Strategic Air Power in Desert Storm

Online Description

In response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the second of August 1990, a small group of air power advocates in the Pentagon proposed a strategic air campaign - “Operation Desert Storm” designed to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait by a sustained effort against the major sources of Iraqi national power. John Andreas Olsen provides a coherent and comprehensive examination of the origins, evolution and implementation of this campaign. His findings derive from official military and political documentation, interviews with United States Air Force officers who were closely involved with the planning of the campaign and Iraqis with detailed knowledge and experience of the inner workings of the Iraqi regime.

🔫 Author Background

John Andreas Olsen is a Royal Norwegian Air Force officer and defense scholar, educated at the Royal Norwegian Air Force Academy, the German Armed Forces Command and Staff College, and with advanced degrees in history and international relations.
He has served as an air force officer, staff planner, and defense attaché, giving him both practitioner and academic perspectives on airpower.
Olsen is best known in the airpower literature for John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power, Airpower Reborn, and edited volumes such as Global Air Power and A History of Air Warfare.
His work often blends operational history, doctrinal analysis, and strategic theory, with a particular focus on how air forces conceptualize and employ “strategic” attack.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Olsen’s central problem is whether the strategic air campaign in Desert Storm—shaped by John Warden’s “Five Rings” and the concept of “strategic paralysis”—was an effective and valid way to use airpower against Saddam Hussein’s regime.
He argues that the coalition air campaign was conceptually innovative and turned air operations into the backbone of the war effort, but it did not deliver its unstated political aim of changing the regime because the planners misunderstood the nature and resilience of Saddam’s power base.
The book contends that the “heart of the strategy, the attacks against Saddam Hussein’s political power base, did not meet the hoped for, but unstated, objective of changing the regime,” largely because “Saddam Hussein’s political structure was far more complicated and resistant to precision bombing than assumed.” (p. 2)
Olsen positions Desert Storm as a watershed for airpower’s political utility, but also as a cautionary tale about intelligence limits, doctrinal bias, and the gap between physical destruction and political outcomes.

🧭 One‑Paragraph Overview

Olsen offers a tightly focused case study of the first phase of Operation Desert Storm—the strategic air campaign against the Iraqi leadership. He traces how Warden’s Checkmate team in the Pentagon generated the Instant Thunder concept; how it evolved as it was transferred to Riyadh and reworked by Horner and Glosson; how it interacted with U.S. political aims, joint doctrine, and coalition constraints; and how it actually played out in the air war. The book then shifts perspective to a detailed anatomy of Saddam’s regime—its party, government, military, security/intelligence services, and tribal kinship system—to show why the leadership-focused air campaign was structurally misaligned with Iraqi political reality. Finally, Olsen evaluates what the bombing achieved and concludes that while airpower contributed decisively to military victory and “fog and friction on a strategic level,” its political effects depended on intangibles beyond target lists, sortie counts, or battle damage assessments. (pp. 1–5)

🎯 Course Themes Tracker

Limits on airpower: Political aims (no regime change), coalition cohesion, ROE, intelligence gaps about Iraqi regime, BDA limits, and adversary adaptation (Scuds, dispersal) channel airpower’s effects.
Expectations vs. reality: Airmen expected “strategic paralysis” and perhaps a coup; reality was a rapid military victory but a durable regime.
Adaptation & learning: Doctrinal evolution from Industrial Web → AirLand Battle → Five Rings; intra‑campaign adaptation via Black Hole, Scud hunt, and weather-driven plan changes.
Efficacy (tac → pol): Precise tactical successes and strong operational outcomes, but mixed strategic/political effects regarding Saddam’s survival.
Alliance/coalition dynamics: U.S. need to protect Israel, reassure Arab partners, and adhere to the UN mandate shaped targeting, phasing, and acceptable aims.
Domain interplay: Stealth/PGM, SEAD, ISR, C2, and space-enabled navigation and BDA enabled inside‑out attacks but were constrained by intel and political filters.

🔑 Top Takeaways

Instant Thunder and the Five Rings represented a genuine doctrinal break: airpower was designed as the main instrument to achieve national objectives, not merely to support ground forces. (pp. 64–67)
This doctrinal leap rested on fragile assumptions about intelligence, precision, and adversary behavior that were only partly met in practice. (pp. 66–67)
The U.S. political leadership’s limited war aims (expel Iraq from Kuwait, not topple Saddam) and coalition sensitivities imposed ceilings on what the air campaign was allowed to try to accomplish. (pp. 1–3, 295–296)
U.S. military intelligence excelled at order‑of‑battle analysis but had scant insight into Iraqi regime structure, tribal politics, or security networks, leaving planners to target a political system they barely understood. (pp. 2–3, 207–215, 241–242)
Saddam’s power base—Ba’ath Party, government, military, security/intelligence complex, and tribal kinship network—was extraordinarily redundant and resilient; attacking “leadership” facilities was not the same as attacking the regime. (pp. 175–176, 200–201, 207–215, 219–220)
Politically driven diversions (notably the Scud hunt to keep Israel out) and weather issues showed that strategic air plans are never pure expressions of doctrine; they are constantly negotiated with politicians, allies, and the environment. (pp. 241–248, 245–247)
Measures of success in 1991—sorties flown, targets hit, percentage of PGMs, collapsed electrical grids—tell us little about whether the campaign achieved its core political purpose. (pp. 241–244, 262–269)
Desert Storm cemented airpower’s centrality for later limited wars (Deliberate Force, Allied Force, etc.), but also exported its blind spots about regime resilience and the difficulty of coercing authoritarian leaders via air attack alone. (pp. 2–4, 286–287, 295–296)

📒 Sections

Introduction

Summary:

The introduction situates the 1990–91 crisis: Bush’s four national objectives, UNSCR 678, and the four‑phase design of Operation Desert Storm (strategic air, air superiority, battlefield prep, ground). Olsen states that the study focuses “primarily with the first phase of Operation Desert Storm – the air campaign against the Iraqi leadership,” examining the “genesis, evolution and execution of the strategic air campaign plan” and Iraqi perceptions of it. (p. 2) He frames his core question as assessing the validity of a concept that sought “strategic paralysis” by striking Saddam’s political power base, while acknowledging that the campaign succeeded militarily but failed to change the regime. (p. 2) The introduction highlights the growing post–Cold War reliance on airpower as the “instrument of choice” for dealing with recalcitrant regimes and notes that airpower’s vocabulary and mystique still confuse analysts. (pp. 2–3) Olsen then outlines the structure of the book: Chapter 1 gives context, Chapters 2–3 trace the plan’s genesis and evolution, Chapter 4 dissects the Iraqi regime, and Chapter 5 assesses what the bombing actually accomplished. (p. 3)

Key Points:

Desert Storm’s offensive is structured into four phases; this study focuses on Phase I’s strategic air campaign. (p. 1)
The aim is to test the concept of “strategic paralysis” against a real regime that “did not lend itself to change through the application of air power.” (pp. 2–3)
U.S. intelligence was “focused more on ‘order-of-battle’ assessments than on the make-up and nature of political regimes,” leaving planners with poor insight into Iraqi politics. (p. 2)
Airpower had become central in a series of post–Cold War operations (Deliberate Force, Desert Fox, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom), yet remained contested and poorly understood. (pp. 2–3)
The book is explicitly a case study but aspires to broader implications for modern airpower’s political utility. (p. 2–3)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Establishes the limits of airpower as arising partly from political aims and partly from intelligence blind spots.
Sets up expectation vs. reality by contrasting the promise of “strategic paralysis” with the later finding that Saddam survives.
Introduces the framework of the Five Rings and “strategic paralysis” that will be interrogated throughout.
Signals a systemic critique: counting targets and sorties is insufficient to understand strategic effect.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Limited war aims (no declared regime change), coalition dependence, need to avoid Israeli entry (exogenous; partially relaxable through diplomacy; strategic-level).
Intelligence/Information: Focus on OB vs. regime sociology; lack of on‑the‑ground Iraqi expertise (endogenous to U.S. system; partially adjustable but not in time for 1991).
Strategic: Ambiguous/unstated objective of regime change; gap between formal objectives and planners’ hopes.
Technological/Capability & Operational: Reliance on stealth/PGM and space-enabled C2; yet BDA and regime effects hard to measure.

