Digital Empires

The Global Battle to Regulate Technology

🎙️ Comps Prep (Oral Comprehensive Exam)

• If the US, China, and the EU can export “tech companies, technologies, and rules” beyond their borders, then global competition increasingly runs through “digital empires,” because influence comes from governing foreign populations’ data/information without formal conquest. So what for strategy: treat tech governance as geopolitical terrain, not “domestic policy.” (PDF p. 13)

• When a state chooses a market-driven, state-driven, or rights-driven regulatory model, then it gets predictable tradeoffs in innovation, control, and rights—and exports those tradeoffs abroad—because each model reflects distinct ideological commitments embedded in law and institutions. So what for strategy: partner alignment will often hinge on regulatory values, not just hardware. (PDF p. 13)

• When horizontal rivalry among empires intersects with vertical struggle between governments and tech firms, then platforms become both instruments and obstacles to state power, because states need private capability (innovation/cybersecurity) while trying to curb corporate governance over societies. So what for strategy: plan for firms as semi-sovereign actors in competition, not neutral vendors. (PDF p. 33)

• Bridge: This aligns with Patterson’s strategic-competition framing of IW-by-other-means by showing regulation/standards/data rules as non-kinetic levers that can decide “the battle for the soul of the digital economy.” (PDF p. 33)

Online Description

Bradford argues that the US, China, and the EU function as three “digital empires,” each advancing a distinct regulatory model—market-driven, state-driven, and rights-driven—while exporting that model through corporate dominance, infrastructure buildout, and regulatory reach. These competing approaches collide in battles over technology, markets, security, and rights, reshaping global power and raising high-stakes questions about the future of liberal democracy and the global digital order. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 30–33)

Author Background

TBD

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60‑Second Brief

• Core claim (1–2 sentences):

  • The US, China, and EU are competing “digital empires” whose regulatory models travel across borders through firms, infrastructure, and law—reordering global power around control of data/information and the rules of the digital economy. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 29)

• Causal logic in a phrase:

  • Regulatory model → export mechanism (private / infrastructure / regulatory power) → global standards & dependencies → durable influence over foreign societies. (PDF p. 29)

• Why it matters for IW / strategic competition (2–4 bullets):

  • Regulation and standards become tools of coercion, alignment, and influence below armed conflict thresholds—shaping how populations communicate, organize, and perceive legitimacy. (PDF p. 13)

  • “Horizontal” rivalry among empires and “vertical” rivalry between states and tech firms turns platforms/infrastructure into contested terrain. (PDF p. 33)

  • Model diffusion (and backlash) creates bloc-like dynamics (rights vs control vs markets), raising risks of fragmentation and competitive escalation. (PDF p. 30–33)

• Best single takeaway (1 sentence):

  • Strategy in the 2020s requires treating tech regulation, data governance, and infrastructure choices as grand-strategic decisions, not administrative details. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 29–33)

Course Lens

• How does this text define/illuminate irregular warfare?

  • Not an IW text per se, but it reframes “competition” as governance over populations via control of data/information and the digital rules that structure daily life—an influence contest that operates persistently “below war.” (PDF p. 13)

  • It highlights how states (and firms) can shape foreign societies without formal political control—an “informal empire” logic relevant to modern influence campaigns and political warfare. (PDF p. 13)

• What does it imply about power/control, success metrics, and timeline in IW?

  • Power is exercised through rule-setting and system design: private power (dominant firms), infrastructure power (networks/standards), and regulatory power (laws with extraterritorial effects). (PDF p. 29)

  • Control is both horizontal (empire vs empire) and vertical (state vs platform); success is durable compliance, dependency, and norm adoption—not battlefield outcomes. (PDF p. 33)

  • Timeline is long: infrastructure and regulatory diffusion create path dependencies that are hard to unwind once embedded in foreign societies. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 29)

• How does it connect to strategic competition?

  • Regulation functions as geopolitical strategy by externalizing a model’s values (freedom/market, control/state, rights/law) into other jurisdictions and shaping global standards—deciding whose rules govern the digital order. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 30–33)

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Seminar Questions (from syllabus)

• How do the three digital empires reshape global competition?

• How does regulation operate as geopolitical strategy?

• What implications arise from divergent standards?

• Which model is best positioned for future competition?

• Does the US reliance on private-sector innovation strengthen or weaken national security when compared to the EU and Chinese regulatory models?

• What does Bradford’s work reveal about the strategic significance of data?

✅ Direct Responses to Seminar Questions

• Q: How do the three digital empires reshape global competition?

  • A:

    • They reframe competition as a struggle over governance of the digital economy—who sets the rules that shape foreign societies—rather than only territorial or military contests. (PDF p. 13)

    • Each empire projects influence by exporting a domestic model abroad, pulling other states “into the orbits” of competing regulatory regimes. (PDF p. 13)

    • Competition becomes multi-channel: private power (US firms), infrastructure power (China’s network buildout), and regulatory power (EU rule-setting) operate as distinct vectors of influence. (PDF p. 29)

    • Rivalry is not only interstate (“horizontal” battles) but also state–platform (“vertical” battles) that determine whether governments or firms govern key social spaces. (PDF p. 33)

    • Unaligned markets become “battlefields,” where local governments weigh American platforms, Chinese infrastructure, and European law when choosing digital futures. (PDF p. 29)

• Q: How does regulation operate as geopolitical strategy?

  • A:

    • Regulation exports values and constraints: by pushing a model abroad, states seek to “shift the rest of the world closer to the norms and values inherent in their … models.” (PDF p. 26)

    • The EU’s strategy relies heavily on regulatory power that “entrenches European digital norms across the global marketplace,” affecting non-EU users through corporate compliance. (PDF p. 29)

    • China’s strategy relies heavily on infrastructure power, building “critical digital network infrastructures” abroad via firms with close state ties, embedding standards and dependencies. (PDF p. 29)

    • The US strategy historically relied heavily on private power—dominant companies shaping the global digital sphere through products/services and business practices. (PDF p. 29)

    • Regulation also becomes coercive statecraft in the tech war context—e.g., export controls and entity listings used to constrain adversary capabilities and shape the technological frontier. (PDF p. 217–218)

• Q: What implications arise from divergent standards?

