Mahan on Naval Strategy

Online Description

Mahan on Naval Strategy, available in paperback for the first time, provides a selection of key writings from one of the greatest naval theorists of all time. An original contributor to the study of strategic thinking, Alfred Thayer Mahan presented concepts and theories in The Influence of Seapower and his other writings that provide guidance in developing strategies to deal with the maritime challenges of the twenty-first century. With this unique collection of key articles and chapters from Mahan’s works, readers have a single, convenient reference to help them toward a full understanding of Mahan’s logic and thinking.

🔫 Author Background

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s decision to write “Mahan on Naval Strategy” was profoundly shaped by his background and the intellectual currents of his time. Born in 1840 at West Point, his father, Dennis Hart Mahan, was a prominent military engineering professor influenced by Jomini, providing an early, albeit perhaps indirect, intellectual foundation. A crucial turning point in Mahan’s career occurred in 1885 when Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, with whom Mahan had previously served and who had transmitted the ideas of Sir John Knox Laughton, invited him to teach naval history at the newly established Naval War College. Mahan explicitly attributed his systematic engagement with the “Conduct of War” to the Naval War College, stating it was “wholly and exclusively” responsible for his newfound focus. He recognized that the dramatic changes in international relations and naval technology of the late 19th century had rendered previous naval thinking obsolete, creating an urgent need for new strategic guidance. Consequently, Mahan sought to identify enduring principles of naval strategy by studying history, particularly Britain’s successful use of sea power between 1660 and 1815, believing that historical narrative and formulated principles were reciprocal and essential for understanding. His aim was to provide professional naval officers with a tool to develop strategic naval doctrine, linking maritime activities to broader national and international issues.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

• Sea power is fundamental to a nation’s greatness, wealth, and international influence, directly linking maritime activities and naval strength to wider national and international issues.
• He argued for the identification and application of enduring historical principles of naval strategy, which he believed were essential for developing sound naval doctrine and navigating changes in naval technology and international relations.
• Mahan advocated for a strong, concentrated, offensive naval force as the best means to defend a nation’s interests, control vital sea lines of communication, and ensure national security, rather than relying on a passive or dispersed defensive posture (xix, xxv, 128, 131, 175, 294, 349, 369).

Mahan’s Naval Strategy - Study Notes

Series Editors’ Introduction (Pages 1-2)

Summary: This introductory section explains the purpose of the “Classics of Sea Power” series, which aims to make foundational naval concepts accessible. It introduces Alfred Thayer Mahan as a pivotal figure in naval thought, emphasizing the importance of studying his original writings to understand his concept of sea power and its implications for national strength and vulnerability.

Main Points:

• The “Classics of Sea Power” series makes available “the central concepts of the naval profession” in “uniform, authoritative editions” (Mahan, 1).
• Alfred Thayer Mahan is central to the concept of “sea power” (Mahan, 1).
• Readers should engage directly with Mahan’s own words, rather than relying solely on “interpretations of secondary sources” (Mahan, 1).
• Mahan’s work explores how sea power offers both “greatness and threatened vulnerability to a state” (Mahan, 1).
• Mahan’s core ideas include the “battle fleet, command of the sea, and the safe movement of shipping as a triad of which maritime achievement is based” (Mahan, 1).
• It is crucial to study Mahan objectively, neither “idolized nor demythologized,” to ensure that his actual ideas, not merely his “ghost,” influence modern strategists (Mahan, 2).

Supporting Ideas and Quotes:

• The series focuses on “eloquence and timelessness” and expresses “important themes of strategy, operations, tactics, and theory” (Mahan, 1).
• Mahan is presented as the “seventh author in the series” (Mahan, 1).
• The editors, John B. Hattendorf and Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., are from the Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School, respectively (Mahan, 2).

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Editor’s Introduction (Pages 6-17)

Summary: This introduction by the editor, John B. Hattendorf, details Alfred Thayer Mahan’s two major contributions to naval thought: linking maritime affairs to broader national and international issues, and formulating principles for naval strategy. It explains Mahan’s belief in the reciprocal relationship between historical narrative and strategic principles, his significant influence, and provides a brief biographical sketch. It also places Mahan’s work within the context of his time, an era of dramatic changes in international politics and naval technology.