Chapter 1: The Politicomilitary Context of Operation Desert Storm

Summary:

Chapter 1 reconstructs the U.S., regional, and doctrinal context that made the Desert Storm air campaign possible. Olsen charts how U.S. presence in the Middle East expanded over the Cold War, how Arab nationalism, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the Iran–Iraq War militarized the region, and how Iraq emerged from the 1980s with a large but economically strained military. He then examines U.S. Cold War doctrine—Active Defense and its successor AirLand Battle—stressing how they were built for a NATO–Warsaw Pact showdown, not a contingency like Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait. (pp. 41–60) The chapter emphasises the heavy Army imprint on U.S. thinking and the expectation that airpower would support ground maneuver rather than lead the campaign. It also notes the bitter Vietnam legacy, particularly skepticism about gradual air campaigns and body counts. Overall, Olsen argues that Desert Storm’s air concept represented a major departure from both regional contingency plans and established doctrine. (pp. 3, 41–60)

Key Points:

U.S. objectives in the Gulf were shaped by energy security, Israeli security, and containing Soviet influence.
Iraq’s regional position and debt after the Iran–Iraq War created incentives for aggression against Kuwait.
Active Defense and later AirLand Battle were designed for high‑intensity ground combat in Central Europe; TRADOC and TAC formalized joint doctrine via ALFA and FM 100‑5. (pp. 41–60)
AirLand Battle sought to use long‑range fires and maneuver to strike deep echelons, but still treated airpower largely as an adjunct to land operations. (p. 60)
Vietnam’s strategic air failures (Rolling Thunder) and the perceived success of 1972 Linebacker shaped both enthusiasm and caution toward airpower. (pp. 41–60)
Contingency plans for Southwest Asia did not anticipate a primarily air‑led campaign; Desert Storm departed “considerably” from them. (p. 3)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Limits on airpower emerge initially as doctrinal: the institutional assumption that air cannot win wars alone.
Expectations vs. reality: Army‑centric doctrine created expectations of a ground‑heavy war that the air campaign would later upend.
Establishes learning over time from WWII and Vietnam into AirLand Battle, but also path dependence that constrained imagination in 1990.
Provides backdrop for the doctrinal insurgency by Warden and Checkmate.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic/Doctrinal: AirLand Battle and NATO focus (endogenous; somewhat adjustable as crisis unfolds; strategic/operational).
Operational: Basing in the Gulf, reliance on Saudi and regional partners for overflight and staging (exogenous; partly relaxable via diplomacy).
Political: Need to preserve Arab support and not appear to wage a “U.S.–Israel vs. Arabs” war (exogenous; strategic).
Resource/Time: The perceived Soviet threat and budget priorities had shaped force structure and doctrine; by 1990, these were sunk costs.

Chapter 2: The Genesis of the Strategic Air Campaign Plan

Summary:

Chapter 2 narrates how Instant Thunder emerged inside the Pentagon’s Checkmate cell as a strategic alternative to ground‑centric options after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Olsen shows how Warden’s team proposed a conventional strategic air campaign that targeted “the sources of Iraqi national power” in a focused, intense, and concurrent strike on 84 critical targets, aimed at inducing Iraqi withdrawal without major ground combat. (p. 64) The chapter roots this concept doctrinally in earlier strategic bombing ideas—from Industrial Web Theory and AWPD‑1 through Vietnam, El Dorado Canyon, and the AirLand Battle debates—emphasizing both continuity and innovation. (pp. 65–67) Olsen explains how Instant Thunder challenged established doctrine and provoked resistance not only from other services but from within the Air Force, particularly TAC and CENTAF. He highlights the crucial role of personalities and networks—Warden, Deptula, Loh, Schwarzkopf, Powell—in pushing the idea upward despite institutional skepticism. Ultimately, the chapter argues that Desert Storm’s strategic air campaign would not have taken the form it did “had it not been for the initiative, persistence and conviction of a few unorthodox airmen.” (p. 65)

Key Points:

Instant Thunder sought to win in six–nine days by striking leadership, C3, key infrastructure, and selected forces—“a stand‑alone war‑winning option.” (p. 64)
The plan represented a “significant departure” from doctrine where air supported ground operations. (p. 64)
Warden’s Five Rings Model, Global Reach–Global Power, and the Instant Thunder concept amounted to a “major doctrinal change.” (p. 3)
The plan was criticized as mere “target listing,” but Olsen stresses its underlying theory of strategic paralysis, not attrition. (p. 113)
Schwarzkopf requested a strategic air option when he had few ground forces in theatre, but his initial thinking was more about punitive retaliation than full‑blown strategic paralysis; Warden expanded the scope. (pp. 112–113)
Opposition came from TAC, CENTAF, and parts of JCS who were steeped in AirLand Battle and skeptical of promises that airpower alone could win.
The plan had to be sold simultaneously to theatre commanders (Horner, Glosson) and Washington decision‑makers (Powell, Scowcroft, Bush). (p. 3)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Shows doctrinal innovation as a bottom‑up process driven by a small network, not institutional consensus.
Illustrates limits on airpower as institutional: airmen themselves resisted a radical strategic role.
Sets up a key expectations vs. reality gap, as Instant Thunder’s optimistic predictions will later be compared with actual outcomes.
Raises learning questions: Warden’s theory draws lessons from WWII and Vietnam, but reinterprets them in a way that others dispute.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Need for a plan that could operate before ground forces arrived; deterrence and crisis signaling requirements. (Exogenous; highly influential.)
Strategic/Doctrinal: AirLand Battle expectations; skepticism among JCS and CENTCOM (endogenous; contested but gradually relaxed).
Technological/Capability: Reliance on stealth (F‑117), PGMs, and Tomahawks–capabilities limited in number and unproven at scale (partly fixed).
Intelligence: Assumption of “reasonable intelligence and adequate precision,” inherited from Industrial Web thinking, but not fully validated. (pp. 66–67)

Section 2.1: From the Industrial Web Theory to AirLand Battle

Summary:

This sub‑section traces the genealogy of modern strategic air power thought. Olsen reviews Industrial Web Theory from the Air Corps Tactical School, AWPD‑1’s promise that 6,860 bombers could defeat Germany in six months, and the mixed record of WWII strategic bombing against Germany and Japan. (pp. 65–67) He emphasizes that these theories assumed the ability to locate and destroy critical nodes with good intelligence and precision—assumptions that often failed in practice. (p. 66) He then describes the post‑Vietnam environment, where doubts about strategic bombing combined with the Army’s move to Active Defense and later AirLand Battle, emphasizing maneuver, deep strikes, and joint integration. (pp. 41–60, 65–67) The sub‑section argues that Warden’s Five Rings concept built on this heritage but sought a more systemic and less attritional view of the enemy state, emphasizing paralysis over cumulative destruction.

Key Points:

Industrial Web Theory assumed fragile industrial systems, precise targeting, and passive enemies; its mixed WWII record left a negative public image of “strategic bombing” (Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima). (pp. 65–67)
AWPD‑1 and subsequent plans highlighted electric power, transportation, and petroleum as key nodes; Olsen notes parallels with Instant Thunder’s targeting of C3 and utilities. (pp. 65–67)
Post‑Vietnam doctrine criticized attritional bombing and gradually shifted toward deep attacks integrated with land maneuver. (pp. 41–60)
Warden’s Five Rings tried to overcome Industrial Web’s mechanistic assumptions by focusing on leadership, system essentials, and information flows, but he retained confidence in precision and systemic vulnerability.
AirLand Battle’s concept of striking second and third echelons with long‑range fires opened doctrinal space for more ambitious air roles, but still subordinated them to the ground campaign. (p. 60)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Provides framework lineage for today’s “effects-based” and “system‑of‑systems” thinking.
Highlights recurring limits: intelligence, precision, adversary adaptation, and moral/political backlash.
Shows how airpower theory is continually reframed by prior wars—WWII, Vietnam—and by interservice politics.

Limits Map (mini):

Technological/Capability: Need for adequate precision and navigation; WWII and Vietnam reveal limits (partly overcome by Desert Storm’s PGM/stealth, but not fully).
Intelligence/Information: Difficulty in identifying truly “vital” targets; historic overconfidence. (Endogenous, persistent.)
Legal/Normative: Public revulsion at area bombing helped push postwar doctrine toward greater discrimination, setting expectations for Desert Storm.