  • A:

    • Divergent standards intensify “battle lines” where models collide—especially around speech/content, privacy/data flows, and security—making interoperability and shared governance harder. (PDF p. 33–35)

    • Firms face conflicting compliance demands, pushing them toward market exits, localization, or selective compliance—fueling fragmentation dynamics. (PDF p. 33, PDF p. 206)

    • Divergence heightens alliance management problems: democracies must reconcile different balances of rights, markets, and security to avoid being out-competed by the coherence of authoritarian control models. (PDF p. 30–33)

    • Divergent regimes amplify national security anxieties: data access, espionage risk, and supply-chain leverage become central, not peripheral, to tech policy. (PDF p. 28–29)

    • The information environment becomes a strategic battleground: standards shape what populations see, share, and trust—raising stakes for legitimacy and democratic resilience. (PDF p. 33, PDF p. 449)

• Q: Which model is best positioned for future competition?

  • A:

    • Bradford argues the conventional US–China binary is “flawed,” because the EU constitutes a third center of regulatory gravity shaping the future digital order. (PDF p. 30)

    • She argues the “American market-driven regulatory model is fading,” leaving many countries to coalesce behind either a Chinese state-driven variant or core tenets of the European rights-driven model. (PDF p. 30)

    • The EU is described as “a more desirable alternative model in the democratic world,” while China’s model is “appealing to authoritarian leaders” and some developing countries. (PDF p. 31)

    • Practical “positioning” therefore looks bifurcated: the EU can lead in rule-setting diffusion; China can expand via infrastructure/standards and offer an authoritarian toolkit; the US retains private power but faces declining model legitimacy absent regulatory adaptation. (PDF p. 29–31)

• Q: Does the US reliance on private-sector innovation strengthen or weaken national security when compared to the EU and Chinese regulatory models?

  • A:

    • It strengthens national power through the global dominance of US tech firms (private power), but creates governance gaps when market incentives conflict with societal resilience, privacy, and democratic integrity. (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 26)

    • The US model’s “limited role for the government” is explicitly bounded by national security/cybersecurity where the state “can and must work alongside private companies”—suggesting security dependence on private capability. (PDF p. 33)

    • China’s state-driven model can align firms with regime objectives and security priorities (and control information flows), but at the cost of rights and openness—turning technology into a tool to “empower the state, not its people.” (PDF p. 33)

    • The EU’s rights-driven model prioritizes protections that can bolster democratic resilience and trust (privacy, constraints on harmful content and market power), but can be portrayed as harming innovation and free speech—raising tradeoff questions in competition. (PDF p. 28–29)

    • Bradford’s framing implies national security is not just “capability,” but also legitimacy and governance: democracies can lose if they lose either to China (horizontal) or to tech giants (vertical). (PDF p. 33)

• Q: What does Bradford’s work reveal about the strategic significance of data?

  • A:

    • Data is the central resource of digital power: “personal data is the most valuable resource in the 21st-century digital economy” and fuels tech firms’ power—making data governance core to national influence. (PDF p. 11)

    • Data flows become a geopolitical fault line: EU privacy constraints and US surveillance practices can disrupt transatlantic commerce and force firms to reconsider market presence. (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 261–263)

    • Data access and control underpin both vertical battles (states vs firms) and horizontal rivalry (empire vs empire), linking domestic legal regimes to global alignment choices. (PDF p. 33)

    • In authoritarian contexts, data enables surveillance, censorship, and behavioral manipulation, making exported infrastructure and standards strategically consequential (control at scale). (PDF p. 102–103, PDF p. 38)

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Chapter-by-Chapter Breakdown

Chapter 0: Introduction (PDF p. 7–39)

• One-sentence thesis: Bradford frames the US, China, and the EU as three competing “digital empires” whose export of firms, infrastructure, and rules reshapes global power through control of data/information and governance beyond borders. (PDF p. 13)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Starts from mounting calls to regulate tech (including AI risks) but highlights that consensus on need for regulation doesn’t imply consensus on form of regulation. (PDF p. 13)

  • Defines three “dominant digital powers” (US, China, EU) as “digital empires,” analogous to informal empires projecting power across borders. (PDF p. 13)

  • Argues digital power is centered on controlling data/information; “control of data and information is power.” (PDF p. 13)

  • Introduces export logic: empires extend governance models abroad, influencing foreign societies without seeking formal political control. (PDF p. 13)

  • Distinguishes private, infrastructure, and regulatory power—and maps each to US, China, EU respectively. (PDF p. 29)

  • Frames competition as both horizontal (empire vs empire) and vertical (governments vs tech companies). (PDF p. 33)

  • Argues the “American market-driven regulatory model is fading,” pushing countries toward either Chinese state-driven or European rights-driven tenets. (PDF p. 30)

  • Stakes are existential for liberal democracy: democracies can lose to China (horizontal) or to tech giants (vertical). (PDF p. 33)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Digital empires

  • Digital power (data/information control)

  • Private vs infrastructure vs regulatory power

  • Horizontal vs vertical battles

  • “Empires by invitation” (PDF p. 29)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Broad public and regulatory “tipping point” framing; AI risk discourse; tech regulation momentum (illustrative). (PDF p. 13)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Provides a vocabulary for non-kinetic power projection (rules, standards, infrastructure) that shapes foreign societies.