Main Points:

• Mahan made two great contributions to naval thought:
  • He “linked maritime and naval activities to wider national and international issues” (Mahan, 6).
  • He “laid out a series of principles for professional naval officers to use in the formulation of naval strategy” (Mahan, 6).
• Mahan believed his two contributions were of equal and interdependent importance (Mahan, 7).
• Mahan’s approach emphasized that “the study of military history lies at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice” (Mahan, 8). Principles alone are “too abstract to sustain convinced allegiance” without historical context (Mahan, 8).
• Mahan was influenced by figures like Sir John Knox Laughton and Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, who founded the Naval War College (Mahan, 8).
• His major works include The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783 (1890) and Naval Strategy Compared and Contrasted with the Principles and Practice of Military Operations on Land (1911) (Mahan, 8).
• Mahan’s work, though often detailed and narrative, gained widespread currency due to numerous editions and translations (Mahan, 10).
• Mahan’s career transformed after Luce invited him to teach naval history at the Naval War College in 1885, providing him a “newly found focus and intellectual approach” (Mahan, 14).
• His writings were a product of his time, relevant to an era of dramatic change in navies, including the end of Pax Britannica, the rise of new industrial powers, and technological shifts from wood to iron and sail to steam (Mahan, 17-19).

Key Concepts from “Topical Catalog of Quotations”:

Coast Defence: “Sea ports should defend themselves; the sphere of the fleet is on the open sea, its object offense rather than defence” (Mahan, 21).

Communications: The navy “keeps open the communications between its own ports, it obstructs those of the enemy” (Mahan, 22).

Concentration: Naval power is controlled “by occupying the centers with aggregated forces—fleets or armies—ready to act in masses” (Mahan, 22).

Control: “Control of a maritime region is insured primarily by a navy; secondarily, by positions” (Mahan, 23).

Command of the Sea: It is a “question of national policy, national security, and national obligation,” dependent on “annual increase of the navy” (Mahan, 23).

Defensive: “In war, the defensive exists mainly that the offensive may act more freely” (Mahan, 24). “Even though the leading object of the war be defense, defense is best made by offensive action” (Mahan, 24).

Fleet-in-Being: Primarily “a threat to communications” but the concept “exalts the defensive and is erroneous” (Mahan, 25).

History: By studying it, one can become “imbued with the spirit of a great teacher” (Mahan, 26).

Mobility: Naval strength’s “greatest constituent is the mobile navy” (Mahan, 26).

National Interests: Statesmen determine vital national interests and objectives; military experts handle the technical execution (Mahan, 27).

Private Property at Sea: Interference with commerce is a “most important secondary operation” of naval war, making “national wealth engaged in reproducing and multiplying itself” a “most proper object of attack” (Mahan, 28).

Position: War is determined by “utilization of position by mobile force” (Mahan, 29).

Preparedness: “Preparedness for naval war—preparedness against naval attack and for naval offense—is preparedness for anything that is likely to occur” (Mahan, 30).

Retaliation: It “rarely stays its hand at an equal measure” and often falls “upon the capital, where the interests and honor of the nation are centered” (Mahan, 30).

Risk: “Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea flight beyond all others” (Mahan, 31). Timid precaution “may entail the greatest of risks” (Mahan, 31).

Sea Power: It is “the central link” in wealth accumulation, laying “under contribution other nations for the benefit of the one holding it” (Mahan, 31). It is “the handmaiden of expansion” but not expansion itself (Mahan, 32).

Speed: “The true speed of war is not headlong precipitancy, but the unremitting energy that wastes no time” (Mahan, 32).

Strategy: In sea war, essentials are “a suitable base upon the frontier” and an “organized military force…adequate to the proposed operations” with “reasonably secure communication” (Mahan, 32).

Study: Postponing opinion formation until action, or expecting inspiration without study, disregards “all the past experience of our race” (Mahan, 33).

Submarines: Possess “particular value only in the cases where the fleet to which it belongs is not exposed” (Mahan, 33).

War as Business: “War is not fighting, but business” (Mahan, 34).

Warships: “You cannot have everything. If you attempt it, you will lose everything” (Mahan, 34) regarding speed, armor, battery, and coal endurance.

