Russia and the Changing Character of Conflict

Tracey German (Cambria Press, 2023)

🎙️ Comps Prep (Oral Comprehensive Exam)

• If Russian military thinkers believe future conflict is decided by exhausting an opponent and eroding will, then Russia will prioritize integrated campaigns that blend military pressure with information and other nonmilitary tools, because “victory is won by the domination of ideas and narratives rather than physical territory.” So what for strategy: resilience of societies and decision-systems is a primary “battlefield,” not an adjunct. (p. 240)

• When Russian military science treats foresight/forecasting as essential to avoid strategic surprise and guide planning, then Russian institutions will continuously study Western interventions and Russia’s own wars for “lessons,” because they assume technological and socio-political change alters how wars are fought. So what for strategy: track Russian lesson-learning debates as indicators of what Moscow will attempt next. (p. 21–23)

• If Russia assumes rapid, high-tech “contactless” operations plus information effects can deliver quick political results, then it risks preparing for the wrong war, because morale, will to fight, and operational friction can turn “future war” concepts into attritional conflict—as Ukraine illustrates. So what for strategy: deny quick wins and plan to sustain long contests of will. (p. 246)

• This book’s framing of strategic competition as continuous confrontation—where nonmilitary means and information effects are central—aligns with Patterson et al.’s “winning without fighting” lens and complements Simpson’s emphasis on war as political/narrative struggle. (p. 240–241)

Online Description

German examines Russian debates about how conflict is changing and argues that Western analysis often misreads Russia by “templating” Western concepts onto Russian actions; instead, she traces how Russian military science, Western interventions, and Russia’s post-Soviet wars shape Russian expectations about future conflict—especially the growing role of nonmilitary means, information confrontation, high-tech capabilities, and proxies. (pp. 6, 246)

Author Background

Tracey German is a British scholar specializing in conflict, security, and international relations, best known for her research and writing on Russia and post-Soviet security dynamics. She is a full Professor of Conflict and Security in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London, where she focuses on Russian foreign and security policies, strategic culture, and how Russia uses force in the post-Soviet space. Her work often examines Russia’s engagement with its neighbours, the Caucasus and Caspian regions, and the implications of NATO and EU enlargement for regional security. She also has extensive field experience in the region and speaks Russian.

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60‑Second Brief

• Core claim (1–2 sentences):

  Russian military thought increasingly treats conflict as a continuum of confrontation in which nonmilitary means and information struggle can be decisive, but Ukraine shows that “intangibles” like morale and will still shape outcomes and frustrate forecasting. (pp. 240, 246)

• Causal logic in a phrase:

  Observation (Western wars + Russia’s own operations) → emulation/adaptation → concepts stressing information superiority, disorganization, nonmilitary means, and selective/indirect force. (p. 246)

• Why it matters for IW / strategic competition (2–4 bullets):

  • Russia frames strategic competition as ongoing struggle where information effects and nonmilitary pressure can “weaken a country from within.” (pp. 37–38)

  • Russian theorists treat information space as a battlespace; success is measured in will, cohesion, and decision advantage—not only terrain seized. (pp. 166, 240)

  • Russia’s reliance on ambiguity/deniability (e.g., proxies/PMSCs) complicates attribution and thresholds—classic “below the line” strategic competition dynamics. (p. 209)

• Best single takeaway (1 sentence):

  Understand Russian military thought on its own terms—do not “template” Western concepts onto Russia—because adversaries’ unique experiences generate different theories of force and conflict. (p. 246)

Course Lens

• How this text defines/illuminates irregular warfare:

  • Russian usage blurs “war” and “struggle” (bor’ba), reinforcing a continuum where political, informational, economic, and other tools are integral to confrontation—not separate from “war.” (pp. 34–36)

  • “Nonmilitary means” are explicitly treated as levers of power (political, information, diplomatic, economic, legal, spiritual/moral, humanitarian) that can be combined with force. (Glossary p. 249)

  • Information confrontation is portrayed as central: “battles” begin in information space, and influence operations aim at decision-making and public consciousness. (p. 166)

• What it implies about power/control, success metrics, and timeline in IW:

  • Power/control is often pursued indirectly: “disorganization” of command systems, reflexive control, deception, and manipulation of cognition and narratives. (pp. 175–176; Glossary p. 250)

  • Success metrics skew toward exhaustion and will: “weaken their will to resist,” dominate narratives, and reduce internal cohesion. (p. 240)

  • Timeline thinking includes compressed “initial periods” that can decide outcomes quickly, but Ukraine illustrates that protraction and friction persist. (Glossary p. 248; p. 246)

• How it connects to strategic competition:

  • The US/NATO are framed as primary “opponents” in Russian information confrontation narratives, which shapes Russian expectations and preparations. (p. 170)

  • The book warns that strategic competitors observe, emulate, and adapt—so competition is a dynamic learning contest, not a static “capabilities spreadsheet.” (p. 246)

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Seminar Questions (from syllabus)

• How well is the US postured to take on an adversary like Russia?

