Command Of The Air

Online Description

In the pantheon of air power spokesmen, Giulio Douhet holds center stage. His writings, more often cited than perhaps actually read, appear as excerpts and aphorisms in the writings of numerous other air power spokesmen, advocates-and critics. Though a highly controversial figure, the very controversy that surrounds him offers to us a testimonial of the value and depth of his work, and the need for airmen today to become familiar with his thought. The progressive development of air power to the point where, today, it is more correct to refer to aerospace power has not outdated the notions of Douhet in the slightest In fact, in many ways, the kinds of technological capabilities that we enjoy as a global air power provider attest to the breadth of his vision. Douhet, together with Hugh “Boom” Trenchard of Great Britain and William “Billy” Mitchell of the United States, is justly recognized as one of the three great spokesmen of the early air power era. This reprint is offered in the spirit of continuing the dialogue that Douhet himself so perceptively began with the first edition of this book, published in 1921. Readers may well find much that they disagree with in this book, but also much that is of enduring value. The vital necessity of Douhet’s central vision-that command of the air is all important in modern warfare-has been proven throughout the history of wars in this century, from the fighting over the Somme to the air war over Kuwait and Iraq.

🔫 Author Background

Giulio Douhet, an Italian soldier and writer (born 1869, commissioned into the Italian Army in Artillery in 1882), began formulating his theories on air warfare as early as 1909 and commanded one of the world’s first air units as Italy entered World War I in 1915. His bold ideas, such as proposing an independent bomber force to attack Austrian cities, were initially rejected by military leaders, leading to his court-martial and imprisonment for criticizing the Italian military. Despite this adversity, Douhet remained profoundly convinced that the advent of airpower fundamentally altered the character of war, transforming it into a total national struggle where all citizens and their resources would become targets.

He wrote The Command of the Air, with Book I published in 1921 and additional seminal pieces added later, to vehemently argue for the absolute necessity of achieving “command of the air” as the first and most crucial objective in any conflict. Douhet believed this command could only be secured by establishing an independent, offensive air force focused on destroying the enemy’s aerial forces on the ground at their bases. His ultimate aim was to demonstrate that through strategic bombardment of vital national centers and civilian populations, an air force could crush the enemy’s moral and material resistance, leading to a swifter and less costly victory than traditional land or sea campaigns. He asserted that his logical deductions were essential for his country’s defense and that ignoring them would lead to defeat.

🔍 Author’s Main Issue / Thesis

• The Revolutionary Change in Warfare: Douhet argues that the advent of airpower fundamentally alters the character of war, making it a total national struggle where the battlefield extends to all citizens and their resources. He posits that traditional land and sea defenses are insufficient against this new dimension of conflict, blurring the distinction between combatants and civilians.

• The Decisive Importance of “Command of the Air”: He maintains that the first and most crucial objective in any future conflict is to achieve “command of the air”. This command is defined as putting the enemy in a position where they cannot fly, while preserving one’s own ability to do so, primarily by destroying their aerial forces on the ground at their bases, supply depots, and production centers.

• The Mandate for an Independent, Offensive Air Force: Douhet asserts the necessity of an Independent Air Force that operates autonomously from land and sea forces to fulfill its decisive strategic role. This force should be organized exclusively for offensive action, prioritizing the use of bombardment against vital national centers and civilian populations to crush their moral and material resistance, leading to a swift and less costly victory. He views defensive aviation and auxiliary air roles as ineffective and wasteful diversions of resources.

📒 Sections

Book One: The Command of the Air

PART I

Chapter I: The New Form of War

Main Idea/Thesis: The advent of aviation fundamentally alters the character of warfare, transcending geographical boundaries and extending the battlefield to entire nations, thereby eliminating the traditional distinction between soldiers and civilians. This revolutionary change makes command of the air the paramount and decisive objective for achieving victory in any future conflict.

Supporting Quotes:

“No longer can areas exist in which life can be lived in safety and tranquility, nor can the battlefield any longer be limited to actual combatants. On the contrary, the battlefield will be limited only by the boundaries of the nations at war, and all of their citizens will become combatants, since all of them will be exposed to the aerial offensives of the enemy. There will be no distinction any longer between soldiers and civilians.” (Douhet, 32) “The brutal but inescapable conclusion we must draw is this: in face of the technical development of aviation today, in case of war the strongest army we can deploy in the Alps and the strongest navy we can dispose on our seas will prove no effective defense against determined efforts of the enemy to bomb our cities.” (Douhet, 33) “To have command of the air means to be in a position to wield offensive power so great it defies human imagination. It means to be able to cut an enemy’s army and navy off from their bases of operation and nullify their chances of winning the war. It means complete protection of one’s own country, the efficient operation of one’s army and navy, and peace of mind to live and work in safety. In short, it means to be in a position to win. To be defeated in the air, on the other hand, is finally to be defeated and to be at the mercy of the enemy, with no chance at all of defending oneself, compelled to accept whatever terms he sees fit to dictate.” (Douhet, 51) “The army and navy should not then see in the airplane merely an auxiliary arm of limited usefulness. They should rather see in the plane a third brother, younger of course, of the powerful family of War.” (Douhet, 62) “From this axiom we come immediately to this first corollary: In order to assure an adequate national defense, it is necessary—and sufficient—to be in a position in case of war to conquer the command of the air. And from that we arrive at this second corollary: All that a nation does to assure her own defense should have as its aim procuring for herself those means which, in case of war, are most effective for the conquest of the command of the air.” (Douhet, 63)

