How ISIS Fights

Military Tactics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt

🎙️ Comps Prep (Oral Comprehensive Exam)

• If an armed non-state actor can generate tactical innovations and shift among ways of warfare, then it can punch above its material weight in combat effectiveness and endurance, because adaptation changes the local balance faster than incumbents can learn. So what for strategy: counter-IW planning has to target the innovation/shift cycle, not just manpower and territory. (pp. 21, 202)

• If ISIS can execute a state-level expansion pattern of intelligence + infiltration, absorption/recruitment, looting, experienced leadership, and rapid knowhow transfer (iALLTR), then it can scale combat power across theaters, because each local foothold becomes a supply, personnel, and learning node. So what for strategy: disrupt absorption, looting pipelines, and cross-theater transfer as aggressively as you target fighters. (pp. 202–203)

• If ISIS pairs high-lethality tactical packages (e.g., IED/VBIED/SVBIED plus specialized assault elements and drones) with tactical autonomy/mission-oriented execution, then it can remain tactically effective in urban fights even while strategically losing, because initiative and specialization compress the defender’s decision cycle. So what for strategy: partner forces must be designed/trained to blunt these packages at the tactical edge. (pp. 207–209)

• This book aligns with Biddle’s emphasis that nonstate actors’ battlefield methods are conditional on capability and environment, and it gives concrete operational mechanisms (iALLTR/SCCLC/counteroffensive patterns) that can be paired with Kalyvas-style population/control models. (pp. 202–209)

Online Description

Ashour analyzes how ISIS executed military operations across Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Egypt, building an original framework of strategy types and tactic categories and applying it to detailed battlefront case studies to explain ISIS’s combat effectiveness, endurance, and patterns of expansion and contraction. 

Author Background

Omar Ashour is a British-Canadian academic and expert in security and military studies, currently serving as a Professor at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies in Qatar and holding affiliations with the University of Exeter in the UK. He earned his PhD in Politics from McGill University and has a distinguished career researching insurgency, counter-terrorism, de-radicalization, and combat effectiveness in the Middle East and beyond. Ashour’s work combines extensive field research, interviews, and analysis of militant tactics; his 2021 book How ISIS Fights: Military Tactics in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Egypt offers a systematic examination of the Islamic State’s tactical innovations and combat strategies across multiple theaters, demonstrating how the group blended conventional and unconventional warfare to expand and endure against stronger adversaries. Beyond this book, he has authored and edited other significant works on jihadist movements and contributes regularly to scholarly and policy debates on security and conflict.

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60‑Second Brief

• Core claim (1–2 sentences):

  • ISIS’s distinctive battlefield performance is best explained by (1) tactical innovations and (2) shifts among ways of warfare, amplified by operational-level patterns that move people, weapons, and knowhow across theaters. (pp. 21, 202–203) 

• Causal logic in a phrase:

  • Innovation + strategic shifting + operational transfer → disproportionate combat effectiveness + endurance.

• Why it matters for IW / strategic competition (2–4 bullets):

  • IW outcomes can hinge on operational learning and transfer, not only ideology, grievance, or external sponsorship. (pp. 202–203)

  • ISIS shows how an ANSA can hybridize (terrorism/guerrilla/conventional tactics) and still maintain coherence through organizational practices like autonomisation and specialization. (pp. 199–201)

  • Tactical-level realities (IEDs, snipers, SVBIEDs, drones, mission-type execution) shape strategic timelines by stretching campaigns and raising partner-force costs. (pp. 207–209)

• Best single takeaway (1 sentence):

  • Countering ISIS-like actors requires disrupting how they fight and learn (innovation + transfer + local absorption), not merely killing leaders or retaking terrain. (pp. 202–203)

Course Lens

• How does this text define/illuminate irregular warfare?

  • Treats ISIS as an insurgent actor waging a politico-military struggle to weaken the state and replace the political order, while flexibly employing conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism as ways of warfare. (p. 17) 

  • Illuminates IW as implemented through tactics + operational art, not as a purely political narrative contest: the book systematically disaggregates the tactical repertoire and links it to battlefield outcomes. (pp. 17–21)

• What does it imply about power/control, success metrics, and timeline in IW?