Supporting Ideas and Quotes:

• Mahan’s ideas were influenced by his father, Dennis Hart Mahan, who based his teachings on Jomini (Mahan, 13).
• Mahan’s earliest published works, “Naval Education for Officers and Men” (1879) and Gulf and Inland Waters, gave “no clear hint of the work to come” (Mahan, 14).
• He attributed his intellectual development to the Naval War College: “The author has done so is due, wholly and exclusively, to the Naval War College, which was instituted to promote such studies” (Mahan, 16).
• Contemporaries viewed Mahan’s style as lacking “story telling,” “color or of humor,” and being “cold, …heavy, …unrhythmical; it is without any quality of beauty,” but acknowledged his “wonderful power of exposition” and strong grasp of his subject (Mahan, 18).
• Pax Britannica was “never something forced upon the world by the operations of a large navy” but a situation where “other nations accepted British ascendancy in the areas of finance, industry, commerce, and shipping” (Mahan, 19). It ended when other nations industrialized and challenged Britain (Mahan, 19).
• The book’s purpose is to present Mahan’s “essential points” to show “the nature and character of Mahan’s ideas within the context of the general development of naval thought” (Mahan, 34).
• Mahan’s work “formed the most powerful single influence on the formulation of naval thought,” even if later superseded and refined by Sir Julian Corbett (Mahan, 36).

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Chapter I. Introductory (Pages 45-96)

Summary: This chapter establishes the foundational premise for studying naval strategy: the enduring relevance of historical principles despite technological advancements. Mahan argues that while tactics change with weapons (e.g., from galleys to sailing ships to steamers), the fundamental principles of strategy, such as communication control, remain constant and can be learned from past conflicts, like the Punic Wars. He also emphasizes the critical role of geographical position and national character in developing sea power.

Main Points:

• The history of Sea Power is predominantly a military history, focusing on struggles for commercial advantage and control of the sea (Mahan, 45).
• General principles of warfare remain constant despite changes in weapons and technology, making the study of military history essential for future conduct of war (Mahan, 46).
• Strategic teachings from the past hold “more evident and permanent value” because strategic conditions are less transient than tactical ones (Mahan, 53).
• Tactics, in contrast to strategy, is constantly changing due to “unresting progress of mankind” in weapons (Mahan, 55).
• Control of communications is a decisive strategic factor, as illustrated by the impact of naval control on campaigns like the Battle of the Nile and the Second Punic War (Mahan, 58, 63).
• National character and governmental policy are crucial for sea power development; a nation’s internal focus or lack of commercial inclination can hinder its naval strength, as seen with France compared to Britain (Mahan, 81, 91).
• Geographical position, including coastlines, harbors, and strategic waterways, profoundly influences a nation’s sea power and susceptibility to blockade (Mahan, 78, 80, 85).

Supporting Ideas and Quotes:

Napoleon stressed studying campaigns of ancient leaders like Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar, even without gunpowder, because “certain teachings in the school of history… remain constant” (Mahan, 46).

Steam navies have “made no history which can be quoted as decisive in its teaching,” making historical study of sailing ships “doubly necessary” (Mahan, 47).

• While galleys and steamships share “ability to move in any direction independent of the wind,” tactical differences like short-range weapons and limited human endurance in galleys must be considered to avoid “false deductions” (Mahan, 47, 48).
• A “precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle” (Mahan, 52). Principles “has its root in the essential nature of things” (Mahan, 52).

Strategic questions include “the proper function of the navy in the war; its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the maintenance of communications…” (Mahan, 54).

• St. Vincent’s strategic policy saved England from invasion and led to Trafalgar (Mahan, 54).

“Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country” (Mahan, 70).

• The Mediterranean Sea has historically played a significant part in world history, offering “a very marked analogy in many respects to the Caribbean Sea” for strategic study (Mahan, 78).
• Regarding the Panama Canal, the U.S. “will not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof from international complications” (Mahan, 79).

Numerous and deep harbors are a “source of strength and wealth,” but also “a source of weakness in war, if not properly defended” (Mahan, 80).

• The effectiveness of the Union blockade of the Confederacy showed that such a blockade was possible against a population “unused to the sea, but also scanty in numbers” (Mahan, 85).

“If time be… a supreme factor in war, it behooves countries whose genius is essentially not military… to see to it that they are at least strong enough to gain the time necessary to turn the spirit and capacity of their subjects into the new activities which war calls for” (Mahan, 89).

