Pacific Power Paradox

Online Description

A new history of Asian peace since 1979 that considers America’s paradoxical role After more than a century of recurring conflict, the countries of the Asia-Pacific region have managed something remarkable: avoiding war among nations. Since 1979, Asia has endured threats, near-miss crises, and nuclear proliferation but no interstate war. How fragile is this “Asian peace,” and what is America’s role in it? Van Jackson argues that because Washington takes for granted that the United States is a force for good, successive presidencies have failed to see how their statecraft impedes more durable forms of security and inadvertently embrittles peace. At times, the United States has been the region’s bulwark against instability, but America has been a threat to Asian peace as much as it has been its guarantor. By grappling with how America fits into the Asian story, Jackson shows how regional stability has diminished because of U.S. choices, and why America’s margin for geopolitical error is less now than ever before.

🔫 Author Background

• Van Jackson is an international-relations scholar focused on Asian security and U.S. statecraft; this book synthesizes scholarly debates and practitioner insights to reassess how U.S. policy shaped the “Asian peace.” Specific institutional affiliations and degrees: Not found in provided source.

• Related works cited in the book include Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US–North Korea Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2016), and articles on U.S. primacy and Asian strategy, indicating longstanding expertise on coercion, alliances, and East Asian security. 

• The preface notes his Washington experience and the realization, during and after the Trump years, that many “continuities” in U.S. statecraft had been mythologized as benevolent leadership, prompting this reassessment. 

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Jackson argues that the United States has shown three faces to the Asian peace—aloof hegemon, vital bulwark, and imperious superpower—often simultaneously. Sustaining peace requires replacing triumphalist “Pacific power” narratives with a more accurate, layered account of what actually stabilized Asia since 1979. That layered account identifies six drivers of peace (forward U.S. presence, alliances, great‑power détente, economic interdependence, regionalism, and democracy/good governance) and evaluates each presidency by how it balanced risk and wagers relative to these drivers. “A Pacific power narrative more faithful to reality is a prerequisite for better statecraft” (p. 7). 

🧭 One-Paragraph Overview

Pacific Power Paradox reframes post‑1979 Asian stability as a contingent, multi‑cause achievement rather than the straightforward product of U.S. hegemony. Jackson shows how presidents from Nixon to Trump alternately reinforced or eroded peace’s foundations as they pursued other priorities—opening to China, military superiority, unipolar hubris, the war on terror, the Obama pivot, and Trump’s rivalry‑first approach. His analytic lens—the risk–wager balance—assesses whether policy choices jeopardized (risk) or positively invested in (wager) the peace’s known causes. The book ends with principles for preserving peace amid Sino‑U.S. rivalry and the rise of “Indo‑Pacific” thinking, urging policy makers to recover the Asian peace as a referent narrative for strategy.

🔑 Top Takeaways

• Peace had many parents: six reinforcing causes—not just U.S. primacy—underwrote Asia’s “relative peace” since 1979. Over‑crediting any single cause invites policy errors. 

• Risk–wager balance is a powerful diagnostic: presidencies differ by how they accept risks against known peace drivers and where they place positive bets. 

• Détente mattered more than appreciated: Sino‑U.S. cooperation checked adventurism, reduced miscalculation, and enabled growth—its erosion under Obama and collapse under Trump raised war risks. 

• Unipolar “oxygen” helped—but often by accident: U.S. presence, alliances, and predictable continuity stabilized Asia, even when Washington pursued other agendas. 

• Rivalry is not a strategy: overmilitarized, zero‑sum approaches narrow options, embrittle peace, and generate ugly externalities at home and abroad. 

• Indo‑Pacific turn: offers opportunities (westward extension of stabilizing practices) but risks distraction and overextension; contributions should avoid new entrapments and prioritize anti‑hegemonic balance.

📒 Sections

Preface

Summary: Jackson recounts that the “East Asian peace” puzzle long went unacknowledged in Washington, where elites credited U.S. hegemony and mythologized benevolence. The Trump era seemed discontinuous at first, but archival and documentary review convinced Jackson it amplified longstanding habits in U.S. statecraft. This mythologizing allowed U.S. policy makers to “play with Asia’s fate” without grasping how actions interacted with peace’s layered causes. The book aims to bridge scholarly knowledge about peace’s sources with practitioner narratives that often ignored them. (pp. vii–viii). 

