Emotional Choices

Online Description

This book examines coercive diplomacy and presents a theory of ‘emotional choice’ to analyse how affect enters into decision-making.

Key Terms & Definitions

Term: Coercive diplomacy

Definition: Use of military threats (and limited force) to induce a target to stop, undo, or reverse behavior, as an alternative to full‑scale war.

Role in author’s argument: Central domain of application. The core puzzle is why weaker targets often resist coercive diplomacy despite coercers’ military superiority and high costs of defiance.

Analytical notes: Markwica focuses on compellent threats by militarily stronger states against weaker targets, and on the target leader’s decision to comply or resist. Deterrence is acknowledged but treated as analytically distinct, even though real cases blur.

Comparison to other theorists: Builds directly on George/Simons and Freedman but criticizes rationalist/coercion literature (Schelling, Pape, Sechser, Slantchev) for assuming a logic of consequences and largely ignoring how emotions shape leaders’ perceptions of threats, incentives, and costs.

Term: Compellence vs. deterrence

Definition: Compellence (coercive diplomacy) seeks to change ongoing or past behavior; deterrence seeks to prevent a future action.

Role in author’s argument: Emotional choice theory is developed for compellence/coercive diplomacy, but Markwica notes that in practice compellence and deterrence often blend.

Analytical notes: Emotions matter for both, but compellence inherently threatens the target’s status quo, identities, and self‑esteem, making pride, humiliation, and anger especially salient.

Comparison to other theorists: Follows classic Schelling distinction but shifts emphasis from objective cost–benefit to how leaders feel about being told to change course.

Term: Logic of consequences (rational choice / homo oeconomicus)

Definition: Actors choose options that maximize expected utility given preferences and beliefs about costs, benefits, and probabilities.

Role in author’s argument: One of two dominant existing action models. Serves as a baseline and foil for emotional choice theory; Markwica shows where it explains behavior and where it fails.

Analytical notes: Assumes conscious, deliberate calculation; preferences are given and stable; emotions appear mainly as noise or “motivated bias.” Markwica accepts its elegance but argues humans systematically violate its premises, especially under threat.

Comparison to other theorists: Near to Fearon, Pape, Sechser, Slantchev. Markwica agrees that material power and resolve matter but argues that emotional processes mediate how leaders perceive and weigh those factors.

Term: Logic of appropriateness (constructivist / homo sociologicus)

Definition: Actors ask, “What does someone like me do in a situation like this?” and act according to norms and identities that define proper behavior.

Role in author’s argument: Second major existing model. Explains how stable norms/identities shape preferences and set boundaries on what choices are thinkable.

Analytical notes: Good at explaining patterned behavior and why some options are off the table; weaker at explaining rapid shifts or reversals in decision‑making during crises.

Comparison to other theorists: Aligns with Lebow, Gelpi, Rousseau, Wendt, Stein. Markwica integrates these insights but says constructivists typically under‑theorize emotions as dynamic drivers of short‑term change.

Term: Logic of affect / Emotional choice theory / homo emotionalis

Definition: An emotion‑based action model in which individual decision‑making is shaped by the dynamic interplay of norms, identities, and emotions. Norms and identities provide long‑term conditions; emotions are short‑term catalysts for change.

Role in author’s argument: Core theoretical contribution. Used to explain why target leaders either comply with or defy coercive threats, and why their choices shift across crisis phases.

Analytical notes:

Emotions are shaped by culture (emotion norms, identities) and by situational appraisals.
Emotions then influence preference formation, judgment, and choice selection through appraisal tendencies and action tendencies.
Logic of affect complements but can also outperform logics of consequences/appropriateness in explaining puzzling decisions (e.g., Khrushchev’s sudden decision to remove missiles; Saddam’s refusal to withdraw).

Comparison to other theorists:

Goes beyond Jervis/Stein’s “psychology of deterrence” and prospect theory by building an explicit, emotion‑centered logic of choice, not just bias around a rational baseline.
Closer to Lebow, Hall, Ross, Mercer in treating emotions as constitutive, not just distorting, but offers more formal propositions and systematic measurement strategy.

Term: Emotion

Definition: A relatively short‑lived, partly biological and partly culturally conditioned response to a stimulus, involving appraisals, subjective feelings, bodily reactions, and expressive behavior.

Role in author’s argument: Fundamental causal variable. Emotions are the “short‑term catalysts” that prompt shifts in leaders’ priorities, interpretations, and willingness to comply or resist.

Analytical notes:

Emotions are not opposed to rationality; they are prerequisites for judgment and are deeply embedded in cognition.
Markwica distinguishes integral emotions (directly related to the decision) from incidental emotions (spillover from unrelated events) and focuses on the former.

Comparison to other theorists: Contrasts with older IR views of emotion as mere “motivated bias” (Lebow’s early work, much deterrence theory). Treats emotion as structured, patterned, and often adaptive.

Term: Affect, moods, and feelings

Definition:

Affect – broad umbrella for emotional responses, including moods and discrete emotions.
Moods – longer‑lasting, diffuse feeling states without a specific object.
Feelings – subjective awareness of emotional states.

Role in author’s argument: Clarifies scope: emotional choice theory focuses on discrete emotions linked to particular appraisals, not just general “moodiness.”

Analytical notes: Prevents slippage between “affect” as any non‑cognitive factor and the specific, theorized emotions (fear, anger, hope, pride, humiliation).

