The Art of War

Online Description

The Art of War by Antoine-Henri Jomini is a foundational military treatise that shaped modern strategic thought. Drawing on his experience as a general and military theorist during the Napoleonic Wars, Jomini distills the principles of warfare into a systematic, almost scientific approach. He emphasizes the importance of lines of operation, decisive points, and interior lines, arguing that war can be understood through timeless principles rather than chaos. Unlike Clausewitz’s more philosophical take, Jomini presents war as a rational endeavor governed by strategic laws. His work profoundly influenced 19th- and early 20th-century military education, especially in Europe and the United States.

🔫 Author Background

Antoine-Henri Jomini was a Swiss-born military officer and theorist who served in both the French and Russian armies during the Napoleonic Wars. Initially working in business, he turned to military writing out of a deep fascination with strategy and soon caught the attention of Napoleon’s staff. Jomini served under Marshal Ney and later directly advised Tsar Alexander I of Russia, gaining firsthand experience in high-level operational planning. Disillusioned by court politics and intrigued by the possibility of codifying warfare, he sought to distill Napoleon’s battlefield successes into universal strategic principles. His desire to make military theory accessible and practical for officers led to the publication of The Art of War in 1838. Jomini believed that war could be approached scientifically, and his work emphasized geometry, maneuver, and decisive points over moral or political factors. He wrote The Art of War as a capstone to his life’s work, hoping to educate future military leaders and offer a rational, systematic framework for understanding and executing war.

✍️ Key Terms

Lines

• Line of Operation:

  The term zone of operations is applied to a large fraction of the general theater of war; the term lines of operations will designate the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army. Whether it follow a single or several routes (115)

• Zone of Operations:

  A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object, whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. (115)

• Simple Line of Operations:

  are those of an army acting from a frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies. (116)

• Double Lines of Operations:

  are those of two independent armies proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in distance and for long intervals of time. (116-117)

• Interior Lines of Operations:

  Interior lines of operations are those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a greater force. (117)

• Exterior Lines of Operations:

  lead to the opposite result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses. (117)

• Concentric Lines of Operations:

  are those which depart from widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance of or behind the base. (117)

• Divergent Lines of Operations:

  are those by which an army would leave a given point to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course, necessitate a subdivision of the army. (117)

• Deep Lines of Operations:

  simple long lines (117)

• Maneuver-Lines:

  I apply to momentary strategic lines, often adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be confounded with the real lines of operations. (117)

• Secondary-Lines:

  are those of two armies acting so as to afford each other mutual support (117)

• Accidental Lines:

  are those brought about by events which change the original plan and give a new direction to operations. (117)

• Lines of Communication:

  designate the practicable routes between the different portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone of operations. (116)

• The Principal Line of Operations:

  is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over which, if compelled, it would retreat. (116)

• Permanent Lines of Defense:

  which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as the line of a fortified frontier (110)

• Eventual Lines of Defense:

  which relate only to the temporary position of an army. (110)

• Intrenched Lines:

  Besides the lines of circumvallation and contravallation referred to above, there is another kind, which is more extended than they are, and is in a measure allied to permanent fortifications, because it is intended to protect a part of the frontiers. (170)

• Line of Circumvallation:

  is a military fortification built around a besieged city or fortress, facing inward, designed to prevent the defenders from escaping or receiving reinforcements. (GPT)

• Line of Contravallation:

  is a defensive fortification built around the outside of a besieging army’s position, facing away from the besieged city or fortress. (GPT)

• Line of Battle:

  the position occupied by battalions, either deployed or in columns of attack, which an army will take up to hold a camp and a certain portion of ground where it will await attack, having no particular project in view for the future (198)

Pivots

• Pivots of Operations:

  In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of support on the strategic front are called pivots of operations, and are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of maneuver. (112)

• Pivots of Maneuver:

  are detachments of troops left to guard points which it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. (112)

Bases

• Base of Operations:

  A base of operations is the portion of country from which the army obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively. (91)

• Permanent Base:

  which are usually established upon our own frontiers, or in the territory of a faithful ally (98)

• Temporary or Eventual Bases:

  which result from the operations in the enemy’s country; but, as these are rather temporary points of support (98)