Key Points:

• Washington rarely treated absence of war as an object of strategy. 

• Trump’s “rupture” masked continuities stretching back decades. 

• Need to integrate academic insights on peace into policy narratives. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Reframing narratives; continuity vs. change; demystifying hegemony.

Introduction

Summary: The book introduces the Pacific power paradox and advances a layered account of the Asian peace. Jackson previews the historical chapters (Nixon through Trump) and sets up the six drivers of stability to be used as a diagnostic baseline. The introduction insists that better strategy starts with a more accurate narrative about America’s mixed legacy—neither villainizing nor exceptionalist. It outlines the plan to evaluate each presidency’s risks (what they imperil in peace’s causes) and wagers (what they invest in). It establishes the objective: recover the Asian peace as a policy heuristic for future statecraft. (pp. 7–9, 22–23).

Key Points:

• Peace is relative, exclusion of the Indian subcontinent clarifies the puzzle. 

• Three American “faces” toward peace: aloof hegemon, bulwark, imperious superpower. 

• Chapters will judge presidencies by risks/wagers against six drivers. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Measurement of peace; narrative discipline; methodology as statecraft guide.

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Chapter 1: The Asian Peace as a Guide to Statecraft

Summary: Jackson defines the Asian peace as the post‑1979 absence of interstate war across East Asia and the Pacific and surveys measurement debates (casualty thresholds, structural vs. literal violence). He reviews explanations—power‑based (U.S. presence & alliances), economic interdependence, regional institutions, and localized norms—and argues their mutual reinforcement produced stability. The chapter rejects “single‑cause” thinking, advancing a layered peace logic culminating in six diagnostic indicators: U.S. forward presence, U.S. alliances, great‑power détente, interdependence, regionalism, and democracy/good governance. He then introduces the risk–wager balance as an evaluative tool for presidential choices. (pp. 10, 20–27).

Key Points:

• Definitional/measurement issues: relative vs. absolute peace. 

• Institutions and norms matter in combination, not isolation. 

• Six indicators specify peace’s causal architecture. 

• Risk–wager: decisions either undercut (risk) or invest (wager) in these drivers. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Method over monism; theory‑to‑practice translation; caution against over‑crediting hegemony.

Section 1.1: What Is the Asian Peace?

Summary: Establishes a conservative definitional threshold for war (casualty‑based) and justifies excluding the Indian subcontinent (Kargil, Siachen, Kashmir) to preserve analytic clarity. Peace has been relative and unevenly just, raising questions about how to count “structural violence.” (p. 10). 

Key Points:

• Counting war via casualties reflects de facto conflict reality. 

• “Asia” in this book = East Asia + Pacific (not the Indian subcontinent). 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Measurement shapes policy debates; scope conditions matter.

Section 1.2: Norms, Institutions, Interdependence

Summary: Reviews ASEAN’s noninterference/consensus norms and informal diplomacy (Track 1.5/2), arguing they reduce audience costs and facilitate de‑escalation. However, “pure culturalist” explanations cannot explain temporal variance or pre‑peace violence. Institutions’ effects are conditional on power and interdependence. (pp. 20–21). 

Key Points:

• ASEAN norms socialize behavior; outsiders adapt to “act locally.” 

• Culture alone cannot explain war/peace variation. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Constructivism with constraints; embeddedness of norms in power/economy.

Section 1.3: A Layered Peace

Summary: Argues explicitly against “method of the single cause” (Morgenthau), emphasizing complementarity of U.S. power, interdependence, regionalism, and local norms. Forward U.S. presence is a prior condition enabling deeper forms of peace (e.g., ASEAN). (p. 25). 

Key Points:

• Multiple mechanisms operate together; relative weights vary over time. 

• U.S. presence underwrites space for economic/regional cooperation. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Eclectic theorizing; interdependence of causes.