Comparison to other theorists: More fine‑grained than much coercion literature, which often says “fear” or “resolve” without specifying type, object, or temporal profile.

Term: Emotion norms (feeling rules & display rules)

Definition: Socially learned norms that prescribe which emotions one ought to feel (feeling rules) and how one should express or hide them (display rules) in particular contexts.

Role in author’s argument: Channel how norms and identities shape emotions. Emotion norms help explain why the same threat triggers very different emotional trajectories across cultures and leaders (e.g., Saddam’s taboo on fear).

Analytical notes:

Provide a bridge between culture (constructivism) and psychology.
Also create emotion traps: prohibitions on “appropriate” emotions can undermine adaptation (e.g., suppressing fear until it’s too late).

Comparison to other theorists: Goes beyond standard identity‑talk (Lebow, Wendt) by specifying how cultural scripts operate at the level of affective experience and expression.

Term: Identities / Identity work / Recognition

Definition: Self‑conceptions of “who I am” in relation to significant others, which actors seek to have recognized and validated.

Role in author’s argument: Identities condition which emotions become salient and legitimate. Threats to identity elicit pride, humiliation, anger, or hope, which in turn shape decisions (e.g., Khrushchev as responsible defender of socialism; Saddam as “Arab knight”).

Analytical notes:

Identity validation by others can ease humiliation and enable compliance (Khrushchev after Kennedy’s respectful signaling).
But validating aggressive identities may embolden leaders to act out those roles.

Comparison to other theorists: Echoes Wendt and Lebow on recognition/status, but embeds identity work directly into an emotional mechanism, not just social structure.

Term: Appraisals & appraisal tendencies

Definition: Cognitive evaluations of a situation (e.g., certainty, control, responsibility, future expectation) that give rise to specific emotions; appraisal tendencies are the systematic ways each emotion biases subsequent judgments along these dimensions.

Role in author’s argument: Mechanism linking emotions to decisions. Fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation each adjust how leaders assess risks, blame, and options.

Analytical notes:

Fear → appraisals of threat and uncertainty; can promote caution or risky gambles depending on control.
Anger → appraisals of certainty and other‑blame; encourages risk‑acceptant punishment.
Hope → appraisals of positive but uncertain outcomes; sustains resistance.
Pride → appraisals of achievement and status; supports stubbornness and public defiance.
Humiliation → appraisals of unjust degradation; can produce either withdrawal or revenge.

Comparison to other theorists: More structured than generic “misperception”; sits between prospect theory’s risk framing and constructivist identity accounts.

Term: Core relational themes

Definition: Short phrases summarizing the type of person–environment relationship implied by each emotion (e.g., “threat to self,” “offense against me and mine,” “unjust degradation”).

Role in author’s argument: Help map specific crisis events to likely emotional responses and hence to action tendencies.

Analytical notes: Provide a diagnostic tool: if a leader narrates events as “offense” rather than “danger,” expect anger more than fear and greater resistance.

Comparison to other theorists: Imported from Lazarus and appraisal theory; rarely used explicitly in IR coercion work.

Term: Five key emotions (fear, anger, hope, pride, humiliation)

Definition: Emotion families singled out as especially important for coercive diplomacy because they structure perceptions of threats, status, and future possibilities.

Role in author’s argument: Empirical focus of emotional choice theory. Markwica develops propositions about how each emotion affects preference formation and behavior, then tests them in the Cuba and Gulf cases.

Analytical notes (very compressed):

Fear: Can induce compliance, risk‑averse de‑escalation, paralysis, or panic escalation depending on appraisals of control and inevitability.
Anger: Increases perceived certainty and blame; fosters risk‑acceptance, defiance, and desire to punish the coercer.
Hope: Sustains resistance by highlighting possible favorable outcomes (e.g., belief the US will not actually attack or will fracture coalition).
Pride: Motivates consistency with self‑image and public stance; makes backing down costly in emotional/status terms.
Humiliation: If seen as justified → withdrawal; if seen as unjust and leader has capacity → desire for revenge and continued resistance.

Comparison to other theorists: Connects directly to Stein’s call to study fear/anger/humiliation in deterrence and builds systematic causal expectations instead of ad‑hoc “anger explanations.”

Term: Emotion regulation / Emotion work (surface & deep acting)

Definition: Strategies by which individuals attempt to change what they feel (deep acting) or how they express feelings (surface acting) to conform to emotion norms.

Role in author’s argument: Helps explain why leaders sometimes override initial emotion impulses and how they manage conflicting norms (e.g., Saddam’s suppression of fear).

Analytical notes: Emotion work can sustain public resolve while inner fear grows; but over‑rigid regulation (e.g., taboo on fear) can prevent adaptive responses until late.

Comparison to other theorists: Connects Arlie Hochschild’s sociology to high politics; largely absent from standard coercive diplomacy texts.

Term: Emotional relevance typology

Definition: Scheme for classifying the role of emotions in each decision as Unknown, Irrelevant, Minor, Relevant, or Principal factors.

Role in author’s argument: Lets Markwica systematically assess how much each emotion mattered across the 13 decisions in the two case studies.

Analytical notes: Provides a quasi‑quantitative structure without reducing emotions to numbers; used to compare affective vs rationalist/constructivist explanations.

Comparison to other theorists: More explicit about evidentiary standards than much qualitative IR; resonates with process‑tracing best practices.

Term: Process analysis (and interpretive process tracing)

Definition: An explanatory strategy that traces sequences of events and internal changes (including emotions) over time, emphasizing how they co‑constitute outcomes rather than just input→output causality.