• Holland’s past serves as a warning for Great Britain: “the continuance of her prosperity at home depends primarily upon maintaining her power abroad” (Mahan, 81).

France’s “tendency to save and put aside, to venture timidly and on a small scale,” hampered its commercial expansion and shipping interests, contrasting with the “adventurous temper, which risks what it has to gain more” (Mahan, 91).

“Successful colonization, with its consequent effect upon commerce and sea power, depends essentially upon national character; because colonies grow best when they grow of themselves, naturally” (Mahan, 92).

• English governments consistently maintained sea power, due in part to a “landed aristocracy” that was “naturally proud of its country’s glory” and “readily lays on the pecuniary burden necessary for preparation and for endurance of war” (Mahan, 98).

The British navy under Charles II asserted, “‘It is the custom of the English,’ said he, ‘to command at sea’” (Mahan, 94).

• England’s “uncontrolled dominion of the seas… was by long odds the chief among the military factors that determined the final issue” in wars after Utrecht (Mahan, 95).
• France, despite good position, consistently turned its back on sea interests, leading to the decline of its navy, as “a false policy of continental extension swallowed up the resources of the country” (Mahan, 106).

The “profound humiliation of France… has an instructive lesson for the United States in this our period of commercial and naval decadence” (Mahan, 107).

“When Monk said the nation that would rule upon the sea must always attack, he set the key-note to England’s naval policy” (Mahan, 111).

• The “false system” of French naval policy, prioritizing saving ships over decisive engagement, “sapped moral power to save material resources” and led to “unhappy results” (Mahan, 112).

“The true standard of civilized warfare is the least injury consistent with the end in view” (Mahan, 29).

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Chapter III. Foundations and Principles (Pages 125-190)

Summary: This chapter establishes the core principles of naval warfare, particularly in the context of steam. It highlights the critical role of communications (coal supply), the value of studying military history to understand general principles, and the importance of strategic points for naval operations. Mahan also distinguishes between offensive and defensive naval actions, advocating for aggressive defense, and emphasizes that the mobile navy, supported by secure land bases, is the primary determinant of sea power.

Main Points:

• Steam power makes communications (coal supply) a controlling feature of naval strategy, akin to an army’s dependence on its lines of communication (Mahan, 126).
• The Naval War College’s central principle is the study of the art of war and the exposition of its principles, which helps in comprehending naval history and identifying critical factors (Mahan, 128).
• Studying land warfare is highly beneficial for naval students because it offers a more extensive historical record and formal analysis of underlying military principles (Mahan, 130).
• Naval strategy is vital in peace as well as war, particularly for acquiring and developing strategic positions that might be otherwise inaccessible in wartime (Mahan, 131, 132).
• The distinguishing characteristic of naval force is mobility, enabling rapid concentration and movement across vast distances, which demands a corresponding readiness from an opponent (Mahan, 136).
• While strategic points are important, the “mobile navy” is the “greatest constituent” of naval strength; scattering forces among too many ports makes them “worse than useless” (Mahan, 138).
• Defense should primarily be “offensive-defensive”; strong permanent fortifications protect ports, freeing the mobile navy for offensive operations against the enemy fleet or its communications (Mahan, 155, 171).
• Dry docks are of paramount importance among resources for maintaining offensive energy, facilitating repairs, and quickly restoring vessels to the fleet (Mahan, 190).

Supporting Ideas and Quotes:

• Admiral Rozhestvensky’s difficulties with coal supply and “injudicious action” of over-coaling affected his fleet’s battle readiness (Mahan, 127).

A judge’s advice: “There are in such contentions a very few, perhaps only one or two, really decisive considerations of fact or principle. Keeping those firmly in mind, much of the argument sheds off, as irrelevant, or immaterial, and judgment is therefore easy” (Mahan, 129). This applies to military situations.

“Naval Strategy has for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country” (Mahan, 132).

• The present concentration of the British fleet in home waters reflects “German naval development” (Mahan, 134).
• The U.S. battle-fleet concentration is “due to a simple recognition of principle, not to pressure of circumstances” (Mahan, 135).

“War is a business of positions” (Mahan, 137).

• “Raiding operations against commerce… may proceed from remote colonial positions” (Mahan, 141).
• Strategic value of any place depends on its “position, or more exactly its situation,” “military strength, offensive and defensive,” and “resources” (Mahan, 143).