Chapter 3: The Evolution of the Strategic Air Campaign Plan

Summary:

Chapter 3 tracks how Instant Thunder evolved into the executable Desert Storm air campaign as the concept moved from Washington to Riyadh and entered joint and coalition planning channels. Olsen reconstructs key briefings, emphasizing the shifting balance of influence between Warden’s Checkmate team and Horner/Glosson’s CENTAF planners. (pp. 127–132, 171–174) The chapter describes the creation of the “Black Hole” planning cell in Riyadh, the development of the Master Attack Plan (MAP) and Air Tasking Order (ATO), and the process of selling the concept to political leadership while accommodating Army and Marine concerns. It shows how the original leadership‑centric plan expanded to include more traditional objectives: air superiority, battlefield preparation, and support to the ground campaign. (pp. 171–174) Olsen underscores that although many targets and phasing details changed, the “philosophical or conceptual” basis—inside‑out attacks on leadership and system essentials—remained intact. (p. 174)

Key Points:

As the crisis deepened, Schwarzkopf and Powell pushed to include more target sets, especially Iraqi ground forces and logistics, broadening the plan beyond Warden’s narrow leadership focus. (p. 113)
The Black Hole in Riyadh operationalized the concept, converting theory into detailed target lists, timing, routes, and SEAD plans, while also navigating tanker constraints and coalition inputs.
Planning bifurcated: one group in Riyadh concentrated on operational execution (MAP/ATO), while another group in Washington continued strategic lobbying. (p. 3)
Despite friction between Checkmate and CENTAF, Olsen reports consensus among Horner, Deptula, and Warden that there were no “philosophical or conceptual” changes to the plan, only adjustments to targets and phasing. (p. 174)
Intelligence friction persisted: the Black Hole needed rapid BDA feedback to retask strikes, while intel organizations were geared toward slower, battlefield‑oriented assessments. (pp. 241–244)
Joint politics forced compromises: naval air, Marine aviation, and allied contributions required visible roles, and Army leaders insisted on robust interdiction and Republican Guard targeting.

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Demonstrates adaptation under constraint: the plan changes to accommodate joint, coalition, and political realities without abandoning its core concept.
Highlights the C2 and intel limits of rapid, effects‑based planning in a joint environment.
Shows how strategic ideas (Five Rings, paralysis) become embedded in operational tools like MAPs, target lists, and ATOs.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Tanker availability, basing, airspace management, aircraft mix (endogenous but partly adjustable; operational).
Political: Need to give each service and key allies meaningful roles; requirement to prepare for eventual ground offensive.
Intelligence: Inadequate BDA processes for regime‑focused effects; analytic culture still battlefield-centric (endogenous).
Resource/Time: Compressed planning timelines vs. large target sets; limited stealth aircraft and PGMs.

Chapter 4: The Target State – The Iraqi Regime’s Political Power Structure

Summary:

Chapter 4 is the analytical core of Olsen’s critique: it constructs a detailed picture of Saddam Hussein’s regime to test whether the strategic air campaign targeted the true centers of gravity. Olsen argues that Saddam’s political power base consisted of five overlapping pillars: the Ba’ath Party, the formal government, the military apparatus, the security and intelligence network, and an informal kinship complex rooted in tribal and family ties. (p. 23) He shows how Saddam centralized authority in the Office of the Presidential Palace and used overlapping agencies, party organs, and tribal networks to prevent coups and control society. (pp. 200–201, 207–215, 219–220) The chapter emphasizes that recruitment into key positions was based on personal loyalty, family ties, and tribal affiliation rather than formal hierarchy, creating a system in which formal institutions were only part of the power story. (pp. 207–215) Olsen concludes that U.S. planners did not grasp this structure; they attacked buildings and communication nodes but left the underlying social and tribal networks intact. Thus, the strategic air campaign misidentified or at best incompletely targeted the regime’s center of gravity.

Key Points:

Saddam’s five pillars of power: Ba’ath Party, government, military, security/intel network, and kinship complex. (p. 23)
The Office of the Presidential Palace functioned as the real nerve center, with seven key security/intel agencies reporting directly to it. (pp. 207–208)
Recruitment of security/intel officials and many senior officers prioritized personal loyalty and tribal/family ties; multiple agencies overlapped intentionally so that “several officials were watching each other.” (pp. 199–200, 207–208)
The Iraqi military was large and capable but politically subordinated, with significant redundancy and internal policing by party/security organs. (pp. 200–201)
The tribal system, especially al‑Bu Nasir and allied Sunni tribes within the “Sunni Triangle,” provided deep social cohesion and mutual dependence among the ruling elite. (pp. 215, 219–220)
During the 1991 uprising (Intifada), the security and tribal networks proved decisive in crushing opposition despite the devastation of war. (pp. 214–215)
U.S. intel “had not ever set foot inside Iraq” in many cases; the order‑of‑battle focus meant planners lacked understanding of this social architecture. (p. 214)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Directly addresses limits of airpower: air strikes on hardened facilities cannot easily penetrate social networks, fear, and tribal loyalty.
Undermines the expectation that leadership targeting would quickly produce coups or mass unrest.
Clarifies why attrition of military assets and infrastructure did not automatically translate into regime collapse—a key efficacy gap.
Provides a framework (five pillars + kinship) useful for analogies to other authoritarian regimes.

Limits Map (mini):

Intelligence/Information: Profound lack of understanding of Iraqi political sociology; exogenous in part (closed regime) but also endogenous (US focus on OB).
Adversary Adaptation: Regime deliberately built redundancy and overlapping security organizations to withstand coups and external attack.
Technological/Capability: Precision strikes could destroy nodes, but not the trust, fear, and kinship patterns that sustained the regime.
Political: U.S. political unwillingness to pursue ground-based decapitation or deep involvement in Iraqi internal politics limited ability to exploit regime vulnerabilities.

Section 4.1: The Iraqi Security and Intelligence Network

Summary:

Olsen describes a highly secretive and faceless security/intel network as the “structural foundation of the regime’s power base.” (p. 207) Agencies like Mukhabarat (General Intelligence), Estikhbarat (Military Intelligence), Amn al‑Khass (Special Security), and Amn al‑Amm (General Security) reported not to ministries but directly to the Office of the Presidential Palace. (pp. 207–208, 212–214) Each agency had its own internal security branch, and their areas of responsibility overlapped deliberately to create competition and mutual surveillance. (pp. 207–208) The National Security Bureau coordinated their activities and managed a Joint Operations Room with a wide‑area computer network linking rapid reaction units—an attractive target for strategic air planners. (pp. 208–214) Olsen notes that this system created a “Kafkaesque” environment of fear, constant monitoring, and rapid, ruthless repression, ensuring that coup plots and uprisings failed—even under Desert Storm bombing and the subsequent Intifada. (p. 214)

Key Points:

Seven major agencies formed a dense security web, all ultimately controlled by Saddam via the Presidential Palace. (pp. 207–208)
Recruitment prioritized family, regional, and tribal ties from Saddam’s native area; loyalty and ruthlessness mattered more than education. (pp. 207–208)
The National Security Bureau and its Joint Operations Room linked agencies and rapid reaction forces in Baghdad via electronic networks. (p. 208)
The network’s purpose was both regime security and control of society, with informers embedded in diplomatic missions, military units, and local police stations. (pp. 207–208, 212–214)
U.S. strategic air planners correctly saw this network as a key target set, but had very limited understanding of internal redundancies and emergency procedures. (p. 241)
Even under intense bombing, the network remained functional enough to prevent a coup or sustained uprising. (pp. 214–215)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Illustrates how intelligence and adversary adaptation combine to limit airpower: you can hit nodes, but not the systemic fear and redundancy.
Highlights mismatch between Warden’s model (leadership & C3 as critical nodes) and a regime that had designed its security apparatus precisely to survive such attacks.
Reinforces that strategic airpower’s political effects hinge on knowing the true structure of the enemy’s state, not just its visible infrastructure.

Limits Map (mini):

Intelligence/Information: Inadequate mapping of security agencies, their interconnections, and contingency plans (endogenous, partially adjustable but not in crisis timeline).
Adversary Adaptation: Network built explicitly to resist coups, assassination, and external pressure (largely fixed; strategic).
Technological/Capability: Data networks and HQs were vulnerable to PGMs, but redundancy, manual backup, and personal couriers reduced impact.

Section 4.2: The Iraqi Military Apparatus

Summary:

This section analyzes the Iraqi military as the third pillar of Saddam’s power. Olsen shows that, on paper, Iraq fielded the largest military in the Arab Middle East—2.5 times the size of Egypt’s forces—but its autonomy was sharply limited. (p. 200) The Military Bureau, a Ba’ath Party organ, monitored the armed forces, while Party security and Special Security organizations ensured loyalty through surveillance and overlapping authority. (pp. 199–200) Senior commands were often filled by tribe and family members, and promotions required approval from party and security organs. (pp. 200–201) Saddam personally directed aspects of the Iran–Iraq War from a bunker under the presidential palace, down to platoon‑level decisions. (p. 200) The regular Army, Republican Guard, and Popular Army had distinct roles, with the Guard and internal security forces serving as praetorian shields for the regime. (pp. 200–201) The net effect was a military that could fight effectively on defense but had limited political agency and strong internal fragmentation.