Role in author’s argument: Methodological backbone. Used to reconstruct emotional trajectories of Khrushchev and Saddam and link them to choices.

Analytical notes:

Focuses on “how” instead of only “whether” X caused Y.
Combined with interpretive process tracing of textual emotion signs to infer emotions and their intensity.

Comparison to other theorists: Extends standard process tracing (George/Bennett) by explicitly incorporating emotion and cultural context as evolving variables.

Term: Emotion indicators (explicit/implicit, cognitive/behavioral signs)

Definition: Four broad classes of evidence used to infer emotions from texts: explicit emotion words, figurative language, cognitive content (e.g., risk talk), and observable behavior (e.g., voice, posture, actions).

Role in author’s argument: Operationalization of emotions. Allows structured inference from leader speeches, transcripts, memoirs, and internal recordings.

Analytical notes: Markwica ranks indicators by strength (e.g., private, contemporaneous, off‑the‑cuff remarks trump memoirs) and cross‑checks across sources.

Comparison to other theorists: Much more explicit than most historical coercion work about how we know what leaders felt.

Term: Coercer dilemma

Definition: Structural dilemma arising because signals that raise fear enough to induce compliance also risk triggering panic, anger, humiliation, pride, or hope in ways that undermine compliance.

Role in author’s argument: Summarizes emotional constraints on effective coercive diplomacy. Coercers must induce sufficient fear and quash hope/pride without provoking anger/humiliation that drive defiance.

Analytical notes: Explains why coercive diplomacy is hard to calibrate and why even powerful states often fail. Connects micro‑level emotions to macro‑level poor success rates.

Comparison to other theorists: Parallels Schelling’s “threats that leave something to chance” and George’s “limits of coercive diplomacy,” but rephrased in emotional, not just informational or structural, terms.

Author Background

Robin Markwica – German political scientist specializing in international security, foreign policy analysis, and political psychology.
Education: BA studies in political science and history (Freiburg/Harvard), M.Phil. in Modern History (Cambridge), D.Phil. in International Relations (Oxford).
Career: Max Weber Fellow at the European University Institute, research fellow at Oxford and Hertie School; more recently Founding Director of The Conversation Germany.
Relevance to SAASS 628: Trained across history, IR, and psychology; sits at the intersection of strategic studies and political psychology, making him a bridge between Schelling/George‑style coercion and the “affective turn” in IR.

Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

Markwica tackles the puzzle that militarily superior coercers often fail to secure compliance from weaker targets. He asks: Why and under what conditions do political leaders reject coercive threats from stronger opponents, and when do they yield?

His thesis: existing explanations relying on the logic of consequences (rational choice) and logic of appropriateness (constructivism) are incomplete because they largely ignore emotions. He proposes a third action model—the logic of affect / emotional choice theory—in which norms and identities shape leaders’ emotions, and these emotions, in turn, structure their preferences, judgments, and choices. Applying this model to Khrushchev in the Cuban Missile Crisis (success) and Saddam in the Gulf conflict (failure), he argues that emotional trajectories explain key decisions better than rationalist or purely cultural accounts.

One-Paragraph Overview

Emotional Choices builds an emotion‑centered theory of coercive diplomacy and tests it on two canonical cases: Nikita Khrushchev’s response to U.S. coercion in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and Saddam Hussein’s response to U.S.‑led coercion in the 1990–91 Gulf conflict. After critiquing rationalist and constructivist models, Markwica advances emotional choice theory, which links norms and identities to five key emotions—fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation—via emotion norms and appraisal processes. These emotions then affect leaders’ preferences, risk assessments, and choice among options. Using interpretive process tracing of archival records, transcripts, and internal regime documents, he reconstructs the evolving emotional trajectories of both leaders across multiple decision points. The book finds that emotions often played a principal or significant role in both compliance and resistance and that understanding these emotional dynamics clarifies why coercive diplomacy worked in Cuba but failed in Iraq. It closes with policy implications for calibrating threats and inducements, managing humiliation, and recognizing the coercer dilemma.

🎯 Course Themes Tracker (Quick Hooks)

Coercion, compellence, deterrence
- Reinterprets two famous compellence episodes; emphasizes that coercive outcomes hinge on emotional reactions, not just capability ratios.
Credibility & resolve
- Credibility is felt as much as calculated; leaders infer resolve partly from perceived emotional arousal (e.g., Khrushchev worrying Kennedy might “give way” to his passions).
Signaling & perception
- Signals that seem clear and strong to coercers may be read as humiliating or disrespectful, generating anger/humiliation rather than fear. Symbolic gestures of respect can matter more than material “side payments.”
Rational vs. emotional vs. cultural logics
- Explicit three‑logic comparison: consequences, appropriateness, affect. Shows how emotional choice theory integrates cultural norms with psychological mechanisms to explain within‑case shifts.
Theories of victory
- Coercers’ theory of victory (“threaten strongly, then maybe reward”) is challenged; logic of affect suggests simultaneous threats and incentives may work better in some contexts.
Escalation dynamics & thresholds
- Emotions (fear, anger, humiliation) push leaders across thresholds toward either escalation, paralysis, or retreat; small shifts in appraisals (e.g., about opponent control) can flip behavior.
Alliance assurance & extended deterrence
- Identity and status concerns vis‑à‑vis allies (e.g., Khrushchev as protector of Cuba, Saddam as champion of Arabs) intensify pride and fear of humiliation, complicating compliance.
Cost‑balancing & risk manipulation
- Costs are not purely material; leaders weigh emotional costs of humiliation or loss of status against physical risks, and anger can make costs of defiance feel acceptable.
Instruments of coercion
- Beyond troop deployments and sanctions: symbolic recognition, language, sequencing of threats and inducements, and management of public humiliation become key instruments.
Competition continuum
- Shows how crises evolve as emotional contests over honor, fear, and humiliation, not just bargaining over territory; emotional trajectories shape whether competition stops at coercion or slides into war.

