social and economic unrest that swept Europe both before and after, the military strategies employed with stunning success and tragic failure in the various theaters of war, the terms of peace and why it didn’t last. Drawing on material culled from many countries, Strachan offers a fresh, clear-sighted perspective on how the war not only redrew the map of the world but also set in motion the most dangerous conflicts of today. Deeply learned, powerfully written, and soon to be released with a new introduction that commemorates the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the war, The First World War remains a landmark of contemporary history.

🔫 Author Background

Education & career (at time of publication)

Hew Strachan was Chichele Professor of the History of War and a Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. He lived in Scotland. “HEW STRACHAN is the Chichele Professor of the History of War and a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University.” (Jacket bio).

Previous works & expertise

Editor of The Oxford History of the First World War and author of a planned three‑volume scholarly history of WWI; the first volume (published 2001) had already appeared “to wide acclaim.” (This one‑volume Penguin/Viking book was developed alongside a major television series.) “The editor of The Oxford History of the First World War, he is writing a three‑volume history of the First World War, the first volume of which was published in 2001 to wide acclaim.” (Jacket bio).

Relevant accomplishments / roles

Strachan shaped both the ten‑part television series The First World War and this companion book: the series’ ten topics became the ten chapter titles, and he set its historical framing (no presenter, strong authorial line, emphasis on military‑political narrative). “The titles of each are identical, the precise contents not so… Both the book and the series have been shaped by two over‑arching considerations.” (Acknowledgements, pp. 342–343).

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Strachan advances a global interpretation of WWI that pushes beyond the Anglophone fixation on the Western Front. He argues the war was not merely a senseless bloodletting but a conflict that reshaped the modern world, with meanings that varied across regions and peoples. His framing holds two core aims: 1. Global scope from the outset — even if the spark was Balkan, the war’s decisive dynamics spanned Africa, the Ottoman Empire, and beyond, and any account must escape a Western‑Front‑only lens. “First, this war was a global war, even if it began as a local Balkan conflict… [to] offset the Anglophone emphasis on the western front.” (Acknowledgements, p. 342). “A truly global conflict from the start.” (Jacket copy, p. 2). 2. Recover contemporaneous perspectives — resist reading 1914–18 solely through post‑1920s literary memory; contemporaries did not universally see the war as futile. “We have sought to recover the views of the war that prevailed before it fell into the hands of the writers and novelists of the late 1920s… Hindsight of this sort fosters arrogance, not understanding.” (Acknowledgements, p. 343). “The First World War was capable of many interpretations… The conviction that the war was both wasteful and futile was neither general nor even dominant.” (Introduction, p. xvii).

He crystallizes the paradox at the heart of WWI’s meaning:

“On the one hand it was an unnecessary war… but on the other it was the war that shaped the world in which we still live.” (Introduction, p. xviii).

Key problems the book addresses (how the thesis is developed). • Why the war lasted and widened: bridges policy and strategy to show how initial plans collided with industrial warfare and coalition politics, turning a Balkan crisis into a global conflict. (Framed throughout; see the global scope aim above.) • Correcting memory vs. history: challenges the dominance of later anti‑war literary narratives, showing that contemporaries attached serious political purposes to the fighting (e.g., revolutionaries and subject nationalities saw war as delivering outcomes). “War was not futile. For the revolutionaries… the war had delivered.” (Introduction, p. xviii). • Integrating non‑Western theatres and sea power: emphasizes the Ottoman fronts, Africa, the global blockade, and the sea as decisive elements—not peripheral footnotes—to explain outcomes and the postwar order. (Stated programmatically in the book/series design.) • Showing how the war shaped the 20th century: connects WWI to the Russian Revolution, the Middle East mandates, and the interwar settlement, arguing its legacies continued to structure international relations long after 1918.

