Rethinking the World

Online Description

Stunning shifts in the worldviews of states mark the modern history of international affairs: how do societies think about—and rethink—international order and security? Japan’s “opening,” German conquest, American internationalism, Maoist independence, and Gorbachev’s “new thinking” molded international conflict and cooperation in their eras. How do we explain such momentous changes in foreign policy—and in other cases their equally surprising absence? The nature of strategic ideas, Jeffrey W. Legro argues, played a critical and overlooked role in these transformations. Big changes in foreign policies are rare because it is difficult for individuals to overcome the inertia of entrenched national mentalities. Doing so depends on a particular nexus of policy expectations, national experience, and ready replacement ideas. In a sweeping comparative history, Legro explores the sources of strategy in the United States and Germany before and after the world wars, in Tokugawa Japan, and in the Soviet Union. He charts the likely future of American primacy and a rising China in the coming century. Rethinking the World tells us when and why we can expect changes in the way states think about the world, why some ideas win out over others, and why some leaders succeed while others fail in redirecting grand strategy.

🧭 60‑Second Brief

• Core claim (1–2 sentences): Major foreign policy shifts by great powers occur through a two‑stage ideational process—collapse of a dominant orthodoxy when outcomes starkly violate social expectations, followed by consolidation of a viable replacement idea that demonstrates early efficacy. Ideas are irreducible causal forces but interact regularly with power and domestic interests.   

• Causal mechanism in a phrase: Expectations–results mismatch → delegitimation → focal alternative + perceived success → institutionalization. 

• Paradigm & level(s) of analysis: Synthetic (constructivist core + realist and liberal inputs); primarily state/collective level with systemic and individual interactions.   

• Why it matters for policy/strategy (1–2 bullets):

  • Anticipating change requires tracking collective expectations and the supply/efficacy of alternatives, not just shocks or power shifts.   

  • External actors can shape consolidation by enabling early “successes” for preferred ideas (e.g., post‑1945 U.S. support for West German integration). 

🧪 Theory Map (IR)

• Paradigm(s): Constructivist core; “rough synthesis” with realism (constraints of power) and liberalism (interest groups, leaders, institutions). 

• Level(s) of analysis: State/collective (dominant national ideas); with systemic feedback (power, transnational influence) and individual agency operating within ideational constraints.   

• Unit(s) of analysis: National orthodoxies about how to relate to international society: integrationist, separatist, revisionist.   

• Dependent variable(s): Continuity or change in a state’s foreign policy orientation toward international society. 

• Key independent variable(s): (1) Expectations–results gap from events; (2) number/salience of replacement ideas; (3) perceived efficacy of the alternative; (4) embeddedness of old orthodoxy; (5) transnational support/opposition.       

• Causal mechanism(s): Two‑stage process: collapse (delegitimation via violated expectations and undesirable consequences) → consolidation (coordination on a focal alternative that appears to “work” and becomes institutionalized).   

• Scope conditions: Most applicable to great powers; periods with interpretable feedback; when collective ideas (not just leader beliefs) structure policy; outcomes contingent on availability of alternatives and power‑enabled results.   

• Observable implications / predictions:

  • No durable change after shocks if no prominent alternative or mixed alternatives → “Try harder!” or “Counterrevolution.” 

  • Rapid consolidation when single alternative exists and early positive results follow → “Long live change!” 

  • External patrons can tilt consolidation by underwriting early success. 

• Potential falsifiers / disconfirming evidence:

  • Enduring change without prior collapse/efficacy;

  • Sharp collapse with salient alternative yet no change (beyond anomalies discussed);

  • Cases where power or interests alone predict timing/direction better than the expectations–results logic.   

🎓 Course Questions (from syllabus)

List verbatim, numbered Q1, Q2, …, as extracted from the syllabus excerpt for this session.

1. How do ideas about international politics and foreign policy emerge and take hold?

2. When do these ideas change and when do they remain consistent?

3. What is the relationship between a change in ideas and a change in the international system?

4. What is the relationship between power and ideas?

5. How do ideas function at the individual level versus at the group level?

6. Can you connect Legro’s explanations to Waltz first and second “images”?

7. What causal mechanisms would you incorporate to improve Legro’s framework?

8. How does this reading help you anticipate the creation of new ideas or collapse of existing ones?

✅ Direct Responses to Course Questions

Q1. How do ideas about international politics and foreign policy emerge and take hold?