Chapter II: The Independent Air Force

Main Idea/Thesis: Achieving “command of the air” requires an Independent Air Force, an autonomous entity separate from traditional land and sea forces. Its primary objective should be to destroy all of the enemy’s aerial capabilities, focusing particularly on their ground infrastructure (e.g., airports, supply bases, production centers) rather than just engaging in air-to-air combat. This force must prioritize maximum bombing power and be composed primarily of “battleplanes” capable of both offense and defense.

Supporting Quotes:

“Therefore, an Independent Air Force must be organized and employed with this destruction as the end in view.” (Douhet, 73) “The most effective method would be to destroy the eggs and the nests systematically… A much better way is to destroy his airports, supply bases, and centers of production.” (Douhet, 73) “The following simple outline shows the skeleton upon which an Independent Air Force should be constituted: 1. Maximum bombing power 2. Combat power proportionate to the enemy’s possible strength” (Douhet, 74) “The airplane is not adaptable to defense, being preeminently an offensive weapon.” (Douhet, 44) “What determines victory in aerial warfare is fire power.” (Douhet, 88) “Therefore, from all points of view it is best that the bulk of an Independent Air Force be made up entirely of battleplanes designed for aerial combat and for bombing offensives against the surface.” (Douhet, 224)

Chapter III: Aerial Warfare

Main Idea/Thesis: Aerial warfare is fundamentally an offensive endeavor and should always be conducted in mass to maximize material and moral effects. The primary strategy involves inflicting the greatest possible damage in the shortest time, with the most effective defense being indirect—destroying the enemy’s air force at its source, as it is easier to strike than to parry in the air.

Supporting Quotes:

“An Independent Air Force should always operate in mass.” (Douhet, 95) “On this aspect of aerial warfare, I do not believe it possible to lay down any specific rules. It will be enough to keep in mind the following basic principle, which is the same one which governs warfare on land and sea: Inflict the greatest damage in the shortest possible time.” (Douhet, 99) “The only really effective aerial defense cannot but be indirect; for it consists of reducing the offensive potentiality of the opponent’s air forces by destroying the source of aerial power at its point of origin. The surest and most effective way of achieving this end is to destroy the enemy air force at its bases, which are found on the surface.” (Douhet, 105) “The fact is this: with the air arm it is easy to strike but not to parry.” (Douhet, 207) “I consider the organization of this passive protection not only useful but indispensable. I regret to disappoint Engineer Attal, but I stand firmly on my statement: “I acknowledge the value of anything which can be done to lessen the effect of the aerial offensives against us, provided it would not decrease the strength of the offensive which we might carry to the enemy.”” (Douhet, 406)

Chapter IV: The Organization of Aerial Warfare

Main Idea/Thesis: The unique characteristics of air power necessitate a dedicated, independent military branch, the Air Ministry, to oversee its creation, organization, and strategic employment. This independent air force should have its own budget and doctrine, distinct from the army and navy, and leverage civil aviation for rapid wartime conversion and technological advancement.

Supporting Quotes:

“In 1910 I wrote: “Besides the technical question of weapons involved, aerial warfare also demands solution of the problems of preparation, organization, and utilization of aerial forces; that is, it calls for the creation, ex novo, of a third part of the art of war, the art of aerial warfare.”” (Douhet, 129) “Therefore, the command of the air cannot be conquered except by an adequate aerial force… An adequate national defense cannot be assured except by an aerial force capable in case of war of conquering the command of the air.” (Douhet, 64) “I have dwelt at great length on the reasons why I consider an independent aviation having the mission, in case of war, of conquering the command of the air, to be indispensable.” (Douhet, 141) “The first step toward preparedness would be to separate bombing and pursuit aviation from the army and navy, thus setting up the first independent nucleus, the seed, which, whatever the form it may take, will in a not too distant future become an Independent Air Force.” (Douhet, 142) “Since peace-time civil aviation can and should be quickly converted into military aviation when the occasion arises, the Ministry of Aeronautics should keep a vigilant eye upon the organization and armament of the proposed fleets of air transports, so that both organization and armament can be quickly and easily converted into means of war.” (Douhet, 149) “It is understandable, therefore, how in choosing between two masses, one made up of military planes and the other of civilian ones capable of immediate conversion to military ones, there are moral and material advantages in choosing the second… a mass of civilian planes capable of being converted into military ones will always cost less than an equal number of military ones.” (Douhet, 237) “National defense can be assured only by an Independent Air Force of adequate power.” (Douhet, 70)

PART II (Added in 1926)

Main Idea/Thesis: This section emphatically reasserts and clarifies the core concepts of “Independent Air Force” and “command of the air.” It argues that any resources diverted to auxiliary aviation or direct aerial defense are wasted, as the only legitimate aerial organization is one singularly focused on achieving complete air superiority to enable decisive offensive operations against the enemy’s vital centers.