Section 1.4: The Risk–Wager Balance

Summary: Defines risk as choices that imperil the “reference narrative” (the Asian peace) by neglecting a known cause; wagers are positive investments aligned with expected stabilizing effects. This two‑concept grammar structures the book’s historical assessments. (pp. 26–27). 

Key Points:

• Six indicators become reference points for diagnosing risk. 

• Wagers without offsetting risks are preferable; risky choices demand compensating wagers. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Decision‑making under uncertainty; analytical discipline.

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Chapter 2: Founding the Asian Peace

Summary: The Nixon–Mao opening (1972 Shanghai Communiqué) catalyzed Sino‑U.S. détente—an unintended “founding moment” of the Asian peace—emerging from shifting power balances, softening images, and domestic politics that enabled engaging a former enemy. Post‑1949 enmity (Korean War, revolutionary antagonism) gradually yielded to pragmatic coexistence, which checked rivalry and created conditions for broader regional stability and growth. The chapter stresses contingency: “Big outcomes often have small beginnings.” (pp. 29–30). 

Key Points:

• 1972 opening reframed Asia’s strategic geometry; détente became a stabilizer. 

• Domestic politics and perceptions mattered as enabling conditions. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Détente as peace driver; agency under structural constraints.

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Chapter 3: Conservative Domination of Asia (Reagan Era)

Summary: Reagan sought “peace through strength,” prioritizing military superiority and accepting high costs/risks to pressure the USSR. While the 1980s saw dangerous moments (e.g., 1983 war scares), Asia was a low‑threat environment compared with prior decades; U.S. force posture expanded and helped deter conflict, often as a secondary by‑product of anti‑Soviet strategy. Economic growth across NICs and deferred disputes also lowered war propensity. The result: stability owed partly to luck and partly to U.S. military predictability. (pp. 43–44, 70–71).

Key Points:

• Reagan’s wager: military superiority; risk: exacerbating security dilemmas. 

• Asia’s context enabled risk‑acceptant U.S. behavior without war. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Peace via deterrence + permissive environment; unintended stabilizing effects.

Section 3.1: A Favorable Imbalance of Military Power

Summary: Military expansion and demonstrations (“fight and win”) raised risks but bolstered regional deterrence; “I wanted peace through strength, not peace through a piece of paper” (p. 44). The stabilizing effects were incidental to Asia; priority remained the Soviet contest. 

Key Points:

• Forward presence and exercises increased; allies reassured. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Incidental peace dividends; alliance signaling.

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Chapter 4: A Unipolar Imperium and Its Discontents (George H. W. Bush & Clinton)

Summary: Post‑Cold War unipolarity produced Asia’s most peaceful modern era: Russia receded, Vietnam left Cambodia, worries about Japanese hegemony faded, and democratization advanced. U.S. policy first asserted continuity amid uncertainty, then embraced liberal hubris (APEC, IMF conditionality), sometimes aiding stability, sometimes constraining democratic sovereignty (e.g., Indonesia’s turbulence in 1998). Alliances and Sino‑U.S. engagement buffered Taiwan and enabled interdependence, but risks accumulated in North Korea and through uneven democratic effects. (pp. 71–73, 102–103).

Key Points:

• Unipolar moment = high stability + expanding interdependence. 

• U.S. economic statecraft had two faces: integration and constraints on sovereignty. 

• Alliances + engagement buffered flashpoints (e.g., Taiwan 1996). 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Liberal ordering as mixed blessing; stability through continuity.

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Chapter 5: The War on Terror versus Great‑Power Competition (George W. Bush)

Summary: After 9/11, the war on terror became “not just a priority, but the priority” (p. 107), diverting attention from Asia but indirectly sparing it the era’s most militaristic impulses. Military superiority logic persisted (2002 NSS), and alliances gained salience for burden sharing; Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand deepened cooperation. China policy shifted from “strategic competitor” to “responsible stakeholder,” while the Pentagon (ONA) quietly worried about Chinese anti‑access developments. In narrow terms, defense bloat stabilized Asian deployments; strategically, U.S. neglect postponed riskier policies in Asia. (pp. 107–117, 110–111, 116–117).