• Lateral Bases:

  perpendicular to the front of defense are often decisive in preventing the enemy from penetrating to the heart of the country (92)

• Double Base:

  particularly such as have two sides almost perpendicular to each other and forming a re-entrant angle, thus affording a double base if required, and which, by giving the control of two sides of the strategic field, assure two lines of retreat widely apart, and facilitate any change of the line of operations which an unforeseen turn of affairs may necesitate. (92)

Points

• Objective Point:

  Two Classes - Objective Points of Maneuver and Geographical Objective Points (102)

• Objective Points of Maneuver:

  • In contradistinction to geographical objectives, derive their importance from, and their positions depend upon, the situation of the hostile masses. (102)
  • That is, those which relate particularly to the destruction or decomposition of the hostile forces. (103)

• Geographical Objective Points:

  A geographical objective point may be an important fortress, the line of a river, a front of operations which affords good lines of defense or good points of support for ulterior enterprises. (102)

• Political Objective Points:

  There is another class of decisive points to be mentioned, which are determined more from political than from strategic considerations: they play a great part in most coalitions, and influence the operations and plans of cabinets. (104)

• Decisive Strategic Points:

  should be given to all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise.(100)

• Decisive Geographic Points:

  Those points the possession of which would give the control of the junction of several valleys and of the center of the chief lines of communication in a country (100)

• Decisive Points - Accidental Points of Maneuver:

  are on that flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same danger. (101)

📒 Sections

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Chapter I: Statesmanship in its Relation to War

Main Points

• This chapter focuses on the political and diplomatic considerations that precede and influence the conduct of war
• It outlines different types of wars (e.g., offensive, defensive, intervention, national, civil) and emphasizes how the political context modifies military operations, even though the core military principles remain constant
• The chapter highlights the importance of political foresight in determining if a war is “proper, opportune, or indispensable” and in shaping the overall strategy to achieve its objectives

Definitions

• Statesmanship in its relation to war: “those considerations from which a statesman concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the war” (Jomini, 13)
• Offensive Wars to Reclaim Rights: Wars where a state seeks to enforce claims by arms, with the necessity of consulting “public interest” before action (Jomini, 17)
• Wars of Expediency: Wars undertaken for commercial and political reasons, such as acquiring natural boundaries or lessening the power of a dangerous rival, often involving coalitions (Jomini, 18)
• Wars of Intervention: A type of war of expediency where a state interferes in a contest already begun, ideally at an “opportune moment” to decisively use its resources (Jomini, 18, 20). They can be internal or external (Jomini, 20)
• Aggressive Wars for Conquest: Wars waged for territorial acquisition or other reasons, where dogma can act as a pretext or a powerful ally
• Wars of Opinion: Wars waged for a dogma or ideology, potentially exciting popular ardor or finding bitter enemies (Jomini, 23, 26)
• National Wars: “the most formidable of all,” waged against a united people determined to sustain their independence, making every step of the invader disputed and supplies difficult to obtain (Jomini, 30)
• Civil Wars and Wars of Religion: Intestine conflicts often resulting from ideological or religious sectarianism, or feudal disputes (Jomini, 32)
• Double Wars: Engaging in two great wars simultaneously, which is generally advised against (Jomini, 37)

Supporting Arguments

• Adaptability of Operations: While the “principles of strategy are always the same,” the “political part of war” is modified by “the tone of communities, by localities, and by the characters of men at the head of states and armies” (Jomini, 17)
• Intervention Advantage: Interfering in an existing conflict can be highly advantageous as it allows a power to throw its “whole weight and influence” at the most opportune moment. Austria’s successful intervention in 1813, regaining Italian empire and influence in Germany, exemplifies combining “political but also the military chances in her favor” (Jomini, 20-21)
• Challenges of National Wars: In national wars, an invading army faces immense obstacles, including hostile inhabitants, lack of reliable information, and constant threats to communications, making it difficult to subdue the country unless immensely strong and supported by a regular army as a nucleus (Jomini, 30-33)
• Conducting Wars of Opinion: It is crucial to aim for a speedy resolution without subjugating the country or alarming the national spirit, as exemplified by the Duke of Angoulême’s swift expedition in Spain in 1823 (Jomini, 28)
• Danger of Multiple Wars: Jomini supports the Roman maxim of avoiding “two great wars at the same time” due to the inherent dangers, unless a strong ally provides aid (Jomini, 37)