Supporting Quotes:

“By the term Independent Air Force—it seems to me I have made it clear since 1921—I do not mean any air force capable of carrying out any military action whatever, but an air force fit to strive for conquest of the command of the air. By the expression “command of the air” I do not mean supremacy in the air nor a preponderance of aerial means, but that state of affairs in which we find ourselves able to fly in the face of an enemy who is unable to do likewise.” (Douhet, 180) “In view of the carrying capacity and range of modern airplanes and the efficacy of present destructive materials, these advantages are such that a country in possession of adequate air forces can crush the material and moral resistance of the enemy; that is to say, that country can win regardless of any other circumstances whatsoever.” (Douhet, 181) “Auxiliary aviation is defined as that mass of airpower which facilitates or integrates land and sea actions… therefore not designed for the conquest of the command of the air… Consequently, aerial means set aside for auxiliary aviation are means diverted from their essential purpose, and worthless if that purpose is not pursued.” (Douhet, 187-188) “To conquer the command of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose.” (Douhet, 63) “If an Independent Air Force attacks the enemy’s surface objectives directly, whatever else it may do, it will diminish his air potentiality. The reduction of the enemy’s air potentiality to zero, or conquering the command of the air, will be effected as rapidly as our Air Force can operate intensively, can possess the greater means of surface destruction, and can pick its objectives with care.” (Douhet, 203) “We can go even further in this respect. As a matter of fact, it would be better if these characteristics, or at least some of them, were elastic. For instance, since radius of action, armor protection, and armament can be translated into carrying capacity, and since the sum total of the weight of these in a given plane is constant, the weight of any of them may be increased at the expense of any or all of the others.” (Douhet, 225) “We have been able to determine through deduction the characteristics a battleplane should have—the only type of plane which should make up the operating mass of an Independent Air Force—the only organism necessary, because sufficient in itself, to wage aerial warfare.” (Douhet, 229) “Therefore, if we want to be in a position to strike at them, we must have an Independent Air Force capable of crossing the Alps and the narrow seas surrounding us. The first of these conditions determines the minimum ceiling the planes of our Air Force must have; the second the minimum radius of action of the whole Air Force. If we do not meet these two conditions, the value of the whole Independent Air Force will be nullified.” (Douhet, 233) “It is understandable, therefore, how in choosing between two masses, one made up of military planes and the other of civilian ones capable of immediate conversion to military ones, there are moral and material advantages in choosing the second… By using convertible civilian planes, we obtain from the same expenditure greater military power and at the same time the possibility of actively maintaining a very comprehensive civilian air service.” (Douhet, 237)

Book Two: The Probable Aspects of the War of the Future

Introduction

Main Idea/Thesis: Predicting the character of future wars is a serious analytical problem, not mere speculation. Warfare is undergoing radical changes, and understanding these evolutions by logically deducing future effects from present causes is crucial for effective preparation.

Supporting Quotes:

“Defining with a larger measure of probability what the forms and characteristics of future wars will be like is not, as some lazy minds affirm, the province of the fortuneteller or the idle speculator. It is, rather, a serious problem, the solution to which must be worked out by logical progression from cause to effect.” (Douhet, 272) “In the period of history through which we are passing, war is undergoing a profound and radical change in character and forms, so that the war of the future will be very different from all wars of the past.” (Douhet, 273)

Chapter I: The World War (Land Aspect)

Main Idea/Thesis: World War I fundamentally shifted warfare from conflicts between professional armies to “titanic struggles for life and death between two coalitions of peoples,” involving the entire national resources and blurring the distinction between combatants and civilians. This prolonged and costly war of attrition was largely due to a widespread misunderstanding of the increased efficacy of defensive firearms, which led to static fronts and costly, inconclusive offensives.

Supporting Quotes:

“In the World War, then, the pawns in the game were the people themselves, with all their spiritual and material wealth. The armed forces were only one of the manifestations of the power of the peoples involved in the struggle.” (Douhet, 276) “The spontaneous and unexpected rise of the continuous front, the surprising revelation of the efficacy of the defensive, and the failure of the prevailing rules of war caused a serious disorientation.” (Douhet, 285) “The offensive action is always more expensive than the defensive, until it succeeds in overwhelming the defense. After conquering, the offensive reaps the fruits of its labor in large measure. But the offensive is a net loss when it is stopped before it reaches its objective, because then it costs the attacker more than the defender.” (Douhet, 287)

Chapter II: The World War (Sea Aspect)

Main Idea/Thesis: The submarine introduced a revolutionary technical factor in naval warfare, challenging traditional naval supremacy and defensive strategies. Like land warfare, it showed how new means could fundamentally alter the character of conflict, forcing powerful navies to adopt defensive postures and highlighting the unpreparedness of those who clung to outdated doctrines.