  • “Power” in IW includes combat effectiveness (ability to fight and win engagements) and military effectiveness (capacity to generate/maintain combat power over time). (p. 20) 

  • Success is not only territorial control; it includes endurance and the ability to expand/contract and persist through learning, transfer, and tactical adaptation (e.g., autonomisation). (pp. 200–201)

  • Timeline: the operational patterns (iALLTR/SCCLC/counteroffensives) help explain why ISIS could scale quickly and also prolong losses through stubborn counteroffensives and defensive adaptations. (pp. 203–204, 208)

• How does it connect to strategic competition?

  • Suggests strategic competition can be shaped by nonstate operational learning networks that exploit weak governance spaces, move knowhow across borders, and impose persistent costs on states and coalitions. (pp. 202–203)

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Seminar Questions (from syllabus)

• How does this case help explain how IW is implemented?

• How do Biddle and Kalyvas explain ISIS strategic choices?

• How should the US/partners counter an organization like ISIS?

✅ Direct Responses to Seminar Questions

• Q: How does this case help explain how IW is implemented?

  • A:

    • IW is implemented through a stack: ways of warfare (conventional/guerrilla/terrorism) → tactical categories → operational patterns that sequence and combine them. (pp. 17–21, 202–204)

    • The book operationalizes “implementation” by tracing concrete battlefronts (Fallujah, Mosul, Ramadi; Raqqa; Derna, Sirte; Sinai/Sheikh Zuweid) and showing how tactics were selected/combined under constraint. 

    • A key implementation insight is the operational-level triad: iALLTR (state-level expansion/learning), SCCLC (city seizure sequence), and a cult of counteroffensives (persistent, coordinated local counterattacks even when “irrational” by conventional planning). (pp. 202–204) 

    • ISIS’s implementation often depended on bottom-up, mission-oriented execution and autonomisation, enabling initiative when higher command/control degraded. (pp. 200–201, 208) 

• Q: How do Biddle and Kalyvas explain ISIS strategic choices?

  • A:

    • Biddle (inference): ISIS choices to mix irregular and quasi-conventional methods fit a logic of capability and environment—using what it could execute effectively (not merely what it possessed), especially in complex terrain like cities. (pp. 207–209)

    • Kalyvas (inference): ISIS’s operational patterns (especially SCCLC’s “soften” and coalition manipulation) are compatible with a control/collaboration framing—violence and alliances shape local compliance, contested space, and information flows. (pp. 203–204)

    • The book itself bridges levels in a way that makes the Biddle/Kalyvas pairing useful: it distinguishes macro/meso/micro drivers and argues ISIS’s uniqueness is concentrated at the meso-level (organizational features like cohesion, autonomisation, specialization). (pp. 199–201) 

• Q: How should the US/partners counter an organization like ISIS?

  • A:

    • Treat the center of gravity as learning + transfer: target iALLTR’s components (local intelligence/infiltration networks, absorption pipelines, looting of arms, leadership nodes, and cross-theater knowhow transfer). (pp. 202–203)

    • Build partner urban defense to defeat ISIS’s high-lethality packages (IED/VBIED/SVBIED + specialized assault teams + drones), which the book suggests will remain attractive to ISIS and imitators. (pp. 207–208)

    • Expect persistent counteroffensives; design stabilization and holding plans to withstand tenacious, coordinated local counterattacks even after “liberation.” (pp. 203–204)

    • Reduce the returns to coalition manipulation: SCCLC includes coalition-building but also liquidation of partners; supporting local armed coherence and information-sharing reduces ISIS’s ability to exploit divisions. (p. 203)

    • Measure success via durable reductions in operational transfer and local absorption, not just body counts or short-term territorial metrics. (pp. 202–203)

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Chapter-by-Chapter Breakdown

Chapter 1: Is It Mainly Tactics? (pp. 1–37)

• One-sentence thesis: The book reframes ISIS’s battlefield performance as a function of tactical innovation and strategic shifting, and defines the conceptual and methodological toolkit to test that claim. (pp. 17–21)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Defines conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and insurgency as the analytic backdrop for ISIS’s repertoire. (p. 17)

  • Distinguishes tactics (engagement-level methods) from operational art (linking tactics to strategic objectives). (pp. 17–18)

  • Introduces two hypotheses: H1 tactical innovations increase combat effectiveness; H2 strategic shifts increase military endurance. (p. 21)

  • Builds a three-strategy / fifteen-tactics framework for analyzing ISIS’s “repertoire.” (pp. 23–24)

  • Sets the book’s focus on the insurgent side and argues understanding how ISIS fights is critical to defeating it. (p. 17)

  • Explains data sources and approach (including interviews and an ISIS warfare dataset built from ISIS and non-ISIS sources). (pp. 24–26)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Combat effectiveness vs military effectiveness (p. 20)

  • Tactical innovations; strategic shifts (p. 21)

  • Tactics vs operational art (pp. 17–18)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Conceptual definitions; framework tables; methodological discussion of interviews and datasets. (pp. 17–26)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Provides a vocabulary to explain “IW implementation” beyond slogans—by specifying tactics categories and operational linkages.