• How should US/allies prepare for conflict with Russia or similar strategies?

• What types of strategies would be most effective?

✅ Direct Responses to Seminar Questions

• Q: How well is the US postured to take on an adversary like Russia?

  • A:

    • The book implies a core US vulnerability is conceptual: if Russia treats conflict as continuous “struggle” blending nonmilitary means and information effects, a force-on-force framing risks missing how Russia seeks advantage through cognition, decision disruption, and societal pressure. (pp. 34–36; 240)

    • If Russian information warfare is seen as hard to attribute and effective against open societies, then US posture must include domestic resilience and attribution capabilities—not only forward military posture. (p. 170)

    • Russia’s proxy toolkit (including PMSCs) complicates thresholds and legal/political response; US posture is only as strong as allied mechanisms for exposure, attribution, and coordinated countermeasures. (p. 209)

    • The Ukraine war highlights Russian shortfalls and the enduring importance of morale/will; this creates opportunity for US strategy to focus on denial, endurance, and alliance cohesion rather than assuming “silver bullet” high-tech dominance. (p. 246)

• Q: How should US/allies prepare for conflict with Russia or similar strategies?

  • A:

    • Prepare for contests where the “principal objective” is exhaustion and will-breaking; operational plans should explicitly include protection of decision-making, cohesion, and narrative legitimacy as defended assets. (p. 240)

    • Build resilience for the “initial period of war” problem—rapid, decisive moves with deployed forces—through readiness, early warning, and decision speed (especially in grey-zone escalation pathways). (Glossary p. 248)

    • Harden networks and C2 against “disorganization,” deception, and reflexive control; train to operate under information degradation and manipulation. (pp. 175–176; Glossary p. 250)

    • Treat proxy ecosystems as a strategic target set: track, expose, sanction, and disrupt the financing/logistics of deniable actors that provide Russia flexibility. (p. 209)

    • Avoid mirror-imaging and “templating” Western concepts; systematically study Russian military debates to anticipate what Russia thinks works—and what it will try to do. (p. 246)

• Q: What types of strategies would be most effective?

  • A:

    • Strategies that deny quick political outcomes by preventing will-collapse: make “exhaustion” campaigns fail by reinforcing social cohesion, allied unity, and credible escalation management. (p. 240)

    • Integrated strategies that match the “nonmilitary means” problem: synchronize diplomatic, informational, economic, legal, and military levers (and prepare to contest both psychological and technical information confrontation). (Glossary p. 249; p. 175)

    • “Expose and attribute” strategies against ambiguity: undercut deniability and disrupt proxies/PMSCs as instruments of statecraft. (p. 209)

    • Competitive learning strategies: continuously update assessments as adversaries emulate/adapt; use Ukraine as a reminder that forecasting is hard and that human factors can overturn “future war” assumptions. (p. 246)

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Chapter-by-Chapter Breakdown

(Chapter order and start pages from the Table of Contents.)

Chapter 0: Introduction (p. 1–12)

• One-sentence thesis: Western discourse on Russia often mirror-images and over-labels; to understand Russian behavior, analyze Russian military science debates about how conflict is changing. (pp. 6, 246)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Russia’s 2014 Ukraine actions spurred Western debates about “hybrid war,” but the author argues Russian perspectives have been under-analyzed. (p. 6)

  • Russian theorists emphasize forecasting/foresight, while acknowledging prediction is inherently difficult. (p. 6)

  • The book is structured around lesson-learning (Part I) and continuity/change in perceived future conflict (Part II).

  • Ukraine (from Feb 2022) is flagged early as challenging assumptions about “future war” and the feasibility of prediction. (p. 7)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Changing character of conflict; foresight/forecasting; mirror-imaging.

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Russia/Ukraine 2014; Russia/Ukraine 2022 (as an early challenge case).

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Warns against analytic shortcuts (e.g., labeling) that obscure adversary logic.