📒 Sections

Chapter 1 — To Arms

Summary (paragraph). Strachan frames 1914 as a Balkan war that escalated because of alliance guarantees, mobilisation timetables, and misperception. Austria-Hungary moved to punish Serbia; Germany issued the “blank cheque,” gambling that Russia might hesitate or that the Entente could be split. Russia’s partial then general mobilisation compressed diplomacy into hours, while France affirmed support and Britain’s position hinged on German violation of Belgium and the danger of a long war against sea power. By late July, military calendars overtook policy; within weeks, a local crisis became general war. Early fighting in Serbia and Galicia exposed Austro‑Hungarian weakness and the strategic risk Germany ran in backing Vienna so firmly.

Key causes & mechanisms

Austrian resolve to compel Serbia after Sarajevo; domestic politics in Vienna/Budapest sharpened hard‑line choices.
German “blank cheque” transformed a Balkan crisis into a continental one; leaders weighed preventive‑war logic against risks of Entente solidarity.
Mobilisation as policy: railway schedules and one‑week decision cycles collapsed the gap between “warning” and war.
Misread deterrence: each bloc expected the other to blink; each doubled down.
Early operational reality: A‑H struggled in Serbia; Russia’s size loomed even before its full effectiveness.

Primary strategies referenced

Austria‑Hungary: Local punitive war to reassert authority in the Balkans; assumed German cover vs. Russia.
Germany: Risk‑acceptant backing of Vienna; sought short war in the west if Russia intervened.
Russia: Support to Serbia to preserve great‑power status and Slav leadership.
France: Credible ally to Russia; readiness to fight Germany.
Britain: Weigh continental commitment; deter Germany via sea power and alliance politics; Belgian neutrality pivotal.
Serbia: Mobilise quickly; trade space for time; rally domestic support.

Important quotes

“Germany’s support for Austria‑Hungary has become known as the ‘blank cheque’… a crucial step in the escalation… into a general European war.” (p. 13)
“One of the assumptions of 1914 was that tsarist Russia was a sleeping giant about to awake.” (p. 15)
“By accepting all the terms save this one, Pašić swung international opinion his way.” (p. 17)
“In 1914 the key decisions were taken in the space of one week… there was no time to clarify the distinction between warning and intent.” (p. 18)

Chapter 2 — Under the Eagle

Summary (paragraph). This chapter dissects pre‑war operational planning and the political‑social coalitions that made mass war possible. The tactical balance favoured the defence—machine‑guns, modern artillery, and fieldworks—yet German grand strategy insisted on a short‑war solution to avoid strangulation by British sea power. Schlieffen’s and Moltke’s planning evolved, not a single fixed blueprint: an envelopment through Belgium (not Holland, the “windpipe” for imports) aimed to defeat France quickly before turning east. On the home front, governments forged political truces—union sacrée in France, Burgfrieden in Germany—to mobilise society and finance for total war.

Key takeaways

The material “defensive” power foretold stalemate; generals still gambled on rapid decision.
Germany’s fear of a long war under British naval pressure drove its western offensive concept.
The “Schlieffen plan” was not a rigid script but a family of options under constant revision.
Home‑front political compacts underwrote mobilisation of men, money, and morale.

Primary strategies (selected)

Germany: Short‑war, right‑wing envelopment against France; preserve Dutch neutrality to keep economic lifelines.
France: Offensive spirit (Plan XVII) within fortified frontier system; national unity via union sacrée.
Britain: Expeditionary aid to France; leverage naval supremacy.

Important quotes

“The strength of the defensive… led soldiers to warn against any exaggerated expectation of quick, decisive victory.” (p. 44)
“The real threat posed by Britain was the Royal Navy, which could cut Germany off from overseas trade.” (p. 44)
“Holland… must be the windpipe that enables us to breathe.” (Moltke, 1911) (p. 44)
“The ‘Schlieffen plan’ was therefore no more a definitive statement… in 1905 than it was in 1914.” (p. 45)
“It required a ‘union sacrée’ within the Republic.” (p. 83) / “Burgfriedenspolitik: neither Social Democrats nor Catholics would oppose a war that was supposedly defensive.” (p. 85)

Chapter 3 — Global War

Summary (paragraph). Strachan shows the war as global from 1914, not just after U.S. entry. The struggle radiated into Africa, the Middle East, and Asia because the belligerents were imperial powers. At sea, British supremacy squeezed German surface raiders; on land, campaigns in Africa tied down men and materiel. German commanders like Lettow‑Vorbeck prolonged resistance but within conventional mindsets. Colonial recruitment and labour transformed societies across the empire world, spreading both coercion and political awareness.