Key Points:

Iraqi armed forces were large but politically controlled via party organs and security agencies; generals had “little say in policy-making and threat assessments.” (p. 200)
All three services (Army, Air Force, Navy) were heavily infiltrated; even small exercises required approval from the Military Bureau, MoD, and Military Intelligence. (p. 200)
The Republican Guard and later Special Republican Guard provided elite, regime‑loyal units under direct presidential control. (pp. 200–201)
Army organization reflected British influences (sections to corps), but equipment was largely Soviet. (p. 201)
The military’s dual role—shielding the regime and prosecuting wars—created tensions, resolved by prioritizing regime security over battlefield effectiveness.
For air planners, this meant that destroying forces and C2 might not produce elite defection or coup, since key coercive power was embedded in parallel security structures.

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Shows again that military attrition ≠ political collapse, a key challenge to simple airpower theories.
Highlights regime security vs. national defense as a central analytic distinction.
Provides context for why Republican Guard targeting was politically salient but not decisive for regime change.

Limits Map (mini):

Strategic: The regime prioritized internal security over external effectiveness; this made Iraq more resilient to defeat but less effective militarily.
Operational: Centralization to Saddam slowed adaptation but prevented independent military initiatives that might have threatened the regime.
Intelligence: U.S. focus on OB underplayed these political roles and the Guard’s function as a praetorian force.

Section 4.3: The Iraqi Tribal Kinship System

Summary:

Olsen explores the informal kinship network underpinning Saddam’s rule. He argues that understanding the regime requires going “beyond this extraordinary organisational design” to analyze how tribe, clan, and family ties structured power. (p. 215) Saddam relied heavily on his al‑Bu Nasir tribe and allied Sunni tribes from the “Sunni Triangle,” using kinship, patronage, and selective repression to secure loyalty. (pp. 215, 219–220) Tribal shaykhs were turned into regime partners through “Ba’thization,” material benefits, and empowerment as local enforcers; in return, they policed their own people and delivered recruits. (pp. 215, 219–220) Olsen notes that this system created a narrow but deeply cohesive ruling circle, where the Majid and Ibrahim family branches competed under Saddam’s balancing hand. (pp. 219–220) He concludes that this tribalization of power produced a form of cohesion that no amount of precision bombing of government buildings could readily fracture.

Key Points:

Kinship ties formed a social network where “social closeness with the leader determined power.” (p. 215)
Saddam consciously co‑opted tribal shaykhs, turning them into power‑sharing partners and instruments of control. (p. 215)
The al‑Bu Nasir tribe was small but central; its relatives held key posts in ministries, military, and security services, creating an extended family regime. (pp. 216–220)
Tribal leaders gained material benefits (infrastructure, education, promotions) and in turn provided loyal recruits and local control. (p. 219)
The regime managed inter‑tribal balance by divide‑and‑rule, rewarding some tribes and punishing others, ensuring no single group could challenge al‑Bu Nasir. (p. 219–220)
Even within the ruling clan, power was carefully balanced between Majid and Ibrahim branches, overseen by Saddam. (p. 220)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Demonstrates that social structures and identity politics can be central limits to coercive airpower.
Explains why “leadership targeting” did not automatically generate defection: elites had their fate tied to Saddam’s survival.
Offers a framework for analogies to other kinship‑based authoritarian regimes.

Limits Map (mini):

Intelligence/Information: U.S. planners lacked a kinship map; tribal structures were essentially invisible to targeteers.
Adversary Adaptation: Saddam deliberately constructed tribal alliances to survive crises like Desert Storm and the 1991 uprising.
Political: Limited war aims and lack of a postwar political strategy meant the coalition never exploited potential tribal fissures on the ground.

Chapter 5: An Examination of the Strategic Air Campaign

Summary:

Chapter 5 evaluates what the strategic air campaign actually accomplished—as designed, as executed, and as perceived in Baghdad. Olsen begins with the formal objectives in OPORD 91‑001: attack the political‑military leadership and command facilities, gain and maintain air superiority, sever supply lines, destroy NBC capabilities, destroy Republican Guard forces, and liberate Kuwait City. (p. 241) He then compares these with the missions assigned to airpower and recounts the campaign’s execution, focusing on leadership and C3 strikes, SEAD, the Scud hunt, weather problems, raids on Baghdad, and final operations. (pp. 241–253, 268–274) The chapter emphasizes that airpower achieved overwhelming air supremacy, devastated Iraqi infrastructure, and greatly degraded Iraqi military effectiveness, but did not produce the hoped‑for regime change or internal revolt. (pp. 268–274) Olsen argues that three factors limited the strategy’s optimal execution: “limited understanding of the nature of the regime, inadequate intelligence and political restraints from Washington.” (p. 23) He concludes that the political outcome of bombing “had little to do with sorties flown, buildings struck and tanks destroyed, but much to do with the intangibles of politics” disconnected from battlefield metrics. (p. 5)

Key Points:

OPORD 91‑001 and Bush’s NSD‑54 defined objectives that blended regime isolation, NBC destruction, battlefield attrition, and Kuwait’s liberation. (pp. 241–242)
The first 24 hours saw concentrated F‑117 and TLAM strikes on leadership, C3, and electric power; Iraq’s IADS was rapidly suppressed, enabling follow‑on operations without a separate “battle for air superiority.” (pp. 241–244)
The Scud hunt, ordered by Cheney to prevent Israeli retaliation, represented a major diversion from the original plan and early political interference in air operations. (pp. 245–247)
Weather, dispersal, and Iraqi adaptation further complicated precision strikes, especially on mobile launchers and some leadership targets. (pp. 247–248)
BDA friction: Black Hole needed fast, raw hit/miss data, while intel organizations insisted on full analysis; planners resorted to alternate channels like DIA and Navy SPEAR. (pp. 241–244)
Iraqi perceptions were shaped by the dramatic central Baghdad raids, Patriot interceptions (perceived as successful), and the regime’s ability to maintain internal security and control the narrative. (pp. 245–247)
Strategic airpower considerably aided the ground campaign and coalition victory, but did not fulfill the implicit expectation of regime collapse. (pp. 268–274)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Directly interrogates measures of effectiveness, and the mismatch between what planners measured and what mattered politically.
Highlights political limits and alliance management (Scuds, Israel, NBC) as central constraints.
Shows adaptation & learning within the campaign (BDA workarounds, target reprioritization) but also structural blind spots about the regime.
Reinforces that airpower can be decisive militarily but limited politically in a constrained, coalition, limited‑war setting.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Washington’s insistence on avoiding Israeli entry and limiting collateral damage; UN mandate bounded war aims. (Exogenous; strategic.)
Intelligence/Information: BDA problems; absence of metrics for “regime vulnerability” and political effects; reliance on external cues (Scud launches, broadcasts).
Operational: Weather, Scud mobility, sanctuary issues (launchers in western Iraq, urban cover); limited F‑117 and TLAM numbers; tanker constraints.
Adversary Adaptation: Dispersal, deception, use of mobile TELs, and flexible security/intel practices reduced impact of some target sets.

Section 5.1: The Course of the Strategic Air Campaign

Summary:

Olsen organizes the campaign chronologically, starting with the opening leadership and C3 strikes and ending with final operations against Republican Guard and other military targets. He stresses that the campaign followed an “inside‑out” logic—hitting the regime’s central nervous system while simultaneously suppressing air defences. (p. 241) The ability to strike high‑value targets in Baghdad without a prolonged preliminary air superiority battle is presented as a major operational advantage. (pp. 241–244) Over time, target priorities shifted as some leadership nodes were neutralized, Scud hunting consumed sorties, and preparations for the ground offensive intensified. (pp. 244–253) Olsen notes that while the overall concept remained intact, actual execution deviated in ways that mattered for measuring effect: some planned targets were never hit, some had to be reattacked multiple times, and some categories (e.g., Scuds, Republican Guard) absorbed disproportionate attention.

Key Points:

The campaign moved from leadership/C3 and IADS to electricity, industry, fielded forces, and finally concentration on Republican Guard.
Inside‑out strikes reduced the need for phased, linear operations, illustrating the potential of stealth and PGMs. (pp. 241–244)
BDA friction and uncertain feedback on systemic effects made it difficult to calibrate when “enough” damage had been done to leadership or electricity. (pp. 241–244)
The “course” of the campaign was shaped less by doctrinal preferences than by emergent factors: Scuds, weather, ground force buildup pace, and political pressure. (pp. 244–248, 253–256)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Shows operational adaptation under friction rather than clean doctrinal implementation.
Provides concrete context for evaluating effectiveness: what actually happened vs. what was planned.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Dynamic re-tasking constrained by sortie generation, tanker scheduling, and BDA delays.
Political: Need to demonstrate progress to Washington and coalition capitals; manage media optics of raids on Baghdad.