  • Frames conflict as more than kinetic force—includes ideas, narratives, and societal pressure. (p. 240)

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • US posture (conceptual preparedness); how to prepare (study adversary thought).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Prediction is an inherently difficult endeavor.” (p. 6)

Part I Summary — Lessons Learned (p. 13–118)

• Russian military thought is shaped by systematic lesson-learning: studying others’ wars (esp. Western interventions) and Russia’s own post-Soviet operations. (p. 246)

• The “changing character” debate is anchored in institutional military science, competing schools of thought, and fear of surprise/unpreparedness. (pp. 21–23)

• These lessons feed a view that technological change and nonmilitary means are increasingly salient—and must be integrated into planning. (pp. 37–38)

Chapter 1: The Evolution of Military Thought (p. 15–52)

• One-sentence thesis: Russian military science institutionalizes theory-and-practice learning and insists on foresight to avoid surprise; contemporary debates increasingly emphasize both technology and nonmilitary means as drivers of conflict change. (pp. 15, 21–23, 37–38)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • “Military science” is treated as a body of knowledge about war and preparation for it, grounded in historical experience and practice. (p. 15)

  • Forecasting/foresight is positioned as essential: without predicting future conflict, states risk unpreparedness and surprise. (pp. 21–22)

  • The Academy of Military Sciences (AVN) is highlighted as a key institution (founded 1994) for theoretical and applied military science and reform support. (pp. 16–17)

  • Russian debates distinguish “war” and “struggle” (bor’ba), reinforcing a continuum framing rather than a strict “war/peace” dichotomy. (pp. 34–36)

  • From 2008, Russian journals increasingly discuss 21st-century conflict and threats, with two themes: (1) new technologies/high-precision weapons; (2) expanding nonmilitary means (incl. regime change fears). (pp. 37–38)

  • Concepts like “new-generation war” emphasize asymmetric actions and combined political/economic/technological/information campaigns to neutralize military superiority. (p. 37–38)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Military science; foresight/forecasting; war vs struggle; nonmilitary means.

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Institutional development (AVN); historical experience as basis for forecasting. (pp. 15–17)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Explains why Russia treats information and nonmilitary tools as integral, not ancillary.

  • Provides the intellectual base for Russian “whole-of-state” competition framing. (Glossary p. 249)

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • How to prepare; effective strategies (avoid mirror-imaging; watch adversary theory).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “War may become a blind gamble.” (p. 15)

Chapter 2: Observing Western Interventions (p. 53–80)

• One-sentence thesis: Russian analysts use US/NATO interventions as “data” to argue that future wars will be faster, more precise, and increasingly “contactless,” with information and aerospace strike enabling strategic effects short of traditional conquest. (pp. 53–58, 62, 65)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Russian military thought treats post-Cold War Western interventions as central reference points for changing character debates. (pp. 53–55)

  • NATO’s Kosovo campaign is discussed as a “low-intensity” conflict shifting into direct military operations and demonstrating the coercive utility of airpower and precision strike. (p. 56)

  • Analysts assess operations like Iraq 2003 as “unprecedented,” emphasizing surprise, tempo, and the ability to secure objectives quickly. (p. 65)

  • The “sixth-generation war” concept is presented (Slipchenko), distinguishing noncontact operations and precision strike dominance. (pp. 60–62)

  • These wars are interpreted as evidence that information, C2, and precision strike are decisive; hence Russia must prepare to counter/replicate them. (p. 62)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Contactless/noncontact war; network-centric warfare; sixth-generation war; aerospace/precision strike.

• Evidence / cases used:

  • NATO Kosovo (1999); Iraq (2003); broader post-Cold War interventions. (pp. 56, 65)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Shows how Russia internalizes Western patterns and seeks to deny Western advantages (information superiority, strike precision, tempo).

  • Helps explain why Russia emphasizes “initial period” decisiveness and information dominance. (Glossary p. 248)

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • How to prepare; effective strategies (deny Russia its expected model of quick, decisive operations).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Those are the types of wars for which Russia must prepare.” (p. 62)

Chapter 3: Operational Experience in the Post-Soviet Era (p. 81–118)

• One-sentence thesis: Russia’s own wars (Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, Syria) are treated as laboratories that generate “lessons” about tempo, C2, information control, and the limits of assumed quick victories. (pp. 83–84, 89, 93, 107)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Chechnya (1994–96) is described as initially unplanned/unprepared (no formal war declaration), with poor communications and no unified C2—driving hard “lessons learned.” (p. 83)

  • Heavy artillery/airpower and urban destruction are highlighted as features of Chechnya; Russia learned about the political costs and information environment of such wars. (p. 84)

  • Information management becomes an explicit lesson: Russia learned it must control information flows (Chechens were seen as initially controlling reporting). (p. 89)

  • Georgia (2008) is used to identify operational shortcomings, including C2 and communications issues, prompting reform/modernization. (p. 93)

  • Ukraine (2014) is framed as operationally significant and tied to debates about nonmilitary means and ambiguity. (p. 97)

  • Syria is presented as a venue for testing weapons and validating expeditionary approaches, including precision strike and combined arms learning. (p. 107)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Lessons learned; information control; operational tempo; expeditionary “testing ground.”