  • Sets up an analytic approach that can compare ISIS to other ANSAs/ASAs on combat performance rather than ideology alone.

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • Q1 (implementation of IW)

  • Q2 (linking Biddle/Kalyvas-levels to ISIS choices)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “A tactic combines two or more of these four features: firepower and explosive power; mobility and positioning; protection and stealth; and shock.” (p. 17)

  • “This is how IS fights. And understanding how it fights is critical for its ultimate defeat.” (p. 17)

Chapter 2: Implodes but Expands: How the ‘Islamic State’ Fights in Iraq (pp. 38–78)

• One-sentence thesis: Iraq is the core laboratory for ISIS’s evolution, showing how tactical and strategic adaptation enabled both expansion (e.g., Mosul 2014) and prolonged resistance (e.g., Mosul 2016–17). 

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Traces ISIS’s Iraqi evolution and uses battlefront analyses to connect organizational change to battlefield methods. (pp. 38–45)

  • Fallujah: analyzes shifts and innovations from 2014–2016, including how ISIS used “softening” and “creeping” actions and coalition dynamics. (pp. 47–49)

  • Mosul: details the sequencing of operations in 2014 and later adaptation under coalition pressure in 2016–2017. (pp. 50–62)

  • Ramadi: treats it as a major test of tactical “upsets” and the costs of “cult of counteroffensives” behavior. (pp. 63–69)

  • Uses reported-tactics tables to show the prominence of IEDs, sniping, SVBIEDs, and other categories across battlefronts. (pp. 58, 62, 68)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • SCCLC in practice at the city level (pp. 47–48)

  • Tactical innovations and strategic shifts at Mosul (pp. 59–62)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Battlefront studies: Fallujah (2014–16), Mosul (2014–17), Ramadi (2014–16), plus reported usage tables. 

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Shows how “preparatory” operations (soften/creep) can fix defenders in garrison roles and shape the city fight before the main assault. (p. 203)

  • Illustrates why liberation operations must plan for post-liberation counteroffensives and urban defensive adaptation.

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • Q1 (implementation via battlefront sequencing)

  • Q3 (countering: urban defense + partner design)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “The first hypothesis is that ‘tactical innovations’ increase combat effectiveness.” (p. 21)

  • “The second hypothesis is that ‘strategic shifts’ increase military endurance.” (p. 21)

Chapter 3: Explodes and Expands: How the ‘Islamic State’ Fights in Syria (pp. 79–125)

• One-sentence thesis: Syria illustrates ISIS’s rapid growth and adaptation, including the operational limits of SCCLC outside Iraq and the evolution of defensive innovation under coalition pressure. (pp. 99, 203)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Reviews ISIS’s emergence and expansion in Syria and why strategy/tactics varied across locations and opponents. (pp. 79–95)

  • Uses Raqqa as a key battlefront to show patterns of reported tactics in 2016–2017 (notably heavy IED use and sniping). (p. 112)

  • Highlights how ISIS leveraged and combined tactics in ways that resemble “unconventional combined arms,” including defensive combinations involving drones, SVBIEDs, and assault elements. (pp. 207–208)

  • Assesses why SCCLC succeeded in some contexts (e.g., Raqqa 2013 per conclusion discussion) and failed or partially applied elsewhere. (p. 203)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Unconventional combined arms (pp. 207–208)

  • Limits/conditions for SCCLC success outside Iraq (p. 203)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Battlefront analysis; Raqqa reported-tactics table (N=1068) includes high reported use of static IEDs (362; 34%) and sniping (284; 27%). (p. 112) 

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Demonstrates how ISIS can remain tactically dangerous while strategically losing, by innovating defensively and relying on mission-oriented execution.