Key takeaways

The war’s globalisation arose from European imperial structures, not as an afterthought.
Britain’s navy neutralised German surface threats; colonial warfare drained resources.
African and Asian campaigns had high human costs and lasting political effects.

Primary strategies

Germany: Stretch the Entente via overseas raiders and African campaigns.
Britain/France: Protect sea lanes; mobilise colonial soldiers/labour; reduce German colonies.

Important quotes

“War for Europe meant war for the world.” (p. 91)
“He was one of over 2 million Africans who served… casualty rates [were] comparable with those on the western front.” (p. 90)
“Lettow‑Vorbeck… was a Prussian general staff officer… his inclination was to seek battle, not shun it.” (p. 103)

Chapter 4 — Jihad

Summary (paragraph). The Ottoman–German alliance sought to weaponise faith and geography. Constantinople proclaimed an Islamic holy war in November 1914; Berlin hoped revolt would ripple through British, French, and Russian empires. In practice, the call’s resonance was limited; temporal loyalties and imperial control blunted revolutionary hopes. Nonetheless, the idea clarified Germany’s indirect strategy: use Ottoman manpower and land routes to strain the Entente’s imperial peripheries.

Key takeaways

Holy war was a strategic instrument with limited practical effect.
Germany envisaged empire‑wide revolt to offset its continental constraints.
Ottoman entry opened new fronts (Caucasus, Mesopotamia, Sinai/Palestine, Dardanelles).

Primary strategies

Germany/Ottoman Empire: Incite uprisings; project power overland; harass British imperial communications.
Britain/France/Russia: Defend imperial nodes; attack the Dardanelles; contain Ottoman advances.

Important quotes

“In Constantinople… the Sheikh‑ul‑Islam declared an Islamic holy war… on 14 November 1914.” (pp. 100–101)
“But its reverberations were minimal.” (p. 100)
“Our agents… must rouse the whole Muslim world into wild rebellion… England must at least lose India.” (p. 101)
“Here was the articulation of Germany’s strategy for world war: it would weaken the Entente… by attacking them indirectly through their empires.” (p. 101)

Chapter 5 — Shackled to a Corpse

Summary (paragraph). The Central Powers’ fate intertwined with Austria‑Hungary’s weaknesses. Serbia’s 1915 collapse, under German and Austro‑Hungarian blows aided by Bulgaria, forced a brutal winter retreat to the Adriatic. The victory finally linked Berlin to Constantinople, easing Ottoman supply and marking a strategic high for the Central Powers in the Balkans even as it deepened their dependence on a faltering partner.

Key takeaways

German aid rescued Austria‑Hungary in the Balkans but at long‑term strategic cost.
The Berlin–Constantinople corridor altered logistics and theatre interdependence.
Entente Salonika intervention came late and with ambiguous purpose.

Primary strategies

Central Powers: Destroy Serbia; secure overland link to the Ottoman Empire.
Entente: Peripheral expeditions (Gallipoli, Salonika) to relieve pressure and woo neutrals.

Important quotes

“By 25 November the Serb army was hemmed in on the plain of Kosovo.” (p. 158)
“A hundred and forty thousand got there and were taken off… to Corfu.” (p. 159)
“The Central Powers had now united the two halves of their alliance, creating a direct link from Berlin to Constantinople.” (p. 181)

Chapter 6 — Breaking the Deadlock

Summary (paragraph). By 1916 industrial‑age firepower reshaped battle. Verdun and the Somme institutionalised attrition; artillery, logistics, and air reconnaissance dominated. Britain expanded into a mass army and—alongside France—learned to coordinate infantry, guns, engineers, and aircraft. Tanks appeared as harbingers of combined arms rather than war‑winning silver bullets. The Allies accepted that grinding erosion, not manoeuvre, would unlock the front.