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Chechnya; Georgia (2008); Ukraine (2014); Syria. (pp. 83, 89, 93, 97, 107)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Highlights that Russia “learns” about narrative/information control as operational necessity.

  • Illustrates how Russia mixes conventional and irregular/deniable tools across theaters (Ukraine/Syria).

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • US posture (anticipating Russia’s practical learning); preparation (counter lessons Russia internalizes).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Russia drew the conclusion that it must control information flows.” (p. 89)

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Part II Summary — Continuity and Change (p. 119–246)

• Part II explores how Russian thinkers combine continuity (fear of surprise; emphasis on forecasting) with claims of major change (information domain centrality; high-tech futures; proxies). (pp. 21–23, 240)

• It also tests the debates against reality: Ukraine challenges technological determinism and re-centers “intangibles” like morale and will. (p. 246)

Chapter 4: High-Tech Futures (p. 121–154)

• One-sentence thesis: Russian debates increasingly emphasize that information and communications technologies, precision strike, and automation/AI will accelerate tempo and expand noncontact options, while adversaries will compete to disrupt and “disorganize” each other’s systems. (pp. 123–126, 146)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • The chapter links changes in conflict to rapid development of high-tech and information technologies, with strong focus on “informatization” of warfare. (pp. 123–124)

  • Network-centric ideas and information superiority appear as recurring themes for future operations. (Glossary p. 249)

  • Reconnaissance-strike/fire complexes (integrating ISR + C2 + precision strike) are treated as central to high-tech operational concepts. (Glossary p. 249)

  • The discussion extends to automation, robotics, and AI as potential qualitative shifts in the means/methods of war. (pp. 37–38; 123–124)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Network-centric warfare; reconnaissance-strike complex; contactless warfare; AI/robotics (as debated drivers).

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Theoretical debates and doctrinal/analytical writings on technology and high precision. (pp. 123–126)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • High-tech futures are not just “more weapons”; they enable faster information effects, deception, and decision disruption.

  • Implies priority on electronic warfare, cyber effects, and C2 contestation.

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • US posture; preparation (protect networks; contest ISR/C2; operate under disruption).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • TBD (no short quote selected from this chapter excerpt).

Chapter 5: Undermining the Will to Resist (p. 155–190)

• One-sentence thesis: Russian thinkers elevate information confrontation and psychological effects as decisive, arguing that conflict is increasingly won by shaping cognition, demoralizing populations, and manipulating decision-making—often in ways difficult to attribute. (pp. 166, 170, 240)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • The chapter frames information space as the first arena of conflict: “battles” begin there before battlefields. (p. 166)

  • Russian discussion treats information warfare as both technical (systems, EW) and psychological (public consciousness, decision-making). (p. 176)

  • Information warfare is described as indirect, nonmilitary influence that is difficult to attribute—especially potent against “open societies.” (p. 170)

  • Reflexive control and deception (maskirovka) are presented as methods to shape adversary decisions toward outcomes favorable to Russia. (pp. 175–176; Glossary p. 250)

  • The chapter also links the internal “moral factor” (patriotism, cohesion) to resilience against adversary information warfare and to sustaining conflict. (pp. 179–180)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Information confrontation; information superiority; reflexive control; maskirovka; cognitive operations.

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Russian debates on IW in late 1990s/2000s; interpretations of Kosovo 1999 and broader confrontation narratives. (pp. 170–172)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Clarifies how Russia conceptualizes sub-threshold competition as warfare/struggle targeting cohesion and decision processes.

  • Highlights attribution and ambiguity as enablers of coercion below overt war thresholds.

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • US posture; preparation; effective strategies (resilience, attribution, narrative defense).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Battles are not played out on the battlefields, they are first played out in the information space.” (p. 166)

Chapter 6: All Available Means? (p. 191–216)

• One-sentence thesis: Proxies—especially private military and security companies—provide Russia a flexible, deniable instrument of statecraft that expands the menu of indirect action and complicates escalation management for adversaries. (p. 209)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • The chapter situates proxies within “indirect and asymmetric methods,” including political and informational measures, as part of modern conflict. (p. 191)

  • PMSCs are discussed as tools that blur state/non-state lines and provide plausible deniability. (p. 209)

  • The Wagner Group is cited as a prominent example in the Russian proxy ecosystem. (p. 198)

  • The legal status of PMSCs in Russia is debated; “mercenary” activity is criminalized, but firms operate in practice. (p. 199)

  • PMSCs are portrayed as extensions of foreign policy, enabling presence and influence without formal deployment. (p. 209)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Proxies; PMSCs; deniability/ambiguity; indirect/asymmetric methods.