🔑 Top Takeaways

Military superiority is not enough. Coercive diplomacy succeeds or fails largely through the target leader’s emotional interpretation of threats, incentives, and status implications.
Emotions are structured, not random. Fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation follow patterned logics via appraisals and action tendencies and can be analytically traced.
Norms and identities shape which emotions are felt. Emotion norms and identity scripts channel how leaders react—e.g., fear taboos or masculine honor codes make admitting vulnerability very costly.
Coercers face a genuine “coercer dilemma.” Signals that induce enough fear to promote compliance also risk provoking anger and humiliation or triggering panic and paralysis.
Symbolic recognition matters as much as material carrots. Kennedy’s respect and security guarantee mattered more to Khrushchev than the Turkey missile trade; Saddam craved, but did not get, recognition as an Arab champion.
Rationalist and constructivist models explain parts of behavior. Logic of affect often supplements or outperforms them, especially for sudden reversals in choice behavior.
Emotions are observable enough to be studied. With careful source criticism and process tracing, emotions can be inferred from historical records; they are not beyond rigorous analysis.
Policy implication: To coerce effectively, strategists must practice strategic empathy—anticipating how specific leaders, with specific identities and emotion norms, will feel about particular threats and inducements.

📒 Sections

Chapter 1: Introduction – The Puzzle of Coercive Diplomacy

Summary:

Introduces coercive diplomacy, notes its surprisingly low success rate despite coercers’ military superiority, and lays out the central question: why some leaders defy coercive threats from stronger states while others yield. Reviews rationalist (logic of consequences) and constructivist (logic of appropriateness) accounts and argues both underplay emotions. Sets up the need for an emotion‑based logic of choice and motivates selection of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf conflict as cases rich in primary sources and canonical in the coercion literature.

Key Points:

Empirical record shows coercive diplomacy succeeds in only ~17–36% of cases.
Classic expectation (from Clausewitz and others): weaker side yields when facing overwhelming power—contradicted by cases like Saddam, Qaddafi, Milosevic.
Rationalist accounts: leaders comply when expected costs of resistance exceed those of compliance.
Constructivist accounts: leaders comply when demands fit their norms and identities.
Both literatures mention fear/humiliation but treat them superficially, without systematic theorizing or measurement.

Theory Lens Map:

Dominant lenses critiqued: rational choice, cognitive psychology (bias), constructivism.
Proposed addition: logic of affect as a third action model, complementing but distinct from the other two.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Dissatisfaction with low explanatory power of pure cost‑benefit or identity‑only approaches.
Need to integrate neuroscience/psychology insights (automatic processing, unconscious appraisals) into strategic studies.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Traditional coercion logic: use superior power to manipulate target’s cost–benefit calculation.
Markwica’s twist: the same military moves and diplomatic signals are filtered through leaders’ emotional states, which may invert the intended effect (e.g., intimidation vs provocation).

Limits Map (mini):

Rationalist and constructivist limits:
- Under‑specify how fear/humiliation arise.
- Assume too much conscious deliberation given evidence that most brain activity is affective/automatic.

Chapter 2: The Logic of Affect – Emotional Choice Theory

Summary:

Develops emotional choice theory as an action model that sits alongside logics of consequences and appropriateness. Defines emotions, affect, and moods; introduces emotion norms, identities, and appraisal theory; and elaborates propositions about how the five key emotions influence preference formation, judgment, and choice. Emphasizes that norms and identities are long‑term structural conditions, while emotions are rapidly changing catalysts that help explain sudden reversals in leaders’ behavior.

Key Points:

Decision‑making is shaped by interaction of norms, identities, and emotions—none of the three alone suffices.
Emotion norms (feeling and display rules) are culturally embedded and variable across contexts.
Identities structure what is at stake emotionally (e.g., status, honor, role obligations).
Five key emotions selected based on prior IR work and psychological research; each associated with particular appraisal and action tendencies.
Emotional choice theory generates specific propositions (e.g., strong fear + low sense of control → risk‑averse retreat; strong anger + perceived injustice → risk‑acceptant resistance).

Theory Lens Map:

Rational choice: treats emotions mostly as unwanted noise or stable preferences; emotional choice says they are time‑varying drivers.
Constructivism: highlights norms/identities but struggles with short‑term shifts; emotional choice adds emotions as dynamic link between culture and choice.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Human choice is heavily shaped by unconscious appraisals; conscious deliberation is a small slice of brain activity.
Emotions provide energy and direction to action, making some options psychologically salient and others unthinkable.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Propositions specify how each emotion affects:
- Perceived credibility of coercer threats (fear, hope).
- Tolerance for costs and risks (fear vs anger).
- Willingness to accept public humiliation (pride, humiliation).

Limits Map (mini):

Theory is most applicable when:
- Target leader has high personal authority.
- Sufficient evidence exists to reconstruct emotional trajectories.
- Integral emotions dominate over incidental ones.