Supporting Quotes:

“Admiral Lord St. Vincent once attacked Prime Minister Pitt in the House of Lords because he seemed in favor of encouraging experiments with the torpedo and submarine… That instrument was perfected, and after almost a century took away the dominion of the seas from the English.” (Douhet, 297) “These strange prejudices were not dispelled even by the sinking of the Hague, Cressy, and Aboukir… Only after the sinking of the Audacious… did the possibilities of the new arm begin to be realized.” (Douhet, 300) “Until now few nations have been able to afford the luxury of having big ships which would have enabled them to rule the seas; but now the submarine has upset this situation and the dread of the English Navy as a compelling political argument has disappeared.” (Douhet, 303)

Chapter III: Poison Gas and Airplane Development

Main Idea/Thesis: The combination of aircraft and poison gas represents a terrifying new offensive capability, enabling attacks that extend over wide areas and durations, directly targeting civilian populations. This immediate and overwhelming assault on national resistance (both material and moral) will be the key to shortening future wars, making prior international restrictions on such weapons irrelevant.

Supporting Quotes:

“The almost simultaneous appearance of the poison-gas arm lends still sharper point to this revolution… The offensive action of poison gas is therefore exercised in volume and duration.” (Douhet, 310) “The airplane affords the means to drop great quantities of poison gases over armies and large extents of territory. The airplane makes it possible for chemical warfare to produce terrifying effects over wide extents of ground.” (Douhet, 313) “It is claimed that with 80 or 100 tons of poison gas, it would be possible to envelop a great city like London or Paris, and that with a proportionate number of explosive, incendiary, and poison-gas bombs it would be feasible to destroy completely great centers of population, because the poison gas would make it impossible to put out the fires.” (Douhet, 314) “The undeniable fact is this: whatever the situation of the armies and navies on the surface, today the airplane makes it possible to launch over enemy territory offensive actions larger and stronger than any action which could have been imagined. The air arm gives the means of reaching the most vital of the enemy’s centers, and poison gas makes such an offensive as terrifying as it could possibly be.” (Douhet, 316)

Chapter IV: The Future (Decisive Air Power)

Main Idea/Thesis: The ultimate conclusion is that command of the air is the necessary and sufficient condition for victory in future wars. This mandates the creation of a powerful Independent Air Force capable of relentless, direct aerochemical offensives against the enemy’s vital centers and air infrastructure. Traditional land and sea forces, even if strong, will be unable to protect their nations from such attacks, leading to a rapid collapse of moral and material resistance.

Supporting Quotes:

“In a book of mine in 1921 I asked the following question: Is it not true that the strongest army deployed on the Alps and the strongest navy sailing our seas, could do nothing practical against an enemy adequately armed in the air who was determined to invade our territory and destroy from the air our communication, production, and industrial centers, and sow death, destruction, and terror in our population centers in order to break our material and moral resistance? The only possible answer then was: “It is true”…” (Douhet, 320) “There is only one valid way to defend oneself from aerial offensives: namely, to conquer the command of the air, that is to prevent the enemy from flying, while assuring this freedom for oneself.” (Douhet, 326) “Considering the decisive importance of the conquest of the command of the air, it is imperative to put oneself in condition to reach toward this aim. It is essential to have an Independent Air Force able to fight an aerial battle, the most powerful possible within one’s resources; and to have this it is necessary to make use of all the available resources of the nation.” (Douhet, 329) “In all probability, unless there is a great disproportion of means and resources, a collapse in morale of the air-dominated nation will come before the outcome of war on land and sea could be decided.” (Douhet, 345) “Therefore, I say, above all else, let us dominate our sky.” (Douhet, 345)

Book Three: Recapitulation

Introduction

Main Idea/Thesis: Douhet continues to champion his core concept of an Independent Air Force and an Air Ministry as essential for national defense, believing that historical events have validated his pioneering ideas since 1909. He aims to further clarify and reinforce his argument that concentrating aerial forces for command of the air is paramount, even if it means eliminating auxiliary aviation and traditional aerial defense.