  • Recasts “regulation” as strategic competition—how a state governs foreign populations indirectly. (PDF p. 13)

  • Clarifies that control contests can be simultaneously interstate and state–corporate, complicating traditional strategy models. (PDF p. 33)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Today’s digital empires are primarily exporting their tech companies, technologies, and rules across national borders.” (PDF p. 13)

  • “personal data is the most valuable resource in the 21st-century digital economy and is what fuels the extraordinary power of the tech companies.” (PDF p. 11)

Part I Summary (Digital Empires: Three Competing Regulatory Models):

• Lays out three coherent governance models (market-, state-, rights-driven) rooted in different ideological commitments and domestic institutions. (PDF p. 33)

• Establishes the foundational tradeoffs: freedom/innovation vs control/stability vs rights/democratic integrity—before turning to collision points and export dynamics. (PDF p. 33–35)

• Sets up how each model evolves over time, sometimes amplifying similarities but also sharpening core differences. (PDF p. 33)

Chapter 1: The American Market-Driven Regulatory Model (PDF p. 41–81)

• One-sentence thesis: The US model prioritizes free speech, a “free internet,” and innovation by limiting state regulation and relying on markets and self-regulation—except where national security/cybersecurity justify state involvement. (PDF p. 33)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Describes an American regulatory ethos that places “notable faith in markets” and a limited governmental role to preserve innovation. (PDF p. 33)

  • Shows how liability and speech frameworks create broad operating space for platforms, reinforcing market-led governance. (PDF p. 49–54)

  • Emphasizes “self-regulation” as a defining feature: platforms are expected to manage their own content and governance choices. (PDF p. 48)

  • Highlights the centrality of Section 230 in shaping US internet speech and platform liability. (PDF p. 49–54)

  • Explains how early legal and policy choices enabled rapid scaling of US tech companies and reinforced private power. (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 49–54)

  • Notes the model’s internal tensions: rising scrutiny of tech power and harms pushes the US toward rethinking antitrust, privacy, and platform rules. (PDF p. 30, PDF p. 13)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Market-driven model

  • Techno-libertarianism / “Californian ideology” (PDF p. 293)

  • Self-regulation (PDF p. 48)

  • Section 230 safe harbor (PDF p. 49–54)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Communications Decency Act / Section 230 debates and “policy of the United States” language (PDF p. 53–54)

  • Stratton Oakmont v Prodigy (platform moderation liability context) (PDF p. 49)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • US private power (platform reach) is a strategic asset—but also a vulnerability if governance gaps enable adversary influence operations. (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 33)

  • Illustrates how domestic legal design choices can produce global influence through platform diffusion.

  • Highlights security dependence on private capability: the state must “work alongside” firms in cybersecurity. (PDF p. 33)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” (PDF p. 54)

Chapter 2: The Chinese State-Driven Regulatory Model (PDF p. 82–122)

• One-sentence thesis: China’s state-driven model harnesses technology for economic growth and regime security, embedding censorship and surveillance into governance while subordinating tech firms to CCP control. (PDF p. 82–83)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Opens with Xi-era intensification of information control: a renewed crackdown on the internet and digital political space. (PDF p. 82)

  • Frames online space as a regime battleground for public opinion and stability. (PDF p. 82)

  • Describes censorship mechanisms and the architecture of state control over speech and information flows (e.g., Great Firewall). (PDF p. 85–86)

  • Shows how surveillance scales through data collection and AI-enabled monitoring, including facial recognition and social management systems. (PDF p. 102–103)

  • Connects state control to industrial strategy: tech is treated as a national project, not merely market competition. (PDF p. 92)

  • Highlights “crackdown” dynamics aimed at ensuring tech giants do not “overpower the Chinese state,” including interventions in major firms. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 110)

  • Positions the model as exportable, especially to governments seeking sovereignty/control tools. (PDF p. 38)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • State-driven model

  • Internet/cyber sovereignty logic (implied by control priorities) (PDF p. 85–86)

  • Censorship + propaganda governance

  • AI-powered mass surveillance (PDF p. 37)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • People’s Daily editorial framing of the internet as a political battlefield (PDF p. 82)

  • Sharp Eyes program, Xinjiang surveillance, social management tools (PDF p. 102–103)

  • Ant Group IPO suspension and Alibaba penalty as state assertion over tech power (PDF p. 110)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Demonstrates how digital control tools can harden regimes and suppress dissent—relevant for understanding partner/adversary stability.

  • Sets up the logic of exporting surveillance and governance standards as an influence tool (infrastructure + norms). (PDF p. 38)

  • Clarifies why democracies see China’s model as antithetical: it “empower[s] the state, not its people.” (PDF p. 33)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “The Internet has become the main battlefield for public opinion struggle.” (PDF p. 82)

Chapter 3: The European Rights-Driven Regulatory Model (PDF p. 123–169)

• One-sentence thesis: The EU’s rights-driven model centers individual and collective rights in the digital economy, using assertive regulation to constrain platform power, protect privacy, and preserve democratic discourse. (PDF p. 33, PDF p. 123)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Positions EU regulation as a deliberate alternative to both US market-led governance and Chinese state control. (PDF p. 33)

  • Treats data protection and privacy as foundational constraints shaping digital markets and platform behavior. (PDF p. 123)

  • Describes how the EU targets harmful online content and disinformation as threats to democracy, not just consumer issues. (PDF p. 134–138)

  • Highlights legislative tools aimed at platform accountability and systemic risk mitigation (e.g., DSA proposals). (PDF p. 137–138)

  • Frames EU activism as reclaiming control over tech giants via antitrust and data protection enforcement. (PDF p. 13)

  • Introduces the EU’s ambition to write global rules and discipline corporate behavior through law—often criticized as “regulatory imperialism.” (PDF p. 28–29)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Rights-driven model

  • GDPR / data protection logic (PDF p. 123)

  • Platform accountability / systemic risk framing (PDF p. 137–138)

  • Regulatory power as a governance tool (PDF p. 29)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • EU response to social media harms and democratic discourse risks (PDF p. 134–138)

  • Policy discourse captured by EU officials emphasizing rule-setting ambition (PDF p. 123)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Demonstrates how rights-based regulation can be wielded as geopolitical influence and as democratic resilience strategy.

  • Shows a pathway for democracies to compete with authoritarian models without adopting authoritarian methods.