Key Points:

• War‑on‑terror focus froze Asia posture; alliances re‑purposed. 

• “Responsible stakeholder” détente reduced bilateral friction with China. 

• ONA seeded A2/AD concerns—hedging against future rivalry. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Aloof hegemony with stabilizing by‑products; siloed grand strategy.

Section 5.1: Military Superiority Requires Allies

Summary: The 2002 NSS reaffirmed dissuasion/primacy; allies’ symbolic and material contributions legitimated U.S. campaigns and indirectly bolstered regional confidence in U.S. staying power. (pp. 108–111). 

Key Points:

• Burden sharing > cost sharing; alliance politics reframed. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Alliance reassurance under non‑Asian priorities.

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Chapter 6: Pivoting in Posthegemony Asia (Obama)

Summary: The global financial crisis accelerated narratives of U.S. decline and Chinese ascent; Obama’s pivot/rebalance sought to correct geographic imbalance by recommitting to Asia’s “operating system.” The approach emphasized alliances (“backbone” of presence), incremental military laydown adjustments (Darwin rotations; EDCA), institutional engagement, and managed détente with China to avoid crisis spirals—even as Beijing grew more assertive. While stabilizing in context, U.S. economic regionalism lagged and democracy promotion proved limited. The era ended with eroding quality of peace and less certainty about the durability of its sources. (pp. 131–156).

Key Points:

• Rebalance = alliance centrality + measured posture shifts + rules‑based rhetoric. 

• Détente produced crisis‑management protocols; constrained escalation. 

• U.S. peripheral in new regional economic architectures; limits of “engagement.” 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Managing decline narratives; balancing reassurance and restraint.

Section 6.1: Alliance Centrality

Summary: Obama framed alliances as the fulcrum of the pivot (Clinton; DSG 2012), repeatedly affirming treaty networks as the backbone of presence and a rules‑based order. (pp. 133–134). 

Key Points:

• Institutionalized predictability as stabilizer; modest posture tweaks. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Liberal ordering via alliances.

Section 6.2: Détente with China, Crisis Management

Summary: Despite rising PRC assertiveness, U.S.–China cooperation included operational safety agreements; détente muted some escalatory dynamics (e.g., Scarborough/Senkaku counterfactuals). Yet Washington’s policy circle soured on engagement by 2016. (pp. 155–156). 

Key Points:

• Détente as shock absorber; elite consensus frayed late. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Great‑power relations as peace driver.

Section 6.3: Regionalism & Democracy Promotion

Summary: Engagement with institutions and democratic norms aimed to socialize behaviors but delivered thin returns on stabilization as security flashpoints outpaced multilateralism; democracy was at best neutral for peace. (p. 156). 

Key Points:

• Activity ≠ influence; economic regionalism deepened without U.S. centrality. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Limits of liberal intergovernmentalism.

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Chapter 7: The Risk–Wager Imbalance of the Trump Era

Summary: Trump centered a sultanistic foreign policy that was hyper‑militarized, mercantilist, anti‑multilateral, and rivalry‑first—amplifying longstanding habits under far less favorable conditions. Defense budgets surged; rhetoric invoked “peace through strength,” yet forward presence was questioned for cost reasons; allies were recast as “protectorates,” undermining confidence in U.S. competence. Taiwan signaling sharpened PRC ire; the Korean Peninsula saw acute nuclear‑crisis risk. The administration’s approach made the U.S. “Asia’s most volatile actor,” collapsing détente and embrittling peace’s foundations. (pp. 164–195, 166–185, 172–173).

Key Points:

• Military‑first “Indo‑Pacific” + decoupling rhetoric; rivalry without strategy. 

• Alliance shake‑downs (burden sharing as rent); competence doubts. 

• Korea crisis and Taiwan signaling increased war risk. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Risks without offsetting wagers; rivalry’s domestic/external pathologies.

Section 7.1: Military‑First in the “Indo‑Pacific”

Summary: Budgets climbed to historic highs; leadership sold “peace through strength,” but internal fights over forward presence exposed strategic incoherence. (pp. 166–167). 