Supporting Quotes:

“Since 1909 I have done nothing but repeat and amplify these fundamental assertions, always elated by the course of events, which undoubtedly has supported my original deductions.” (Douhet, 354) “The National Government did in fact create first the Aeronautical Ministry and later the Independent Air Force.” (Douhet, 355) “At that time I had explicitly stated that the conquest of the command of the air is absolutely necessary for victory. A logical corollary of that idea is that it is essential to be prepared for the conquest of the air, and that therefore most of our aerial forces ought to be concentrated into the Independent Air Force, the organization designed for the conquest of the air.” (Douhet, 356) “To concentrate is the opposite of to disperse. So, taking one more step, in Part II of The Command of the Air, added in the edition of 1927, I affirmed the necessity of concentrating all available aerial forces into an Independent Air Force designed to sustain the struggle of which the final objective is the command of the air. In order to accomplish this, I said, it would be advisable to do away with auxiliary aviation and aerial defense forces, both of which I considered a futile dispersion of strength, useless, superfluous, and harmful.” (Douhet, 357)

Chapter I: Auxiliary Aviation

Main Idea/Thesis: Douhet strongly reiterates that auxiliary aviation (air power directly supporting land or naval forces) is useless, superfluous, and harmful. It drains resources that should be concentrated in the Independent Air Force, which alone can achieve command of the air. If the Independent Air Force wins, it can then provide any necessary auxiliary support; if it loses, auxiliary forces would be ineffective anyway.

Supporting Quotes:

“In opposition to my assertion that auxiliary aviation is useless, superfluous, and harmful, my opponents have been content to emphasize the importance of these auxiliary forces during land and sea operations…” (Douhet, 362) “Consequently, aerial means set aside for auxiliary aviation are means diverted from their essential purpose, and worthless if that purpose is not pursued.” (Douhet, 188) “Considering, then, that, if it seems worthwhile, there will be nothing to prevent detaching some of the planes from the Independent Air Force to use as auxiliaries after the command of the air has been conquered, we must logically conclude that auxiliary aviation is worthless, superfluous, harmful.” (Douhet, 188) “The army and navy should not let their efficiency depend upon the generosity of the Air Ministry or on sacrifice on the part of the Independent Air Force. If the auxiliary aviation is acknowledged to be indispensable to the functioning of the surface armed forces, it should have its own place in the organization of these armed forces, like all their other means and equipment.” (Douhet, 382) “I am convinced that, if such a system should be adopted, not only would the auxiliary aviation really function, but little by little the army and navy would dispense with them.” (Douhet, 391)

Chapter II: Aerial Defense

Main Idea/Thesis: Douhet dismisses direct aerial defense as largely ineffective and economically unsound. He argues that investing in anti-aircraft artillery or pursuit planes for purely defensive purposes is a misallocation of resources. The only true “defense” is to achieve command of the air through overwhelming offensive action, thereby preventing the enemy from launching attacks in the first place. Passive protection (e.g., shelters) to mitigate damage is acceptable, but not a substitute for offensive air power.

Supporting Quotes:

“I will give up all my theories if someone will prove to me that, by means of a determined organized aerial defense, practically possible to bring into existence, we could reduce the force of eventual aerochemical offensives against our country to a point where they would be unimportant and not dangerous to its safety.” (Douhet, 401) “I am convinced that it cannot fulfill its aim because much larger forces are needed for defense in the air than for offense.” (Douhet, 402) “We do need a moral preparation, then; but it must be one which will answer the purpose. Besides the moral, material preparation is needed too, which will help to decrease the effects of the offensive. These two preparations together constitute a whole of passive aerial protection which does not employ offensive aerial means, and therefore is not contradictory to the principle of resigning oneself to endure the enemy offensives in order to inflict greater ones on him. I consider the organization of this passive protection not only useful but indispensable.” (Douhet, 406)

Chapter III: The Aerial Battle

Main Idea/Thesis: Douhet clarifies that the primary goal of the stronger Independent Air Force is not to seek out and engage in air-to-air battles with the enemy’s air force, particularly if the weaker enemy can easily avoid such engagements. Instead, the focus should be on relentlessly prosecuting offensive actions against surface targets to destroy the enemy’s air potential at its source (bases, production centers) and inflict material and moral damage. The “aerial battle” is thus a means to an end (command of the air), not the end itself.

Supporting Quotes:

“Consequently, I have always maintained, and I say it again, that the stronger Independent Air Force must not avoid battle, but the weaker must avoid it. Even this seems to me clear and unequivocal.” (Douhet, 409) “Therefore, I assert that today, as ever, it is not enough for an Independent Air Force to be able to fight in the air, but it must also have an offensive capacity against the surface.” (Douhet, 409) “Why should looking for a battle with the enemy be the necessary and most efficacious way to put out of action the enemy Air Force, which can always, or nearly always, avoid it at will? In my opinion, if the commander of the stronger Independent Air Force lost his patience under mere pinpricks, he would be showing such nervous instability that he had better go home and grow cabbages.” (Douhet, 412) “If the defensive does not allow an inferiority of means, but rather requires a larger expenditure of them, may I ask who would be so naïve as to assume the defensive in the air? Therefore, it is best always and everywhere to act offensively.” (Douhet, 418)

Chapter IV: The Aerial Field as the Decisive Field

Main Idea/Thesis: Douhet strongly asserts that the aerial field will be the decisive theater of future wars, overriding traditional land and sea dominance. To achieve victory, a nation must adopt the principle of “resist on the ground in order to mass your strength in the air,” dedicating the maximum possible resources to the Independent Air Force to directly attack the enemy nation’s material and moral resistance. This strategic focus ensures the quickest and most economical path to victory.