  • Suggests likely diffusion of tactical packages (drones + SVBIED + assault elements) to other ANSAs. (pp. 207–208)

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • Q1 (IW implementation across battlefronts)

  • Q3 (countering: defensive innovation and diffusion)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “These tactics were also effective in defensive operations, mainly by countering the overwhelming advantages of the liberating forces …” (p. 208)

Chapter 4: Reloads but Implodes: How the ‘Islamic State’ Fights in Libya (pp. 126–159)

• One-sentence thesis: Libya shows both ISIS’s ability to “reload” via transfer and adaptation and the limits of sustaining gains when facing mobilized local coalitions and concentrated opposition. (pp. 147–149, 203)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Uses Derna and Sirte as paired cases for how ISIS attempts city footholds and responds when under pressure. (pp. 126–141)

  • Derna (Jan–Apr 2016): reported tactics emphasize IED-intensive activity (29; 39%), sniping (19; 26%), and suicide attacks (15; 20%). (p. 149) 

  • Sirte (2016): reported tactics include IEDs (63; 32%), direct-fire weapons (54; 27%), and sniping (42; 21%), illustrating heavy reliance on defensive attrition and urban fighting methods. (p. 146) 

  • The conclusion generalizes Libya as evidence for iALLTR’s importance (leadership and knowhow transfers) and SCCLC’s uneven success. (pp. 202–203)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Comparative transfer/leadership effects (iALLTR) (pp. 202–203)

  • Counteroffensive persistence under collapse (pp. 203–204)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Derna, Sirte battlefront analyses; tactics tables; discussion of coalition dynamics. (pp. 126–151)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Highlights that coalition-building against ISIS can emerge when softening/creeping serves as early warning and triggers balancing. (p. 203)

  • Reinforces the need to plan for “collapsed C2 but still coherent squads” (unit cohesion + autonomisation). (pp. 200–201)

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • Q1 (implementation through city campaigns)

  • Q3 (countering: coalition management and post-liberation security)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “SCCLC showed that IS is capable of both (tactical) coalition-building … But … IS is extremely treacherous.” (p. 203)

Chapter 5: Lures, and Endures: How ‘Sinai Province’ Fights in Egypt (pp. 160–194)

• One-sentence thesis: Sinai Province demonstrates how ISIS affiliates adapt to local conditions, sustaining endurance through luring/ambush dynamics and a repertoire heavy in sniping and IEDs, culminating in set-piece attacks like Sheikh Zuweid (2015). (pp. 169–170, 184–185)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Profiles Sinai Province’s methods and why its operational environment differs from Iraq/Syria/Libya. (pp. 160–168)

  • Uses a reported tactics table for SP’s first year (2014–2015): sniping (471; 42%) and IEDs (301; 27%) dominate reported usage. (p. 178) 

  • Analyzes the July 2015 battle of Sheikh Zuweid as a major offensive attempt—described as “a blitzkrieg” relying on “technicals.” (p. 184)

  • Shows how SP’s tactics included combined fire systems (e.g., guided missiles, rockets, mortars) and shaped the defender’s response. (pp. 169–170, 184–186)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Local adaptation under different terrain/state posture

  • Battlefront-specific offensive sequencing (“lure” dynamics; endurance) (pp. 184–186)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Sinai Province 2014–2015 reported tactics table (N=1112); Sheikh Zuweid battle table (N=202). (pp. 178, 183) 

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Endurance in IW can come from tactics that impose constant friction (IEDs/sniping), not only from territorial governance.

  • Partner force design must be tailored to local tactical profiles (counter-sniper + counter-IED + ISR against mobile raiding).

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • Q1 (implementation under distinct local constraints)

  • Q3 (countering: partner design + local intelligence)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Sinai Province’s (SP) attack on Sheikh Zuweid … was a blitzkrieg.” (p. 184)

  • “The IS fighters relied on ‘technicals’ as the main tool for making decisive charges …” (p. 184)

Chapter 6: Agency with a Tactical Edge (pp. 195–213)

• One-sentence thesis: The conclusion locates ISIS’s uniqueness in the quality/quantity of tactical innovation and strategic shifts, and refines the theory by elevating operational-level modi operandi and meso-level organizational features as decisive. (pp. 199–203)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Argues the uniqueness of ISIS combat performance lies in tactical innovations, strategic shifts, and sustained operational planning/execution relative to other ANSAs. (p. 202)

  • Introduces three critical operational modi operandi: iALLTR, SCCLC, and a cult of counteroffensives. (pp. 202–204)

  • Highlights leadership and rapid cross-theater knowhow transfer as standout comparative advantages. (p. 203)