Key Points:

• “Primacy” rhetoric masked inconsistent operational choices. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Means–ends misalignment.

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Chapter 8: Searching for an Indo‑Pacific Peace (Conclusion)

Summary: Jackson calls for recovering the Asian peace as a referent narrative, acknowledging how policy‑maker beliefs diverged from scholarly insights and often subordinated stability to other aims. He reassesses history to foreground détente’s value, the frequent (but incidental) stabilizing effects of U.S. aloofness, and the ways U.S. policy unwittingly gave China positional power through economic alienation. He offers principles: attack root causes of insecurity (oligarchy, labor precarity, climate), choose strategy over rivalry, and pursue anti‑hegemonic balancing while treating the Indo‑Pacific with prudence (contribute without new commitments; avoid entrapment). (pp. 200–211, 203–206, 208–211).

Key Points:

• Make the Asian peace the policy heuristic; price risks; pair risks with wagers. 

• Rivalry is costly; strategy must mitigate its domestic/foreign externalities. 

• Indo‑Pacific engagement: help stabilize without overcommitting. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Narrative discipline; structural humility; justice‑oriented statecraft.

Section 8.1: Principles for an Indo‑Pacific Peace

Summary: “Coercion and the use of force are sometimes necessary but also a trap” (p. 204); elevate statecraft to tackle root causes of insecurity, not just crisis symptoms. Avoid rivalry‑as‑default; if chosen, do so transparently after pricing downsides. Favor anti‑hegemonic balancing and contributions to Indian Ocean stability without new hard commitments; work in solidarity with frontline states to dampen incentives for conflict. (pp. 204–211).

Key Points:

• Diagnose/target social foundations (oligarchy, inequality, climate). 

• Rivalry narrows options, breeds domestic harms; strategy should widen them. 

  Cross-Cutting Themes: Peace as political economy + restraint; regional pluralism.

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🎭 Central Themes

• Layered Peace: Stability arises from interlocking mechanisms—power, economics, institutions, norms—whose weights shift over time. 

• Risk–Wager Statecraft: Evaluate choices by how they threaten or bolster the six indicators of peace. 

• Narrative Matters: Replace flattering myths of U.S. benevolence with a more accurate paradox to guide policy. 

• Détente’s Hidden Work: Great‑power cooperation as an undervalued peace driver. 

• Rivalry Caution: Militarized competition without strategy embrittles peace and corrodes democracy. 

📖 Historiographical Context

• Engages realist accounts (e.g., American pacifier/primacy, selective engagement), liberal institutionalist and democratic‑peace claims, and constructivist ASEAN‑way narratives—arguing each captures partial truths that function together.

• Inserts the East Asian peace literature (Tønnesson; Kivimäki) and critiques “single‑cause” explanations; stresses regional (not unit‑level) logics. 

• Reinterprets post‑1979 history via risk–wager lens, re‑valuing détente and exposing how U.S. policy often prioritized other goals over preventing war. 

🧩 Frameworks & Methods

• Six Indicators guiding diagnosis: U.S. forward presence; U.S. alliances; great‑power détente; interdependence; regionalism; democracy/good governance. (p. 26). 

• Risk–Wager Balance: conceptual grammar for interpreting presidential choices; used across “case histories” to track continuity/change. (pp. 27–28).

• Sources: policy documents (e.g., 2002 NSS), elite memoirs, declassified reports, academic works; cross‑case presidential narrative from Nixon to Trump. 

🤷‍♂️ Actors & Perspectives

Richard Nixon

• Role / position: U.S. President who opened to China (1972).

• Perspectives: Pragmatic détente to exploit strategic opportunity.

• Evolution: From staunch anti‑communist to architect of opening.

• Influence: Helped found the conditions for the Asian peace. 

Mao Zedong / (later) Deng Xiaoping

• Role: PRC leaders during opening and reform.

• Perspectives: From revolutionary antagonism to pragmatic engagement (“reform and opening”).

• Evolution: Shift toward restrained foreign policy amid domestic priorities.

• Influence: Enabled détente; later reforms underpinned interdependence.