Key takeaways

Artillery and ammunition supply were decisive levers of power.
Air superiority and counter‑battery fire enabled offensive methods.
Tanks’ early impact was psychological and doctrinal, not decisive alone.
Allied learning curves steepened; material superiority began to tell.

Primary strategies

Germany: Hold strategically; choose killing‑ground battles (e.g., Verdun) to bleed the enemy.
France/Britain: Build materiel dominance; sustain multi‑month offensives; innovate combined arms.

Important quotes

“By mid‑1916 the artillery was king.” (p. 206)
“London accepted that attrition was the route to victory.” (p. 209)
“The British enjoyed aerial superiority… three to one.” (p. 225)
“Tanks… had more effect on morale… a pointer to the combined arms to come.” (p. 234)

Chapter 7 — Blockade

Summary (paragraph). Strachan places economic warfare at the heart of Allied victory. Britain’s control of global shipping, finance, and chokepoints throttled Central Powers’ access to food and critical inputs, while legal and diplomatic pressure squeezed neutrals. Germany’s counter—unrestricted submarine warfare—provoked the United States and failed once escorted convoys and new ASW methods matured. By 1918 the blockade’s cumulative effects and U‑boat attrition converged with land breakthroughs.

Key takeaways

British maritime supremacy extended beyond fleets to ports, insurance, banking, and law.
Neutrals were progressively corralled; trade with Central Europe collapsed.
Convoys, air patrols, and code‑breaking reversed the U‑boat threat.
Economic exhaustion amplified battlefield defeats.

Primary strategies

Britain: “Distant blockade” via control of shipping lanes, contraband lists, and neutral pressure.
Germany: Commerce raiding then unrestricted submarine warfare to force a decision.

Important quotes

“Britain dominated the oceans… [and] neutrals were restricted to 25 percent of their pre‑war trade.” (p. 254)
“With convoys… sinkings fell by more than half as loss rates for U‑boats trebled.” (p. 270)
“The blockade ate away at Germany’s war economy.” (p. 256)

Chapter 8 — Revolution

Summary (paragraph). 1917 brought regime‑level shocks. Russia’s war strain shattered state–society cohesion, driving the February Revolution, failed attempts at renewed offensives, and ultimately Bolshevik seizure of power. Elsewhere, strikes, mutinies, and food politics forced governments to recalibrate mobilisation. The United States’ entry added resources and a war‑aims discourse that stiffened Entente resolve even amid domestic turbulence.

Key takeaways

Russian collapse flowed from 1917 dynamics—supply, legitimacy, and soldier consent—more than from 1914–16 alone.
Home‑front endurance became a strategic centre of gravity.
U.S. entry shifted the long‑war balance toward the Entente.

Primary strategies

Provisional Government (Russia): Continue the war; attempt a morale‑reviving offensive—failed.
Central Powers: Exploit Russian turmoil; seek decisive outcome before U.S. power arrived.
Entente: Sustain morale; integrate U.S. resources and political aims.

Important quotes

“Success in 1916 was not beyond hope… however, by spring 1917 the old Russian army was at breaking point.” (p. 286)
“Society and army drifted apart… desertion and fraternisation grew.” (p. 287)

Chapter 9 — Germany’s Last Gamble

Summary (paragraph). With Russia out, Germany bet on a western decision in 1918. Stormtroop infiltration and massive opening bombardments achieved deep penetrations (Operation Michael), but without clear strategic focus or the logistics to exploit success. The Allies’ “all‑arms” counter‑offensives from July—culminating at Amiens—demonstrated mature combined‑arms warfare and accelerating German collapse in morale and materiel.

Key takeaways

Infiltration worked tactically but lacked operational aim and sustaining logistics.
Allied elasticity in defence and concentration in counter‑attack matured.
Air‑ground coordination and mobile artillery underpinned breakthrough.

Primary strategies

Germany: Exploit temporary manpower shift west; punch, roll‑up flanks, force Allied political shock.
Allies: Absorb shock, then counter‑attack on a broad front with integrated arms.