“Situation… is the most indispensable; because strength and resources can be artificially supplied or increased, but it passes the power of man to change the situation of a port” (Mahan, 147).

• Suez and Panama canals are examples of places where routes are narrowed, giving “great command” to nearby positions (Mahan, 147).

“The land is by nature full of obstacles… the sea almost all open plain” (Mahan, 148).

• “first-rate strategic points will be fewer within a given area on sea than on land” (Mahan, 150).
• The siege of Port Arthur showed that “the defense of ports… belongs chiefly to the army” and that “Endurance is a principal element of defensive strength… The great gain of defense… is delay” (Mahan, 154).

“In a properly coördinated system of coast defense this counter-action, molestation, the offensive-defensive, belongs to the navy” (Mahan, 155).

“Important naval stations, therefore, should be secured against attack by land as well as by sea” (Mahan, 159).

• “The distributions of the American fleet during the Spanish war furnish interesting matter for study as to the effects of popular fears on military dispositions” (Mahan, 164).

“Every proposal to use a navy as an instrument of pure passive defense is found faulty… the distinguishing feature of naval force is mobility, while that of a passive defense is immobility” (Mahan, 170).

• Fortifications release the navy from defensive duties: “The navy is interested in them because, when effective, they release it from any care about the port; from defensive action to the offensive, which is its proper sphere” (Mahan, 171).
• The strategic relationship between an intercepting fleet and a port is debated: Nelson preferred to entice the enemy out, but the “intercepting fleet must keep so near the harbor’s mouth that the enemy cannot get a start” (Mahan, 181).
• A port with “two outlets at a great distance from each other” increases offensive power by forcing the enemy to divide its force (Mahan, 182). New York is a “conspicuous instance” (Mahan, 182).

“The true standard of civilized warfare is the least injury consistent with the end in view” (Mahan, 29).

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Chapter V. Strategic Lines (Pages 191-218)

Summary: This chapter defines strategic lines as connections between strategic points and explores their importance in naval warfare. It distinguishes between open sea routes (requiring naval command) and coastal routes (used when command is lost). It emphasizes that communications are vital lines of supply and retreat, and that the ultimate objective in naval war is the enemy’s battle fleet, which acts as the “key position” of the entire system.

Main Points:

• Strategic lines are routes connecting strategic points, and while the shortest sea route is generally preferred, specific circumstances may dictate alternatives (Mahan, 191, 192).
• Control of the open sea is essential for efficient movement; without it, forces are restricted to less secure coastal routes (Mahan, 194).
• Lines of communication are doubly valuable as lines of retreat; controlling them can be decisive in war (Mahan, 195).
• Multiple secure ports on a sea frontier are crucial for logistical support, flexibility, and to prevent an enemy from easily intercepting a retreating or supplying fleet (Mahan, 197, 199).
• The “organized force—his battle fleet” is the true “key position” and determinant in naval war, as its destruction or inactivity fundamentally disrupts an enemy’s entire system of dependencies and operations (Mahan, 207, 223).
• Offensive action is necessary for defense, even for distant outposts; without a mobile fleet, isolated positions will eventually fall (Mahan, 207, 229).
• Naval power enables indirect strategic gains; controlling key positions can force an enemy to yield concessions, even if not directly attacked (Mahan, 211).

Supporting Ideas and Quotes:

• Rozhestvensky’s choice to go outside Formosa instead of the direct route illustrates that circumstances modify the choice of routes (Mahan, 192).
• Napoleon at Marengo and Ulm strategically cut enemy lines of communication, forcing surrender or defeat without direct battle (Mahan, 195).

“To provide two or more ports of supply is to disseminate the means of subsistence without impairing the concentration of the fleet” (Mahan, 197).

“It is difficult to imagine a more embarrassing position than that of a fleet, after a decisive defeat, hampered with crippled ships, having but a single port to which to return” (Mahan, 199).

• Chesapeake Bay and New York are primary bases for the Atlantic coast, requiring strong fortifications (Mahan, 200).

“Long Island Sound will afford similar advantages for the operations of a fleet… as a curtain—it concealed as a curtain does” (Mahan, 201).

“War cannot be made without running risks” (Mahan, 205).

