Man, the State, and War

Online Description

What are the causes of war? Waltz probes the ideas that thinkers throughout the history of Western civilisation - including St. Augustine, Hobbes, Kant, & Spinoza - have offered to explain the reasons for men & related prescriptions for peace.

🧭 60‑Second Brief

• Core claim (1–2 sentences): Explanations for war cluster at three “images”—man, the state, and the international system—but the anarchical system operates as the permissive cause that renders war recurrent unless radically altered (e.g., world government). Thus, first- and second‑image factors are the immediate (efficient) causes of particular wars, while anarchy conditions them.     

• Causal mechanism in a phrase: Anarchy → self‑help → security dilemma & balancing → recurrent conflict.   

• Paradigm & level(s) of analysis: Classical realism with a three‑level analytic scheme (individual, state, system); third image frames the others. 

• Why it matters for policy/strategy (1–2 bullets):

  • Policies premised solely on improving people or regimes often misfire if they neglect systemic constraints. 

  • Even well‑intentioned states must prepare for balancing and deterrence; morality travels differently across domestic vs. anarchical settings. 

🧪 Theory Map (IR)

• Paradigm(s): Classical Realism (with proto‑structural insights); engages Liberal and Marxist/revisionist claims as second‑image alternatives.   

• Level(s) of analysis: Individual / State / Systemic (Waltz’s “images”). 

• Unit(s) of analysis: Individuals (leaders, publics), states (regime type, domestic coalitions), and the state system (distribution of capabilities; absence of authority).   

• Dependent variable(s): Occurrence/recurrence of war; patterns of peace.

• Key independent variable(s): Human nature and elite behavior (1st image); regime type, economic/social structure (2nd image); anarchy, relative power/balancing (3rd image).     

• Causal mechanism(s): Efficient causes (decisions of people and states) + permissive cause (anarchy: “wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them”). 

• Scope conditions: Applies to systems of multiple sovereign states without a superior coercive authority; logic weakens if effective world government emerges.   

• Observable implications / predictions: Persistent balancing and alliance formation; preventive war temptations under “shadow of the future”; public‑opinion “sanctions” insufficient to ensure peace absent coercion.     

• Potential falsifiers / disconfirming evidence: Durable peace among sovereigns without higher authority; systematic non‑balancing despite rising hegemons; reliable replacement of force by public opinion in interstate conflict.     

🎓 Course Questions (from syllabus)

List verbatim, numbered Q1, Q2, …, as extracted from the syllabus excerpt for this session.

1. What examples you can think of that lend support to Waltz’ three different images of the causes of war?

2. What examples can you think of when the United States has pursued any one of these causes to support peace and avoid war?

3. How does the US, Russia, and China exert power to achieve their goals in international relations?

4. Do great powers rely more or less on one “face” of power?

5. Do medium and small powers use different “faces” of power?

6. Is it possible to use Lukes’ third face of power to shape others’ worldviews?

7. Can the third face of power be used, strategically, to ferment division and stoke conflict?

8. Can it be used to find common ground among actors and strengthen peaceful relations?

9. Is the exertion of power ethical?

10. Does it matter how power is exerted in the international arena or what the envisioned ends of the use of power are?

✅ Direct Responses to Course Questions

Answer each question in order using the text; add page refs where available; append ✓ after each.

Q1. What examples you can think of that lend support to Waltz’ three different images of the causes of war?

Answer:

• First image (individuals): Waltz canvasses thinkers who tie conflict to human drives and leadership pathologies (e.g., animus dominandi); he recounts proposals to select “mentally fit” leaders to avoid war—illustrating the belief that leaders’ traits can precipitate conflict. (pp. 34–36, 79–80)   

• Second image (state structure): “Have‑not” claims, nationalism, and regime types are invoked to explain aggression; liberal hopes that democracies + public opinion will pacify relations exemplify this image. (pp. 83–84, 118–121)   

• Third image (system/anarchy): Preventive war incentives and balancing under anarchy (e.g., Thucydides’ logic; alliance dynamics) show how self‑help generates recurrent conflict. (pp. 159–161, 229–231)    ✓

Q2. What examples can you think of when the United States has pursued any one of these causes to support peace and avoid war?

Answer:

• Second‑image path: Wilson’s program (“community of power,” reliance on organized public opinion and law) sought peace by reforming states and rules, a paradigmatic second‑image prescription. (pp. 118–121) 

• Third‑image path: Waltz reads post‑war U.S. strategy (e.g., Atlantic/Western defense community debates) as balancing against Soviet power—deterrence grounded in anarchy, regardless of the rhetoric. (p. 209)  ✓

Q3. How does the US, Russia, and China exert power to achieve their goals in international relations?

Answer: Waltz does not analyze this specific triad, but his framework implies great powers pursue relative security through alliances, armaments, and internal capacity, because in anarchy “there is no automatic harmony,” and force remains the ultimate arbiter when rules fail. (pp. 160, 207–209, 225–226)    ✓

Q4. Do great powers rely more or less on one “face” of power?