Answer: They are collective, socially salient ideas that crystallize as orthodoxies through institutions, symbols, and practices; not merely aggregated individual opinions. They arise from prior ideas, become embedded in “collective memories,” government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft, and are contested by subgroups even while dominant. (pp. 2–7, 24–27)  ✓

Q2. When do these ideas change and when do they remain consistent?

Answer: Change requires a two‑stage sequence: collapse when outcomes contradict expectations generated by the orthodoxy; consolidation when a prominent alternative demonstrates early efficacy and becomes institutionalized. Continuity persists when shocks fit expectations, consequences are tolerable, the old orthodoxy is deeply embedded, or when there is no/too many alternatives—yielding “Try harder!” or “Counterrevolution” paths. (pp. 28–37, 178–180)      ✓

Q3. What is the relationship between a change in ideas and a change in the international system?

Answer: Great‑power ideational shifts help constitute international politics; national trajectories can reconfigure order (e.g., post‑1945 U.S. integrationism) or leave it intact when change fails to consolidate. Future order thus depends on interplay of ideas and events across major states (Legro highlights U.S. and China). (pp. 177–187)    ✓

Q4. What is the relationship between power and ideas?

Answer: Ideas are irreducible but interact with power in regular ways: power shapes consequences (making some ideas “work”), and powerful states can enable or impede consolidation abroad; yet power alone cannot predict shifts (e.g., U.S. power after WWI without integrationist consolidation). (pp. 178, 181–182)    ✓

Q5. How do ideas function at the individual level versus at the group level?

Answer: Individual psychology explains micro‑change, but Legro emphasizes collective ideas that are intersubjective and often institutionalized; they constrain and enable leaders. National ideas are not mere sums of individuals; they possess organizational properties with coordination problems in both collapse and consolidation. (pp. 2–7, 14–16)    ✓

Q6. Can you connect Legro’s explanations to Waltz first and second “images”?

Answer: Legro’s account primarily sits at Waltz’s second image (national ideas embedded in state societies), while acknowledging first‑image leaders operating within ideational constraints and third‑image (systemic) feedback via power and transnational influence. (pp. 2–7, 178–182)    ✓

Q7. What causal mechanisms would you incorporate to improve Legro’s framework?

Answer: Building on his mechanisms, add (i) intra‑elite network diffusion to specify how focal alternatives gain coherence; (ii) rhetorical entrapment to track how opponents’ language is leveraged during consolidation; and (iii) sequencing of “success signals” (early material wins, audience costs avoided) to operationalize “efficacy.” These extend Legro’s own notes on collective ideation hurdles and efficacy‑driven institutionalization. (pp. 31–37, 178–180)    ✓

Q8. How does this reading help you anticipate the creation of new ideas or collapse of existing ones?

Answer: Monitor: (1) expectations publicly articulated by leaders/orthodoxies; (2) outcome sequences that visibly contradict them; (3) the menu of alternatives in circulation; and (4) early “wins” for any challenger. Where one alternative exists and early results correlate with its prescriptions, expect rapid consolidation; otherwise expect retrenchment. (pp. 28–37, 178–187)    ✓

📚 Section-by-Section Notes

Cover every assigned chapter/section in order. (Contents: Ch.1–6; Appx.1–2) 

Chapter 1: Great Power Ideas and Change (pp. 1–23)

• Purpose: Frame the puzzle—why dramatic ideational shifts occur (or not) in great powers; define the integrationist–separatist–revisionist typology. 

• Key claims: National ideas are collective, embedded, and constitutive of behavior; we need a framework for change in such ideas. 

• Evidence/examples: Typological illustrations (Tokugawa Japan, Napoleonic France, Nazi Germany, U.S. pre‑WWII). 

• Implications: Studying national orientations toward international society is distinct from studying specific strategies (e.g., containment). 

• Ties to course theme: Puts ideas (not only power/interests) at the center of big foreign policy moves.

Chapter 2: Explaining Change and Continuity (pp. 24–48)

• Purpose: Present the two‑stage model with explicit consolidation scenarios (B1–B3).   