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Wagner Group; Russian legal debate on mercenaries/PMSCs. (pp. 198–199, 209)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Proxies enable below-threshold coercion and reduce political costs of casualties/visibility.

  • Raises attribution and escalation-control challenges for the US/allies.

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • US posture; preparation; effective strategies (counter-proxy, exposure, sanctions, partner resilience).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “PMSCs afford the Russian government a very useful degree of ambiguity and deniability.” (p. 209)

Chapter 7: Learning the Wrong Lessons? (p. 217–234)

• One-sentence thesis: Ukraine challenges core assumptions of Russian “future war” thinking—technology did not eliminate friction, and intangible factors (morale, will) proved decisive—suggesting Russia may have mislearned from Western interventions and its own limited campaigns. (pp. 221, 246)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • The chapter opens by emphasizing that Ukraine undercut Russia’s expectation of swift victory and exposed underestimation of resistance and will. (p. 221)

  • Ukrainian war experience challenges “enduring belief” that technology is the central element of war, highlighting morale and will. (p. 246)

  • The author stresses that forecasting future war is “inherently problematic,” reinforcing why mislearning is likely. (p. 246)

  • The chapter reinforces a meta-lesson: both Russia and the West are engaged in observation/emulation/adaptation cycles, and misreading lessons creates strategic vulnerability. (p. 246)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Mislearning; technological determinism vs human factors; forecasting limits.

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine; commentary by Russian analysts (e.g., Khodarenok). (p. 221)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Demonstrates that contests of will remain central even amid high-tech narratives.

  • Suggests denial/endurance strategies can exploit adversary miscalculation.

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • US posture; preparation; effective strategies (deny quick wins; plan for protraction).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “No one will meet the Russian army with bread, salt and flowers in Ukraine.” (p. 221)

Chapter 8: Conclusion (p. 235–246)

• One-sentence thesis: Russian military thought reflects both continuity and change—continuity in fear of surprise and emphasis on forecasting, change in focus on information/nonmilitary means and high-tech—yet Ukraine underscores the enduring primacy of human factors and the limits of prediction. (pp. 240, 246)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • The “principal objective” framing centers exhaustion and will-breaking rather than territorial conquest. (p. 240)

  • The author argues the cognitive realm is a battlespace; victory hinges on narratives/ideas. (p. 240)

  • Ukraine demonstrates that intangible factors (morale/will) increase unpredictability and complicate forecasting. (p. 246)

  • Analysts must study adversary debates and avoid Western “templating,” because states’ experiences create divergent theories of war. (p. 246)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Cognitive realm as battlespace; unpredictability; observation/emulation/adaptation cycle.

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Ukraine war as a stress test; observed Western interventions and Russian adaptation cycle. (p. 246)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Points to resilience, narrative competition, and learning speed as decisive in strategic competition.

  • Reinforces the need to counter both military and nonmilitary campaigns.

• Links to seminar questions: (which questions this chapter most helps answer)

  • All three (posture, preparation, strategy effectiveness).

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Victory is won by the domination of ideas and narratives rather than physical territory.” (p. 240)

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Theory / Framework Map

• Level(s) of analysis:

  • Primarily ideational/institutional (Russian military science debates, doctrinal evolution, lesson-learning).

  • Secondary operational (what Russia learns from campaigns and how that shapes expectations).

• Unit(s) of analysis:

  • Russian military theorists, institutions (e.g., AVN), and state security elites as producers/consumers of “future war” concepts. (pp. 16–17)

• Dependent variable(s):

  • Russian conceptualization of the “changing character of conflict” and implied approaches to future war. (p. 6)

• Key independent variable(s):

  • Observed Western interventions; Russia’s operational experience; technological change; perceived threats from nonmilitary means and information confrontation. (pp. 37–38, 246)

• Mechanism(s):

  • Observation → emulation/adaptation → institutionalization via doctrine, education, procurement, and operational practice. (p. 246)

• Scope conditions / where it should NOT apply:

  • Inference: strongest where adversaries have robust military-science institutions and high strategic anxiety about surprise; weaker where institutions or threat perceptions differ substantially.

• Observable implications / predictions:

  • Emphasis on information superiority, deception/reflexive control, nonmilitary means, proxies/ambiguity, and attempts at rapid “initial period” advantage. (pp. 170, 175–176, 209; Glossary p. 248–250)

Key Concepts & Definitions (author’s usage)

1. Nonmilitary means

• Definition: Other levers of national power (political, information—psychological/technical—diplomatic, economic, legal, spiritual/moral, humanitarian). (Glossary p. 249)

• Role in argument: Central to the claim that contemporary conflict blends military and nonmilitary tools to achieve strategic aims.