Section 5.2: The First 24 Hours of Operations

Summary:

This section details the opening night’s objectives, forces, and results. OPORD 91‑001 specified that the air campaign should: gain and maintain air supremacy; isolate and incapacitate the Iraqi regime; destroy NBC capabilities; eliminate offensive capability; and render Iraqi forces in Kuwait ineffective. (pp. 241–242) The first night prioritized disabling the IADS, leadership, C3, and electrical power. F‑117s carried two‑thirds of leadership strikes and a third of C3 strikes, while Tomahawk land attack missiles (TLAMs) provided additional attacks, despite Powell’s skepticism about their effectiveness. (pp. 241–244) Raw tallies show F‑117s hitting 14 central Baghdad targets in the first 24 hours and only one on the second day; TLAMs hit 39 targets the first day, 18 the second. (p. 244) Olsen stresses that although the numerical data seem modest, the systemic effect—paralyzing air defence and shocking the regime—was substantial.

Key Points:

The opening plan aims at rapid air supremacy and strategic paralysis, not gradual escalation. (pp. 241–244)
F‑117s and TLAMs are used in a complementary fashion; Baghdad is largely reserved for stealth aircraft. (pp. 241–244)
Some TLAM paths via Turkey and Syria are cancelled due to overflight denial, illustrating coalition/geopolitical constraints. (p. 242)
The rapid collapse of Iraqi IADS demonstrated how stealth and SEAD enable strategic attack, confirming some airpower advocates’ expectations.
Early BDA and intel friction emerged immediately, pushing planners to seek alternate channels. (pp. 241–244)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Opening moves show airpower’s operational leverage when political conditions allow surprise and concentration.
But they also reveal how coalition politics and geography (overflight constraints) shape even high‑tech operations.

Limits Map (mini):

Operational: Navigation constraints for TLAMs (need for landmarks), overflight denial by Turkey and Syria; limited number of stealth and cruise systems.
Political/Legal: Overflight permissions; desire to minimize early civilian casualties in Baghdad.
Intelligence: Immediate BDA challenges; difficulty translating physical damage into assessments of leadership paralysis.

Section 5.3: The Scud Diversion

Summary:

Olsen’s treatment of the Scud hunt is a textbook example of political limits rechanneling airpower. After Iraq fired Scuds at Israel, Bush and Cheney, worried about Israeli retaliation and coalition cohesion, ordered Schwarzkopf to prioritize mobile Scud launchers. (pp. 245–247) Schwarzkopf and air planners believed the missiles were militarily insignificant and opposed this diversion from the strategic plan, but were overruled. (p. 245) Planners had reasonable knowledge of fixed launchers and assumed cutting C3 (e.g., fibre‑optic links) would suffice; they underestimated the number and concealment of mobile TELs. (pp. 245–247) The Scud hunt consumed vast sorties and effort, became the third‑largest strategic target category after airfields and Republican Guard, and still produced ambiguous results. (pp. 245–247) On the Iraqi side, Saddam personally directed Scud usage and refrained from chemical warheads out of fear of nuclear retaliation and regime‑destruction. (pp. 245–247)

Key Points:

Scud launches at Israel generated high‑level political pressure that trumped military assessments of their limited operational value. (pp. 245–247)
The Scud hunt diverted sorties from leadership/C3 and other strategic targets early in the campaign. (p. 245–247)
Mobile TELs and concealment in western Iraq posed severe ISR/BDA challenges; airpower alone struggled to find and kill them, even with special forces assistance. (pp. 245–247)
Iraqi decisions about warhead type reveal their sensitivity to U.S. nuclear and regime‑destruction threats—a strategic deterrent effect not captured in sortie metrics. (p. 246)
The episode illustrates how air campaign design is constantly renegotiated with political leadership in light of alliance management concerns.

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Perfect example of political limits on airpower: strategic priorities shifted for coalition management.
Demonstrates adversary adaptation and sanctuary (mobility, concealment) frustrating high‑tech targeting.
Highlights divergences between tactical/operational metrics (Scuds killed) and strategic effect (keeping Israel out, preserving coalition).

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Need to prevent Israeli entry and preserve Arab coalition support; non‑negotiable strategic constraint.
Intelligence/Information: Difficulty detecting mobile launchers; weather and terrain obstacles.
Adversary Adaptation: Mobility, deception, and firing tactics reduced vulnerability to air strike.
Operational: Sortie allocation trade‑offs; limited special forces and cueing assets.

Conclusions

Summary:

In his concluding chapter, Olsen synthesizes the historical narrative and regime analysis into a broader assessment of strategic airpower. He argues that Desert Storm demonstrated airpower’s capacity to dominate the battlespace and become the “backbone of the entire war effort,” but also highlighted the persistent gap between physical destruction and political outcomes. (p. 23) Comparing his findings with scholars like Pape and the GWAPS authors, he suggests that military results—air supremacy, destroyed forces, precision strikes—do not automatically translate into coercive leverage or regime change. (pp. 286–287) The key failure was not in technology or execution but in appreciating “the nature of the regime” and its ability to absorb punishment while maintaining internal control. (pp. 2–3, 214–215) He emphasizes that “the political outcome of bombing had little to do with sorties flown, buildings struck and tanks destroyed, but much to do with the intangibles of politics,” especially alliance dynamics, Iraqi domestic politics, and Washington’s limited aims. (p. 5) Olsen concludes that while the strategic air campaign contributed decisively to liberating Kuwait and degrading Iraqi capabilities, it fell short of its implicit political promise, offering a cautionary framework for future air‑centric limited wars.

Key Points:

Airpower in Desert Storm was historically significant but not revolutionary in its political effects; its success was partial and conditional. (pp. 286–287)
Misreading Iraqi regime structure and social power made leadership targeting far less effective than planners assumed. (pp. 175–176, 214–215)
The campaign’s conceptual innovation (strategic paralysis via Five Rings) was blunted by intelligence gaps and political constraints. (pp. 23, 286–287)
Measures like sortie counts and target damage obscure what really matters: whether bombing changes enemy decision‑making and political structures. (pp. 5, 262–269)
Desert Storm should be seen as a starting point for understanding modern airpower’s strengths and limits, not a template that can be uncritically transplanted to other contexts. (pp. 286–287, 295–296)

Cross‑Cutting Themes:

Brings together limits, expectations vs. reality, and efficacy at all levels of war.
Repositions Desert Storm from a triumphalist narrative to a nuanced case of tactical/operational success and mixed strategic returns.
Encourages strategic empathy: understanding adversary regimes as complex sociopolitical systems.

Limits Map (mini):

Political: Limited war aims, coalition boundaries, and UN mandate; decisions not to pursue regime overthrow.
Intelligence/Information: Structural inability to map and measure the regime’s social‑political resilience.
Strategic: Reliance on one instrument (airpower) to achieve effects that may require integrated political, informational, and ground efforts.
Learning: Post‑1991 air operations often imported Desert Storm’s successes but not its cautions, leading to misapplied analogies.

🧱 Limits Typology (case‑specific)

Political

UN Mandate & Limited Aims: U.S. pledged to liberate Kuwait, not occupy Iraq or topple Saddam; coalition cohesion (Arab partners, Europe) reinforced this ceiling.
- Origin: Exogenous (international politics).
- Adjustability: Partly relaxable in theory but politically infeasible in 1991.
- Effect level: Strategic.
- Adaptation: Air campaign focused on regime isolation, not decapitation or occupation; ground offensive deliberately short and limited.
Alliance Management & Israel: Keeping Israel out of the war to preserve Arab coalition partners drove the Scud hunt and shaped ROE. (pp. 245–247)
- Origin: Exogenous.
- Adjustability: Low; strategic requirement.
- Outcome: Diverted sorties, diluted pure “paralysis” concept, but preserved coalition.

Legal/Normative

Civilian Casualty and Urban Sanctuary Concerns: Desire to minimize collateral damage in Baghdad constrained shelter busting and repeated attacks on some urban targets.
- Origin: Exogenous (international opinion) and endogenous (U.S. norms).
- Adjustability: Somewhat; but political risk of mass casualties high.
- Outcome: Emphasis on precision, stealth, nighttime raids; limited willingness to attack certain “sanctuaries.”