Answer: In Waltz’s terms, coercive capacity looms largest for great powers under anarchy; non‑coercive faces (agenda‑setting, persuasion) cannot reliably substitute for credible force when survival is at stake. Moral expectations calibrated to domestic order do not map cleanly onto international politics. (pp. 207–209)  ✓

Q5. Do medium and small powers use different “faces” of power?

Answer: Yes—because survival under anarchy pushes weaker states toward coalitions and balancing rather than unilateral coercion; “momentarily disadvantaged [states] combine and recombine” to prevent dominance. (pp. 207–209)  ✓

Q6. Is it possible to use Lukes’ third face of power to shape others’ worldviews?

Answer: Waltz treats public opinion and ideas as instruments often emphasized by liberals (e.g., Bentham/Wilson), but he is skeptical they can by themselves secure peace across states; still, elites can mobilize publics, indicating worldview‑shaping is feasible though limited by structure. (pp. 79, 102, 118–121)    ✓

Q7. Can the third face of power be used, strategically, to ferment division and stoke conflict?

Answer: Yes. Because mobilized opinion and elite persuasion can channel passions and fears, they can worsen the security dilemma rather than relieve it. Waltz explicitly warns against overconfidence in behavioral manipulation as a route to peace. (pp. 79–80, 159–161)    ✓

Q8. Can it be used to find common ground among actors and strengthen peaceful relations?

Answer: Sometimes, but only conditionally: where structural incentives align, opinion can lubricate cooperation; absent that, reliance on opinion alone is utopian. (pp. 118–121)  ✓

Q9. Is the exertion of power ethical?

Answer: Waltz argues that in international anarchy moral judgments shift with the security context; “power politics” is neither inherently moral nor immoral—it can be a reasoned response to conditions. (p. 208; cf. conclusion pp. 237–238)    ✓

Q10. Does it matter how power is exerted in the international arena or what the envisioned ends of the use of power are?

Answer: Yes. Means and ends must be evaluated against systemic constraints; force may be necessary to uphold order, but ends‑oriented claims (e.g., moral projects) cannot suspend the balancing logic without changing the system itself. (pp. 207–209, 237–238)    ✓

📚 Section-by-Section Notes

Cover every assigned chapter/section in order.

Chapter I: Introduction (pp. 1–15)

• Purpose: Frame the central question—where are the major causes of war?—and sort answers into three images: man, the state, the state system. 

• Key claims: Each image admits internal diversity; prescriptions must match the locus of cause; logics can be optimistic or pessimistic within the same image. 

• Implications: Analytic clarity is needed to avoid mixing prescriptions with mismatched causes. 

Chapter II: The First Image—International Conflict and Human Behavior (pp. 16–41)

• Purpose: Explain war via human nature, passions, and reason.

• Key claims: Realists often stress persistent defects in human nature (e.g., Niebuhr, Morgenthau); yet conflict can also arise from competition without invoking innate evil. (pp. 34–36, 44–45)   

• Evidence/examples: Morgenthau’s dual roots (competition vs. animus dominandi). (pp. 35–36) 

• Implications: First‑image pessimism overstates what it can explain; basic causes are least manipulable. (p. 34) 

Chapter III: Some Implications of the First Image—The Behavioral Sciences and the Reduction of Interstate Tension (pp. 42–79)

• Purpose: Assess behavioralist remedies (leadership selection, mass attitude change).

• Key claims: Useful at the margin but insufficient without political analysis; elites can mobilize publics, but psychology alone cannot solve political problems. (pp. 79–98; esp. 79)   

• Implications: Overreliance on first‑image fixes risks misdiagnosis. (pp. 96–98) 

Chapter IV: The Second Image—International Conflict and the Internal Structure of States (pp. 80–123)

• Purpose: Shift focus to domestic structures as explanations for war/peace.

• Key claims: “Defects” in states (e.g., expansionist doctrines, have‑not claims) can spur war; liberals expect democracy + public opinion to pacify relations. (pp. 83–84, 100–102, 118–121)   

• Implications: Reforms may reduce conflict, but reliance on opinion or contracts alone is hopeless absent enforcement. (p. 119) 

Chapter V: Some Implications of the Second Image—International Socialism and the Coming of the First World War (pp. 124–158)

• Purpose: Test socialist (second‑image) claims against 1914.

• Key claims: Revisionist optimism underestimated systemic pressures; appeals to class solidarity failed under state imperatives. (p. 158) 

• Implications: Second‑image analyses require third‑image context. (pp. 157–158) 

Chapter VI: The Third Image—International Conflict and International Anarchy (pp. 159–186)

• Purpose: Develop the anarchy argument (Rousseau, Thucydides).