  • Identifies meso-level features shaping combat performance: moral force/psychological warfare, cohesion, autonomisation, transregional experience, flexible hierarchies, specialization-focus. (pp. 199–201)

  • Discusses “mission-type” and “bottom-up” execution enabling improvisation and flexibility, uncommon in many Arab ASAs/ANSAs. (p. 208)

  • Stresses the relativity/adversarial nature of combat effectiveness (competition and adaptation). (p. 209)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • iALLTR, SCCLC, cult of counteroffensives (pp. 202–204)

  • Autonomisation (pp. 200–201)

  • Mission-type tactics; unconventional combined arms (pp. 207–208)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Cross-case synthesis (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Egypt); interview evidence (e.g., unit cohesion contested by only 2 of 31 interviewees who directly engaged ISIS/IS). (p. 200)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Offers a reusable operational template for how an ANSA scales and persists under pressure (transfer + city-seizure sequencing + counteroffensive persistence).

  • Suggests diffusion risk: “unconventional combined arms” and mission-type execution can migrate to other theaters and groups. (pp. 207–208)

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • Q1 (implementation mechanisms)

  • Q2 (mapping to Biddle/Kalyvas)

  • Q3 (countering: what to disrupt/measure)

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “The uniqueness of IS combat performance lies in the quality and the quantity of its tactical innovations …” (p. 202)

  • “Overall … the ‘mission-type’ approach to executing tactics has also enabled and encouraged improvisation, innovation …” (p. 208)

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Theory / Framework Map

• Level(s) of analysis:

  • Macro / meso / micro framing; uniqueness emphasized at meso-level. (pp. 199–201) 

• Unit(s) of analysis:

  • ISIS as an ANSA; provinces (e.g., Sinai Province); battlefronts (Mosul/Raqqa/etc.); tactics categories and operational sequences.

• Dependent variable(s):

  • Combat effectiveness (engagement outcomes); military effectiveness/endurance and expansion. (pp. 20–21, 202)

• Key independent variable(s):

  • Tactical innovations (H1); strategic shifts among ways of warfare (H2). (p. 21)

• Mechanism(s):

  • Operational-level modi operandi: iALLTR (state-level scaling), SCCLC (city seizure sequencing), cult of counteroffensives (sustained local counterattacks). (pp. 202–204)

  • Meso-level enablers: cohesion, autonomisation, flexible hierarchies, specialization-focus, psychological warfare/moral force, and experienced leadership/transfer. (pp. 199–203)

• Scope conditions / where it should NOT apply:

  • Claims are about ISIS and comparative ANSAs/ASAs in the examined theaters; generalization to other ANSAs should be cautious, especially where transfer networks or urban conditions differ. (pp. 202–209)

• Observable implications / predictions:

  • If iALLTR is operating, expect infiltration + absorption + looting + experienced leadership + rapid cross-theater tactical/strategic transfer preceding major expansion. (pp. 202–203)

  • If SCCLC is operating, expect “soften and creep” actions to fix defenders, followed by coalition dynamics and then liquidation/consolidation. (pp. 203–204)

  • If mission-type tactics/autonomisation are strong, expect tactical initiative and innovation even under decapitation and degraded C2. (pp. 200–201, 208)

Key Concepts & Definitions (author’s usage)

• Insurgency

  • Definition: A politico-military struggle aimed at weakening the state and replacing the regime or political order. (p. 17)

  • Role in argument: Frames ISIS as an insurgent actor, not only a terrorist group.

  • Analytical note: Keeps attention on political objectives while enabling tactical/operational analysis.

• Conventional warfare

  • Definition: Fighting where opponents use tactics combining firepower, mobility, protection, and shock. (p. 17)

  • Role: One of three “ways of warfare” ISIS can shift into/out of.

  • Analytical note: Useful for identifying when ISIS is attempting quasi-conventional operations.

• Guerrilla warfare

  • Definition: Small, lightly equipped forces using hit-and-run tactics to avoid decisive engagement. (p. 17)

  • Role: Explains ISIS persistence and harassment under pressure.

  • Analytical note: Operationalizes by identifying tactical categories consistent with hit-and-run.

• Terrorism

  • Definition: Deliberate targeting of unarmed civilians to instill fear and coerce. (p. 17)

  • Role: One of ISIS’s ways of warfare and a “softening” tool in some sequences.

  • Analytical note: Treat as a method that can coexist with other warfare types, not a totalizing label.