Key Quote

“Military science rests upon principles which can never be safely violated in the presence of an active and skillful enemy, while the moral and political part of war presents these variations. Plans of operations are made as circumstances may demand: to execute these plans, the great principles of war must be observed” (Jomini, 17)

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Chapter II: Military Policy

Main Points

• This chapter defines and explores “Military Policy” as a distinct category of considerations that are neither purely diplomatic nor purely strategic, but significantly influence the conduct of war
• It emphasizes the critical importance of understanding the enemy’s material and moral capacities (military system, resources, national passions, leadership)
• A key focus is on the essential conditions for building and maintaining a “perfect army,” including organization, discipline, training, armament, and morale
• The chapter also highlights the judicious selection of generals and the vital role of a competent general staff

Definitions

• Military Policy: “all the combinations of any projected war, except those relating to the diplomatic art and strategy” and “embraces the moral combinations relating to the operations of armies” (Jomini, 39)
• Military Statistics: “the most thorough knowledge possible of the elements of power and military resources of the enemy with whom we are called upon to contend” (Jomini, 40)
• Military Geography: “the topographical and strategic description of the theater of war, with all the obstacles, natural or artificial, to be encountered, and the examination of the permanent decisive points which may be presented in the whole extent of the frontier or throughout the extent of the country” (Jomini, 40)
• Perfect Army: An army that meets twelve essential conditions, including a good recruiting system, organization, national reserves, officer and troop instruction, discipline, reward system, well-trained special arms (engineers, artillery), superior armament, capable general staff, good commissariat/hospitals, and a system for command assignment and fostering military spirit (Jomini, 44)

Supporting Arguments

• Knowledge is Power: Commanders and governments must obtain a thorough knowledge of the enemy’s details, including national passions, military system, resources, government attachment, and the character and abilities of their commanders. Lack of this knowledge can lead to “cruel miscalculations” (Jomini, 35-36, 40)
• Importance of Leadership: The “judicious selection of generals is one of the most delicate points” in government. A general needs “high moral courage” and “physical courage,” with scientific and military acquirements being secondary but valuable auxiliaries. Personal character traits like justice, firmness, and valuing merit in others are also crucial (Jomini, 41, 56)
• Role of the General Staff: A general staff is indispensable and should prepare for all possible war contingencies in peacetime, maintaining archives of historical, statistical, geographical, and strategic data. The chief of staff plays a key role in transmitting and supervising the general’s plans (Jomini, 44, 50-51, 254-255)
• Cultivating Military Spirit: Governments should cultivate a military spirit in their citizens, as the Romans did, to ensure national strength. Jomini warns against prioritizing wealth over the valor of soldiers (Jomini, 60-62). The Russian army’s firmness in retreat is highlighted as a model of good discipline and national character (Jomini, 65-66)
• Army Preparedness: States should always be ready for war, even if not on a constant war-footing, ensuring their military institutions facilitate rapid mobilization and effectiveness (Jomini, 46)

Key Quote

“The most essential qualities for a general will always be as follow:—First, A high moral courage, capable of great resolutions; Secondly, A physical courage which takes no account of danger. His scientific or military acquirements are secondary to the above-mentioned characteristics, though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries” (Jomini, 56)

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Chapter III: Strategy

Main Points

• This chapter provides the core definition of strategy and introduces the fundamental principle of war: concentrating overwhelming force on decisive points of the theater of operations
• It delves into critical strategic concepts, including the theater of war, bases of operations, objective points, fronts of operations, strategic positions, and various types of lines of operations (simple, double, interior, exterior, concentric, divergent, deep, maneuver, secondary, accidental, provisional, definitive)
• Jomini contrasts the old “system of positions” with the modern “system of marches,” advocating for rapid, decisive movements
• It also discusses the strategic value of fortresses, intrenched camps, and têtes de ponts, as well as operations in mountainous countries and grand invasions