Ronald Reagan

• Role: U.S. President emphasizing military superiority.

• Perspectives: “Peace through strength”; risk‑acceptant posture.

• Evolution: Maintained forward presence while courting global risks.

• Influence: Stabilized Asia incidentally in a low‑threat context.

George H. W. Bush

• Role: Managed transition into unipolarity.

• Perspectives: Continuity amid uncertainty; alliance reassurance.

• Evolution: Backed engagement and stability.

• Influence: Marked the most peaceful modern period in Asia. 

Bill Clinton

• Role: U.S. President of liberal hubris era.

• Perspectives: Economic liberalization, APEC, selective democracy support.

• Evolution: Embraced alliances (Nye Initiative) while pushing economic rules.

• Influence: Mixed—stabilizing presence with sovereignty‑limiting economic conditionality (e.g., Indonesia).

George W. Bush

• Role: U.S. President post‑9/11.

• Perspectives: War on terror first; primacy logic retained.

• Evolution: Shifted China from “strategic competitor” to “responsible stakeholder.”

• Influence: Indirectly stabilized Asia by neglecting risky Asia policies; alliances repurposed.

Barack Obama

• Role: U.S. President of the pivot/rebalance.

• Perspectives: Alliance centrality; rules‑based order; managed détente.

• Evolution: Conservative, risk‑sensitive approach; economic regionalism lagged.

• Influence: Stabilized amid volatility; quality/durability of peace eroded by era’s end.

Donald Trump

• Role: U.S. President of rivalry‑first posture.

• Perspectives: Militarized primacy + mercantilism; alliance skepticism; anti‑multilateral.

• Evolution: From questioning presence costs to record defense spending.

• Influence: Collapsed détente; heightened crisis risks (Korea; Taiwan).

Andy Marshall (Office of Net Assessment)

• Role: U.S. defense strategist shaping “competitive strategies.”

• Perspectives: Offensive pressure; long‑term China challenge; anti‑access focus.

• Evolution: From Soviet to China focus post‑Cold War.

• Influence: Seeded A2/AD framing in Pentagon thinking.

Condoleezza Rice

• Role: U.S. National Security Advisor/Secretary of State (G.W. Bush).

• Perspectives: Balance favoring freedom; backed SED with China.

• Evolution: Shifted rhetoric from “strategic competitor” to “responsible stakeholder.”

• Influence: Supported détente amid war‑on‑terror priorities.

Kurt Campbell / Tom Donilon

• Roles: Architect/advocate of the pivot; National Security Advisor.

• Perspectives: Rebalance to Asia’s “operating system”; correct geographic imbalance.

• Evolution: Emphasized alliance centrality and institutional engagement.

• Influence: Codified pivot narrative and agenda. 

Xi Jinping

• Role: PRC leader steering assertive foreign policy.

• Perspectives: Neo‑Leninist consolidation; maritime assertion.

• Evolution: Away from liberal reform expectations toward centralized control.

• Influence: Raised assertiveness and rivalry pressures during/after Obama era. 

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

• 1972‑02‑28 — Shanghai Communiqué — U.S.–China opening launches détente, a core peace driver. 

• 1979 — Start of “Asian peace” window — Benchmark for absence of interstate wars in East Asia/Pacific. 

• 1983 — Cold War war‑scare year — Highlights risk of high‑stakes “peace through strength”; Asia avoids conflict partly by luck. 

• 1991 — Unipolar moment begins — Asia enters its most peaceful modern era; democratization expands. 

• 1995/1998 — Nye Reports — Reaffirms alliances/forward presence as security backbone in East Asia. 

• 1997–1998 — Asian financial crisis / Indonesia’s transition — U.S.-backed IMF measures and turbulence underscore mixed democratic effects. 

• 2001–2002 — 9/11 and NSS — War on terror dominates; primacy logic persists; Asia stabilized by attention diversion. 

• 2006 — U.S.–China Strategic Economic Dialogue — Institutionalizes détente in economic sphere. 

• 2007–2008 — Global financial crisis — Accelerates narratives of U.S. decline/China ascent; sets stage for pivot. 