• Analytical note: Operationalize via observed coordinated campaigns (legal/economic/info actions) that precede or substitute for kinetic operations.

2. Information warfare / information struggle

• Definition: A toolkit spanning military and nonmilitary measures; can include disorganizing C2, deception, sowing instability, and demoralization to the point of losing will to resist. (Glossary p. 248)

• Role in argument: Explains why Russia treats information space as decisive terrain and emphasizes attribution challenges.

• Analytical note: Measure by effects on decision cycles, cohesion, morale, and the information environment (not just messaging volume).

3. Reflexive control

• Definition: Disinformation and deception aimed at provoking a specific adversary reaction; inducing decisions favorable to the initiator; prominence to deception and maskirovka. (Glossary p. 250)

• Role in argument: Mechanism for cognitive/decision manipulation in “information confrontation.”

• Analytical note: Identify by patterns of staged signals, selective disclosure, and adversary decision outcomes consistent with pre-shaped options.

4. Maskirovka

• Definition: Military deception measures to mislead the enemy about presence, location, composition, actions, and intentions of forces. (Glossary p. 248)

• Role in argument: Practical bridge between classic deception and modern information operations.

• Analytical note: Track across tactical-operational-strategic levels; include deception aimed at intelligence services as “connecting link.”

5. New-generation warfare

• Definition: A non-traditional approach incorporating both nonmilitary and military means; often linked to Chekinov and Bogdanov. (Glossary p. 249)

• Role in argument: Captures the blended, asymmetric, and indirect approach emphasized in Russian debates.

• Analytical note: Avoid “doctrine” reification; treat as an analytical umbrella for blended campaigns.

6. Network-centric warfare

• Definition: Achieving information superiority via networks linking sensors, decision-makers, and assets; increases situational awareness, speeds C2, raises tempo. (Glossary p. 249)

• Role in argument: Explains tech-driven expectations for faster operations and C2 contestation.

• Analytical note: Vulnerability: network dependence → disorganization/EW/cyber opportunities.

7. Contactless/noncontact warfare

• Definition: Conflict where much fighting occurs via precision-guided weapons. (Glossary p. 249)

• Role in argument: Frames Russian interpretations of Western interventions and “future war” visions.

• Analytical note: Ukraine suggests limits; assess whether Russia can actually sustain precision, ISR, and logistics.

8. Reconnaissance-strike / reconnaissance-fire complex

• Definition: Coordinated long-range precision weapons linked with ISR and C2 (strategic); reconnaissance-fire at tactical-operational level. (Glossary p. 249)

• Role in argument: Operationalizes high-tech futures: effects depend on integration of ISR + strike + command.

• Analytical note: Indicators: kill-chain speed, sensor-to-shooter links, EW resilience.

9. Strategic deterrence

• Definition: Integrated military and nonmilitary measures to deter aggression through progressive costs/unacceptable consequences. (Glossary p. 250)

• Role in argument: Connects Russian “toolbox” thinking to escalation management and coercion.

• Analytical note: For US/allies, map deterrence not only to nuclear/conventional but also to information/economic/legal measures.

10. PMSCs (as proxies)

• Definition (as used here): Private military/security companies used as tools of foreign policy; provide ambiguity and deniability. (p. 209)

• Role in argument: Demonstrates indirect action and threshold manipulation in strategic competition.

• Analytical note: Track ownership ties, contracting channels, logistics basing, and narrative framing to attribute state control.

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Key Arguments & Evidence

• Argument 1: Russian military thought increasingly emphasizes nonmilitary means and information confrontation as decisive in modern conflict.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • “Nonmilitary means” explicitly defined as levers of state power beyond force. (Glossary p. 249)

    • “Battles” first occur in information space; information warfare is hard to attribute and potent against open societies. (pp. 166, 170)

  • So what:

    • Strategic competition is fought through cohesion, legitimacy, and decision advantage; military overmatch alone is insufficient.

• Argument 2: Russian “future war” concepts are driven by lesson-learning from Western interventions and Russia’s own operations, but forecasting is inherently difficult and vulnerable to mislearning.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Prediction/forecasting is repeatedly flagged as difficult/inherently problematic. (pp. 6, 246)

    • Ukraine demonstrates technology is not the sole driver; morale/will matter. (p. 246)

  • So what:

    • Effective strategy targets the adversary’s faulty assumptions and forces them into protracted contests they hoped to avoid.