• Tactics

  • Definition: Engagement-level methods that combine features like firepower, mobility, protection/stealth, shock. (p. 17)

  • Role: The book’s main explanatory lever for combat effectiveness.

  • Analytical note: Enables categorization and comparison across battlefronts.

• Operational (level) / operational art

  • Definition: The level linking tactical actions to broader strategic objectives via sequencing and combination. (p. 18)

  • Role: Core refinement of the book’s original hypotheses (modi operandi).

  • Analytical note: Counter-IW must contest this level (transfer, sequencing), not only tactical events.

• Combat effectiveness

  • Definition: The ability to fight in engagements and win battles. (p. 20)

  • Role: Primary DV for H1.

  • Analytical note: Track via outcomes and relative performance, not just attack frequency.

• Military effectiveness

  • Definition: Capacity to “create, deploy and maintain combat power.” (p. 20)

  • Role: Bridges battlefield outcomes to endurance/expansion.

  • Analytical note: Links to partner capacity-building and campaign design.

• iALLTR (modus operandi)

  • Definition (as described): Intelligence/infiltration, absorption/recruitment, looting arms, experienced leadership, rapid knowhow transfer. (pp. 202–203)

  • Role: State-level scaling mechanism.

  • Analytical note: Countering requires targeting networks and flows (people/arms/knowhow), not just nodes.

• SCCLC (modus operandi)

  • Definition: Soften/creep → coalition-build → liquidate/consolidate (city-level seizure/ domination sequence). (pp. 203–204)

  • Role: Explains how ISIS takes towns/cities and then manages (and betrays) alliances.

  • Analytical note: Predicts early violence and infiltration, plus post-seizure “purges” of former allies.

• Autonomisation

  • Definition: Self-reliant small units able to pursue objectives even when cut off from higher command. (pp. 200–201)

  • Role: Helps explain endurance and continued tactical effectiveness under decapitation.

  • Analytical note: Suggests that leadership targeting alone is insufficient without disrupting local unit sustainment.

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Key Arguments & Evidence

• Argument 1: Tactical innovations increase combat effectiveness.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Hypothesis stated explicitly (p. 21) and supported through battlefront case comparisons and tactics tables (e.g., heavy IED + sniping + SVBIED patterns in Mosul/Raqqa). (pp. 58, 62, 112)

  • So what:

    • Counter-IW must anticipate and blunt innovation cycles (e.g., new combinations and defensive adaptations).

• Argument 2: Strategic shifts among ways of warfare increase military endurance.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Hypothesis stated explicitly (p. 21); cross-theater synthesis argues endurance/expansion persist “even when … resources should have yielded none of that,” due to innovations, shifts, and operational artistry. (p. 202)

  • So what:

    • Strategy should focus on denying ISIS the ability to shift effectively (e.g., disrupting cross-domain packages and governance/force protection seams).

• Argument 3: Operational-level modi operandi are decisive amplifiers.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • iALLTR, SCCLC, and cult of counteroffensives named as critical to performance; examples of SCCLC enabling attacks under disadvantage and of persistent counteroffensives across battlefronts. (pp. 202–204)

  • So what:

    • Campaign design must disrupt operational sequencing and transfer, not just fight battle-by-battle.

• Argument 4: ISIS’s uniqueness is concentrated at the meso-level (organizational features).

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Meso-level features enumerated (cohesion, autonomisation, flexible hierarchies, specialization-focus, etc.) and tied to persistence under C2 collapse and decapitation. (pp. 199–201)

  • So what:

    • Partner-building should prioritize unit cohesion, decentralized initiative, and counter-network intelligence as much as equipment.

⚖️ Assumptions & Critical Tensions

• Assumptions the author needs:

  • Reported-tactics and interview data are sufficiently reliable to compare battlefront patterns.

  • Tactical categories and strategy types are meaningful across cases and over time.

• Tensions / tradeoffs / contradictions:

  • Emphasizing tactics risks underweighting political legitimacy, governance, and external support—yet the book argues these are insufficient without explaining combat performance.

  • Operational patterns (e.g., SCCLC) can be both effective and self-defeating (coalition betrayal), raising questions about long-run political strategy vs short-run military gain.

• What would change the author’s mind? (mark clearly as inference)

  • Inference: Demonstrating that ISIS’s combat effectiveness/endurance can be fully explained by macro drivers (sponsorship, grievances, geography) without tactical/operational mechanisms would undermine the framework.