Definitions

• Strategy: “the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations” (Jomini, 70). It is “the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion” (Jomini, 12)
• Grand Tactics: “the art of posting troops upon the battle-field according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map” (Jomini, 70)
• Logistics: “the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises” (Jomini, 69)
• Fundamental Principle of War: “To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one’s own” and “To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one’s forces” (Jomini, 71-72)
• Theater of Operations: “the whole extent of country which it is proposed to invade, that which it is necessary to defend, and, in general, all the country which an army may use as a base of operations” (Jomini, 74). It is also described as a “certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which may be traversed by an army” (Jomini, 116)
• Base of Operations: “the portion of country from which the army obtains its reinforcements and resources, from which it starts when it takes the offensive, to which it retreats when necessary, and by which it is supported when it takes position to cover the country defensively” (Jomini, 77)
• Decisive Strategic Point: “all those which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise” (Jomini, 86). These include permanent geographical points (e.g., controlling a river line or valley junctions) and accidental points of maneuver (e.g., based on troop positions) (Jomini, 86-87)
• Objective Points: Include “objective points of maneuver, and geographical objective points” (Jomini, 100). Geographical objectives are important fortresses or lines, while maneuver objectives depend on “the situation of the hostile masses” (Jomini, 100). The campaign’s objective is often the hostile capital or a province whose loss would force peace (Jomini, 100)
• Fronts of Operations: “the space covered by the army, whether it be in line of battle, or in encampments, or in cantonments” (Jomini, 105). It is the area “upon which the enemy may attack” (Jomini, 330)
• Strategic Fronts: Used to refer to the “general front which the army would cover” (Jomini, 105) and sometimes interchangeably with fronts of operations
• Lines of Defense: Can be “strategic and tactical.” Strategic lines are “Permanent lines of defense” (e.g., fortified frontiers) or “Eventual lines of defense” (temporary army positions) (Jomini, 108)
• Strategic Positions: “temporary positions which the corps d’armée will occupy upon this front of operations, or upon the line of defense” (Jomini, 66)
• Zone of Operations: “a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object” (Jomini, 116)
• Lines of Operations: “the part of this fraction [zone of operations] embraced by the enterprises of the army” (Jomini, 100). Jomini clarifies that multiple adjacent parallel routes used by divisions of the same army still constitute a single line (Jomini, 117)
  • Principal line of operations: “that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over which, if compelled, it would retreat” (Jomini, 118)
  • Simple lines of operations: A zone presenting “but a single line of operations” (Jomini, 117)
  • Double lines of operations: Employed by “two independent armies” or “two nearly equal armies commanded by the same general but widely separated” (Jomini, 102)
  • Interior lines of operations: Used by “one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies,” allowing for faster concentration than the enemy (Jomini, 102)
  • Exterior lines: “formed by an army operating simultaneously on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of their masses,” leading to army subdivision (Jomini, 102-103)
  • Concentric lines of operations: “depart from widely-separated points and meet at the same point” (Jomini, 119)
  • Divergent lines: An army “leave[s] a given point to move upon several distinct points,” requiring subdivision (Jomini, 119)
  • Deep lines: “simply long lines” (Jomini, 119)
  • Maneuver-lines: “momentary strategic lines, often adopted for a single temporary maneuver” (Jomini, 119)
  • Secondary lines: Lines of “two armies acting so as to afford each other mutual support” (Jomini, 120)
  • Accidental lines: “brought about by events which change the original plan” (Jomini, 120)
  • Provisional and definitive lines of operations: Provisional lines are adopted for a “preliminary, decisive enterprise” before a more advantageous “definitive” line is chosen (Jomini, 120-121)
• Strategic Reserves: A modern invention to protect the rear and depots, or to recruit and support the army (Jomini, 67, 133)
• Têtes de Ponts: “the most important of all field-works” for securing river crossings (Jomini, 160)
• Intrenched Camps: Fortified camps providing “temporary support” to an army