  • Highlights that rule-setting can shape foreign societies at scale (exterritorial effects). (PDF p. 28–29)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “In Europe, the bird will fly by our rules.” (PDF p. 123)

Part II Summary (Imperial Rivalries):

• Moves from model description to collision points where regimes and firms confront incompatibilities across speech, data, and security. (PDF p. 33–35)

• Demonstrates how firms “straddle” models and become the object of vertical battles, while states contest each other horizontally in the same domains. (PDF p. 34)

• Shows how these clashes harden bloc dynamics and raise the stakes of standard-setting and supply chain dependence. (PDF p. 35)

Chapter 4: Between Freedom and Control: Navigating Competing Regulatory Models (PDF p. 170–208)

• One-sentence thesis: As tech firms operate across empires, they are forced to mediate incompatible demands between openness and control, turning corporate decisions (compliance, exit, localization) into geopolitical acts that shape fragmentation and influence. (PDF p. 34, PDF p. 206)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Focuses on firms caught “between” models as they confront competing rules and values in multiple jurisdictions. (PDF p. 34)

  • Highlights vertical battles: governments pressure firms to align with national priorities, while firms resist to protect business models and global access. (PDF p. 34)

  • Explores dilemmas for American firms operating in China under censorship and data control pressures. (PDF p. 178–179)

  • Examines Chinese firms abroad facing democratic scrutiny, including national security concerns tied to data access and influence. (PDF p. 191)

  • Shows how disputes drive talk (and policy movement) toward decoupling, localization, and fractured governance.

  • Frames platform governance and app ecosystems as spaces where values get enforced de facto, not just debated.

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Corporate “straddling” of models (PDF p. 34)

  • Vertical battles (state vs firm) (PDF p. 34)

  • Content moderation/censorship dilemmas (PDF p. 178–179)

  • National security scrutiny tied to platforms/data (PDF p. 191)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Google’s “Project Dragonfly” episode (PDF p. 178)

  • Facebook in China constraints and strategic implications (PDF p. 179)

  • TikTok/WeChat national security concerns in the US (PDF p. 191)

  • Mark Zuckerberg testimony framing China’s export of an alternative internet vision (PDF p. 206)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Platforms become influence terrain: corporate policies can amplify or blunt censorship, propaganda, and disinformation.

  • Shows coercive leverage points (market access, app stores, data localization) that can be used strategically.

  • Reinforces the idea that “governance” contests can be fought through private infrastructure and policy choices. (PDF p. 34)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “China is building its own internet focused on very different values, and is now exporting their vision of the internet to other countries.” (PDF p. 206)

Chapter 5: The Battle for Technological Supremacy: The US–China Tech War (PDF p. 209–251)

• One-sentence thesis: The US–China tech war is a state-led contest for technological supremacy where export controls, sanctions-like tools, and supply-chain chokepoints become mechanisms to degrade adversary capacity and shape the global tech order. (PDF p. 35, PDF p. 217–224)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Treats the rivalry as more than commercial: it is a strategic contest tied to security, power, and global leadership in frontier technologies. (PDF p. 35)

  • Explains how the US escalates with restrictive tools (Entity List, export controls) to limit Chinese access to advanced tech. (PDF p. 217–224)

  • Uses Huawei as a focal case for how supply chains, networks, and espionage fears fuse commercial and security logic. (PDF p. 217–220)

  • Highlights the role of semiconductors and AI as central arenas for competitive advantage and military significance. (PDF p. 218)

  • Shows how measures ripple globally, forcing third countries and firms to make alignment choices that can harden blocs.

  • Warns of fragmentation pressures and potential movement toward a bifurcated digital economy under rival spheres. (PDF p. 220)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Tech war / technological supremacy (PDF p. 35)

  • Export controls as strategic tools (PDF p. 217–224)

  • Chokepoints / supply-chain leverage (PDF p. 218)

  • Decoupling / fragmentation risk (PDF p. 220)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Export Control Reform Act of 2018 and “emerging and foundational technologies” (PDF p. 217–218)

  • Entity List and Huawei restrictions; US network bans; allied pressure campaigns (PDF p. 217–220)

  • October 2022 US export restrictions on advanced computing and semiconductor manufacturing items (PDF p. 218)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Illustrates coercive competition below kinetic conflict: capability denial, alliance pressure, and economic statecraft.

  • Shows how legal/regulatory tools can function as strategic weapons in prolonged rivalry.

  • Emphasizes that tech war tools have spillover effects on partners’ autonomy and alignment. (PDF p. 220)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “activities contrary to US national security and/or foreign policy interests.” (PDF p. 217)

Chapter 6: When Rights, Markets, and Security Collide: The US–EU Tech War (PDF p. 252–291)

• One-sentence thesis: Transatlantic conflict stems from differing regulatory priorities (rights-driven EU vs market-driven US) producing recurring clashes over data, markets, and security even as shared democratic interests create incentives for convergence. (PDF p. 35, PDF p. 261–263)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Centers the recurring contradiction: the US prizes market openness and innovation; the EU demands rights safeguards and regulatory control. (PDF p. 33, PDF p. 261–263)

  • Highlights data transfers and privacy as a key battleground with major economic consequences. (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 261–263)

  • Shows how EU legal constraints can destabilize transatlantic commerce and force renegotiation of governance arrangements. (PDF p. 29)

  • Explores how these disputes coexist with strategic alignment pressures driven by shared concerns about China’s surveillance/censorship model. (PDF p. 37)

  • Examines pathways toward resolution or managed rivalry, given deep economic interdependence and common security interests. (PDF p. 35)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Rights–markets–security collision (framing)

  • Data transfer governance / adequacy logic (PDF p. 261–263)

  • “Regulatory imperialism” critique in transatlantic context (PDF p. 29)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Privacy Shield invalidation and disarray effects on transatlantic commerce (PDF p. 29)

  • Commercial stakes: data flows supporting the “$7 trillion transatlantic economic relationship” (PDF p. 29)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Alliance cohesion is strategic: democratic rivalry can be exploited by authoritarian competitors to fracture standard-setting coalitions.

  • Data governance disputes show how domestic surveillance practices become international strategic liabilities.