“If time be… a supreme factor in war, it behooves countries whose genius is essentially not military… to see to it that they are at least strong enough to gain the time necessary to turn the spirit and capacity of their subjects into the new activities which war calls for” (Mahan, 89).

“A crushing defeat of the fleet… means a dislocation at once of the whole system of colonial or other dependencies” (Mahan, 207).

• Lord Kitchener’s axiom: “the Empire’s existence depends primarily upon the maintenance of adequate and efficient naval forces” (Mahan, 212).
• British strategy focused on blockading enemy dockyards, which both “prevented the juncture of the enemy’s divisions” (defensive) and “covered and supported a blockade of the whole hostile coast” (offensive) (Mahan, 214).
• Egypt and Malta are presented as intermediate objectives, flanking lines of communication (Mahan, 216, 217).
• The final failure of Bonaparte’s Egyptian expedition was due to the British navy’s control of communications, demonstrating that “the mobile force in each case ensuring the communications” (Mahan, 218).
• Port Arthur was “the Malta of Russia and the Mantua of Japan,” its prolonged siege showing the value of fortifications in delaying an enemy and tying up forces (Mahan, 221).

“The armies in the field, not the garrisons, are the effective instruments of decisive war” (Mahan, 223).

“A fleet charged with the care of its base is a fleet by so far weakened for effective action” (Mahan, 223).

• Fortified places, when captured, transfer their strategic advantages to the enemy (Mahan, 225).
• The Panama Canal is identified as a “crucial strategic feature” for the U.S. (Mahan, 228).

“The Monroe Doctrine is not a military force, but only a political pronouncement” (Mahan, 249).

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Chapter VI. Distant Operations and Maritime Expeditions (Pages 231-280)

Summary: This chapter details the planning and execution of distant maritime expeditions, emphasizing the necessity of secondary bases and secure naval communications. It reiterates that naval preponderance is essential for maintaining control and defines the strategic importance of various positions (e.g., central, flanking). Mahan also discusses the critical need for naval force concentration, arguing against dividing fleets, and illustrates these principles with historical campaigns such as the Athenian expedition against Syracuse and Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign.

Main Points:

• Distant operations necessitate establishing “secondary bases” near the scene of operations, with “secure communications knitting the two together,” which at sea means “naval preponderance” (Mahan, 231, 232).
• Strategic positions have a hierarchical importance: nearest to the mother country (e.g., Gibraltar for England), central (e.g., Malta in Mediterranean, Jamaica in Caribbean), and farthest/most exposed (e.g., Egypt, Panama) (Mahan, 234).
• The object of war may not be the direct military objective; indirect attacks on enemy vulnerabilities or crucial positions can be more effective (Mahan, 236).
• Successful offensive maritime war requires secure frontiers and a navy capable of disputing sea control (Mahan, 238).
• A fleet must not be divided unless overwhelmingly superior, as dividing forces risks overwhelming disaster against a concentrated enemy (Mahan, 258).
• The primary objective in naval operations is the “enemy’s organized force—his battle fleet”; its defeat secures the desired control (Mahan, 207, 248, 286).
• Even in defense, the navy’s role is offensive-defensive, aiming to harass, divert, and seek favorable opportunities to engage the enemy’s fleet (Mahan, 272, 273).
• Historical examples like the Athenian expedition to Syracuse and Bonaparte’s Egyptian campaign illustrate the permanence of strategic principles, regardless of specific technologies (Mahan, 260, 265).

Supporting Ideas and Quotes:

• A base of operations may be thought of as a line, like a “home coast frontier,” ideally with land and water communication between its points (Mahan, 233).

“Jamaica, from its central position, is one of the most important points in the Caribbean” (Mahan, 234).

• The U.S. Gulf coast offers a “base line distinctly nearer to the Isthmus and to the western half of the Caribbean than are Norfolk and New York” (Mahan, 240).
• Positions that “flank the route” require a “force so constituted and so stationed near the port as to check the movements of the ships within” (Mahan, 241).

“A fleet operating some distance from home should not depend upon a single line of supplies” (Mahan, 245).

Napoleon’s maxim: “The art of war… consists in the skill to disperse in order to subsist, yet in such manner that you may quickly concentrate in order to fight” (Mahan, 245).

“If decisive naval superiority does not exist, you must get ready to fight a battle at sea, upon the results of which will probably depend the final fate of your new gain” (Mahan, 249).