• Key claims: Collapse hinges on expectations–results gaps; consolidation hinges on availability and efficacy of replacement ideas.   

• Evidence/examples: U.S. after WWI (continuity despite “shock”); Weimar Germany (defeat without ideational shift); binary vs. fragmented oppositions. 

• Implications: Shocks alone are insufficient; watch idea–event interactions.

Chapter 3: The Ebb and Flow of American Internationalism (pp. 49–83)

• Purpose: Trace U.S. movement from no‑entanglement to integrationism; test alt. explanations.

• Key claims: Continuity after WWI; decisive change during/after WWII; the shift preceded the Cold War.   

• Evidence/examples: Content analysis of State of the Union (1908–1950) + editorial responses (Figure 3.1; method in Appx.2).     

• Implications: Ideational consolidation can be observed in discourse; public symbols track collective orientation.

Chapter 4: Germany, from Outsider to Insider (pp. 84–121)

• Purpose: Explain Germany’s post‑1918 continuity vs. post‑1945 integration.

• Key claims: WWI defeat produced collapse conditions, but Versailles blocked consolidation, yielding a “Try harder!” revanchist path; after 1945, total defeat + Allied support enabled integrationist consolidation.   

• Evidence/examples: Interwar doctrines (“war as ultimate arbiter”); Berlin airlift, Occupation Statute, NATO entry as efficacy signals. (pp. 86, 113–121)   

• Implications: External power can sponsor consolidation of new orthodoxies.

Chapter 5: Overhaul of Orthodoxy in Tokugawa Japan and the Soviet Union (pp. 122–160)

• Purpose: Two non‑world‑war cases to probe generality.

• Key claims: Tokugawa seclusion orthodoxy lacked a domestic alternative in 1853, delaying change; Meiji consolidation required new ideas + early success. Soviet “new thinking” consolidated as correlation‑of‑forces expectations failed and a plausible mutual security idea had networks in place.     

• Evidence/examples: Daimyo opinion split; Gorbachev’s 1986 agenda; transnational epistemic ties. (pp. 126–141, 142–157)   

• Implications: Supply of alternatives (and their social carriers) is pivotal.

Chapter 6: The Next Century (pp. 161–188)

• Purpose: Synthesize findings; explore U.S. “Bush revolution” and China’s rise.

• Key claims: Absent further shocks and spectacular efficacy, U.S. likely to tack back to Atlantic‑Pact integrationism; China’s trajectory shows cautious integrationism, though negative feedback or crises could spur separatist or revisionist turns. (pp. 165–174)     

• Implications: Policy debates (engagement vs. containment) should be keyed to China’s internal ideational debates and expectations. 

Appendix 1: The Transformation of Economic Ideas (pp. 189–198)

• Purpose: Test portability to economic policy.

• Key claims: The same collapse–consolidation logic explains Keynesian turns, trade shifts, and monetarist adoption; in politics, correlation often speaks louder than causation. (pp. 190–196)     

• Illustrations: U.S. tariffs → RTAA reversal; British monetarism post‑1979; EMS success vs. “snake” failure. (pp. 209–213)   

Appendix 2: Analysis of Presidential Discourse (pp. 199–200+)

• Purpose: Coding scheme for Figure 3.1 (0–5 scale; intercoder reliability; newspaper editorial overlay).   

🧩 Key Concepts & Definitions (author’s usage)

• Collective (national) ideas: Intersubjective orthodoxies embedded in institutions, symbols, and routines that guide foreign policy. 

• Integrationism / Separatism / Revisionism: Ideal‑type orientations toward joining, remaining aloof from, or overturning international society. 

• Collapse: Delegitimation of the dominant orthodoxy via expectations–results contradictions with undesirable consequences. 

• Consolidation: Coordination on a prominent alternative that shows efficacy, leading to institutionalization. 

• Collective ideation hurdles: Coordination and assurance problems that impede both stages. 

🧑‍🤝‍🧑 Actors & Perspectives

• Leaders (e.g., Wilson, Gorbachev, Meiji elites, Adenauer) — act within collective ideas; success hinges on exploiting collapse–consolidation windows and early results.   

• Domestic coalitions/interest groups — supply and sponsor replacement ideas; their distribution affects consolidation. 