Chapter 3: Inferring Actors’ Emotions – Methodology

Summary:

Addresses the methodological challenge: how can we study leaders’ emotions historically? Proposes an interpretive process‑tracing strategy centered on text‑based emotion indicators, supported by triangulation across sources. Develops the typology of emotional relevance and outlines limitations.

Key Points:

Emotion indicators: explicit emotion terms, figurative language, cognitive signs (risk, blame, certainty), and behavioral signs.
Source hierarchy: confidential, contemporaneous documents and recordings > later memoirs > public speeches.
Typology of emotional relevance (Unknown / Irrelevant / Minor / Relevant / Principal) used to evaluate each decision.
Introduces process analysis as a way to combine causal and constitutive reasoning to track emotion–decision loops.

Theory Lens Map:

Moves beyond experimental or survey methods by leveraging archival material (Soviet Presidium protocols, Ba’ath regime tapes, etc.).

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Emphasizes humility: we cannot literally read leaders’ minds but can infer consistent emotional patterns from traces.
Tackles concerns that emotions are too “private” for rigorous study.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Method reveals when emotional responses align or diverge from rationalist expectations (e.g., when rising troop numbers reduce fear because they are reinterpreted as political theater).

Limits Map (mini):

Limits include:
- Incidental vs integral emotions hard to separate.
- Display vs felt emotion may diverge.
- Reliance on textual sources excludes some bodily cues.
- Interpreter’s own biases and cultural distance.

Chapter 4: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (Khrushchev)

Summary:

Reconstructs Khrushchev’s emotional trajectory across seven key decisions, from the choice to deploy missiles to the final agreement to withdraw them. Shows that fear, hope, pride, and humiliation—filtered through Soviet emotion norms and Khrushchev’s identity as responsible leader and defender of socialism—explain both his initial defiance and eventual compliance with U.S. coercive diplomacy.

Key Points:

Pre‑crisis decision to place missiles: driven by fear of U.S. invasion of Cuba and pride in protecting a revolutionary ally and redressing nuclear asymmetry.
Early crisis phase: U.S. quarantine did not immediately coerce Khrushchev; he encouraged rapid completion of missile installations, reflecting hope that Americans would accept a fait accompli and pride in standing firm.
Mid‑crisis: as evidence mounted that Kennedy might lose control to hawks or “give way” to his passions, fear of uncontrollable nuclear escalation surged.
Final decision to remove missiles: combination of intense fear and gratitude/relief at Kennedy’s respectful signals (private assurance on Turkey missiles; public pledge not to invade Cuba), which alleviated humiliation and preserved some pride.

Theory Lens Map:

Rationalist lens: can explain some concern about nuclear war but struggles to account for timing and suddenness of Khrushchev’s shift from defiance to concession.
Constructivist lens: identity as defender of socialism explains resistance but not his rapid reversal.
Logic of affect: fear spike plus status‑preserving recognition explains why he backed down at exactly that moment.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Symbolic incentives (recognition, security guarantees) outweighed material incentives (Turkey missiles).
U.S. behavior accidentally navigated the coercer dilemma: induced fear without overwhelming humiliation, and offered face‑saving recognition.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Emotional trajectory:
- Fear (of U.S. invasion and nuclear imbalance) → missiles to Cuba.
- Pride/hope → persistence after U.S. discovery.
- Escalating fear + recognition of Kennedy’s seriousness → preference for compliance.
Outcome: Coercive diplomacy succeeds largely because fear becomes dominant while humiliation is mitigated by respect.

Limits Map (mini):

Case unusually rich in archival sources; may not generalize to less documented crises.
Soviet group dynamics and domestic political constraints are present but less fully explored than Khrushchev’s individual emotions.

Chapter 5: The Gulf Conflict, 1990–1991 (Saddam Hussein)

Summary:

Traces Saddam’s emotional responses across six key decisions—from invading Kuwait to finally withdrawing under duress. Shows how pride, hope, anger, humiliation, and suppressed fear, shaped by Ba’athist emotion norms and Saddam’s identity as Arab knight and revolutionary leader, led him repeatedly to defy U.S. coercive diplomacy. Only when fear and humiliation became overwhelming did he order withdrawal, long after the coercive strategy had “failed.”

Key Points:

Decision to invade Kuwait: strong pride and anger (about perceived Kuwaiti slights and economic injustice), limited fear of U.S. response, hope that Arab and great powers would not oppose him decisively.
Refusal to withdraw after initial UN demands: pride and hope remained high; he believed coalition might fracture and that he could rally Arab opinion.
As U.S./coalition buildup grew, Saddam’s fear initially rose but later receded when he came to believe the Americans could not or would not remove him from power.
Saddam’s fear taboo (emotion norm against expressing fear) and identity as fearless leader impeded timely adaptation; humiliation at being treated as an outlaw strengthened stubbornness.
Only after catastrophic battlefield losses and growing inner collapse did fear and humiliation finally overpower pride and anger, prompting withdrawal from Kuwait—but by then, coercive diplomacy had failed to avert war.