  • Suggests competition management is partly institutional—law and enforcement capacity shape alliance credibility. (PDF p. 29)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • TBD

Part III Summary (Imperial Expansion):

• Shifts from bilateral rivalry to global diffusion: each empire seeks prominence by exporting its model to other regions. (PDF p. 37–38)

• Emphasizes different export mechanisms: US private power, China infrastructure power, EU regulatory power. (PDF p. 37)

• Highlights adoption incentives for third parties: development and “digital sovereignty,” plus authoritarian demand for surveillance capacity. (PDF p. 38)

Chapter 7: The Waning Global Influence of American Techno-Libertarianism (PDF p. 292–329)

• One-sentence thesis: The US model’s global influence is declining as the outsized power and harms of American tech companies trigger backlash, driving states toward stronger sovereignty/control or rights-based regulation. (PDF p. 37, PDF p. 293–294)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Describes the omnipresence of US private power in global digital life through dominant platforms and algorithms. (PDF p. 293)

  • Argues that US firms shape what foreign publics “think, want, and buy,” producing deep political and cultural influence abroad. (PDF p. 293)

  • Links this influence to an exported ethos—the “Californian ideology” and techno-libertarian instincts embedded in products and services. (PDF p. 293)

  • Shows how the US government’s “internet freedom agenda” promoted commercial nonregulation and anti-censorship principles globally. (PDF p. 294)

  • Argues the model becomes a “victim of its early success”: harmful practices and accumulated power create a global backlash. (PDF p. 37)

  • Connects backlash to declining legitimacy of the market-driven model and to increased openness to EU- or China-style alternatives. (PDF p. 30, PDF p. 37)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Internet freedom agenda (commercial nonregulation + anti-censorship) (PDF p. 294)

  • Techno-libertarian instincts / “Californian ideology” (PDF p. 293)

  • Model backlash and decline dynamics (PDF p. 37)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Illustrative platform reach and algorithmic influence claims (PDF p. 293)

  • US diplomatic promotion of internet freedom principles (PDF p. 294)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Loss of normative legitimacy reduces strategic leverage even when capability remains high—relevant for competition centered on influence.

  • Demonstrates how private power can produce blowback, pushing partners toward alternative governance regimes.

  • Highlights that influence operations and democratic integrity risks are partly endogenous to platform design. (PDF p. 293)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • TBD

Chapter 8: Exporting China’s Digital Authoritarianism through Infrastructure (PDF p. 330–368)

• One-sentence thesis: China expands influence by exporting digital infrastructure and surveillance technologies—often welcomed as pathways to “digital sovereignty and development”—embedding Chinese standards and control-friendly practices abroad. (PDF p. 38)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Shows how Chinese firms build telecommunications and e-commerce infrastructure across regions, extending China’s “sphere of influence.” (PDF p. 38)

  • Emphasizes that infrastructure is politically consequential because it creates durable dependencies and is difficult to inspect or reverse. (PDF p. 18)

  • Describes the Digital Silk Road as a conduit for both connectivity and surveillance-capable systems. (PDF p. 38)

  • Notes China’s growing role in international standard setting, enabling the export of regulatory standards alongside hardware. (PDF p. 38)

  • Explains demand-side drivers: developing countries welcome capital and technology; authoritarian governments seek surveillance tools “toward illiberal ends.” (PDF p. 38)

  • Highlights allied unease and the difficulty of countering China’s infrastructure expansion. (PDF p. 38)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Infrastructure power (PDF p. 29)

  • Digital Silk Road (PDF p. 38)

  • Standard-setting as influence mechanism (PDF p. 38)

  • Digital sovereignty (as adoption motivation) (PDF p. 38)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Reports of Chinese infrastructure projects and surveillance technology provision across regions (PDF p. 38)

  • Huawei as a contested infrastructure actor and focal point for allied pushback (PDF p. 29)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Infrastructure export is a long-horizon influence instrument: it shapes partner state governance capacity and information control.

  • Raises intelligence and coercion risks tied to data access and embedded standards.

  • Suggests counter-strategy requires competing financing, standards coalitions, and credible alternatives—not only warnings. (PDF p. 38)

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Infrastructure is the most opaque and therefore most concerning form of power.” (PDF p. 18)

Chapter 9: Globalizing European Digital Rights through Regulatory Power (PDF p. 369–410)

• One-sentence thesis: The EU globalizes its digital rules via regulatory power—through de facto corporate compliance and de jure legal emulation—often becoming “the most influential international regulator” despite lacking dominant tech firms. (PDF p. 35, PDF p. 371–372)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Frames EU influence as export of digital rules through the “Brussels Effect,” extending EU standards globally. (PDF p. 371)

  • Distinguishes de facto diffusion (firms standardize on EU rules) from de jure diffusion (other states adopt similar laws). (PDF p. 371–372)

  • Argues Brussels Effect can shape outcomes even when firms oppose rules; the EU’s market leverage can outweigh corporate preferences. (PDF p. 372)

  • Notes broad global adoption patterns: “150 countries … have enacted data privacy laws,” and EU rules influence their design. (PDF p. 372)

  • Highlights political economy: corporate lobbying can dilute proposals, but the EU still often sets the baseline. (PDF p. 372)

  • Engages critiques of “regulatory imperialism” and digital protectionism, emphasizing the real extraterritorial impact regardless of normative view. (PDF p. 28–29)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Brussels Effect (PDF p. 371)

  • De facto vs de jure regulatory diffusion (PDF p. 371–372)

  • Regulatory power (PDF p. 29)

  • Regulatory imperialism critique (PDF p. 29)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • GDPR-driven diffusion dynamics; global privacy laws count and influence patterns (PDF p. 372)

  • Antitrust and regulatory enforcement shaping global firm behavior (PDF p. 392)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Demonstrates how rule-setting can become a non-kinetic form of power projection—compelling global compliance without territorial control.

  • Suggests democratic competition can be waged via institutional capacity and market leverage, not only hardware dominance.

  • Highlights that “standards wars” can determine long-run alignment and governance models.