Supporting Quotes:

“I have maintained, and continue to do so, that in the wars to come the decisive field of action will be the aerial field; and therefore it is necessary to base the preparation for and direction of the war on the principle: resist on the ground in order to mass your strength in the air.” (Douhet, 420) “It is evident from the quotations above… that they admit the air may become the decisive field.” (Douhet, 421) “By these admissions my opponents have clearly surrendered already. When they take the position that the aerial field becomes decisive only when the aerial action defeats the enemy, they completely agree with me.” (Douhet, 422) “In order to implement V to the fullest, we must give the highest value to one of the three factors, A, N, and AF, and the lowest to the other two. Assuming, as I do, that the aerial factor will be decisive in the wars to come, we must give the highest value to AF and the lowest to A and N.” (Douhet, 428) “The best must be singular, never plural. “Strengthening all the armed forces of a nation as if each one were the decisive one” is… nonsense.” (Douhet, 437) “With the arrival of air power, the armed forces were at last bound in a single whole, because the air force can operate in the sky over land and over sea… the three armed forces… must act with singleness of action toward one end—to win.” (Douhet, 462) “My solution… would bring with it no danger even if the aerial field should not prove to be the decisive one.” (Douhet, 468) “It is therefore essential to force such intolerable conditions upon the enemy; this is the objective of war, as it has been in the past and will be in the future.” (Douhet, 471) “Mr. Endres is right when he says that “in the future, war will be waged essentially against the unarmed populations of the cities and great industrial centers.” He is right because it is logically destined that it be so.” (Douhet, 475) “I have summarized my thought in the words, “to resist on the surface in order to mass our strength in the air.”” (Douhet, 478) “Therefore, ability to dominate the Mediterranean must have great weight in international politics.” (Douhet, 486) “In my opinion this situation makes it difficult to come to any intelligent agreement on a sound doctrine of war. I therefore believe that it will be necessary… to create general war experts, for they are the only ones who can bring into being the new doctrine of war…” (Douhet, 497) “In my opinion the same thing should be done now in regard to warfare in general, which would employ the three armed forces as a unit geared for a single aim… an institution which might be called the War Academy, in which officers of the armed forces selected from the most intelligent, learned, and open-minded of them, could study these formidable new problems together.” (Douhet, 498)

Book Four: The War of 19—

Introduction

Main Idea/Thesis: This work presents a hypothetical future war, focusing on the unprecedented and defining role of formidable air forces. It serves as a practical demonstration of Douhet’s theories, specifically contrasting two different conceptions of warfare and aeronautical organization.

Supporting Quotes:

“In the great war which blazed up in the summer of 19—, formidable air forces took part in warfare for the first time, and it was this which gave the conflict its special characteristics.” (Douhet, 501) “I have no inside information on these subjects; I have only used my imagination to picture two different conceptions of war and two contrasting aeronautical organizations.”” (Douhet, 501)

PART I

Chapter I: The Causes of the Conflict

Main Idea/Thesis: The Kellogg Pact, intended to prevent war, inadvertently contributed to its inevitability and sudden, destructive outbreak, catching the world by surprise.

Supporting Quotes:

“The Kellogg Pact: This incident made war inevitable.” (Douhet, 503)

Chapter II: The Moral Preparation

Main Idea/Thesis: Despite the prevalence of pacifist and humanitarian ideals prior to the war, the populations of the belligerent nations demonstrated a profound and resilient moral preparedness, displaying intense patriotism and heroism during the conflict.

Supporting Quotes:

“Although the war began suddenly, the populations of the nations involved were ready to face it bravely. In spite of the many pacifist and humanitarian theories bandied about during the preceding decade, the people, in their profound common sense, had not gone soft under the influence of these utopian dreams.” (Douhet, 504)

Chapter III: The Intellectual Preparation (France and Belgium)

Main Idea/Thesis: France and Belgium, due to their World War I victory, rigidly adhered to outdated war doctrines, prioritizing land forces and traditional offensive maneuvers. Their intellectual preparation failed to acknowledge the revolutionary changes in warfare, particularly the role of air power, and suffered from a lack of unified command.