Supporting Arguments

• Application of the Fundamental Principle: The “greatest possible force” must be brought to bear on the “decisive point” of the theater of war (Jomini, 114). This involves choosing the correct direction—right, left, or center—in strategic movements and tactical maneuvers (Jomini, 74)
• Offensive vs. Defensive Strategy: The offensive is generally preferred for its morale and resource advantages (Jomini, 72). However, a “defensive-offensive” approach, where a general takes the initiative from a strong defensive position, can also be highly effective (Jomini, 74)
• Bases of Operations: Jomini advocates for bases that are perpendicular to the enemy’s, especially those forming a re-entrant angle, as they provide flexible lines of retreat and facilitate turning the enemy’s communications (Jomini, 83). Napoleon’s success in 1806, using the Rhine and Main as a double base to cut off the Prussians, is a prime example (Jomini, 87). Sea-coast bases are generally problematic for continental armies (Jomini, 83-84)
• Objective Points in Strategy: The ability to choose decisive objective points, as Napoleon did, by focusing on destroying the hostile army rather than just occupying territory, is a hallmark of strategic talent (Jomini, 89)
• Lines of Operations are Crucial: The choice and direction of lines of operations are the “fundamental idea” of a good campaign plan, enabling force concentration (Jomini, 114, 130)
• Superiority of Interior Lines: Interior lines are consistently preferred for armies with equal or inferior forces because they allow for faster concentration against fractions of the enemy. Jomini cites Napoleon’s campaigns in Italy (1796) and France (1814) as successful examples (Jomini, 125, 146). He argues that the failure of Napoleon’s central position in Saxony in 1813 was due to “faults of execution” and the “geographical position of the frontiers of Bohemia” rather than a flaw in the principle itself, and contrasts it with Blücher’s successful use of interior lines at Waterloo (Jomini, 123-125, 146-147, 151, 161)
• Concentric vs. Divergent Lines: Concentric lines can be effective for massing forces, but are “most pernicious” if the enemy has interior lines (Jomini, 126, 150-151). Divergent lines are useful for “add[ing] to the dispersion of the enemy” after their center has been broken (Jomini, 118, 135)
• River Crossings: Crossing a large river in the face of the enemy is a delicate operation requiring deception and securing bridges. The chosen point should ideally allow the army to form a front perpendicular to the river (Jomini, 120, 138-139, 226, 314)
• Evolution of Warfare: Jomini contrasts the old “wars of position” (slow, methodical, dependent on depots) with the “modern system of marches” (rapid, mobile, focused on decisive battles) introduced by the French Revolution and perfected by Napoleon (Jomini, 135-137). He states Napoleon’s method was to “march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, and then to camp in quiet” (Jomini, 166)
• Strategic Role of Fortifications: Fortresses should be located at “important strategic points” to cover frontiers and aid operations, ideally commanding river banks (Jomini, 146, 150). Intrenched camps offer temporary refuge and support, but large, extended intrenched lines are generally ineffective and dangerous (Jomini, 153-154, 187-188)
• Mountain Warfare: Strategic operations in mountainous regions are difficult due to terrain, limiting transversal maneuvers. Decisive points are often valley junctions. Combining regular and partisan warfare is recommended for defense (Jomini, 160-167, 204-205, 212). It is generally unwise to divide an invading army into too many columns in such terrain (Jomini, 168, 213)
• Distant Expeditions: These are inherently risky and rarely successful. Success hinges on securing a “hearty and constant alliance of a respectable power near enough the field of operations to afford a proper base,” as well as accurate assessment of distances, obstacles, and resources (Jomini, 173)

Key Quotes

“Strategy is the art of making war upon the map, and comprehends the whole theater of operations” (Jomini, 70)

“The choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign” (Jomini, 115)

“Simple and interior lines enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the important point, a stronger force than the enemy” (Jomini, 130)

“The system of Napoleon was to march twenty-five miles a day, to fight, and then to camp in quiet. He told me that he knew no other method of conducting a war than this” (Jomini, 167)

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Chapter VI: Logistics; or, The Practical Art of Moving Armies

Main Points

• This chapter defines logistics as the “practical art of moving armies” and emphasizes its role in executing strategic and tactical plans
• It outlines the extensive and vital duties of staff officers in preparing for, facilitating, and supervising army movements, supply, and quartering
• The importance of clear communication and timely, accurate information about the enemy through various means like reconnoissances, spies, and “hypotheses of probabilities” is stressed
• Jomini illustrates good and bad logistical practices with examples from Napoleon’s campaigns