Theory Lens Map:

Rationalist: can describe changing cost–benefit balance but struggles to explain why Saddam repeatedly discounted high odds of defeat.
Constructivist: identity as Arab defender explains some resistance but under‑explains the timing of his (late) shift.
Logic of affect: detailed emotional trajectory aligns closely with decision points and misperceptions.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

Humiliation is central: public vilification and dismissive language from the U.S. reinforced Saddam’s desire to resist and seek vindication.
Symbolic disrespect undermined potential openings in November 1990, when alternative emotional management might have induced earlier compliance.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Emotional trajectory:
- Pride/anger/hope → invasion and initial defiance.
- Rising fear, then declining fear, as he reinterprets U.S. resolve.
- Mounting humiliation, oscillating with anger, keeps him locked into resistance.
- Final combination of crushing fear and humiliation triggers withdrawal, but only after war.
Outcome: Coercive diplomacy fails as a strategy to avoid war, even though it eventually contributes to withdrawal; emotional dynamics made early compliance unlikely.

Limits Map (mini):

Saddam’s inner circle and regime survival concerns matter but are folded into his own emotional experience; less focus on wider Iraqi society.
Access to Ba’ath archives is better than most authoritarian cases but still incomplete.

Chapter 6: Conclusion – Coercer Dilemma & Policy Implications

Summary:

Assesses how well emotional choice theory performed, compares it with the logics of consequences and appropriateness, introduces the coercer dilemma, and draws cautious policy recommendations for coercive diplomacy when coercers are militarily stronger and target leaders have high domestic authority.

Key Points:

Emotional choice theory explains puzzling decisions better than existing models and complements them where they already have traction.
Reveals that physical threats have no uniform effect; they may intimidate or provoke depending on emotional appraisals.
Symbolic gestures (recognition, respectful language) can be as important as material incentives.
The coercer dilemma: inducing enough fear without triggering paralysis, anger, excessive humiliation, or counter‑productive pride/hope is extremely difficult.
Cautions against deliberate use of humiliation as a tool and against feigning emotions; perceived inauthenticity can backfire and increase mistrust.

Theory Lens Map:

Each logic has strengths/weaknesses; a pluralistic approach that integrates all three is recommended. Emotional choice adds crucial micro‑level texture.

Cross-Cutting Themes:

“Affective revolution” in IR is underway but still developing; this book is a foundational step in specifying an emotion‑based logic of choice.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Policy implications (for UN SC and major powers):

Tailor threats and inducements to target’s emotion norms and identities.
Use symbolic respect and recognition to ease humiliation when asking for concessions.
Consider issuing threats and positive incentives simultaneously rather than sequentially, at least in some contexts.

Limits Map (mini):

Based on two cases → generalizations are necessarily contingent and specific to situations where coercers are stronger and targets have strong domestic authority.

Section 2.X: The Five Key Emotions and Coercive Diplomacy

Summary:

Pulls together propositions about fear, anger, hope, pride, and humiliation in coercive contexts and how each can support or undermine compliance.

Key Points:

Fear is double‑edged: can motivate compliance or provoke pre‑emptive escalation or paralysis.
Anger systematically encourages risk‑acceptant defiance and punishment of the coercer.
Hope sustains resistance by keeping alive expectations of escape, compromise, or coalition fracture.
Pride makes backing down emotionally costly, especially under public scrutiny.
Humiliation can trigger either withdrawal (if degradation accepted as justified) or revenge (if perceived as unjust).

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Effective coercion must:
- Raise fear of consequences.
- Kill hope of cost‑free resistance.
- Avoid stoking anger and humiliation that drive revenge.
- Manage pride by offering dignified exit options.

Section 3.X: Emotion Indicators & Evidence Hierarchy

Summary:

Details how Markwica reads archives to infer leaders’ emotions.

Key Points:

Four indicator types: explicit/implicit verbal cues, cognitive content, and behavior.
Evidence from secret recordings & internal transcripts is privileged over public rhetoric and post‑hoc memoirs.
Cross‑case and within‑case consistency in indicators boosts confidence in inferences.

Section 4.X: Khrushchev’s Decision to Remove Missiles (Oct 1962)

Summary:

Zooms in on the critical decision to remove missiles and accept Kennedy’s terms.

Key Points:

No single new piece of information explains the shift; rationalist accounts struggle.
Fear that Kennedy might lose control and unleash nuclear war grew rapidly.
Kennedy’s private and public signals provided recognition and face‑saving reassurance, easing humiliation.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Before: Pride + hope > fear → continued defiance.
After: Fear + recognition > pride → compliance.

Section 5.X: Saddam’s Final Withdrawal Decision

Summary:

Highlights Saddam’s eventual order to withdraw and why it came so late.

Key Points:

Emotional state oscillated between intense fear and humiliation; ultimately his sense of humiliation about Iraqi military performance sapped his energy to continue.
Only when fear of regime collapse and personal defeat became overwhelming did he override pride and order withdrawal.

Coercion Logic Breakdown:

Strong evidence that emotional exhaustion and breakdown, not rational reevaluation of costs alone, drove late compliance.