Supporting Quotes:

“Because these two powers were victorious in the World War, they were led to perfect the armaments and systems of war which gave them the victory then…” (Douhet, 505) “Today the ideal is to compel the enemy to fight a war of movement—that is, bring the Napoleonic form of war back again, as though it were possible to change reality and go back to the past.” (Douhet, 509) “France had no institution competent to consider war as a whole; she had only three separate and independent authorities charged with the task of preparing for and waging war in three distinct fields.” (Douhet, 511) “The most modern matériel should go to the Independent Air Force, and that which became obsolete should be handed down to the auxiliary aerial forces.” (Douhet, 540) “Independent Air Force: The Independent Air Force had been entrusted with the following tasks: 1. To attack, in order to gain or consolidate aerial superiority over the enemy aerial forces. 2. To carry the offensive to the enemy’s territory. 3. To cooperate directly with the land and sea forces, and eventually to reinforce the auxiliary aviation organically assigned to said forces.” (Douhet, 533)

Chapter V: The Material Preparation—Germany

Main Idea/Thesis: Germany’s material preparation was revolutionary, driven by post-WWI restrictions and industrial advancements. It focused on creating a dominant Independent Air Force composed solely of “battleplanes,” designed for massive, direct aerochemical offensives against enemy national resistance. Land forces were prepared for a firm defensive posture to conserve resources for the decisive air campaign, and civil aviation was fully integrated for wartime conversion.

Supporting Quotes:

“The restrictions imposed upon her by the Treaty of Versailles and the development of her aeronautical and chemical industries had led Germany to an entirely different conception of war.” (Douhet, 513) “It is not in the armed forces of the enemy but in the nation itself that the will and capacity to make war is found. Warfare must therefore be waged against the people, to break their will and destroy their capacity to make war.” (Douhet, 514) “By limiting the aims of our land and naval forces to those strictly needed for the full development of the mission of the aerial forces, we will automatically be able to increase the air force and decrease the army and navy correspondingly.” (Douhet, 520) “The preparation of the land armed forces was inspired by the concept that they were to be in condition to resist firmly, with the smallest possible expenditure of resources, so that most of the resources could be given to the forces entrusted directly with reaching the decision.” (Douhet, 527) “The Independent Air Force had to be able to (1) fly over the enemy’s territory, overcoming resistance; and (2) execute efficient aerial offensives while flying over the enemy territory.” (Douhet, 550) “The Air Force must be made up entirely of a single type of plane, the battleplane.” (Douhet, 553) “The battle division (3 squadrons, 9 planes) had been designated as the tactical unit… in order better to impress the personnel with the concept of mass action.” (Douhet, 565) “Keeping formation was the division’s best protection against attack; and the knowledge of this had been firmly fixed in the minds and hearts of all the flying personnel.” (Douhet, 568) “General Reuss’s idea was that the Independent Air Force, as soon as war was about to begin, should launch themselves on the enemy’s territory, like a tightly wound spring suddenly released, possibly without warning, and attack with the greatest intensity, giving no respite to the enemy, nor to themselves, in order to concentrate the offensive into as short a period of time as possible, and obtain the most shattering effect.” (Douhet, 563) “All means of civil aviation had to be put at the disposal of the Independent Air Force the moment war broke out. This applied to both matériel and personnel.” (Douhet, 571)

PART II

Chapter VI: The Allies’ Plan of Operation

Main Idea/Thesis: The Allied plan for war was conventional and defensive-minded, focused on holding a ground line and engaging in limited, high-explosive bombings against military targets, while adhering to international conventions. This approach proved inadequate against Germany’s revolutionary aerial strategy, fundamentally misunderstanding the scope and nature of the coming air war.

Supporting Quotes:

“The plan of operation worked out by the French and Belgian General Staff was very simple—to defend the Rhine line and attack on the rest of the front.” (Douhet, 572) “Although the warning was so short, it was tantamount to giving up the advantage of surprise.” (Douhet, 573) “In order to put the responsibility for first violating the agreement of the international convention on Germany, the Allies ordered that bombing operations should be confined to railroad stations, and that only high-explosive bombs should be used.” (Douhet, 575)

Chapter VII: Germany’s Plan of Operation

Main Idea/Thesis: Germany’s strategy was a direct application of Douhet’s theories: to swiftly conquer command of the air by launching a massive, total aerochemical offensive against the enemy’s vital national centers (political, industrial, communication hubs, capital cities) from the war’s outset, without formal declaration. This relentless, surprise attack aimed to break enemy morale and achieve a rapid, decisive victory, while their ground forces maintained a holding action.