Definitions

• Logistics: “the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops; in a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises” (Jomini, 69). Jomini further elaborates that modern logistics, encompassing the chief of staff’s broader duties, is akin to “the science of applying all possible military knowledge” (Jomini, 255)

Supporting Arguments

• Comprehensive Duties of Staff Officers: Logistics encompasses a vast array of duties, including:
  • Preparing all necessary matériel for the army (horses, carriages, arms, bridge-trains, ambulances)
  • Drafting orders, instructions, and itineraries for army assembly and operations
  • Coordinating with engineer and artillery chiefs for depot security and fortifications
  • Ordering and directing reconnoissances and gathering enemy intelligence through spies and prisoners
  • Ensuring proper execution of movements, regulating marches and halts for different columns
  • Composing and instructing advanced guards, rear-guards, and other detachments
  • Supervising the movement and security of supply trains (baggage, munitions, provisions, ambulances)
  • Organizing depots, collecting transportation, and ensuring successive arrival of supplies
  • Managing hospitals and convalescent/wounded men
  • Tracking and managing detachments and strategic reserves
  • Supervising siege duties and retreat precautions
  • Assigning cantonment positions and ensuring observance of orders
• Clarity in Orders: A general’s “greatness” is evident in his plans, but their execution depends on the “clearness of style” in his orders. Jomini contrasts Napoleon’s “eccentric conciseness” with overly detailed instructions given to experienced generals (Jomini, 259-260)
• March Management: For large corps, details of marches should be trusted to experienced generals, with clear indications of objective, route, and time of arrival, alongside enemy intelligence and lines of retreat (Jomini, 262). Neglecting halt arrangements can lead to disorder (Jomini, 237, 337)
• Depot Network: A good line of depots is essential for maintaining communications with the army’s base. Depots should be echeloned on “three different lines of communication” for efficient supply and protection (Jomini, 173, 263-264). Water transport (navigable streams, sea) is highly advantageous for supplies (Jomini, 174-176)
• Intelligence Gathering: Obtaining accurate information about the enemy is of “highest importance” but also “utmost difficulty” (Jomini, 269, 397). Jomini identifies four means: espionage, reconnoissances by skilled officers, questioning prisoners, and forming “hypotheses of probabilities” (Jomini, 270). He emphasizes that making “reasonable and well-founded hypotheses” is a crucial skill for a general, allowing preparation for contingencies (Jomini, 271-272, 408). Signals, especially telegraphs, are also important, as demonstrated by Napoleon’s use in 1809 (Jomini, 275-276, 409)
• Logistical Masterpieces: Napoleon’s concentrations at Gera in 1806 and before the 1815 campaign are cited as “masterpiece[s] of logistics” due to their precision and coordination (Jomini, 265-266). His famous decree for the Wagram Danube crossing also showcases logistical brilliance, despite a staff error (Jomini, 267, 391-392)
• Logistical Failures: Jomini highlights Berthier’s mistake at Wagram (mixing up bridge assignments) and the lack of prepared retreat routes at Leipzig in 1813 (including the premature blowing of a bridge) as instances of faulty logistics leading to significant consequences (Jomini, 267-268, 392-393)

Key Quotes

“The emperor was his own chief staff officer. Provided with a pair of dividers opened to a distance by the scale of from seventeen to twenty miles in a straight line, (which made from twenty-two to twenty-five miles, taking into account the windings of the roads,) bending over and sometimes stretched at full length upon his map, where the positions of his corps and the supposed positions of the enemy were marked by pins of different colors, he was able to give orders for extensive movements with a certainty and precision which were astonishing” (Jomini, 265)

“A general should neglect no means of gaining information of the enemy’s movements, and, for this purpose, should make use of reconnoissances, spies, bodies of light troops commanded by capable officers, signals, and questioning deserters and prisoners” (Jomini, 274)

“Perfect reliance should be placed on none of these means. As it is impossible to obtain exact information by the methods mentioned, a general should never move without arranging several courses of action for himself, based upon probable hypotheses that the relative situation of the armies enables him to make, and never losing sight of the principles of the art” (Jomini, 275)

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