• Argument 3: Russia’s proxy toolkit (including PMSCs) expands indirect options and complicates response thresholds through ambiguity and deniability.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • PMSCs provide “a very useful degree of ambiguity and deniability.” (p. 209)

  • So what:

    • Counter-strategy must include exposure/attribution and disruption of proxy ecosystems.

• Argument 4: The “end state” logic is will-breaking rather than occupation; the cognitive realm is treated as a battlespace where narratives are decisive.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • “The principal objective is to exhaust an adversary and weaken their will to resist.” (p. 240)

  • So what:

    • Metrics and planning horizons must include psychological endurance, political cohesion, and alliance legitimacy.

⚖️ Assumptions & Critical Tensions

• Assumptions the author needs:

  • Russian military-theoretical writing and debate are meaningful indicators of how Russia intends to prepare and fight. (implied across the book’s method)

  • Observed wars provide transferable “lessons” (an assumption the book also problematizes). (p. 246)

• Tensions / tradeoffs / contradictions:

  • Forecasting imperative vs unpredictability: Russia emphasizes foresight, but war’s complexity and human factors resist prediction. (pp. 6, 246)

  • Tech-centric “future war” vs morale/will: High-tech futures are highlighted, yet Ukraine re-centers morale and will to resist. (p. 246)

  • Ambiguity tools vs control risks: Proxies provide deniability, but can generate blowback and accountability gaps (inference, consistent with deniability logic).

• What would change the author’s mind? (mark clearly as inference)

  • Inference: If future Russian operations consistently demonstrated that information/nonmilitary means are marginal (not central) and that outcomes hinge primarily on conventional destruction/occupation—contrary to the “cognitive realm” emphasis. (p. 240)

Critique Points

• Strongest critique:

  • The book highlights the importance of Russian debates, but open-source theorizing can diverge from practice; Ukraine underscores that gap and may complicate how much weight to place on “future war” discourse. (p. 246)

• Weakest critique:

  • TBD (needs full review against complete chapter text for balance and evidentiary density).

• Method/data critique (if applicable):

  • Reliance on published debates may underweight classified planning, bureaucratic politics, and implementation capacity (inference).

• Missing variable / alternative explanation:

  • Inference: Domestic political imperatives and regime security may shape concepts like “nonmilitary means” as much as external learning does.

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Policy & Strategy Takeaways

• Implications for the US + partners:

  • Treat information space and the cognitive realm as contested operational environments; Russia expects to compete by exhausting will and dominating narratives. (p. 240)

  • Build allied mechanisms for attribution and coordinated response to ambiguous/proxy actions. (p. 209)

  • Prepare for compressed “initial periods” of rapid action while sustaining protraction if quick wins fail. (Glossary p. 248; p. 246)

• Practical “do this / avoid that” bullets:

  • Do: Invest in societal resilience (media literacy, institutional trust, crisis communication) as a deterrence/defense layer.

  • Do: Train decision-making under deception and degraded information; anticipate reflexive control dynamics. (Glossary p. 250)

  • Do: Build counter-proxy playbooks (exposure, financial disruption, legal actions, partner capacity building). (p. 209)

  • Avoid: Mirror-imaging (“templating Western concepts”) as a default analytic move. (p. 246)

• Risks / second-order effects:

  • Over-securitizing the information environment can erode democratic legitimacy (inference).

  • Proxy countermeasures risk escalation if attribution is contested or politicized.

• What to measure (MOE/MOP ideas) and over what timeline:

  • MOE: public confidence, institutional trust, alliance cohesion signals, decision-cycle speed under crisis.

  • MOE: adversary narrative penetration and ability to generate “disorganization” in C2/political processes. (p. 175–176)

  • Timeline: monitor both the “initial period” (days–months) and protracted endurance indicators. (Glossary p. 248)

⚔️ Cross‑Text Synthesis (SAASS 644)

• Where this aligns:

  • Patterson (IW + strategic competition): German’s depiction of continuous “struggle” and nonmilitary means maps to competition below full-scale war, where shaping decisions and cohesion is decisive. (Glossary p. 249; p. 240)

  • Simpson (war as politics/narrative): “domination of ideas and narratives” as victory condition directly reinforces war-as-political-communication logic. (p. 240)

• Where this contradicts:

  • Potential tension with any “tech-determinist” readings: Ukraine reasserts morale/will and unpredictability over purely technological explanations. (p. 246)

• What it adds that others miss:

  • An adversary-centric view of how Russian institutions theorize “future war,” including Russian terminology (war/struggle) and institutional emphasis on forecasting to avoid surprise. (pp. 21–23, 34–36)

  • A concrete explanation of ambiguity/deniability as a statecraft enabler via proxies/PMSCs. (p. 209)

• 2–4 “bridge” insights tying at least TWO other readings together:

  • German + Patterson + Simpson: Strategic competition in IW is best modeled as a contest over decision-making and legitimacy (ideas/narratives), not just force ratios.