Supporting Quotes:

“In brief, it was to beat the enemy in the air, meanwhile holding him on land, thereby being able to inflict such severe losses on the enemy country as to make it stop fighting.” (Douhet, 576) “The first offensive action had to be launched at the very beginning of the war in an effort to catch the enemy’s aerial forces in the process of mobilization.” (Douhet, 576) “By the first offensive action of the Independent Air Force, General Reuss wanted to achieve the double goal of beating the enemy’s aerial forces and giving the people of the enemy nation the feeling of being dominated from the air.” (Douhet, 578) “In face of a mass attack by the Independent Air Force, launched along the whole front in successive waves, the Allies’ action could not but prove disorganized and chaotic [writes General Reuss in his Memoirs].” (Douhet, 581) “The invasion of the enemy’s sky by the Independent Air Force did not have to take place as a gesture… Therefore, beginning with its very first action, the Air Force had to act offensively against surface objectives.” (Douhet, 586) “The itineraries of the various columns were predicated on the criterion of giving the enemy the immediate sensation of being dominated from the air, by attacking the political and railroad centers far from the borders, and even the capital cities.” (Douhet, 587) “General Reuss proposed to inform the adversary of his intentions so that they could take the necessary countersteps. Since the means to hinder the mobilization and concentration of the enemies’ armed forces were available, it would have been a crime against the Fatherland to fail to use them and wait until they were ready to fight… everyone knows, or should know, that war is war.” (Douhet, 597) “Concept of Operation: To attack in mass all along the frontier, in successive waves, with the left wing reinforced to envelop Paris from the south, and to beat the enemies by bombing their main lines of communication, thus giving them the immediate impression that they are being dominated from the air.” (Douhet, 598)

Chapter VIII: The Battle of June 16

Main Idea/Thesis: The initial German aerial offensive on June 16, employing battle divisions in disciplined mass formations, decisively overwhelmed the Allied air forces, which proved disorganized and ineffective in their defensive efforts. Germany’s focus on maintaining formation and delivering devastating blows to vital enemy centers, regardless of losses, achieved both immediate material destruction and a powerful psychological impact, demonstrating the superiority of their offensive doctrine.

Supporting Quotes:

“Properly speaking, the battle began between 6 o’clock and a quarter after 6 in the morning when the first aerial units from both sides made contact.” (Douhet, 607) “The Allied pursuit units… tried to take an advantageous position… But the German divisions… proceeded on their route, keeping their formation intact.” (Douhet, 610) “The apparent impassivity displayed by the German divisions while flying to their destination and keeping their formations intact irrespective of losses, greatly puzzled the Allied airmen used to maneuver, but this impassivity constituted the great strength of the divisions themselves, and their entire personnel were intimately and deeply conscious of it.” (Douhet, 612) “The Independent Air Force… has defeated the Allied Aerial Forces, then bombed the cities of Bordeaux, Limoges, Clermont-Ferrand… besides dropping more than 1,000 tons of bombs on the suburbs of Paris.” (Douhet, 616) “The news which began to arrive in the early hours of the morning at once gave them a feeling of their own inferiority in the air.” (Douhet, 617)

Chapter IX: Operations of June 17

Main Idea/Thesis: The German Independent Air Force continued its relentless aerochemical offensives on June 17, destroying key communication hubs and cities, thereby confirming the Allies’ aerial impotence. This rapid and devastating aerial campaign directly attacked civilian morale and national infrastructure, forcing mass evacuations and demonstrating the decisive impact of Douhet’s air power doctrine, effectively ending the conflict’s meaningful resistance within two days.

Supporting Quotes:

“About 1 a.m. on the seventeenth, the cities of Köln, Mainz, Koblenz, and Frankfurt were bombed by the 4 night-bombing brigades of the French Independent Air Force… The damages were very serious. Great fires were caused everywhere, and, as the spreading of poison gas prevented the bringing of help, the four cities were almost completely destroyed.” (Douhet, 620) “Consequently, today, between 4 p.m. and 5 p.m., the German Independent Air Force will completely destroy the cities of Namur, Soissons, Châlons, and Troyes, and their inhabitants are hereby warned to evacuate them.” (Douhet, 621) “News reports which began to arrive… appeared at once as most ominous. They helped to convince them of the physical impossibility of preventing and counteracting the enemy’s aerial action…” (Douhet, 622) “The reality, the terrible reality, of their aerial impotence had to be faced and acknowledged… the humiliation of having to bow to an enemy ultimatum; tomorrow, very likely, if it suited the enemy, Paris and Brussels might have to be evacuated!” (Douhet, 625-626) “…the four cities became unapproachable flaming braziers and burned to the ground under the eyes of their former inhabitants, who had sought refuge and shelter in the neighboring countryside.” (Douhet, 629) “From this moment on, the history of the war of 19— presents no more interest.” (Douhet, 630)

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🥰 Who Would Like it?

• Lemay

📚 Related Books

• On War
• Mahan on Naval Strategy

🗂 Notable Quotes & Thoughts

“The command of the air is a necessary and sufficient condition of victory” (Douhet, 1927, p. 128) “to conquer the command of the air—that is, to put the enemy in a position where he is unable to fly, while preserving for one’s self the ability to do so.” (Douhet, 1921, p. 16; Douhet, 1927, p. 94) “Any effort, any action, or any resources diverted from this essential aim makes conquering the command of the air that much less probable; and it makes defeat in case of war that much more probable.” (Douhet, 1921, p. 26; Douhet, 1927, p. 86)