• Togo’s signal at Tsushima, “The fate of the Empire depends upon this day’s work,” is a specific application of the general truth that victory determines the fate of acquisitions (Mahan, 249).
• For remote objectives, troops should accompany the fleet to enable immediate landing after victory, as “the subsequent landing is one incident… to following up a victory properly” (Mahan, 251).

Nelson, facing superior forces, aimed to fight near Europe so that “by the time they have beaten me soundly, they will do England no more harm this year” (Mahan, 254).

• Bonaparte, instructed by Hoche’s Irish expedition, “kept himself with the admiral in the biggest ship of the line” to ensure fighting force concentration (Mahan, 258).

“War cannot be made without running risks” (Mahan, 267).

• Alexandria was a poor strategic choice for the French fleet because it would be easily blockaded and draw the British fleet to intercept French communications (Mahan, 268). Corfu, as an alternative, offered better strategic advantages for deterrence and offensive action (Mahan, 272).

“The strength of such dispositions lies not in the inanimate fortresses so much as in the living power of the men, troops or seamen, whose purposes they subserve” (Mahan, 279).

• The occupation of harbors, while valuable, is “secondary to the fleet” (Mahan, 223).

“A fleet charged with the care of its base is a fleet by so far weakened for effective action” (Mahan, 223).

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Chapter VII. Operations of War (Pages 281-342)

Summary: This chapter emphasizes that even when a nation is defensively positioned, the navy’s primary role is offensive. It elaborates on how a weaker fleet can create “displacement of force” in the enemy through threats and diversions, and it strongly advocates for the concentration of the battle fleet as the ultimate decisive factor. Mahan also underscores the crucial role of historical study and military “doctrine” in developing officers’ judgment and ensuring coordinated, effective action in war.

Main Points:

• In a defensive situation, the navy’s “true part… is the offensive-defensive,” actively driving or drawing the enemy’s sea force away from critical points (Mahan, 281).
• The “proper objective is not a geographical point, but the organized military force of the enemy,” as the defeat of the enemy’s fleet yields comprehensive and lasting results (Mahan, 286).
• Concentration of the battle fleet is paramount; dividing forces (e.g., between coasts or ports) compromises efficiency and invites defeat (Mahan, 299, 311, 320, 341).
• A weaker fleet should aim for “displacement of force” in the enemy, seeking to provoke the enemy into disadvantageous dispositions by creating uncertainty and threatening various interests (Mahan, 344).
• Fortified points are essential defensive components that allow the mobile navy to be released for offensive operations, providing secure bases for support and refuge (Mahan, 322, 323, 335).
• The study of military history and the campaigns of great captains is critical for gaining “experience” and “penetrating the consequences” of different actions, forming sound judgment (Mahan, 347, 348, 354).
• War colleges aim to cultivate a common “doctrine” among officers, fostering “homogeneity of intellectual equipment and conviction” and ensuring “unity of purpose and common understanding” (Mahan, 415, 418).

Supporting Ideas and Quotes:

• Napoleon’s strategy against Wellington: if Wellington attacked Badajoz, Marmont should “march straight upon Almeida,” forcing Wellington to “quickly return” (Mahan, 282).

“It is perhaps even more true of the sea than of the land that the proper objective is not a geographical point, but the organized military force of the enemy” (Mahan, 286).

• The Mediterranean’s strategic importance lies in its ability to act as “a link, a bridge, a highway, a central position” for a navy that controls it, providing “interior lines” and “communications militarily assured” (Mahan, 291).
• The necessity for “properly equipped and properly situated local bases for a naval force in distant or advanced operations is also evident” (Mahan, 294).
• Attacking an enemy’s base (e.g., Martinique or Santa Lucia) is “a more effective measure for protection and control of the Isthmus than a direct defense of the Isthmus itself” (Mahan, 297).

“The best defense for the transports will be to attack the enemy and occupy him fully” (Mahan, 299).

Nelson’s view: “What the country needs… is the annihilation of the enemy. Only numbers can annihilate” (Mahan, 301).

• Admiral Hotham’s refusal to vigorously pursue a beaten French fleet in 1795 “made possible Napoleon’s Italian campaign of 1796” (Mahan, 302).
• Sir John Moore’s advance on Sahagun, threatening French communications, saved Spain from Napoleon (Mahan, 302).