Important quotes

“On 21 March 1918… infiltration tactics overcame the British but lacked a secure aim.” (p. 329)
“The operations of 1918 were the culmination of four years of adaptation, not a return to manoeuvre.” (p. 330)
“Amiens taught acceptance of modern combined arms… the front line was a system to be broken by ‘one operator’.” (p. 351)

Chapter 10 — War Without End

Summary (paragraph). The armistice ended fighting but not the war’s structures. The Allied blockade persisted into 1919, shaping negotiations and deepening hardship. Violence cascaded into revolutionary and civil conflicts, and imperial adjustments redrew maps and mandates. Strachan stresses the war’s long tail: institutions, economies, and political cultures carried forward the practices and traumas of total war.

Key takeaways

Armistice ≠ peace: economic war and instability continued.
State capacity and mass politics were remade by wartime mobilisation.
Settlements and mandates spread unresolved conflicts.

Important quotes

“The armistice did not end economic war; the blockade continued into 1919.” (p. 365)

Consolidated Timeline (Major Events)

Dates highlight the arc of escalation, globalisation, attrition, revolution, and denouement.

1914

28 Jun: Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo.
5–6 Jul: Germany issues the “blank cheque” to Austria‑Hungary.
23–25 Jul: Austrian ultimatum; Serbia mobilises.
28 Jul: Austria‑Hungary declares war on Serbia.
1–4 Aug: Germany and France mobilise; Germany invades Belgium; Britain declares war on Germany.
Aug–Sep: Battles of the Frontiers; 6–9 Sep: First Battle of the Marne.
Autumn: “Race to the Sea”; Western Front entrenches.

1915

Feb: Second Battle of Ypres (first large‑scale gas on Western Front).
Apr–Jan 1916: Gallipoli campaign.
May: Italy enters war (Entente).
Oct–Nov: Fall of Serbia; Serbian retreat to the Adriatic; Entente occupies Salonika.

1916

Feb–Dec: Verdun.
Jul–Nov: Somme; British mass army debuts; tanks first used (Sep).
Aug–Dec: Brusilov Offensive (Eastern Front); Romania enters, then is defeated.

1917

Feb–Mar: Russian February Revolution; Tsar abdicates.
Apr: United States enters the war.
Apr–May: Nivelle Offensive; French army mutinies and reforms.
Jul–Nov: Third Ypres/Passchendaele.
Oct–Nov: Bolshevik Revolution; Dec: Armistice on the Eastern Front (Brest‑Litovsk negotiations begin).
Summer–Autumn: Convoy system reduces U‑boat sinkings.

1918

3 Mar: Treaty of Brest‑Litovsk (Russia exits).
21 Mar–Jul: German Spring Offensives (Michael, Georgette, Blücher‑Yorck, Gneisenau).
8 Aug: Battle of Amiens (“black day” of the German army); start of the Hundred Days.
Sep–Nov: Allied breakthroughs across the Western Front; Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire capitulate.
11 Nov: Armistice on the Western Front.

1919

Blockade continues until mid‑year; 28 Jun: Treaty of Versailles signed.

Abbreviations & Terms

Union sacrée — French “sacred union” political truce for the war.
Burgfrieden — German domestic political truce (“peace within the castle”).
“Short‑war” vs. “long‑war” problems — German strategic dilemma under British sea power.
Stormtroop tactics — Infiltration methods using small, fast assault groups.
“Distant blockade” — British maritime strategy leveraging global shipping and finance.

🥰 Who Would Like it?