🧱 Limits Typology (Coercion-Specific)

Ways emotional dynamics limit coercive diplomacy’s effectiveness (derived from the book):

Fear Overload → Panic or Paralysis
- Threats too strong or too immediate can freeze a leader or provoke pre‑emptive escalation, not careful compliance.
Anger Activation → Defiant Resistance
- Perceived injustice or disrespect in the coercer’s demands or rhetoric triggers anger, increasing willingness to bear high costs to resist.
Hope Preservation → Delayed Compliance
- As long as leaders hope for a face‑saving exit, coalition splits, or coercer bluff, they may postpone compliance until options vanish.
Pride Entrapment → Audience Costs on Steroids
- Publicly staking reputation on resistance transforms backing down into an emotionally costly identity betrayal, even if materially rational.
Humiliation Backlash → Revenge Motive
- Involuntary, unjustified degradation (sanctions, rhetoric, symbolic slights) generates desire to restore honor through continued defiance or escalation.
Emotion Norm Pathologies → Learning Failure
- Taboo on fear or on showing weakness prevents adaptive updating; leaders cannot acknowledge risk without betraying identity.
Recognition Miscalibration → Status Spirals
- Over‑recognizing aggressive identities may embolden; under‑recognizing status claims fuels humiliation and anger.
Coercer Dilemma → Design Challenge
- Attempts to fix one limit (e.g., reduce humiliation with inducements) can worsen another (increase hope/pride), creating design trade‑offs.

📏 Measures of Effectiveness (MoE)

Possible MoEs implied by Markwica’s framework:

Behavioral Outcome MoE
- Did the target comply with core demands without major war?
- Timing: compliance before vs after large‑scale hostilities.
Emotional Trajectory MoE
- Did coercer actions shift the target leader’s dominant emotions from pride/hope/anger → manageable fear and non‑vindictive acceptance?
- Evidence of reduced humiliation and preserved dignity at the moment of compliance.
Perceptual/Judgment MoE
- Did appraisals move toward seeing coercer threats as both credible and controllable (fear with control → cautious compliance) rather than as inevitable doom (fear without control → panic) or unjust bullying (anger/humiliation)?
Strategic Interaction MoE
- Did coercer manage the coercer dilemma (enough fear, limited anger/humiliation, little hope)?
- Did symbolic gestures and language improve emotional climate (more respect, less insult)?
Alternative Explanatory MoE
- Does emotional choice theory explain timing and content of decisions better than pure cost–benefit or identity‑only models?

🤷‍♂️ Actors & Perspectives (Strategic Empathy)

Nikita Khrushchev (target leader, Cuba 1962)

Identity: Responsible Soviet leader, defender of socialist camp, peasant‑to‑premier success story who values personal rapport.
Emotion norms: Emphasis on courage and solidarity, but also paternal responsibility to avoid nuclear war.
Emotional trajectory: fear (U.S. nuclear advantage, threat to Cuba), pride and hope (bold missile move), escalating fear and concern about JFK’s emotional state, relief/gratitude at recognition.

John F. Kennedy (coercer leader, Cuba 1962)

Identity: Young, cautious Cold War leader, image‑sensitive, wary of uncontrolled escalation.
Emotional posture (from U.S. sources): also anxious, fearful, sometimes angry, but outwardly controlled; important for Khrushchev’s perception of his resolve and possible loss of control.

Saddam Hussein (target leader, Gulf 1990–91)

Identity: Arab knight, revolutionary strongman, protector of Iraqi sovereignty and honor.
Emotion norms: Fear taboo, valorization of toughness, demand for loyalty and deference.
Emotional trajectory: pride and anger (Kuwait), hope (U.S. won’t attack decisively), fluctuating fear, deepening humiliation at military setbacks, eventual emotional collapse.

George H. W. Bush (coercer leader, Gulf 1990–91)

Identity: Prudent realist, coalition builder, defender of “new world order.”
Emotional posture from Iraqi perspective: seen as arrogant, moralizing, and disrespectful, fueling Saddam’s humiliation and anger.

Advisers & Groups

Presidium and Ba’ath inner circle emotions circulate with leaders’ emotions (Ross’s “circulation of affect”), shaping group decisions and reinforcing emotional trajectories.

🕰 Timeline of Major Events (Very Compressed)

Cuban Missile Crisis (Khrushchev’s perspective)

May–July 1962: Decision to secretly deploy missiles to Cuba (fear of U.S. invasion; desire for nuclear parity and prestige).
14 Oct 1962: U‑2 discovers missiles.
22 Oct: Kennedy announces quarantine; Khrushchev initially urges completion of missiles (pride/hope).
24–27 Oct: Tense stand‑off; evidence accumulates that Kennedy might be losing control; fear of nuclear war intensifies.
28 Oct: Khrushchev announces removal of missiles after receiving respect‑laden messages and security guarantees.

Gulf Conflict (Saddam’s perspective)

2 Aug 1990: Iraq invades Kuwait.
Aug–Nov 1990: UN sanctions and demands to withdraw; coalition buildup; Saddam remains defiant (pride, hope, anger).
Nov 1990: Potential openings for negotiation; Saddam may have been willing to accept limited concessions if treated with more respect.
Jan 17 1991: Operation Desert Storm begins.
Jan–Feb 1991: Air campaign, then ground offensive; Iraqi forces crushed; Saddam’s fear and humiliation spike.
Late Feb 1991: Orders withdrawal from Kuwait under overwhelming pressure and emotional collapse.

📖 Historiographical Context

Dialogues with George, Art, Jakobsen, Freedman on coercive diplomacy’s conditions of success/failure.
Engages prospect theory literature (Levy, Haas, Schaub) but argues that risk framing alone cannot account for emotional specificity.
Builds on Janice Gross Stein and others who called for systematic study of fear, anger, humiliation in deterrence.
Part of the affective turn in IR, alongside Lebow, Hall, Ross, Mercer, and others, but distinctive in offering a formal action model plus detailed case work.