• 2011–2012 — Pivot/Rebalance announced; DSG 2012 — Alliance‑centric strategy, modest posture shifts, institutional engagement. 

• 2017 — Korea nuclear crisis peaks — Pressure‑for‑pressure spiral heightens war risk; deterrent consolidation ends acute phase. 

• 2020 — Sino‑Indian border clashes — Stabilized via buffer arrangements; U.S. largely aloof amid rivalry rhetoric. 

🧐 Critical Reflections

• Strengths: Clear analytical apparatus (six indicators + risk–wager); integrates competing IR schools into a coherent layered model; rescues détente from underappreciation; bridges academic and practitioner discourses; policy‑relevant concluding principles.

• Weaknesses / Blind Spots: Limited microfoundations for how elites update risks; under‑specifies when democracy/regionalism tip from neutral to stabilizing; economic statecraft remedies are sketched at a high level. Evidence for some sub‑national causal claims (oligarchy‑labor‑nationalism linkages) relies on inference rather than direct archival demonstration. 

• Unresolved Questions: How to operationalize “offsetting wagers” in real budgets; calibrating alliance reassurance vs. entrapment; designing anti‑hegemonic balancing that doesn’t drift back into primacy habits. 

⚔️ Comparative Insights

• Against primacy monism (Mearsheimer; Posen/Ross): Jackson’s six‑factor model argues primacy alone cannot explain stability or guide policy; forward presence helps but requires détente/interdependence to be durable. 

• Beyond ASEAN‑centrism (Acharya et al.): Norms/institutions matter, but their effects are conditional and intertwined with power/economy. 

• With East Asian peace literature (Tønnesson/Kivimäki): Confirms “relative peace,” pushes further by making it a policy heuristic and adding risk‑wager discipline. 

✍️ Key Terms

• Asian peace: Post‑1979 absence of interstate war in East Asia/Pacific (relative, not absolute). 

• Risk–wager balance: Framework for judging whether policy choices undercut or invest in peace drivers. 

• Aloof hegemon / vital bulwark / imperious superpower: The three faces of U.S. conduct toward Asian stability. 

• Dual‑hierarchical order: U.S. security–China economic hubs enabling hedging. 

• A2/AD (anti‑access/area‑denial): Pentagon lens on China’s military challenge. 

• Free and Open Indo‑Pacific (FOIP): Rivalry‑inflected regional framing of late 2010s. 

❓ Open Questions

• What concrete offsetting wagers should accompany necessary risks (e.g., Taiwan, alliance cost debates)? 

• Can détente‑like cooperation on crisis management be rebuilt without conceding on values or security? 

• How can U.S. economic statecraft reduce positional power gains for China while avoiding coercive overreach? 

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “A Pacific power narrative more faithful to reality is a prerequisite for better statecraft” (p. 7). 

• “While the threshold definition for the Asian peace is the absence of interstate wars…” (p. 10). 

• “From the various rationales… we can disaggregate six distinct indicators…” (p. 26). 

• “Big outcomes often have small beginnings.” (p. 29). 

• Reagan: “I wanted peace through strength, not peace through a piece of paper.” (p. 44). 

• “The unipolar moment ended up being Asia’s most peaceful in the modern era.” (p. 72). 

• After 9/11: “not just a priority, but the priority.” (p. 107). 

• Ben Rhodes: “What we’re trying to do is to get America another fifty years as leader.” (p. 132). 

• “The Trump administration was the most imperious of any since the onset of the Asian peace…” (p. 195). 

• “Policy makers must recover the Asian peace as a referent narrative in U.S. foreign policy.” (p. 208). 

🥰 Who Would Like It?

• Graduate seminars on IR theory & Asian security, policy practitioners seeking a diagnostic for strategy, and scholars critiquing hegemony‑centric narratives.

📚 Related Books

• Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft in Asia. 

• Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World. 

• Mira Rapp‑Hooper, Shields of the Republic (alliances). 

• David Kang, works on hierarchy and East Asian peace. 

• Stein Tønnesson, Explaining the East Asian Peace. 

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