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “Europe is increasingly globalizing its digital rules through the so-called “Brussels Effect.”” (PDF p. 371)

Chapter 10: Conclusion (PDF p. 411–449)

• One-sentence thesis: Bradford argues the future digital order hinges on how the US, EU, and their allies manage both the horizontal contest with China and the vertical contest with tech giants—because losing either can undermine liberal democracy. (PDF p. 33, PDF p. 448–449)

• What happens / what the author argues (5–10 bullets):

  • Reassesses the “battle for the soul” of the digital economy: which model prevails, and what that means for rights, freedom, and democratic institutions. (PDF p. 30, PDF p. 33)

  • Argues democracies can lose if they shift toward a state-driven model under China’s influence, subjugating rights “to state control.” (PDF p. 33)

  • Warns democracies can also lose if tech giants win the vertical battle, leaving societies “at the mercy” of business models that can undermine elections and rights. (PDF p. 33)

  • Emphasizes the need for democratic coordination and realistic strategy given interdependence and enforcement constraints.

  • Ends with an urgency framing: the digital society faces a pivotal moment where governance choices will lock in trajectories. (PDF p. 449)

• Key concepts introduced (0–5):

  • Democratic resilience as strategic objective (PDF p. 33)

  • Horizontal vs vertical battle end-states (PDF p. 33)

  • Model coalescence vs fragmentation dynamics (PDF p. 30)

• Evidence / cases used:

  • Synthesis of prior chapters’ rivalry and export dynamics; democratic coordination imperatives (PDF p. 33)

• IW / strategy relevance (2–4 bullets):

  • Frames the strategic competition as a legitimacy/governance contest—central to IW logics of influence over populations.

  • Highlights that long-run outcomes depend on institutional choices (regulation, enforcement, alliance coordination), not only tech breakthroughs.

  • Suggests measures of success should track norm adoption and resilience, not solely capability.

• Links to seminar questions: Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5, Q6

• Notable quotes (0–2):

  • “The digital society is at an inflection point.” (PDF p. 449)

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Theory / Framework Map

• Level(s) of analysis:

  • Global system of regulatory competition among major powers (“digital empires”) (PDF p. 13)

  • Domestic political-legal models shaping tech governance (Part I framing) (PDF p. 33)

• Unit(s) of analysis:

  • States / supranational regulators (US, China, EU) (PDF p. 13)

  • Tech companies as corporate empires and governance actors (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 33)

  • Third-country governments as “battlefield” decision-makers in unaligned markets (PDF p. 29)

• Dependent variable(s):

  • Distribution of digital power and influence over foreign societies (PDF p. 13)

  • Diffusion/adoption of regulatory models (PDF p. 26, PDF p. 37–38)

  • Degree of fragmentation vs interoperability in the global digital order (implied by battle framing) (PDF p. 30–33)

• Key independent variable(s):

  • Mechanism of influence: private vs infrastructure vs regulatory power (PDF p. 29)

  • Market size and leverage (EU’s global regulatory reach) (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 371–372)

  • State capacity to control firms/infrastructure and enforce rules (China/EU) (PDF p. 38, PDF p. 33)

  • Ideological commitments (freedom/markets; control/state; rights) (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 33)

• Mechanism(s):

  • Private power diffusion: global platform dominance exports norms/business practices (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 293)

  • Infrastructure embedding: building networks + standards exports governance preferences (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 38)

  • Regulatory diffusion (“Brussels Effect”): de facto corporate standardization and de jure legal emulation (PDF p. 371–372)

  • Legal/economic statecraft: export controls and restrictions as competitive tools (PDF p. 217–218)

• Scope conditions / where it should NOT apply:

  • Less applicable where states lack regulatory/enforcement capacity or where digital markets are insulated from cross-border firms/infrastructure (inference).

  • Model diffusion may be constrained by domestic politics, developmental capacity, and security alignments (inference).

• Observable implications / predictions:

  • As the US model “fades,” third countries face increasing pressure to align with either China’s state-driven or Europe’s rights-driven tenets. (PDF p. 30)

  • Regulatory power (EU) can systematically shape global firm behavior even absent domestic tech dominance. (PDF p. 371–372)

  • Infrastructure export and standard-setting can entrench governance preferences in recipient states over long timelines. (PDF p. 38)

Key Concepts & Definitions (author’s usage)

• Digital empires

  • Definition: The US, China, and the EU as leading “technology, economic, and regulatory powers” shaping the global digital order and exporting domestic models. (PDF p. 13)

  • Role in argument: Core unit of geopolitical analysis for tech governance competition.

  • Analytical note: Operationalize via cross-border reach of firms, infrastructure footprint, and extraterritorial regulatory effects.

• Digital power

  • Definition: Power centered on “control of data and information.” (PDF p. 13)

  • Role in argument: Explains why tech governance translates into strategic influence.

  • Analytical note: Track data access, platform control, information environment manipulation capacity.

• Private power

  • Definition: US influence manifesting through dominance of tech companies exercising power across global digital sphere. (PDF p. 29)

  • Role in argument: US mechanism for empire expansion.

  • Analytical note: Measure platform penetration, market capitalization, algorithmic influence.

• Infrastructure power

  • Definition: China’s influence via building “critical digital network infrastructures” abroad through firms tied to the state. (PDF p. 29)

  • Role in argument: China’s path to scale influence, embed standards, and create dependencies.

  • Analytical note: Map telecom backbones, cloud/data centers, surveillance systems, standards body leadership.

• Regulatory power

  • Definition: EU influence through regulation that “entrenches European digital norms across the global marketplace.” (PDF p. 29)

  • Role in argument: EU’s substitute for lacking dominant tech firms.

  • Analytical note: Track extraterritorial compliance, legal emulation, enforcement actions.

• Horizontal battles

  • Definition: Rivalry among the three digital empires. (PDF p. 33)

  • Role in argument: Frames interstate competition for global digital order.

  • Analytical note: Observe coalition patterns, sanctions/export controls, standards competition.

• Vertical battles

  • Definition: Struggle between tech companies and their governments over who sets the rules. (PDF p. 33)

  • Role in argument: Explains internal constraints and corporate agency.

  • Analytical note: Track regulatory enforcement, corporate resistance, compliance/exits.

• Market-driven regulatory model (US)

  • Definition: Centers on free speech, free internet, innovation incentives; limited government role except national security/cybersecurity. (PDF p. 33)

  • Role in argument: Baseline model whose global legitimacy is contested.