• External powers/transnational networks — can catalyze collapse (by generating unfavorable consequences) and fund/validate consolidation. 

🕰 Timeline of Major Events

• 1640–1868 — Tokugawa seclusion orthodoxy; opening pressures mount (1853 Perry). Significance: absence of domestic alternatives delays consolidation.   

• 1868 — Meiji Restoration; consolidation of pro‑integration ideas follows initial foreign missions and successes. 

• 1908–1950 — U.S. discourse shifts from aloofness to integrationism during/after WWII (Figure 3.1). 

• 1919–1930s — Germany’s post‑Versailles “Try harder!” dynamic; continuity of revisionism. 

• 1948–1955 — Berlin airlift; Occupation Statute; FRG entry into NATO—early efficacy and institutional embedding of integration. 

• 1985–1986 — Gorbachev and “new thinking” articulate mutual security; prior expectations fail. 

🧠 Policy & Strategy Takeaways

• Implications for today’s policy choices:

  • To promote change abroad, engineer early wins for preferred alternatives (resources, security guarantees, institutional access). 

  • To anticipate retrenchment, track when shocks confirm rather than violate expectations—there, continuity is likely. 

• R/B/C:

  • Risks: Backing an alternative without delivering early success may trigger counterrevolution. 

  • Benefits: Well‑timed support can lock in integrationist trajectories (e.g., post‑1945 Germany). 

  • Conditions: Presence of a single salient alternative, credible efficacy, and manageable embeddedness of the old idea. 

• If this logic is right, a policymaker should… invest in coalition‑building around one focal idea and sequence visible performances that map to its promises.

⚔️ Comparative Placement in the IR Canon

• Closest kin / contrasts: Aligns with constructivist emphases on norms/ideas; qualifies realist and liberal claims by specifying when power/interests bite. 

• How it differs: Unlike “shocks cause change” or pure power‑transition accounts, Legro insists shocks translate through expectations and collective ideation; unlike purely domestic coalition stories, he specifies collapse–consolidation conditions. 

• Placement: A synthetic framework for ideational change, not a single‑paradigm theory. 

🧐 Critical Reflections

• Strengths: Clear microfoundations for ideational change; portable beyond security (Appendix 1); transparent observable implications. 

• Weaknesses / blind spots: Acknowledged anomalies (e.g., interwar Germany rhetoric manipulation; durable Russian integrationism in 1990s despite weak efficacy); small‑N scope. (pp. 181–182) 

• What would change your mind (author’s or yours)? Multiple cases of durable consolidation without early success, or repeated collapses with prominent alternatives that nonetheless never change orientations.

❓ Open Questions for Seminar

• How do we measure “expectations” independently of outcomes to avoid ex post coding? (Appx.2 offers one discourse‑based approach.) 

• Can international institutions themselves become the carriers of replacement ideas across states, reducing domestic coordination hurdles?

✍️ Notable Quotes (with pages)

• “Ideas are not so much mental as symbolic and organizational; they are embedded not only in human brains but also in the ‘collective memories,’ government procedures, educational systems, and the rhetoric of statecraft.” (pp. 5–6) 

• “Ideational change… consist[s] of two stages: collapse and consolidation.” (p. 178) 

• “Shocks are only a potential occasion for change depending on preexisting expectations.” (pp. 14–15) 

• “States will often adopt policies that correlate with desired results even when there is no clear evidence that those policies caused those results.” (p. 206) 

• “The United States shift preceded—and hence was not caused by—the cold war.” (p. 72) 

📝 Exam Drills

• Likely prompt: “Explain Legro’s two‑stage model and apply it to one success and one failure of ideational change.”

  Skeleton answer:

  1. Define framework—collapse (expectations–results), consolidation (alternative + efficacy). Cite Ch.2. 

  2. Success case: U.S. WWII → integrationism (discourse shift + institutionalization). 

  3. Failure case: Germany post‑WWI → “Try harder!” due to Versailles‑blocked consolidation. 

• Likely prompt: “How should U.S. policy approach a rising China per Legro’s logic?”

  Skeleton answer:

  1. Diagnose Chinese expectations & dominant orientation (integrationist trend). 

  2. Enable efficacy for integrationist actors; avoid actions that validate separatist narratives. 

  3. Monitor shock–expectation mismatches that could flip orientations. 

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