Critique Points

• Strongest critique:

  • The framework privileges battlefield performance; it may under-specify how political governance choices and legitimacy constraints feed back into endurance.

• Weakest critique:

  • The claim that tactics matter is hard to dispute; the more contestable issue is relative weight vs other variables—which the book partially addresses via meso-level emphasis.

• Method/data critique (if applicable):

  • “Reported usage” tables depend on source reporting; some tactics may be over/under-counted due to visibility and propaganda incentives.

  • Interviews (including “31 interviewees who directly engaged ISIS/IS”) are valuable but may be regionally skewed or shaped by recall/role bias. (p. 200)

• Missing variable / alternative explanation:

  • External operational enablers (e.g., enemy collapse, corruption, or coalition sequencing failures) might explain some “upsets” alongside ISIS tactical quality—though the book does note comparative ASA/ANSA leadership issues. (p. 203)

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Policy & Strategy Takeaways

Write this like a strategist:

• Implications for the US + partners:

  • Target ISIS-like groups as learning organizations with transfer networks: degrade the ability to move knowhow and leadership across theaters (iALLTR). (pp. 202–203)

  • Build partner capacity for urban defense against high-lethality packages (IED/VBIED/SVBIED + drone-enabled reconnaissance/attack + specialized assault elements). (pp. 207–208)

  • Prepare for persistent counteroffensives after tactical “wins”; design hold/stabilize phases as contested urban fights. (pp. 203–204)

• Practical “do this / avoid that” bullets:

  • Do: Treat early “soften/creep” activity as an operational warning; harden likely targets and disrupt infiltration and coalition manipulation. (p. 203)

  • Do: Deny looting opportunities (weapons depots, police stations, border posts) and tighten unit-level accountability to cut the arms pipeline. (pp. 202–203)

  • Do: Train partners to operate with decentralized initiative and resilient cohesion (mirroring the advantage ISIS gains from mission-type/autonomised execution). (pp. 200–201, 208)

  • Avoid: Over-optimizing on decapitation strikes alone; autonomised squads can persist and pursue objectives under adverse conditions. (pp. 200–201)

• Risks / second-order effects:

  • Aggressive disruption can intensify short-run violence and retaliation (terrorism as coercive instrument).

  • Coalition-building against ISIS can be fragile; local balancing dynamics may shift quickly if governance is weak.

• What to measure (MOE/MOP ideas) and over what timeline:

  • 6–18 months: frequency and effectiveness of iALLTR indicators (infiltration arrests, weapons theft reduction, leadership/transfer interdictions). (pp. 202–203)

  • 3–12 months: partner force ability to defeat SVBIED/IED/sniper packages (tactical outcomes, casualty ratios, time-to-clear). (pp. 178, 183)

  • 12–36 months: reduction in ISIS’s ability to regenerate operational planning and execute coordinated counteroffensives post-liberation. (pp. 203–204)

⚔️ Cross‑Text Synthesis (SAASS 644)

Connect to other course texts (only what fits):

• Where this aligns:

  • Biddle (Nonstate Warfare): ISIS’s approach fits a view that nonstate battlefield methods are conditional on capability and environment; Ashour adds a fine-grained taxonomy of what those methods look like in urban combat.

  • Mao (Protracted War): SCCLC’s “soften and creep” logic explicitly echoes Mao’s logic of wearing down opponents before decisive action. (p. 203)

• Where this contradicts:

  • Potential tension with any reading that treats ISIS primarily as “terrorism” rather than insurgency + operational art; Ashour insists terrorism is only one element of a broader repertoire. (p. 17)

• What it adds that others miss:

  • A clear operational mechanism for cross-theater scaling (iALLTR) and the idea that knowhow transfer can be a decisive comparative advantage among ANSAs. (pp. 202–203)

  • A strong claim that uniqueness is concentrated at the meso-level (cohesion/autonomisation/specialization), bridging micro motivations and macro context. (pp. 199–201)

• 2–4 “bridge” insights tying at least TWO other readings together:

  • Ashour + Biddle + Mao: ISIS’s ability to shift ways of warfare and sequence soften/creep → assault explains how nonstate forces sometimes approximate “combined arms” effects without matching state resources. (pp. 203, 207–208)

  • Ashour + Kalyvas (inference): SCCLC’s coalition-building and liquidation phases are a mechanism for reshaping local collaboration/control dynamics that Kalyvas emphasizes—violence and alliances as tools of control, not merely “terror.” (p. 203)

  • Ashour + Simpson (inference): Psychological warfare (“moral force” and brutality broadcast) is treated as combat-relevant—not just messaging—linking narrative to tactical advantage. (pp. 199–200)

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❓ Open Questions for Seminar

• If iALLTR is the key scaling mechanism, what are the most practical indicators that it is reconstituting in a post-caliphate environment?