• Key claims: “In anarchy there is no automatic harmony”; states must rely on self‑help; preventive war incentives arise from uncertainty and relative gains concerns. (pp. 160–161) 

• Implications: Third image explains recurrence of war, not any single war. (pp. 186, 232)   

Chapter VII: Some Implications of the Third Image—Examples from Economics, Politics, and History (pp. 187–223)

• Purpose: Illustrate balancing and prudence via cases (Thucydides, European diplomacy).

• Key claims: Balance is often imposed by events on statesmen; coalitions form to block ascendancy; moral codes operate differently without a sovereign. (pp. 207–209, 229–231)   

• Implications: Even anti‑balance rhetoric tends to converge on balancing behavior when threat rises. (p. 209) 

Chapter VIII: Conclusion (pp. 224–238)

• Purpose: Integrate images; address prescriptions.

• Key claims: World government is the logical cure but unattainable in practice; third image provides the framework, first and second supply the forces; permissive vs. efficient causes distinguished. (pp. 232–238)   

• Implications: Foreign policy grounded in the third image is neither moral nor immoral; prudence requires attention to systemic constraints. (p. 238) 

🧩 Key Concepts & Definitions (author’s usage)

• Image: A conceptual “picture” that locates primary causes within man, the state, or the state system; each yields different diagnoses and prescriptions. (pp. 12–14) 

• Permissive cause: Systemic anarchy that allows wars to occur—“wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.” (p. 232) 

• Efficient (immediate) causes: Concrete acts of individuals or states precipitating a given war. (pp. 232–233) 

• Security dilemma / balancing: Under self‑help, states pursue relative security, generating counter‑moves and coalitions. (pp. 207–209, 229–231)   

• Public opinion as sanction: Liberal reliance on publicity and opinion to discipline states—treated as insufficient without enforcement. (pp. 102, 118–121) 

🧑‍🤝‍🧑 Actors & Perspectives

• Individuals/leaders — passions, misperception, moral claims; can trigger crises but are constrained by structure. (pp. 34–36, 232–233)   

• States/regimes — domestic arrangements (liberal, socialist, nationalist) shape preferences and capacity. (pp. 83–84, 118–121, 124–158)     

• System of states — anarchy + distribution of capabilities set the rules of the game that condition all actors. (pp. 159–161, 207–209)   

🕰 Timeline of Major Events (if toggled = Yes)

Not included (toggle = No).

🧠 Policy & Strategy Takeaways

• Anchor ideals to structure: Promote democracy, opinion, and law with credible enforcement and alliance design; otherwise expect disappointment. (pp. 118–121, 207–209)   

• Plan for balancing dynamics: Assume others will react; build coalitions, maintain readiness, manage fears that drive preventive temptations. (pp. 229–231) 

• Moral prudence: In anarchy, ethics and survival are entangled; judge means/ends in light of systemic constraints. (pp. 207–209, 237–238)   

⚔️ Comparative Placement in the IR Canon

• Closest kin / contrasts: Third‑image analysis resonates with Rousseau/Thucydides and Realpolitik; contrasts with liberal and socialist second‑image optimism. (pp. 159–161, 118–121, 124–158)     

• Distinctive move: Separates permissive from efficient causes, preventing single‑cause fallacies. (pp. 232–233) 

• Where it sits: Classical realism with a proto‑structural core that Waltz later develops more formally. (pp. 12–14; 207–209)   

🧐 Critical Reflections

• Strengths: Clear analytic sorting; powerful account of recurrence; rigorous linkage of policy prescriptions to causal claims. (pp. 12–14, 232–238)   

• Weaknesses / blind spots: Abstract on how domestic politics filters systemic pressures; skepticism toward social power/opinion may underplay non‑coercive tools under some conditions. (pp. 118–121) 

• What would change the conclusion: Sustained empirical peace among sovereigns without higher authority; robust evidence that opinion/law displace force system‑wide. (pp. 207–209, 237–238)   

❓ Open Questions for Seminar

• How should policymakers sequence first‑/second‑image reforms under third‑image constraints? (pp. 232–233) 

• When (if ever) do relative gains concerns relax enough to permit reliance on opinion/law? (pp. 160–161, 207–209)   

✍️ Notable Quotes (with pages)

• “In anarchy there is no automatic harmony.” (p. 160) 

• “Wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.” (p. 232) 

• “The balance of power is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen.” (p. 209) 

• “A foreign policy based on this image…is neither moral nor immoral, but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us.” (p. 238) 

📝 Exam Drills (if toggled = Yes)

• Likely prompt: “State and evaluate Waltz’s three images. Which best explains war, and what follows for policy?”

  Skeleton answer:

  1. Define images (man/state/system) and link to prescriptions. (pp. 12–14) 

  2. Argue third image as permissive cause; show how first/second supply efficient causes (with examples). (pp. 232–233; 159–161; 118–121)     

  3. Policy: Combine internal reform and persuasion with balancing/deterrence; avoid single‑cause strategies. (pp. 207–209, 237–238)