🧩 Frameworks & Methods

Three Action Models:
1. Logic of consequences (rational choice).
2. Logic of appropriateness (constructivism).
3. Logic of affect (emotional choice theory).
Mechanism Chain:
- Cultural context → norms & identities → emotion norms → appraisals → specific emotions → appraisal/action tendencies → preferences & judgments → decisions.
Methodological Toolkit:
- Interpretive process tracing.
- Textual emotion indicators with evidence hierarchy.
- Emotional relevance typology (Unknown, Irrelevant, Minor, Relevant, Principal).
Case Selection:
- Canonical, heavily studied crises with strong archival bases on targets (Khrushchev, Saddam).

🔄 Learning Over Time

Within Cases

Khrushchev: learns about Kennedy’s resolve and emotional state over several days; emotional trajectory shifts from pride/hope to fear/relief; compliance reflects this learning.
Saddam: learns some tactical lessons but remains trapped by pride, anger, hope, and fear taboos; emotional learning is slow and late, leading to delayed compliance.

For Theory

Shows that emotions can be traced historically, pushing back on skepticism that feelings are too ephemeral for strategic studies.
Suggests that future coercion research should routinely test for emotional mechanisms alongside cost–benefit and identity explanations.

🧐 Critical Reflections

Scope Conditions:
- Theory explicitly limited to cases where coercers are stronger and targets have strong domestic authority; generalizing beyond this is speculative.
Measurement Concerns:
- Reliance on texts and second‑hand accounts may miss nonverbal cues; interpretive coding of emotions can be contested.
Agency vs Structure:
- Heavy focus on leaders’ inner worlds underplays systemic pressures, bureaucratic politics, and domestic political constraints (though these appear via emotional responses).
Causality vs Narrative:
- Process analysis blurs lines between causal and constitutive explanation; some readers may want more explicit counterfactuals or comparative statistics.
Normative Risks:
- “Better coercion” via emotional manipulation raises ethical concerns; using humiliation instrumentally is rightly flagged as dangerous, but other emotional levers are also ethically fraught.

⚔️ Comparative Insights

Why Cuba ≠ Iraq
- In Cuba, U.S. coercion eventually induced manageable fear while providing recognition and face‑saving assurances → compliance without war.
- In Iraq, U.S. coercion stoked humiliation and anger, while Saddam’s pride, hope, and fear norms blunted fear → prolonged defiance and war.
Theory vs Theory:
- Rationalist: both cases show “resolve + power” but outcomes diverge; emotional differences explain divergence.
- Constructivist: both leaders had identities that could justify either resistance or compromise; emotions explain when and how they switch scripts.
Lesson for Future Crises:
- The same structural configuration (stronger vs weaker) can yield opposite outcomes depending on emotional dynamics; purely structural theories are underdetermined.

✍️ Key Terms / Acronyms

UNSC – UN Security Council
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
CRRC – Conflict Records Research Center (Ba’ath files)
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Ba’ath – Iraqi ruling party under Saddam
Logic of consequences / appropriateness / affect – three action models
Homo oeconomicus / sociologicus / emotionalis – shorthand for each action model’s idealized decision‑maker

❓ Open Questions (Instructor Focus Questions)

Under what circumstances should strategists privilege emotional choice theory over rationalist models for explaining/coaching coercive diplomacy?
How would Markwica interpret extended deterrence (e.g., U.S. commitments to allies) through the lens of emotions, identities, and recognition?
Does emotional choice theory imply that coercive diplomacy is inherently less reliable than its rationalist proponents suggest? Why or why not?
How might a coercer operationally assess a target leader’s emotional trajectory in real time, absent access to archival documents?
Could emotional choice theory help explain why some ostensibly “irrational” actors (e.g., revolutionary regimes, terrorist organizations) respond differently to threats than states?
Is it ethically acceptable for coercers to design strategies that deliberately manipulate emotions (e.g., fear, humiliation, recognition)? Where are the red lines?
How would Markwica’s approach change if the focus were on coercers’ emotions instead of targets’?
What would a Markwica‑style analysis of a contemporary case (e.g., Iran nuclear negotiations, Russia–Ukraine) look like?

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“Emotions function as essential short‑term catalysts for change.”

“Human decision‑making is not only socially but also emotionally constructed.”

(Use these lines as epigraphs or framing sentences in seminar comments or papers.)

🧾 Final-Paper Hooks

Apply emotional choice theory to a new case
- e.g., Iran nuclear crisis, North Korea, Russia–Ukraine, Taiwan Strait—reconstruct the likely emotional trajectory of a leader and assess coercive diplomacy.
Compare Markwica vs Schelling/George
- Evaluate how adding the logic of affect revises classic prescriptions about threat design, sequencing of carrots/sticks, and credibility.
Emotions and Extended Deterrence
- Explore how fear, pride, and humiliation shape alliances and reassurance—e.g., NATO’s eastern flank, U.S.–Japan, U.S.–ROK.
Humiliation as a Strategic Variable
- Build on Markwica to analyze when humiliation leads to capitulation vs revenge and what this implies for sanctions and public shaming strategies.
Emotion Norms & Civil-Military Culture
- Investigate how specific emotion norms (e.g., fear taboos, macho culture) in a state’s leadership or military shape responses to coercion.
Methodological Paper
- Critically assess Markwica’s emotion‑inference method; propose enhancements (e.g., sentiment analysis, leader interviews, experimental wargames).
Normative Critique
- Examine the ethics of “emotional coercion” and whether strategists should deliberately design operations to manipulate fear, pride, and humiliation.