Strategic

Ambiguous Theory of Victory: Formal aims (liberate Kuwait) vs. implicit hope for regime change via air pressure created conceptual drift.
- Origin: Endogenous (U.S. civil–militaries).
- Adjustability: Could have been clarified, but wasn’t; ambiguity persisted.
- Outcome: When Saddam survived, airpower advocates and critics interpreted results differently, fueling later doctrinal debates.

Operational

Basing & Access: Operations depended on Saudi and Gulf bases; no overflight via some neighbors (TLAM paths cancelled due to Turkey/Syria). (p. 242)
- Origin: Exogenous.
- Adjustability: Negotiable but limited.
- Outcome: Influenced target timing, route design, tanker demand.
Sortie Generation & Tankers: Limited tanker numbers, aircraft availability, and maintenance cycles constrained how much of the Five Rings could be attacked quickly.
- Origin: Endogenous resource limit.
- Outcome: Prioritization of leadership/C3 and key fields; some lower‑priority targets delayed.
C2 and BDA: ATO cycle, intel–planner friction, and classification limited rapid feedback on strategic effects. (pp. 241–244)

Technological/Capability

Stealth & PGM Scarcity: F‑117 and high‑end PGMs were few; cruise missiles were expensive and path‑constrained. (pp. 241–244)
SEAD & IADS Complexity: 7,000 radar‑guided SAMs, 9,000 IR SAMs, 7,000 AAA pieces required extensive SEAD effort. (p. 241)
ISR/BDA Limitations: Space, airborne, and imagery intelligence were strong for fixed sites but weak for mobile TELs and underground facilities.

Intelligence/Information

Order‑of‑Battle Bias: U.S. intel optimized for counting divisions, tanks, and radar sites, not mapping kinship networks and regime internal politics. (pp. 2, 214–215)
BDA Culture: Designed to measure battlefield attrition, not systemic political vulnerability; no robust metrics for “regime stress.” (pp. 241–244, 262–269)

Adversary Adaptation

Scud Mobility and Sanctuary: TEL dispersal into western Iraq and use of concealment undermined targetability. (pp. 245–247)
Redundant C3 & Security: Multiple agencies, backups, and manual processes limited the impact of leadership/C3 strikes. (pp. 207–215)

Resource/Time

Short Campaign: Political impatience and military design for a quick war compressed the timeline for strategic air pressure to create political effects.
Force Mix: Force package was dominated by conventional aircraft and unguided munitions; ~210,000 unguided bombs vs. 17,000 PGMs. (p. 280)

📏 Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)

What they tracked then:

Sorties flown, tonnage dropped, target categories attacked (C3, electricity, bridges, Republican Guard, Scuds, etc.).
BDA by physical damage levels (destroyed, severely damaged, moderately damaged, etc.).
Air superiority metrics: Iraqi aircraft sorties, shoot‑down ratios, SAM and AAA effectiveness.
Operational outcomes: ground force attrition, tank/vehicle kills, battlefield mobility constraints.
Some political indicators: Iraqi propaganda tone, Scud launch rates, Iraqi diplomatic maneuvers.

Better MoE today (with rationale):

Regime decision‑making metrics: Changes in Saddam’s behavior, command style, and risk calculus; evidence of disrupted command cycles.
Internal control indicators: Frequency of coup plots, defections, internal purges, or changes in security deployments during and after the air campaign.
Coalition political outcomes: Arab partner behavior, Israeli restraint, UN legitimacy, and regional perceptions of U.S. credibility.
Civilian and infrastructure resilience: Speed of restoration of electricity, communications, and basic services in Baghdad; regime’s ability to sustain internal control.
Longer‑term strategic results: How much Iraqi military capability was degraded over the decade, and how quickly the regime adapted (e.g., UNSCOM battles, sanctions resilience).

Evidence summary:

Olsen highlights that the “political outcome of bombing had little to do with sorties flown, buildings struck and tanks destroyed, but much to do with the intangibles of politics,” signaling that the original MoE set was inadequate. (p. 5)
His deep dive into the regime’s security and tribal networks suggests they remained intact enough to crush uprisings, indicating limited effect on the true center of gravity. (pp. 214–215)
Iraqi restraint on chemical Scuds hints at successful deterrence of certain actions, but not at coercive success on the key objective of withdrawing from Kuwait (which required ground threat and coalition diplomacy as well).

🤷‍♂️ Actors & Perspectives

John A. Warden III (USAF Colonel, Checkmate)

Role / position: Head of Checkmate cell; principal architect of Instant Thunder and advocate for strategic paralysis via the Five Rings.
Key perspectives / assumptions: The enemy is a system; leadership and key nodes are the center of gravity; concurrent, high‑precision strikes can quickly paralyze decision‑making and induce desired political outcomes without grinding ground combat.
Evolution of stance: From a relatively pure strategic‑paralysis advocate in Washington to a more constrained voice as the plan moved to Riyadh; sidelined operationally but his conceptual imprint remained strong.
Influence on outcomes: His ideas provided the philosophical foundation for the strategic air campaign; even as other planners modified details, the inside‑out, leadership‑centric mindset shaped targeting and phasing.

David Deptula (USAF Lt Col, later senior general officer; Black Hole planner)

Role / position: Key planner in Black Hole; central in translating Five Rings into MAPs and ATOs; later a leading airpower theorist.
Key perspectives / assumptions: Effects‑based operations, concurrent strategic attack, and the possibility of airpower as primary war‑winning instrument.
Evolution of stance: Initially a Warden ally, he became a bridge between conceptual and operational communities; defended the plan’s core while adjusting to joint constraints and real‑time feedback.
Influence on outcomes: Strong; he helped ensure that leadership/C3 targeting and inside‑out phasing remained central even as ground‑support requirements expanded.

Charles Horner (USAF Lt Gen, CENTAF / JFACC)

Role / position: Operational air commander in theatre; CENTCOM Forward early in Desert Shield.
Key perspectives / assumptions: Experienced tactical airman; supportive of robust air operations but initially skeptical of an air‑only solution; focused on joint support and achievable, military‑meaningful objectives.
Evolution of stance: From thinking in terms of limited punitive strikes to embracing a comprehensive offensive air campaign once Instant Thunder was adapted; insisted on practical, executable plans.
Influence on outcomes: High; his acceptance and shaping of the plan made it an operational reality, balancing Warden’s vision with joint and coalition requirements.

Buster Glosson (USAF Maj Gen, Black Hole leader)

Role / position: Director of strategic air campaign planning and execution; principal architect of the Black Hole cell.
Key perspectives / assumptions: Aggressive air operations, heavy emphasis on SEAD, leadership/C3, and Republican Guard targeting; belief in airpower’s decisive potential.
Evolution of stance: Transitioned from skepticism toward Instant Thunder’s abstract theory to owning the campaign’s execution and defending its performance.
Influence on outcomes: Very high; controlled MAP/ATO, prioritized targets, and mediated between Washington, Horner, and planners.

Norman Schwarzkopf (US Army GEN, CENTCOM CINC)

Role / position: Overall theatre commander.
Key perspectives / assumptions: Ground commander by background; initially thought in terms of retaliation and ground battle; sought decisive options that minimized coalition casualties and political risk.
Evolution of stance: Asked for a “strategic air campaign” option and embraced Instant Thunder more than Horner initially did; subsequently insisted on robust air prep of the battlefield and destruction of Republican Guard.
Influence on outcomes: Crucial; his request enabled Warden’s concept; his demands for ground prep and Scud suppression broadened and modified the air campaign.

Colin Powell (US Army GEN, Chairman JCS)

Role / position: Highest uniformed officer; senior adviser to President Bush.
Key perspectives / assumptions: Skeptical of claims that technology and airpower alone could win; favored clear objectives, overwhelming force, and a decisive outcome (the so‑called Powell Doctrine).
Evolution of stance: Initially dubious about TLAMs and parts of Instant Thunder; later endorsed the integrated campaign that combined strategic air attack, battlefield interdiction, and a short ground offensive.
Influence on outcomes: High; influenced force buildup, ensured Army needs were met, and provided political cover for a large‑scale, short war.

Saddam Hussein (President of Iraq)

Role / position: Supreme political and military leader.
Key perspectives / assumptions: Believed in his security apparatus, tribal backing, and ability to absorb punishment; initially miscalculated coalition resolve and military balance.
Evolution of stance: Underestimated coalition airpower early; realized the military gap during the war but never doubted his internal security network’s ability to preserve his rule. (pp. 214–215)
Influence on outcomes: Absolute; his refusal to withdraw pre‑ground offensive and ability to repress uprisings ensured regime survival despite military defeat.