  • Analytical note: Evaluate via Section 230-style liability, antitrust posture, privacy regulation gaps.

• State-driven regulatory model (China)

  • Definition: Elevates state role; fuses technological progress with state control; uses censorship/surveillance as governance. (PDF p. 30, PDF p. 82–86)

  • Role in argument: Competing vision attractive to authoritarian leaders. (PDF p. 31)

  • Analytical note: Track censorship architecture, surveillance programs, party-state control of firms.

• Rights-driven regulatory model (EU)

  • Definition: Focuses on individual and collective rights of citizens in the digital economy. (PDF p. 33)

  • Role in argument: Alternative democratic model and source of global regulatory diffusion.

  • Analytical note: Track GDPR-style rights, platform accountability rules, market power constraints.

• Brussels Effect

  • Definition: EU globalizes rules through de facto corporate compliance and de jure emulation. (PDF p. 371–372)

  • Role in argument: Explains EU influence beyond borders.

  • Analytical note: Measure harmonization of global corporate practices and adoption of EU-like statutes.

• Digital sovereignty

  • Definition: A motivation for countries welcoming Chinese technology and standards as a path toward sovereignty and development. (PDF p. 38)

  • Role in argument: Explains receptivity to Chinese infrastructure exports.

  • Analytical note: Observe policies like localization, domestic control demands, vendor diversification.

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Key Arguments & Evidence

• Argument 1: Digital geopolitics is now a three-empire contest, not a simple US–China binary.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Three “digital empires” with distinct models (PDF p. 13)

    • The US–China binary is “flawed” because EU model shapes choices and standards (PDF p. 30)

  • So what:

    • Strategic competition requires coalition strategy around standards and governance, not only tech breakthroughs.

• Argument 2: The mechanism of influence differs—private vs infrastructure vs regulatory power—and each creates different dependencies.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • US private power, China infrastructure power, EU regulatory power (PDF p. 29)

    • Infrastructure export via Digital Silk Road + standards leadership (PDF p. 38)

    • Brussels Effect diffusion (PDF p. 371–372)

  • So what:

    • Competing with China or leveraging EU influence requires tailored tools (financing, standard-setting, enforcement coordination).

• Argument 3: The core conflict is both horizontal (empire vs empire) and vertical (state vs tech firm), and losing either can undermine democracy.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • Horizontal/vertical battle framing (PDF p. 33)

    • Risk of state-driven global shift vs risk of tech giants governing societies through business models (PDF p. 33)

  • So what:

    • Strategy must integrate domestic regulation, alliance policy, and corporate governance as parts of a single competition.

• Argument 4: The US market-driven model is losing legitimacy, pushing many states toward EU rights rules or China control tools.

  • Evidence/examples:

    • “American market-driven regulatory model is fading” (PDF p. 30)

    • Global backlash linked to harmful practices and outsized influence of US tech (PDF p. 37)

  • So what:

    • US grand strategy must decide whether to converge with EU democratic regulation or risk ceding governance leadership to China.

⚖️ Assumptions & Critical Tensions

• Assumptions the author needs:

  • Regulatory models are coherent enough to classify and to generate predictable externalities across borders. (PDF p. 33)

  • States (or supranational entities) can effectively enforce rules on powerful platforms and infrastructures (challenged by “vertical battle” constraints). (PDF p. 33)

• Tensions / tradeoffs / contradictions:

  • Rights-protecting regulation can be framed as “regulatory imperialism” or innovation constraint, yet can also protect global users and democracy. (PDF p. 28–29)

  • Infrastructure export can be welcomed as development and sovereignty while simultaneously increasing surveillance capacity and geopolitical dependence. (PDF p. 38)

  • Democracies face dual risk: authoritarian model diffusion (horizontal loss) vs corporate governance dominance (vertical loss). (PDF p. 33)

• What would change the author’s mind? (mark clearly as inference)

  • Inference: If the US could credibly reform toward a widely emulated democratic regulatory model while retaining innovation leadership, the “fading” trajectory could reverse. (anchored to fading claim) (PDF p. 30)

Critique Points

• Strongest critique:

  • The “three-model” frame can compress internal variation and hybridization within each empire (e.g., overlapping commitments and evolution) into ideal types, risking over-clarity. (PDF p. 33)

• Weakest critique:

  • The book anticipates restraint via interdependence, but the balance between interdependence and hardening bloc politics can shift quickly under shocks (inference).

• Method/data critique (if applicable):

  • Largely a synthetic, cross-domain governance analysis; causal attribution for model diffusion may be difficult to isolate from broader political economy drivers (inference).

• Missing variable / alternative explanation:

  • Domestic political coalitions and economic structure in third countries may explain model adoption as much as “empire” pull—especially where leaders use regulation for internal legitimacy (inference).

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Policy & Strategy Takeaways

• Implications for the US + partners:

  • Treat tech governance as alliance politics: democratic coalitions need shared baselines on privacy, platform accountability, and AI governance to avoid ceding the field to coherent authoritarian offers. (PDF p. 30–33)

  • Compete on infrastructure: provide credible alternatives to Digital Silk Road financing and vendor ecosystems to reduce dependency and surveillance externalities. (PDF p. 38)

  • Harmonize security with rights: US surveillance practices can undermine transatlantic data governance and weaken coalition cohesion. (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 261–263)

• Practical “do this / avoid that” bullets:

  • Do build coordinated standards strategies across democracies (regulation + technical standards + procurement).

  • Do align export-control strategy with allies to avoid leakage and reduce partner resentment while preserving chokepoints. (PDF p. 217–220)

  • Avoid treating tech policy as purely economic policy; it has direct implications for legitimacy, influence, and domestic resilience. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 33)

• Risks / second-order effects:

  • Overuse of coercive tools (export controls, market exclusions) can accelerate fragmentation and push third countries into rival or “non-aligned” stacks. (PDF p. 220)

  • Democratic overregulation without innovation strategy can erode competitiveness, creating security dependence on non-democratic tech stacks (inference).