  • German + Kalyvas (control/info/violence): Russian emphasis on information struggle and will suggests that “control” in conflict includes informational control and psychological dominance, not only territorial control (inference, anchored to German’s information-space framing). (pp. 166, 240)

  • German + Biddle (institutions/tech/stakes): Ukraine illustrates that organizational competence and morale mediate the translation of technology into battlefield advantage, limiting tech-determinist forecasts. (p. 246)

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❓ Open Questions for Seminar

• If Russia frames victory as narrative/idea dominance, what are credible US/allied “success metrics” short of regime change or occupation?

• How should the US calibrate counter-disinformation and resilience programs without undermining democratic legitimacy and civil liberties?

• What indicators best predict when Russia will employ proxies/PMSCs versus overt regular forces?

• How do we operationalize “will to resist” for MOE without reducing it to simplistic polling?

• If forecasting is inherently problematic, what is the right balance between preparing for Russia’s theorized future war and Russia’s actual demonstrated practice?

• What escalation-control mechanisms work when ambiguity and attribution delay are features, not bugs?

✍️ Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “Modern wars are closely intertwined with nonmilitary forms and methods of confrontation.” (p. 5)

• “Prediction is an inherently difficult endeavor.” (p. 6)

• “Battles are not played out on the battlefields, they are first played out in the information space.” (p. 166)

• “The principal objective is to exhaust an adversary and weaken their will to resist.” (p. 240)

• “Victory is won by the domination of ideas and narratives rather than physical territory.” (p. 240)

• “Efforts to forecast the changing character of conflict and shape of future war are inherently problematic.” (p. 246)

• “PMSCs afford the Russian government a very useful degree of ambiguity and deniability.” (p. 209)

• “No one will meet the Russian army with bread, salt and flowers in Ukraine.” (p. 221)

Exam Drills / Take‑Home Hooks

• Likely prompt 1: “Is Russia’s approach to conflict best understood as ‘hybrid warfare’ or as continuity in a ‘struggle’ tradition?”

  • Outline (3-part):

    1. Define the continuum framing (war vs struggle; nonmilitary means as levers of power).

    2. Explain mechanisms (information confrontation, reflexive control, proxies) and intended effects (exhaustion/will-breaking).

    3. Stress-test with Ukraine: limits of prediction and tech determinism; human factors persist. (pp. 34–36, 240, 246)

• Likely prompt 2: “How should the US and allies deter and defend against Russia in strategic competition?”

  • Outline (3-part):

    1. Identify what Russia seeks (dominate narratives; exhaust will; indirect action via ambiguity).

    2. Defense: resilience + attribution + network hardening + counter-proxy toolkits.

    3. Deterrence: make quick wins impossible; impose progressive costs across military and nonmilitary domains.

• Likely prompt 3: “What does Ukraine tell us about ‘future war’ theory?”

  • Outline (3-part):

    1. Summarize Russian expectations about high-tech/noncontact operations (derived from Western interventions).

    2. Show why prediction is difficult; morale/will and friction matter.

    3. Implications: adaptive learning cycles; exploit adversary mislearning.

• If I had to write a 1500‑word response in 4–5 hours, my thesis would be:

  Russia’s approach to conflict is best understood as continuous strategic competition in which nonmilitary means and information confrontation aim to exhaust adversary will, but Ukraine demonstrates that human factors and friction still dominate—so US/allied strategy should prioritize resilience, attribution, and denial of quick political wins. (pp. 240, 246)

  • 3 supporting points:

    1. Russian framing: cognitive realm as battlespace; victory via narratives/ideas; war/struggle continuum. (pp. 34–36, 240)

    2. Mechanisms: information warfare (hard-to-attribute), deception/reflexive control, and proxies/PMSCs. (pp. 166, 170, 209)

    3. Ukraine as correction: technology is not decisive alone; morale/will and unpredictability constrain forecasting. (p. 246)

  • 1 anticipated counterargument:

    • Counterargument: Russia’s actual battlefield performance (logistics, C2, precision limitations) suggests its “future war” theory is aspirational and should not drive US prioritization.

    • Response: Aspirational concepts still shape adversary planning and risk-taking; the correct approach is balanced—study the theory to anticipate intent while using Ukraine to calibrate capability and exploit gaps. (p. 246)

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