Iraqi Security and Intelligence Leadership (e.g., Abd Hamid Hmoud)

Role / position: Senior managers of security/intel network, reporting directly to Saddam. (pp. 207–208)
Key perspectives / assumptions: Survival of the regime above all; trust in redundancy, fear, and intelligence depth; prepared to respond to coups and uprisings.
Evolution of stance: Adapted to air strikes by shifting operations, relying on manual methods, and intensifying repression.
Influence on outcomes: High; they preserved the regime’s internal control, nullifying the core aim of leadership‑focused bombing.

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

1990‑08‑02 — Iraqi invasion of Kuwait — Triggers crisis; creates demand for rapid U.S. response and options beyond ground deployment.
1990‑08‑08 — Bush’s four national policy objectives announced — Establishes limited aims: liberate Kuwait, restore its government, protect U.S. citizens, stabilize Gulf. (p. 1)
1990‑08‑09–10 — Schwarzkopf requests strategic air option from Air Staff — Opening for Warden’s Checkmate team to propose Instant Thunder. (pp. 112–113)
1990‑08‑17 — Warden briefs Schwarzkopf on Instant Thunder — Critical inflection point: a leadership‑centric strategic air plan enters CENTCOM thinking. (p. 136; referenced in notes)
1990‑11‑29 — UNSCR 678 passed — Authorizes “all necessary means” if Iraq does not withdraw by 1991‑01‑15, setting political deadline for war. (p. 1)
1991‑01‑15 — UN deadline expires — Opens door to offensive operations; coalition proceeds to final war planning.
1991‑01‑17 — Desert Storm begins (Phase I: strategic air campaign) — F‑117 and TLAM strikes on leadership/C3/IADS launch the inside‑out campaign; major operational inflection point. (pp. 241–244)
1991‑01‑18 — First Iraqi Scuds hit Israel — Political inflection point: triggers U.S. Scud hunt to keep Israel out, re‑prioritizing air sorties. (pp. 245–247)
1991‑01‑29–02‑01 — Battle of al‑Khafji — Iraqi ground probe and coalition response underscore airpower’s role in halting Iraqi advances and reassure allies.
1991‑02‑24–28 — Coalition ground offensive — Phase IV; rapid collapse of Iraqi forces after weeks of air prep; demonstrates tactical/operational success of air campaign.
1991‑02‑28 — Ceasefire declared — Ends formal hostilities; Saddam remains in power, setting stage for post‑war uprisings and sanctions era.

📖 Historiographical Context

Olsen engages directly with GWAPS (Keaney & Cohen) and its detailed operational analyses, using its data but questioning whether its metrics capture political outcomes. (pp. 23, notes throughout)
He dialogues implicitly with Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win, which emphasizes denial strategies and skepticism about punishment/decapitation: Olsen agrees that regime type matters but is more sympathetic to leadership targeting as a concept, while showing its limits in Iraq.
He references broader airpower theorists and historians—Cohen, Gray, Meilinger, Higham, MacIsaac—which he cites to argue that airpower’s “mystique” and vocabulary have impeded clear analysis. (p. 5)
Compared to celebratory accounts like Hallion’s Storm over Iraq or Mann’s Thunder and Lightning, Olsen is more critical about the political efficacy of the strategic air campaign, though he shares their appreciation for operational innovation.
He also draws on Middle East specialists (Baram, Khadduri, Marr, Makiya) and Iraqi sources to challenge airpower‑centric narratives that ignore internal regime dynamics. (pp. 175–220)

🧩 Frameworks & Methods

Level of analysis: Primarily strategic and operational, with a deep dive into the political‑societal (regime) level on the Iraqi side.
Core frameworks:
- Five Rings Model: Leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, fielded forces—used to conceptualize targeting priorities (Figure 1).
- Strategic Paralysis: Idea that simultaneous attacks on key nodes can incapacitate the enemy system without annihilating fielded forces.
- Five Pillars of Iraqi Power: Ba’ath Party, government, military, security/intel network, kinship; a mirror model on the adversary side. (p. 23)
Instruments & roles:
- Air: Strategic attack, SEAD, air superiority, interdiction, CAS, and leadership targeting.
- Space & ISR: Navigation, communications, and BDA support; limited but growing role.
- Missiles (TLAMs, Scuds): TLAMs as precision, stand‑off strike; Scuds as Iraqi political weapons.
Methods & sources:
- Desert Story Collection (USAF interviews), BBC Frontline transcripts, U.S. official documents (NSD‑54, OPORD 91‑001), GWAPS volumes.
- Extensive secondary literature on both airpower and Iraqi politics.
- Structured narrative plus embedded causal analysis: how doctrinal ideas lead to plan, then to execution and effects.

🔄 Learning Over Time (within the book & vs. prior SAASS 628 cases)

What shifted?

U.S. doctrine moved from WWII/Industrial Web and Vietnam’s gradualism to AirLand Battle’s deep operations and then to Warden’s systemic “strategic paralysis.”
In theatre, planners shifted from deterrent postures and limited retaliatory thinking to embracing a comprehensive, air‑led campaign.
Intelligence and BDA slowly adapted to effects‑based demands, though never fully, prompting informal workarounds.

What persisted?

Overconfidence in the ability of precision bombing to translate into political effects—a theme traceable back to Douhet and ACTS.
Institutional biases (order‑of‑battle focus, Army priority) that undervalued the political analysis of enemy regimes.
The pattern of airpower advocates promising decisive outcomes that political leaders interpret as license for short, low‑cost wars.

What was (mis)learned?

Many post‑1991 narratives overlearned Desert Storm as proof that airpower can coerce or defeat complex adversaries at low cost, downplaying its failure to produce regime change.
Conversely, some critics underlearned its operational revolution—stealth, PGMs, SEAD integration—focusing narrowly on political shortcomings.
Compared with earlier SAASS 628 readings on Vietnam (e.g., Clodfelter), Olsen shows that the U.S. learned to avoid gradualism but did not fully learn to measure what matters strategically.

🧐 Critical Reflections

Strengths:
- Combines detailed campaign history with deep regime analysis—rare in airpower studies.
- Provides an internally coherent critique of leadership targeting that still recognizes airpower’s operational success.
- Uses rich primary sources (Desert Story interviews, Iraqi accounts) to illuminate both U.S. and Iraqi perspectives.
Weaknesses / blind spots:
- Focuses heavily on strategic air campaign; less attention to how ground operations, diplomacy, and sanctions interacted with airpower to shape final outcomes.
- While critical of misreading the Iraqi regime, the book does not fully explore alternative strategies (e.g., different targeting priorities or integrating ground special operations) that might have exploited regime vulnerabilities.
- The analysis is largely U.S.-centric; Iraqi decision‑making is mostly reconstructed through external sources, not deeply grounded in Iraqi archival material.
Unresolved questions:
- Could a better‑informed leadership targeting campaign have toppled Saddam within the same political constraints, or were those constraints decisive?
- How generalizable is the Iraqi case to other authoritarian regimes with different social and security architectures?

⚔️ Comparative Insights (link to prior course readings)

Versus Pape, Bombing to Win:
- Pape emphasizes denial strategies and is skeptical of leadership/punishment; Olsen shows Instant Thunder as a mixed leadership/denial hybrid.
- Desert Storm seems to support Pape’s claim that attacking fielded forces and war‑making capacity matters most for coercion—but only when coupled with credible ground threat.
- Olsen, however, suggests that leadership targeting might be more promising if based on deeper regime understanding, leaving more room for strategic attack than Pape allows.
Versus Vietnam cases (e.g., Clodfelter):
- Both show air campaigns constrained by political limits and misaligned with adversary political structures.
- Desert Storm’s air campaign avoids Vietnam’s gradualism and restrictive ROE in many respects, but still fails to produce the political transformation some airmen hoped for.
- The key continuity is that airpower can shape the battlefield and impose costs, but cannot substitute for a sound political strategy.
Versus classic airpower theorists (Douhet, Mitchell, Warden):
- Olsen confirms that technology (stealth/PGM) moves reality closer to early strategic bombing visions, but also underscores persistent social/political complexities those theorists underplayed.
- Warden’s Five Rings are the most sophisticated descendant, yet still stumble on regime sociology.