  • Infrastructure competition can be interpreted as neo-imperial rivalry, increasing political backlash (inference).

• What to measure (MOE/MOP ideas) and over what timeline:

  • Adoption of EU-like privacy/platform statutes (de jure diffusion) over 3–10 years. (PDF p. 371–372)

  • Corporate global compliance convergence (de facto diffusion) over 1–5 years. (PDF p. 371–372)

  • Infrastructure vendor concentration and standards-body leadership shares over 5–15 years. (PDF p. 38)

  • Indicators of democratic resilience: election integrity impacts, disinformation prevalence, and platform systemic risk responses over 1–4 years. (PDF p. 33)

⚔️ Cross‑Text Synthesis (SAASS 644)

• Where this aligns:

  • Aligns with strategic-competition framings that treat influence, legitimacy, and governance as decisive terrain—here, via regulation, standards, and data rules rather than kinetic force. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 33)

• Where this contradicts:

  • It complicates purely state-centric competition stories by emphasizing vertical battles where tech giants can constrain states and shape societies across borders. (PDF p. 33)

• What it adds that others miss:

  • A concrete typology of power mechanisms (private / infrastructure / regulatory) that lets strategists distinguish “how influence travels” in the digital domain. (PDF p. 29)

• 2–4 “bridge” insights tying at least TWO other readings together:

  • Bradford + Kalyvas: if control and information are central to political violence, then digital platforms/infrastructure are the modern “control” substrate—rule-setting over information flows becomes a proxy for territorial control. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 33)

  • Bradford + German: “nontraditional means” of competition map well onto regulatory and standards warfare—states can coerce and shape others through laws and technical architectures without firing shots. (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 371–372)

  • Bradford + Patterson: strategic competition in IW is partly about shaping how societies govern themselves; here, regulation/data governance decides whose values structure daily life, creating durable alignment. (PDF p. 30–33)

  • Bradford + Biddle: institutions and governance capacity matter—regulatory enforcement and state–society constraints shape whether democracies can compete without adopting authoritarian control methods. (PDF p. 33)

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❓ Open Questions for Seminar

• If the American market-driven model is “fading,” what specific reforms would make it emulable again—without collapsing innovation advantages? (PDF p. 30)

• How should democracies balance the vertical battle: what institutional designs constrain tech giants while preserving open debate and avoiding overreach? (PDF p. 33)

• Is infrastructure power (China) ultimately more durable than regulatory power (EU), or does enforcement legitimacy make regulatory diffusion stickier? (PDF p. 29, PDF p. 371–372)

• What are the “success metrics” for a digital empire—market share, standards adoption, data access, legitimacy, or resilience? How would we measure each?

• Can “digital sovereignty” for developing countries be achieved without importing authoritarian surveillance capabilities? (PDF p. 38)

• How do export controls reshape alliance politics—do they build collective security or create coercive dependencies within the democratic camp? (PDF p. 217–220)

✍️ Notable Quotes & Thoughts

• “personal data is the most valuable resource in the 21st-century digital economy and is what fuels the extraordinary power of the tech companies.” (PDF p. 11)

• “Today’s digital empires are primarily exporting their tech companies, technologies, and rules across national borders.” (PDF p. 13)

• “Infrastructure is the most opaque and therefore most concerning form of power.” (PDF p. 18)

• “unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” (PDF p. 54)

• “The Internet has become the main battlefield for public opinion struggle.” (PDF p. 82)

• “In Europe, the bird will fly by our rules.” (PDF p. 123)

• “China is building its own internet focused on very different values, and is now exporting their vision of the internet to other countries.” (PDF p. 206)

• “The digital society is at an inflection point.” (PDF p. 449)

Exam Drills / Take‑Home Hooks

• Prompt 1: “Explain how regulation operates as geopolitical strategy in the global digital economy.”

  • Outline (3 parts):

    1. Define digital empires + mechanisms of power (private / infrastructure / regulatory). (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 29)

    2. Show how rules travel (Brussels Effect; infrastructure export; platform diffusion) and why that creates dependence/influence. (PDF p. 38, PDF p. 371–372)

    3. Assess strategic implications: alignment choices, fragmentation risks, and democratic resilience stakes. (PDF p. 30–33)

• Prompt 2: “Which digital empire is best positioned to shape the future global order—and why?”

  • Outline (3 parts):

    1. Reject US–China binary; include EU as third pole. (PDF p. 30)

    2. Compare diffusion channels: US private power vs China infrastructure vs EU regulatory (plus strengths/limits). (PDF p. 29–31)

    3. Conclude with conditional forecast: EU among democracies; China among authoritarians/developing recipients; US depends on regulatory adaptation. (PDF p. 30–31, PDF p. 38)

• Prompt 3: “Assess the national security tradeoffs of the US market-driven model.”

  • Outline (3 parts):

    1. Innovation + private power as strategic asset (platform dominance). (PDF p. 29)

    2. Governance gaps as vulnerability (vertical battle; democratic integrity risks). (PDF p. 33)

    3. Strategy options: align with EU democratic regulation; counter China infrastructure influence; manage export controls without self-fragmentation. (PDF p. 30–33, PDF p. 38)

• If I had to write a 1500‑word response in 4–5 hours, my thesis would be:

  • Bradford shows that tech regulation is now a primary arena of strategic competition: power flows through exported rules, infrastructures, and platforms, and democracies must coordinate to avoid losing either to China’s state control or to tech giants’ private governance. (PDF p. 13, PDF p. 33)

• 3 supporting points + 1 anticipated counterargument:

  • Support 1: Three mechanisms (private / infrastructure / regulatory power) explain how influence travels globally. (PDF p. 29)

  • Support 2: The US model is “fading,” making EU vs China the principal choice architecture for many states. (PDF p. 30–31)

  • Support 3: Horizontal and vertical battles jointly determine democratic resilience; losing either undermines liberal democracy. (PDF p. 33)

  • Counterargument: Interdependence and hybridization may prevent stark outcomes and sustain a messy, mixed global order rather than bloc consolidation (inference).