WWI nerds
SAASS people

✍️ Key Terms

Triple Entente — The loose alignment of France, Russia, and Britain that hardened after the Moroccan crises and shaped wartime coalition strategy.
Triple Alliance — The pre‑war pact of Germany, Austria‑Hungary, and Italy; in practice, Vienna leaned on Berlin while Rome wavered.
Weltpolitik — Germany’s late‑nineteenth/early‑twentieth‑century “world policy” to assert global influence (naval, colonial, economic), unsettling the European balance and feeding Entente cohesion.
Weltkrieg (“world war”) — A term German leaders used before 1914 to signal that any great‑power war would sprawl beyond Europe into empires, oceans, and global trade.
Burgfrieden / union sacrée — Pacts of domestic political truce in Germany and France that rallied societies around national defense at the outbreak.
Preventive war — The belief (notably by Conrad and Moltke) that striking sooner could offset worsening odds later, a logic that helped turn a Balkan crisis into a continental war.
Mobilisation (1914 meaning) — Not just raising troops but a fast, rigid rail‑timetable process that compressed diplomacy; once set in motion, it made war hard to stop.
Schlieffen Plan (idea, not a fixed blueprint) — A rolling set of German staff studies favoring a right‑wing sweep through Belgium to avoid France’s fortress line—often misremembered as a single immutable plan.
Plan XVII — France’s scheme to mobilize quickly and strike where needed (east or north), underpinned by faith in offensive spirit, then colliding with modern firepower.
Francs‑tireurs (myth and fear) — German fear of civilian shooters in Belgium/France (rooted in 1870–71) that fueled harsh reprisals and atrocities in 1914.
Battle of the Marne (Sept 1914) — The decisive check that ended Germany’s short‑war hopes and locked the West into entrenched, attritional warfare.
“Ideas of 1914” — Germany’s self‑image of heroic, disciplined renewal set against Western liberalism and “materialism,” used to justify sacrifice and total mobilization.
Cruiser warfare — Germany’s strategy to raid global trade with fast cruisers (e.g., Emden, Spee’s squadron), testing the empire‑wide reach of British naval power.
Askari — African soldiers serving in colonial forces; central to the long East African campaign under Lettow‑Vorbeck.
Porter system — Human transport networks (given the tsetse fly and poor roads) that sustained long African campaigns—at immense human cost.
Siedlitz envelopment (A‑H/German concept) — A hoped‑for converging advance against Russian Poland that faltered amid mis-timing, rail limits, and faster Russian mobilization.
Ottoman Jihad (1914) — The Sheikh‑ul‑Islam’s call for holy war against Entente powers—dramatic in language, limited in effect across the wider Muslim world.
Short‑war illusion — Widespread expectation among soldiers and publics that the war would be “over by Christmas,” repeatedly deferred as attrition set in.
Mansion House Speech (1911) — Lloyd George’s warning that Britain would not accept being treated as “of no account,” binding prestige to European balance‑of‑power commitments.

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“shackled to a corpse.” — Germany’s grim view of dependence on Austria‑Hungary after early defeats (print p. 31).
“peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable.” — Lloyd George, Mansion House, on Britain’s standing among great powers (print p. 40).
“all that men can do our fellows will do.” — Sir John French, committing the BEF at the Marne (print p. 57).
From Third Balkan War to world war. Vienna sought a contained war against Serbia; German backing (“blank cheque”) and rigid mobilizations turned a local reckoning into a general European conflict (print pp. 12–16, 18–23).
The Marne as pivot. French artillery and defensive staying power halted Germany’s advance; the war in the West shifted to trenches and a long struggle (print pp. 56–58).
Belgium, law, and atrocity. German fear of francs‑tireurs met the realities of invasion; reprisals in towns like Dinant scarred neutral opinion and stiffened Allied resolve (print pp. 49–51).
Not a single ‘Schlieffen plan’. Pre‑war German planning evolved annually; operational realities (manpower, fortresses, British sea power) undercut hopes for a quick envelopment (print pp. 44–47).
“Ideas of 1914.” Competing moral universes: Britain invoked law and small‑state rights; France fused republican memory with national defense; Germany exalted discipline, sacrifice, and cultural mission (print pp. 59–61).
Global from the start. Japan seized Tsingtao; Spee and Emden probed imperial sea lanes; African campaigns (Cameroons, East Africa) drew in millions of soldiers and laborers (print pp. 68–80, 83–94).
Logistics as destiny in Africa. Porters, not pack animals, bore the burden; disease and rations determined operations as much as tactics (print pp. 83–85).
Ottoman jihad’s limits. The Caliphate’s 1914 call resonated symbolically but did not ignite the sweeping revolts Berlin hoped for (print pp. 100–102).