• Under what conditions does SCCLC fail because it triggers balancing, and how can partners deliberately induce those conditions? (p. 203)

• How transferable are ISIS’s “mission-type” practices to other ANSAs without ISIS’s specific organizational culture and veteran leadership cadre? (pp. 208–209)

• Does a focus on tactical/operational performance risk underestimating political determinants of endurance, or does it correct an analytic bias in IW studies?

• If autonomisation reduces the value of decapitation, what combination of measures best collapses unit-level self-reliance? (pp. 200–201)

• What would a “counter-iALLTR” campaign design look like in a partner-constrained environment?

✍️ Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “The book primarily focuses on the insurgent side.” (p. 17)

• “This is how IS fights. And understanding how it fights is critical for its ultimate defeat.” (p. 17)

• “A tactic combines two or more of these four features: firepower and explosive power; mobility and positioning; protection and stealth; and shock.” (p. 17)

• “Combat effectiveness is one aspect of the overall military effectiveness.” (p. 20)

• “The first hypothesis is that ‘tactical innovations’ increase combat effectiveness.” (p. 21)

• “The second hypothesis is that ‘strategic shifts’ increase military endurance.” (p. 21)

• “The uniqueness of IS combat performance lies in the quality and the quantity of its tactical innovations …” (p. 202)

• “SCCLC showed that IS is capable of both (tactical) coalition-building … But … IS is extremely treacherous.” (p. 203)

• “These tactics were also effective in defensive operations, mainly by countering the overwhelming advantages of the liberating forces …” (p. 208)

• “Overall … the ‘mission-type’ approach to executing tactics has also enabled and encouraged improvisation, innovation …” (p. 208)

Exam Drills / Take‑Home Hooks

• Prompt 1: “Explain ISIS combat effectiveness beyond ideology: what mechanisms matter most?”

  • Outline:

    1. Define the analytic problem (combat effectiveness vs military effectiveness/endurance).

    2. Present Ashour’s mechanisms: tactical innovations + strategic shifts + operational modi operandi.

    3. Implications: what countermeasures target innovation/transfer vs attrition.

• Prompt 2: “What does Ashour add to Biddle and Kalyvas for understanding nonstate warfare?”

  • Outline:

    1. Biddle lens (capabilities/technology/environment) + Ashour’s tactical taxonomy.

    2. Kalyvas lens (control/collaboration) + Ashour’s SCCLC coalition manipulation and softening.

    3. Synthesis: why integrated tactical-operational + population models improve strategy.

• Prompt 3: “Design a partner-centric campaign to counter ISIS’s post-caliphate adaptation.”

  • Outline:

    1. Threat model: iALLTR reconstitution + tactical packages (IED/sniper/SVBIED/drone) + counteroffensives.

    2. Partner strategy: intelligence/infiltration disruption, weapons-denial, urban defense training, cohesion/initiative.

    3. Metrics + timeline: MOE/MOP tied to transfer disruption and reduced tactical effectiveness.

• If I had to write a 1500‑word response in 4–5 hours, my thesis would be:

  • ISIS’s battlefield performance is best explained by its ability to combine tactical innovation, strategic shifting, and operational transfer/sequencing, which creates disproportionate combat effectiveness and endurance that standard “terrorism-only” frames miss.

  • 3 supporting points + 1 anticipated counterargument:

    • Supporting point 1: Tactical innovations increase combat effectiveness (H1), shown through repeated reliance on high-lethality packages across urban battlefronts.

    • Supporting point 2: Strategic shifts increase military endurance (H2), letting ISIS move between ways of warfare as conditions change.

    • Supporting point 3: Operational patterns (iALLTR/SCCLC/counteroffensives) and meso-level features (cohesion/autonomisation/specialization) amplify adaptation and persistence.

    • Counterargument: Macro drivers (state collapse, external support, sectarian politics) explain ISIS success; response: Ashour does not deny context but shows how ISIS converts context into battlefield outcomes via mechanisms.