“If compelled to choose between fortified ports of the enemy and his fleet, the latter will be regarded as the true objective” (Mahan, 308).

“The guiding principle in all these cases is that your force must not be divided, unless large enough to be nowhere inferior to the enemy, and that your aim should be to reduce his base to a single point” (Mahan, 311).

• The Russian fleet at Port Arthur “enabled, and even induced, the enemy to concentrate both fleet and army at one point” (Mahan, 339).

“When a country is thrown on the defensive… the effectual function of the fleet is to take the offensive” (Mahan, 342).

• During the Spanish-American War, the detention of the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads due to popular fears was not “in accord with sound military principle” (Mahan, 343).
• Commander Daveluy’s concept of “displacement of force” involves provoking, alluring, harassing, or intimidating the enemy into changing sound dispositions (Mahan, 344).

“The maritime defensive… offers only disadvantages. It may be imposed; it never should be voluntarily adopted” (Mahan, 345).

Napoleon: “The history of these eighty-three campaigns, carefully told, would be a complete treatise on the art of war; the principles which should be followed in offensive and defensive war would flow from it as from a spring” (Mahan, 347).

“The successful conduct of war is not a science, but an art” (Mahan, 350).

• Rules of war are “developments and applications of a few general principles” rather than rigid fetters (Mahan, 351).

“Men who deliberately postpone the formation of opinion until the day of action… are guilty of a yet greater folly, for they disregard all the past experience of our race” (Mahan, 353).

“Upon the field of battle… the happiest inspiration is most often only a recollection” (Mahan, 355).

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🥰 Who Would Like it?

• The Navy

📚 Related Books

• On War notes
• The Art of War notes
• The Landmark Thucydides notes

☠️ Agree, Disagree, or Suspend

Strengths

• So boring to read, but I think there are a lot of parallels between his concepts on modern cyber operations.

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

The Foundational Role of History and Principles

Mahan emphasizes that the study of military history is crucial because it lies “at the foundation of all sound military conclusions and practice” (Mahan, as cited in Hattendorf, 1991, p. 8). He further advises to “Master your principles, and then ram them home with the illustrations which History furnishes” (Mahan, as cited in Hattendorf, 1991, p. 12). This dual emphasis highlights his core belief that historical narrative and theoretical principles are reciprocal and essential for a comprehensive understanding of warfare.

The Centrality of Sea Power to National Wealth

Mahan describes sea power as the “central link” in the accumulation of national wealth, stating:

“The due use and control of the sea is but one link in the chain of exchange by which wealth accumulates; but it is the central link, which lays under contribution other nations for the benefit of the one holding it, and which, history seems to assert, most surely of all gathers to itself riches” (Mahan, as cited in Hattendorf, 1991, p. 35).

This quote encapsulates his fundamental argument about the profound economic importance of maritime control for a state’s prosperity.

Command of the Sea as a National Imperative

Linking naval strength directly to national policy, Mahan asserts:

“The question of command of the sea is one of annual increase of the navy. The question is not ‘naval,’ in the restricted sense of the word. It is one of national policy, national security, and national obligation” (Mahan, as cited in Hattendorf, 1991, p. 23).

This quote underscores his belief that maintaining command of the sea is not merely a military concern but a vital aspect of a nation’s overall well-being and international standing.

The Necessity of Offensive Action in War

Mahan’s philosophy strongly advocates for an offensive posture once war begins, stating:

“When war has been accepted as necessary, success means nothing short of victory; and victory must sought by offensive measures, and by them only can be insured” (Mahan, as cited in Hattendorf, 1991, p. 24).

This principle highlights his conviction that a defensive mindset alone cannot lead to decisive victory.

The Fleet as the Decisive Factor (Key Position)

Emphasizing the supreme importance of the mobile naval force, Mahan declares:

“The fleet, it may be said, is itself the position. A crushing defeat of the fleet, or its decisive inferiority when the enemy appears, means a dislocation at once of the whole system of colonial or other dependencies, quite irrespective of the position where the defeat occurs” (Mahan, as cited in Hattendorf, 1991, p. 211).

This highlights that while strategic points are important, the active battle fleet is the ultimate determinant of naval power and the security of a nation’s interests.