✍️ Key Terms / Acronyms

Instant Thunder: Warden’s proposed strategic air campaign plan against Iraq, focused on leadership and system essentials.
Five Rings Model: Conceptual model of the enemy as concentric rings: leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, fielded forces.
Checkmate: USAF Air Staff planning cell in the Pentagon that generated Instant Thunder.
Black Hole: CENTAF planning cell in Riyadh that operationalized the strategic air campaign.
MAP (Master Attack Plan): Integrative plan converting strategy into daily target sets and mission packages.
ATO (Air Tasking Order): Detailed daily order assigning missions to specific aircraft and units.
OPORD 91‑001: Operational order codifying the air campaign’s objectives.
NSD‑54: National Security Directive stating U.S. goals in responding to Iraqi aggression.
IADS: Integrated Air Defence System.
SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defences.
TEL: Transporter‑erector‑launcher for Scud missiles.
GWAPS: Gulf War Air Power Survey.
RCC: Revolutionary Command Council in Iraq.
Mukhabarat / Estikhbarat / Amn al‑Khass / Amn al‑Amm: Iraqi intelligence and security agencies.

❓ Open Questions (for seminar)

Q1: What lessons did American strategists draw upon in designing the Desert Storm campaign?

A: They drew on WWII strategic bombing (Industrial Web Theory, AWPD‑1), the Vietnam experience (failure of gradualism and body‑count metrics), and AirLand Battle’s deep‑strike concepts. These lessons pushed them toward seeking decisive initial blows, attacking deep targets, and avoiding protracted attrition campaigns. Warden and others reinterpreted these lessons into the Five Rings and strategic paralysis, arguing that simultaneous attacks on leadership and system essentials could win quickly without heavy ground fighting.

Q2: What differing interpretations existed of those lessons?

A: Airpower advocates like Warden saw WWII and Vietnam as evidence that strategic bombing was under‑resourced and poorly targeted, not inherently flawed; they argued for more focused, concurrent strategic attack on vital nodes. Many Army and some Air Force leaders read the same history as proof that airpower alone could not compel or coerce adversaries, emphasizing combined arms and ground maneuver. Others (e.g., Powell) believed in overwhelming force and integration, seeing airpower as critical but not sufficient.

Q3: Whose interpretation ultimately shaped the air campaign, and why?

A: The final campaign represents a compromise: Warden’s strategic‑paralysis interpretation provided the conceptual core (inside‑out targeting of leadership/C3), but Horner, Glosson, Schwarzkopf, and Powell shaped the executable plan by expanding target sets (Republican Guard, fielded forces), integrating joint and coalition requirements, and ensuring the ground offensive remained central. Their interpretation prevailed because it aligned with broader institutional doctrine (AirLand Battle), political risk tolerance, and the necessity to reassure Army and coalition partners.

Q4: How effective was the air campaign?

A: Operationally, it was highly effective: it destroyed much of Iraq’s military capacity, achieved air supremacy, degraded C3 and infrastructure, and set conditions for a rapid ground victory. Strategically and politically, it was partially effective: Iraq was expelled from Kuwait, but Saddam’s regime survived, internal opposition was crushed, and many of the regime’s coercive structures remained intact. Effectiveness depended on which objective you prioritize—liberation of Kuwait (success) vs. transformation of Iraq’s political order (failure).

Q5: What limits existed on its employment?

A: Key limits included: UN‑bounded war aims and coalition sensitivities (no official regime change); need to keep Israel out (Scud diversion); ROE and collateral damage concerns; basing and overflight constraints; finite stealth/PGM and tanker capacity; and, crucially, limited intelligence on Iraqi regime structure and social power. Adversary adaptation (dispersal, redundancy, mobile TELs) further constrained airpower’s ability to achieve its most ambitious goals.

Q6: How did strategists at the time measure its effectiveness?

A: They mostly used traditional metrics: sorties flown, target categories struck, physical destruction assessments, and ground force attrition. They also tracked Scud launch rates, Iraqi aircraft sorties, and visible battlefield behavior (e.g., surrender rates, unit cohesion). Some political indicators (Iraqi diplomatic moves, propaganda, coalition stability) were observed, but there was no systematic framework for measuring regime vulnerability or internal control.

Q7: How would we measure its effectiveness in retrospect?

A: Retrospectively, we would distinguish between military, strategic, and political effectiveness. Militarily, the campaign was extremely effective. Strategically, it succeeded in freeing Kuwait and deterring some Iraqi actions (e.g., chemical Scuds), but failed to induce regime change or durable behavioral transformation beyond sanctions‑induced containment. Politically, its effectiveness is ambiguous: it preserved coalition unity and U.S. credibility, yet left a hostile regime in place, setting conditions for a decade of sanctions, crises, and ultimately the 2003 invasion. Our MoE should therefore incorporate regime resilience, internal security capability, long‑term regional outcomes, and the balance of costs and risks, not just wartime destruction.

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“This study concerns itself primarily with the first phase of Operation Desert Storm – the air campaign against the Iraqi leadership.” (p. 2) — Clearly frames the book’s focus and limits; a reminder to keep ground operations in analytical background.
“The heart of the strategy, the attacks against Saddam Hussein’s political power base, did not meet the hoped for, but unstated, objective of changing the regime.” (p. 2) — Direct admission that leadership targeting fell short of its political ambition.
“The US intelligence institution was focused more on ‘order-of-battle’ assessments than on the make-up and nature of political regimes.” (p. 2) — Core diagnosis of an enduring institutional limit.
“The story is one of an important strategic innovation that almost did not happen, but for the initiative, persistence and conviction of a few unorthodox airmen.” (p. 65) — Captures how doctrinal change can hinge on personalities and small networks.
“The structure of Saddam’s political power base made sure that the opposition was totally unprepared when their moment arrived in March 1991. The conditions for a coup or an uprising simply did not exist.” (p. 214–215) — Powerful rebuttal to assumptions that regime collapse was imminent or easily inducible.
“The chapter suggests that the political outcome of bombing had little to do with sorties flown, buildings struck and tanks destroyed, but much to do with the intangibles of politics…” (p. 5) — Summarizes Olsen’s core critique of traditional airpower metrics.

🧾 Final‑Paper Hooks

Claim 1: Desert Storm’s strategic air campaign demonstrates that doctrinal innovation (Five Rings/Instant Thunder) can radically reshape operational practice, but its political efficacy is ultimately bounded by intelligence about the adversary’s regime and by limited war aims.
- Evidence/quotes/pages: Instant Thunder genesis and doctrinal break (pp. 64–67, 113); Horner/Glosson adoption without conceptual change (p. 174); misreading of Iraqi regime structure (pp. 175–220); Olsen’s statement that political outcome hinged on “intangibles of politics” (p. 5).
- Counterarguments: Some might argue that regime change was never an official aim; respond by distinguishing formal vs. implicit objectives and by showing how planners and advocates talked about “strategic paralysis.”
Claim 2: The Iraqi case shows that leadership targeting and “strategic paralysis” are least effective against regimes whose true centers of gravity lie in redundant security networks and kinship‑based social structures, which are poorly mapped by traditional military intelligence.
- Evidence: Five‑pillar regime analysis (pp. 175–220); detailed security/intel description (pp. 207–215); tribal network discussion (pp. 215–220); lack of U.S. contact with Iraqi opposition and analysts never having “set foot inside Iraq” (p. 214).
- Counterarguments: Some might claim that more sustained or less constrained bombing would have worked; answer by showing how much of the network is social and redundant, likely requiring political and ground engagement.
Claim 3: Measures of effectiveness used during Desert Storm—sortie counts, target destruction, and battlefield attrition—obscured the real political outcomes and encouraged later overestimation of airpower in Kosovo, Libya, and beyond.
- Evidence: OPORD 91‑001 objectives and metrics (pp. 241–242); BDA and intel friction (pp. 241–244); Olsen’s critique of sortie/target metrics vs. political results (p. 5, 262–269); regime survival despite devastation (pp. 214–215, 286–287).
- Counterarguments: Some may argue that Kuwait’s liberation was the only relevant measure; respond by showing how airpower narratives were later generalized for regime‑change/coercion missions.
Claim 4: The Scud hunt episode encapsulates how alliance politics can reorient an ostensibly “strategic” air campaign away from its theoretical optimum, suggesting that any theory of airpower must internalize political constraints rather than treat them as exogenous friction.
- Evidence: Cheney’s order for Scud hunt (pp. 245–247); planners’ opposition and assessment of Scuds as militarily minor (p. 245); diversion of sorties (pp. 245–247); Israeli restraint and coalition considerations.
- Counterarguments: Critics may say Scuds posed real strategic risks; grant that point but emphasize that such political constraints are intrinsic, not anomalous, to limited wars.

These hooks can be woven into a final SAASS 628 paper on the limits of strategic airpower in limited wars, leveraging Olsen’s case to critique or refine contemporary airpower theory and practice.